Moral Realism is the Default Within Morality

[henry quirk]

How can we demonstrate that, say, slavery is morally wrong?

how would sullivan have imparted water (as a reality) to keller if she'd had none to offer the girl?

or: what if keller had simply refused to go to the well, imagine sullivan's frustration, the goddamn water is right there, helen, in front of you! just dip your hand into it!

so: how can I demonstrate slavery is morally wrong?

hell if I know...I've tried but you're deaf, dumb, and blind and you won't go to the well

-----

to be clear: I'm not tryin' to insult you, pete

I've been where you are

I was deaf, dumb, and blind, and -- sure as shit -- I wasn't goin' to the well, cuz I was absolutely certain both it and the water were fictions, fictions designed to ensnare...I denied moral reality as stubbornly as you do, usin' the same arguments you use

advocate is on a kick of visitin' dead threads and postin' in 'em...stuff from '14, '15...every so often, as I read through one, I come across posts of mine, posts where I'm denyin' moral reality (among other things)...I had damn good arguments...till I didn't

[KLewchuk]

Here is what David Brink in Moral realism and The Foundations of Ethics wrote:

The preceding section has given us some idea of what Moral realism is, what it is not, and what its main rivals are.
But what interest do these metaethical views hold, and is there any reason to believe one rather than another?
In many areas of dispute between realism and antirealism, realism [moral] is the natural metaphysical position.

We begin as realists about the external world or the unobservable entities mentioned in well confirmed scientific theories.
Generally, people become antirealists about these things (if they do) because they become convinced that realism is in some way naive and must be abandoned in the face of compelling metaphysical and epistemological objections.

So too, I think, in ethics.
We begin as (tacit) cognitivists and realists about ethics.
Moral claims make assertions, which can be true or false;
some people are morally more perceptive than others;
and people's moral views have not only changed over time but have improved in many cases (e.g., as regards slavery).

We are led to some form of antirealism (if we are) only because we come to regard the moral realist's commitments as untenable, say,
because of the apparently occult nature of moral facts or
because of the apparent lack of a well developed and respectable methodology in ethics.8
I think there is more to this dialectical picture than just a suggestive thumbnail sketch of the history of twentieth-century metaethics.

Moral realism should be our metaethical starting point, and we should give it up only if it does involve unacceptable metaphysical and epistemological commitments.

This is why the following survey found a majority of moral philosophers are Moral Realists;

A survey from 2009 involving 3,226 respondents[6] found that 56% of philosophers accept or lean towards moral realism (28%: anti-realism; 16%: other).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism

Moral Realism claims there are moral facts which are supposedly mind-independent, proposition, truth-apt and thus objective just like scientific facts generated from the Scientific Framework and System.

Moral Realists claims comprised of 3 major types of facts;
(Brink, except the points in [] );

• 1. Ethical naturalism is the claim that moral facts and properties just are natural facts and properties.
  
  2. Ethical supernaturalism claims that moral facts and properties just are supernatural facts and properties (e.g., facts about and properties of the will of a divine being).
  
  3. Nonnaturalists such as Moore (1903), Broad (1930), Ross (1930), and Prichard (1949), however, claim that moral facts and properties are neither natural nor supernatural facts and properties; they [moral facts] are sui generis.
  Platonic Ethical universals can included in this group.

I believe the original moral facts deniers arose due to the revolt against religious "moral facts" from a God which were threatened and forced upon believers. Hume was one of those who rebelled against God's moral facts.

Personally I believe moral facts claimed within 2 [from a God] and 3 [intuitive and platonic] are not tenable. There are loads of proofs to support my point.

The moral facts claimed within moral realism - ethical naturalism are the default and thus has to be accepted as such unless proven otherwise.
To reinforce this default position I have demonstrated in the various posts they are justifiable as moral facts.

Meanwhile the moral facts deniers like Peter Holmes, et. al. as in
Is morality objective or subjective? by Peter Holmes
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=24531
could only argue with flimsy words and semantics [inherited from the bastardized philosophy of the LPs] which don't give a dent to Moral Realism as the default and its justified moral facts.

The onus on the moral-facts-deniers to provide justifications why there are no moral facts which are like any other natural facts and properties as with the natural sciences and others.

Do you agree Moral Realism is the default within the domain of Morality and Ethics?
Views.

Veritas,

Perhaps my perception is skewed but I would need to say "no". It appears to me that the current domain of morality and ethics has been overwhelmed by post-modernism, intersectionality, etc., which is counter to concepts of moral truth.

To be clear, I am a moral realist but would assert that it appears that I am in the minority rather than the majority at this time.

[Peter Holmes]

How can we demonstrate that, say, slavery is morally wrong?

how would sullivan have imparted water (as a reality) to keller if she'd had none to offer the girl?

or: what if keller had simply refused to go to the well, imagine sullivan's frustration, the goddamn water is right there, helen, in front of you! just dip your hand into it!

so: how can I demonstrate slavery is morally wrong?

hell if I know...I've tried but you're deaf, dumb, and blind and you won't go to the well

-----

to be clear: I'm not tryin' to insult you, pete

I've been where you are

I was deaf, dumb, and blind, and -- sure as shit -- I wasn't goin' to the well, cuz I was absolutely certain both it and the water were fictions, fictions designed to ensnare...I denied moral reality as stubbornly as you do, usin' the same arguments you use

advocate is on a kick of visitin' dead threads and postin' in 'em...stuff from '14, '15...every so often, as I read through one, I come across posts of mine, posts where I'm denyin' moral reality (among other things)...I had damn good arguments...till I didn't

Sorry, Henry, but this Born Again crap doesn't work. If you have nothing more than Ah-Bileeve, Ah-wuz-blind-but-now-ah-can-see happy-clappery, ya'll jess gotta have faith - then you have no rational argument. You and I think slavery is morally wrong, and it seems for very similar reasons. And that's all there is to it. The claim that it's a fact that it's wrong is like the claim that it's a fact that Jesus lives.

[henry quirk]

thanks for insultin' me, pete...I'll keep it in mind for the future

again, more simply this time...

How can we demonstrate that, say, slavery is morally wrong?

how would sullivan have imparted water (as a reality) to keller if she'd had none to offer the girl?

how would you demonstrate to a deaf, dumb, and blind man the existence of fire if you had no fire on hand and no means to produce fire?

[Veritas Aequitas]

This is why the following survey found a majority of moral philosophers are Moral Realists;

A survey from 2009 involving 3,226 respondents[6] found that 56% of philosophers accept or lean towards moral realism (28%: anti-realism; 16%: other).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism

Veritas,

Perhaps my perception is skewed but I would need to say "no". It appears to me that the current domain of morality and ethics has been overwhelmed by post-modernism, intersectionality, etc., which is counter to concepts of moral truth.

To be clear, I am a moral realist but would assert that it appears that I am in the minority rather than the majority at this time.

I wonder you have done sufficient research on the subject of morality and ethics.

Note the survey above where 56% of philosophers in 2009 were inclined to Moral Realism whereas only 28 are anti-realists.
I don't think the % had changed that drastically since 2009 and its is more likely it has increased.

Because Moral Realism is the default it will remain dominant and more so because Moral Realism is well grounded, justified empirically and philosophically.

The anti-Moral-Realists i.e. the noncognitivists has very loose and flimsy philosophies and they have kept changing their stance ever since they first faced opposition till the present, where their anti-realist views have shifted and are creeping more and more towards realism.
Note the latest escape route for the anti-Moral-Realists is that of Quasi-Realism.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Straw man. To reject moral realism - and therefore moral objectivism (the existence of moral facts) - as irrational is not to adopt moral skepticism, just as it's not to adopt moral relativism.

For example, I think capital punishment is morally wrong, and I can explain and (I think) justify that opinion. But others think capital punishment is not morally wrong, for reasons they find persuasive. The realist/objectivist claim that there's a moral fact of the matter is demonstrably false, which is precisely why there can be rational disagreement about the morality of capital punishment - as there is about other important moral issues.

The absence of moral facts is what makes moral judgement necessary and inescapable. That's our moral predicament.

I believe you are lost on the above.

If you don't believe there are moral facts i.e. moral properties, how can you use the term 'morally wrong' like "I think capital punishment is morally wrong." When rigor is necessary, this is not acceptable.

Well, let's see. Could it be that to call something morally right or wrong is not to ascribe a property, in the way we do when we call a house 'white'? Where's your evidence that moral rightness or wrongness are empirically verifiable properties like whiteness? If they are properties, how can people rationally call, say, capital punishment both morally right and morally wrong? Are we all stupid or blind to the supposed moral property belonging to capital punishment? Ffs, THINK.

Note the following re Moral Properties in its perspective of Moral Realism;

The robust model of moral realism commits moral realists to three theses:[17]

The semantic thesis: The primary semantic role of moral predicates (such as "right" and "wrong") is to refer to moral properties (such as rightness and wrongness), so that moral statements (such as "honesty is good" and "slavery is unjust") purport to represent moral facts, and express propositions that are true or false (or approximately true, largely false, and so on).
The alethic thesis: Some moral propositions are in fact true.

The metaphysical thesis: Moral propositions are true when actions and other objects of moral assessment have the relevant moral properties (so that the relevant moral facts obtain), where these facts and properties are robust: their metaphysical status, whatever it is, is not relevantly different from that of (certain types of) ordinary non-moral facts and properties.
-wiki

Re Capital Punishment on "killing another human" - I have already justified [a "1000" times] the moral fact;
"No human ought to kill another"
I am not going to waste time going over this again.

What you should assert is you do not agree with capital punishment based on your personal opinions and judgments.
If you ever use the term 'moral' that is a categorical error, i.e.
"a property is ascribed to a thing that could not possibly have that property"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_mistake
and thus engaging in pseudo-morality.

Is calling a painting 'beautiful' ascribing a property to it? And would calling it 'ugly' be to ignore the actual property it has? Ffs, THINK.

From your perspective is a categorical error because you deny there are moral facts which is the foundation of morality.

You are shifting the issue to a very subjective issue, whereas morality is objective.
In any case, if anyone think a painting is ugly there is no question of it being beautiful at all.
Such a person would not call a painting an ugly 'beautiful'-painting.

The moral realist abstracted, abducted and inducted from observations and evidences there is a property of morality within humanity and justify his stance with justified true moral beliefs on the various principles and contents of morality.

What a confused mess. That humans have the capacity to make moral judgements could be described as a property of humans. But that doesn't mean the things we judge to be morally right or wrong 'have' the property of moral rightness or wrongness. That's nonsense.

Note my quote from wiki above on the Semantic Thesis of Moral Realism.

Note, I have just directed attention to what is Moral Skepticism, i.e.

Moral skepticism (or moral scepticism) is a class of metaethical theories all members of which entail that no one has any moral knowledge. Many moral skeptics also make the stronger, modal claim that moral knowledge is impossible.
Moral skepticism is particularly opposed to moral realism: the view that there are knowable and objective moral truths.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_skepticism

This is why the checklist is important for you to know where you stand.
Since you deny there are moral facts, moral propositions, moral knowledge, your stance is rightly that of moral skepticism.
Show me if I am wrong.

The comfort of labels? It's the actual claims and arguments that count. By all means call my position 'moral skepticism' if you wish. Or call it 'moral non-cognitivism'. But so what?

I understand there are limitations in putting things into pigeon holes.

However putting things with common features as a starter is one of the most efficient strategies to understand and resolve whatever problems.
This is why all humans are "programmed" with a "pattern seeking" module in the brain.

Therefore [subject to its limitations] assigning the labels moral-skepticism and noncogntivism to you is very critical until you can show otherwise your views do not conform to these labels at all. This is the default with the community of the philosophers on the subject of morality and ethics.

Note the other terms like Moral Nihilism, Moral Queerness, Moral Fictional, Moral Blindness, Moral Deficit and the likes.
You need to research to understand what they represent.

Fuck off. You need to actually think about the issues, rather than collect labels and give them capital letters, as though that makes them seem important.

Getting emotional, eh?
That is the problem when you are ignorant and do not bother to research. In the extreme, some will even kill others for that, e.g. in blasphemy cases arising from their ignorance.

I stated at that moment in time I happened to give special attention to the term 'moral skepticism' and its related topic.
Special attention meant I had read up what they meant to understand the terms thoroughly rather than a mere scan.
The above are serious terms and books have been written on them by various authors.

[Veritas Aequitas]

If a fact of any kind is what we say it is, then ignoring it makes no difference. It remains a fact. And if a fact is not what we say it is, then the claim that there's such thing as a moral fact is incoherent. Can't have it both ways.

a man can choose to ignore that fire is hot...he can ignore fact, yes

and: I never said ignorin' moral fact invalidates it

So we're back to the claim that there are moral facts, whether or not we ignore them. Fire is hot, and we can demonstrate it. How can we demonstrate that, say, slavery is morally wrong? Is that the same kind of demonstration?

As I had stated before Henry's approach is that of Moral Intuitionism.
He is very intuitively right on track with Moral Intuitionism.

Moral Intuitionism
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29996

I understand he is not well versed with the philosophies of Moral Intuitionism to explain his beliefs but in Philosophy of Morality and Ethics, Moral Intuitionism is Moral Realism and Cognitivism, in opposition to your NonCognitivism.

Ethical intuitionism (also called moral intuitionism) is a view or family of views in moral epistemology (and, on some definitions, metaphysics). It is at its core foundationalism about moral knowledge; that is, it is committed to the thesis that some moral truths can be known non-inferentially (i.e., known without one needing to infer them from other truths one believes). Such an epistemological view is by definition committed to the existence of knowledge of moral truths; therefore, ethical intuitionism implies cognitivism.
-wiki

Note Recent works on Moral Intuitionalism;

Contemporary developments
Some recent work suggests the view may be enjoying a resurgence of interest in academic philosophy.

Robert Audi is one of the main supporters of ethical intuitionism in our days. His 2005 book, The Good in the Right, claims to update and strengthen Rossian intuitionism and to develop the epistemology of ethics.

Michael Huemer's book Ethical Intuitionism (2005) also provides a recent defense of the view. Furthermore, authors writing on normative ethics often accept methodological intuitionism as they present allegedly obvious or intuitive examples or thought experiments as support for their theories.
wiki

I have surveyed [not read them thoroughly] the two books above.


Note:

Philosophers commonly identified as intuitionists
Samuel Clarke
Richard Price
Francis Hutcheson
William Whewell
Henry Sidgwick
G. E. Moore
Michael Huemer
Harold Arthur Prichard
W.D. Ross
Robert Audi
C. S. Lewis[citation needed]
Frances Power Cobbe

[Veritas Aequitas]

Well, let's see. Could it be that to call something morally right or wrong is not to ascribe a property, in the way we do when we call a house 'white'? Where's your evidence that moral rightness or wrongness are empirically verifiable properties like whiteness? If they are properties, how can people rationally call, say, capital punishment both morally right and morally wrong? Are we all stupid or blind to the supposed moral property belonging to capital punishment? Ffs, THINK.

Why Moral Realism is realistic?
nb: [mine]

Advantages For Moral Realism

Moral realism allows the ordinary rules of logic (modus ponens, etc.) to be applied straightforwardly to moral statements.
We can say that a moral belief is false or unjustified or contradictory in the same way we would about a factual belief.
[However] This is a problem for expressivism [nonCognitivism], as shown by the Frege–Geach problem.

Another advantage of moral realism is its capacity to resolve moral disagreements: if two moral beliefs contradict one another, realism says that they cannot both be right, and therefore everyone involved ought to be seeking out the right answer to resolve the disagreement.

Contrary theories of meta-ethics have trouble even formulating the statement "this moral belief is wrong," and so they cannot resolve disagreements in this way.

Do you have any dispute with the above claims?

[Peter Holmes]

Well, let's see. Could it be that to call something morally right or wrong is not to ascribe a property, in the way we do when we call a house 'white'? Where's your evidence that moral rightness or wrongness are empirically verifiable properties like whiteness? If they are properties, how can people rationally call, say, capital punishment both morally right and morally wrong? Are we all stupid or blind to the supposed moral property belonging to capital punishment? Ffs, THINK.

Why Moral Realism is realistic?
nb: [mine]

Advantages For Moral Realism

Moral realism allows the ordinary rules of logic (modus ponens, etc.) to be applied straightforwardly to moral statements.
We can say that a moral belief is false or unjustified or contradictory in the same way we would about a factual belief.
[However] This is a problem for expressivism [nonCognitivism], as shown by the Frege–Geach problem.

Another advantage of moral realism is its capacity to resolve moral disagreements: if two moral beliefs contradict one another, realism says that they cannot both be right, and therefore everyone involved ought to be seeking out the right answer to resolve the disagreement.

Contrary theories of meta-ethics have trouble even formulating the statement "this moral belief is wrong," and so they cannot resolve disagreements in this way.

Do you have any dispute with the above claims?

Yes, because the argument is specious.

1 Logical form (ponens, tollens, etc), and logic in general, is about consistency, and has nothing to do with the truth-value of premises. So an argument consisting of nothing but moral assertions can easily be valid. For example: 1 If x is morally wrong, then y is morally wrong. 2 X is morally wrong. 3 Therefore, y is morally wrong. The claim that moral realism uniquely allows this is false, because moral non-realism allows it too. Truth-value is the issue here, and logical consistency doesn't confer truth-value on premises.

2 A thing either does or doesn't exist, and that has nothing to do with language, and therefore nothing to do with logic in the first place. Moral realism is the claim that there is a moral reality consisting of moral things. And the burden of proof is with moral realists, unmet so far, to my knowledge.

3 And as for dispute resolution, this claim is demonstrably false, given the absence of evidence for the existence of a moral reality to which disputants can appeal. For example, the argument about the moral justification for capital punishment necessarily devolves to foundational moral beliefs, which can always clash.

[FlashDangerpants]

Advantages For Moral Realism

Another advantage of moral realism is its capacity to resolve moral disagreements: if two moral beliefs contradict one another, realism says that they cannot both be right, and therefore everyone involved ought to be seeking out the right answer to resolve the disagreement.

Contrary theories of meta-ethics have trouble even formulating the statement "this moral belief is wrong," and so they cannot resolve disagreements in this way.

I told you months ago that your moral realist theory, along with all the competing moral realist theories, are worthless junk specifically because they cannot do the above. If either of you could, then you would have shown why Henry is wrong, or else Henry would show why you are wrong in cases where you both claim moral realism to incompatible claims. Instead you both opted to try and make common cause in spite of your competing truth claims. One person insisting it is a universal moral truth that no human can ever kill another is strictly and utterly incompatible with the claims of the other that any number of crimes must end with a good old fashioned lynching.

So what's supposed to be the advantage there?

[Peter Holmes]

Advantages For Moral Realism

Another advantage of moral realism is its capacity to resolve moral disagreements: if two moral beliefs contradict one another, realism says that they cannot both be right, and therefore everyone involved ought to be seeking out the right answer to resolve the disagreement.

Contrary theories of meta-ethics have trouble even formulating the statement "this moral belief is wrong," and so they cannot resolve disagreements in this way.

I told you months ago that your moral realist theory, along with all the competing moral realist theories, are worthless junk specifically because they cannot do the above. If either of you could, then you would have shown why Henry is wrong, or else Henry would show why you are wrong in cases where you both claim moral realism to incompatible claims. Instead you both opted to try and make common cause in spite of your competing truth claims. One person insisting it is a universal moral truth that no human can ever kill another is strictly and utterly incompatible with the claims of the other that any number of crimes must end with a good old fashioned lynching.

So what's supposed to be the advantage there?

Agreed - and nicely put. We ask for a moral fact: a moral thing that exists, or a moral assertion that's true, in the sense that it could be false if things were different - as could any factual assertion. Response: nothing. But hey, there's a moral reality, so there are moral facts, so morality is objective. Cognitive dissonance, or what?

[FlashDangerpants]

I told you months ago that your moral realist theory, along with all the competing moral realist theories, are worthless junk specifically because they cannot do the above. If either of you could, then you would have shown why Henry is wrong, or else Henry would show why you are wrong in cases where you both claim moral realism to incompatible claims. Instead you both opted to try and make common cause in spite of your competing truth claims. One person insisting it is a universal moral truth that no human can ever kill another is strictly and utterly incompatible with the claims of the other that any number of crimes must end with a good old fashioned lynching.

So what's supposed to be the advantage there?

Agreed - and nicely put. We ask for a moral fact: a moral thing that exists, or a moral assertion that's true, in the sense that it could be false if things were different - as could any factual assertion. Response: nothing. But hey, there's a moral reality, so there are moral facts, so morality is objective. Cognitive dissonance, or what?

I know, right, how bad has this subforum gotten? Now we have to deal with bullshit thread, which essentially boils down to nothing more than an observation that people in general tend to think of their beliefs in general as a body of facts. Utter, pointless, worthless, hopeless junk.

[henry quirk]

as I say: don't let 'em grind you down

[FlashDangerpants]

as I say: don't let 'em grind you down

Good news, he won't. He's far too stupid to understand the problem, otherwise he wouldn't have quoted the thing pointing out his own failure.

[Skepdick]

I know, right, how bad has this subforum gotten? Now we have to deal with bullshit thread, which essentially boils down to nothing more than an observation that people in general tend to think of their beliefs in general as a body of facts. Utter, pointless, worthless, hopeless junk.

Yet here you are. Asserting yourself. As if your beliefs are facts.