'Ought' is 'Is'

[Belinda]

Flash Dangerpants wrote:

If you don't feed people they starve is a factual answer to an inductive question of the sort "what happens to people who don't have any food?"

The question "ought we feed people who don't have any food?" is a moral one, it is not inductive, the answer depends on a normative judgment.

Explicit replies to each of those begin with "because".

There is no identifiable criterion that defines only moral oughts. Your claim asserts nothing but unsubstantiated belief.

[FlashDangerpants]

It's weird how almost every single moral realist dodges the same question.
Weirder still that the exception really is Mannie, because he actually has a grounding for his moral schema, the rest a re just inflating an intuition.

[Belinda]

It's weird how almost every single moral realist dodges the same question.
Weirder still that the exception really is Mannie, because he actually has a grounding for his moral schema, the rest a re just inflating an intuition.

Mannie and other believers believe God issued commands both natural and moral. However believers believe men have no choice but to believe God's natural commands , and it's only the moral commands that men can select or deselect.


What makes any claims true or false?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Moral 'oughtness' within Moral Empirical Realism is grounded and traceable to empirical properties within the human mind, brain and body operating within the Universe. Such justifiable moral facts supervening upon empirical properties are not imaginary. These moral facts are testable and repeatable as true.

Theistic religions are mentally based and are grounded on an impossible-to-be-real-GOD. As such the claim of a God is not justifiable, testable and repeatable as real.

That is circular. You are trying to demonstrate that oughts are ises, so you can't use any of that above as justification because it assumes that oughts are ises. this is simple entry level stuff that a "philosopher-proper" wouldn't need to be told about.

My basis argument is this;

• P1 Whatever thing exists is 'is' i.e. being.
  P2 Reality is all-there-is or all-is_es-there-are.
  P3 'Oughtness' is a thing within all-there-are.
  C1 Therefore 'oughtness' is an 'is'.

Where did I assume oughts are is-es??
Show me which of my premise is false and why they do not follow?

The supervenience is a baseless assertion, you need the argument you are defending to support it, so claiming it in support of that argument is circular. You've tried this same silly trick thousands of times already. You apparently don't find it boring to just do the same stupid thing every single day, but I am tiring of this shit again.

Supervenience is an additional reinforcement to my basic argument.
I agree it has to be justified and there are loads of consensus with the concept of supervenience is the most tenable at present.
We can argue on the tenability of 'supervenience' in the thread I raised, i.e.
viewtopic.php?p=472092#p472092

Notes:

• In philosophy, being means the material or immaterial existence of a thing.[1] Anything that exists is being. Ontology is the branch of philosophy that studies being. Being is a concept encompassing objective and subjective features of reality and existence.[2]
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Being

One self-evident 'oughtness' is the oughtness to breathe, i.e.
"All humans ought to breathe"
is a natural default and an imperative which can be objectively verified as real.

As with the above oughtness to breathe, it is the same for moral oughts within the moral Framework and System.

You've been told enough times already what is wrong with that, if you haven't learned yet, then your ability to learn is clearly a problem.

Philosophically, this is childish.
Telling has no tooth in philosophy, what count are rational arguments to counter another view.
So far you have not produced any effective rational counters against my views.
I have my personal standards of intellectual honesty and integrity to maintain and if your arguments are convincingly rational, I will surely accept them.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Veritas Aequitas wrote:

As with the above oughtness to breathe, it is the same for moral oughts within the moral Framework and System.

"You ought to breathe" literally implies "You owe it to yourself to breathe other wise you will suffocate".

A slightly less obvious example of ought is factual claim: "you ought to keep a social distance otherwise you will spread this intractable infection".

And the following is a less obvious example of how oughtness is a factual claim:

"You ought to fear God otherwise He will strike you down with a thunderbolt" which implies God is real and also punishes people, which people used to believe was a fact.

Here is another ought which is a factual claim, and this ought is largely about owing to others rather than to self:

"One ought to be kind to others who are poor people, as the children of the poor need decent food."

Notice that every ought claim implies a rationale same as all other claims. Just because the rationales are usually not made explicit does not mean the rationales don't exist.

The rationales of oughtness usually reflect cultural claims; religions and their moral codes are of course cultural same as ideas of beauty.

Whatever the 'oughtness' it must be justified empirically and philosophically to be real and objective.

Note the commandment,
"Thou shalt not kill" period, because God said so.

There is no truth the existence of God but
'Thou shalt not kill" [presume another human] by itself is an objective moral truth where is it justified empirically and philosophically to be real.

There is an inherent rationale in 'thou shalt not kill' from God's 10 commandments
but it has to be justified and not merely insisted upon because God said so!

Therefore whether it is explicit or implict, if whatever 'ought' is to be linked to human actions in anyway, it must be justified empirically and philosophically to be real and objective.
You often missed out the bolded statement above.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I am going to tell you a fact which is not inductive, it is a priori, necessary, and frankly should be tautologous. Facts do not allow for mutual contraditiction, in such cases, either one fact claim is true and the other false, or neither is true. No discussion of facts that needs to sidestep this issue has any right to progress any further.

If you don't feed people they starve is a factual answer to an inductive question of the sort "what happens to people who don't have any food?"

The question "ought we feed people who don't have any food?" is a moral one, it is not inductive, the answer depends on a normative judgment.

You are messed up with the concept of morality.

Morality per se is not inductive but moral facts are based on inductive facts generated from within a moral framework and system.

Note my argument;

• There are Moral Facts
  viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29777

Moral facts are the same as other facts which are dependent on other facts and generated from the specific framework and system.
Legal facts of laws and convictions, etc. also significantly dependent of scientific fact, other facts and its own mechanisms and processes.

'Ought to feed people who don't have any food' is too loose.

Note my usual objective moral facts i.e.
'no human ought to kill another human' which is more solidly grounded.

[Veritas Aequitas]

(Yawn.)

What we call truth, facts and (therefore) objectivity are what we say they are - because how could they be otherwise? Words and other signs can mean only what we use them to mean. Only the metaphysically deluded think otherwise.

Any description - and so any truth-claim - is contextual and conventional. So the claim that truth is relative to a descriptive context is trivially true and inconsequential.

If what we call truth, facts and (therefore) objectivity are not what we say they are - the claim that there are moral facts (and therefore moral objectivity) is incoherent. We can choose not to value coherence and use logical rules. But we can't have it both ways.

The assertions 'the sky here today is blue' and 'abortion is morally wrong' don't have the same function. One makes a factual assertion, with a truth-value which, in context, is independent from opinion, about a feature of reality. The other doesn't, because it expresses a moral opinion and could not be falsified, because it has no truth-value.

You think you are a "god" on the knowledge of morality but you are actually on a fool's mission.

I have already countered your idea of what is fact in general and what is a moral fact, note,

• There are Moral Facts
  viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29777

It is very obvious 'the sky here today is blue' and 'abortion is morally wrong' don't have the same function because they are related to different Framework and System of Knowledge.

It is like the facts 'the sky here today is blue' [physical fact] and 'Trump is the 45th President of the USA' [political fact] are different and don't have the same function.

You are so ignorant and dumb in insisting in conflating facts from different FSK as exactly the same without any need for qualifications.

Moral facts exist as justified empirically and philosophical from within and conditioned upon a Moral Framework and System.

[Belinda]

Veritas Aequitas wrote:

Moral facts exist as justified empirically and philosophical from within and conditioned upon a Moral Framework and System.

I agree , and I would like to view a diagram explaining 'Frameworks and Systems of Beliefs' .

[Belinda]

Veritas Aequitas wrote:

Moral facts exist as justified empirically and philosophical from within and conditioned upon a Moral Framework and System.

I agree , and I would like to view a diagram explaining 'Frameworks and Systems of Beliefs' .
I suspect that moral beliefs are a subsection of beliefs that are controlled by priests and in this modern age by media moguls.

Any explanation of beliefs of any sort needs to include hegemonies.

[Peter Holmes]

(Yawn.)

What we call truth, facts and (therefore) objectivity are what we say they are - because how could they be otherwise? Words and other signs can mean only what we use them to mean. Only the metaphysically deluded think otherwise.

Any description - and so any truth-claim - is contextual and conventional. So the claim that truth is relative to a descriptive context is trivially true and inconsequential.

If what we call truth, facts and (therefore) objectivity are not what we say they are - the claim that there are moral facts (and therefore moral objectivity) is incoherent. We can choose not to value coherence and use logical rules. But we can't have it both ways.

The assertions 'the sky here today is blue' and 'abortion is morally wrong' don't have the same function. One makes a factual assertion, with a truth-value which, in context, is independent from opinion, about a feature of reality. The other doesn't, because it expresses a moral opinion and could not be falsified, because it has no truth-value.

You think you are a "god" on the knowledge of morality but you are actually on a fool's mission.

I have already countered your idea of what is fact in general and what is a moral fact, note,

• There are Moral Facts
  viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29777

It is very obvious 'the sky here today is blue' and 'abortion is morally wrong' don't have the same function because they are related to different Framework and System of Knowledge.

It is like the facts 'the sky here today is blue' [physical fact] and 'Trump is the 45th President of the USA' [political fact] are different and don't have the same function.

You are so ignorant and dumb in insisting in conflating facts from different FSK as exactly the same without any need for qualifications.

Moral facts exist as justified empirically and philosophical from within and conditioned upon a Moral Framework and System.

No, wrong again. 'The sky here today is blue' and 'Trump is the 45th POTUS' are factual assertions with truth-value, because they claim something about reality that may not be the case - and they can be verified or falsified. And for these reasons, they have the same function.

But 'abortion is morally wrong' isn't that kind of assertion. There's nothing in reality that can verify or falsify that assertion, which is precisely why people can rationally agree or disagree with it. Your FSK theory is irrelevant here, because you haven't demonstrated that morality constitutes a framework and system of knowledge in the first place. Just saying that it is gets you nowhere.

[FlashDangerpants]

It's weird how almost every single moral realist dodges the same question.
Weirder still that the exception really is Mannie, because he actually has a grounding for his moral schema, the rest a re just inflating an intuition.

Mannie and other believers believe God issued commands both natural and moral. However believers believe men have no choice but to believe God's natural commands , and it's only the moral commands that men can select or deselect.


What makes any claims true or false?

We don't need to relitigate the entire history of epistemology for this. Whatever facts may be in the Grand Scheme of Things, it will still be a truth by definition that facts do not allow for mutual contraditiction, in such cases, either one fact claim is true and the other false, or neither is true. And so it is still going to be the case that no discussion of facts that needs to sidestep this issue has any right to progress any further.

It adds nothing to observe that erroneous information is often taken as fact, or that what actually are very high probabilities are often regarded as the fact of the matter for some purpose or other. There simply cannot as a matter of basic logic, be two facts if either fact requires the other to be false.

This is tautologous, it shouldn't need saying once, yet somehow I have had to write the same thing over and over again because moral realists mostly want to be immune from the requirements of common language some reason.

[Skepdick]

We don't need to relitigate the entire history of epistemology for this. Whatever facts may be in the Grand Scheme of Things, it will still be a truth by definition that facts do not allow for mutual contraditiction, in such cases, either one fact claim is true and the other false, or neither is true. And so it is still going to be the case that no discussion of facts that needs to sidestep this issue has any right to progress any further.

You left out the fine print...

Given a normative conception of "truth".

[FlashDangerpants]

We don't need to relitigate the entire history of epistemology for this. Whatever facts may be in the Grand Scheme of Things, it will still be a truth by definition that facts do not allow for mutual contraditiction, in such cases, either one fact claim is true and the other false, or neither is true. And so it is still going to be the case that no discussion of facts that needs to sidestep this issue has any right to progress any further.

You left out the fine print...

Given a normative conception of "truth".

Irrelevant. I am using the common language meaning of the concept of fact and I am doing so without having to subtly omit anything at all. If somebody else is trying to use an alternative, they are welcome to declare it but they would be well advised to use some additional symbol to remind themselves and their audience not to confuse what they are selling with what the normal word "fact" means. FFFFfact would be perfectly acceptable, then you can just explain what is different about FFFacTTT as opposed to fact - i.e. that mutually contradictory FFAAcccTTtt is allowable while mutually contradictory fact is incomprehensible.

[Skepdick]

Irrelevant. I am using the common language meaning of the concept of fact

The "common language meaning" is normative by virtue of a bandwagon fallacy.

Much like moral norms.

[FlashDangerpants]

Irrelevant. I am using the common language meaning of the concept of fact

The "common language meaning" is normative by virtue of a bandwagon fallacy.

Much like moral norms.

You've had yor attention for today, but already you are back to writing ludicrous piles of hot garbage, fuck off.

If Aquarium and Belinda want to use the fact word to mean something other than what everybody else means when they use it, this requires decalaration.