Thoughts on meaning (opinions/criticisms appreciated)

[Isaac-A-Russell]

The human brain cannot perceive outside of patterns. Mathematics is an understanding of that perception of patterns. Physics is the application of the understanding of that perception of patterns. And our picture of the world is the experience of that perception of patterns.

1. The meaning of a statement relies on the possibility that it can be known to be true or false. Meaningful statements cannot exist without the possibility of meaningless statements. The mechanism of meaning exists not in one statement, but in all statements. Therefore, it is impossible to know whether a statement is meaningful or not without prior knowledge of all other possible statements.

2. It is possible to build a structure of meaningless statements, which, in every aspect but what is called meaning, resembles that of a meaningful statement. The distinction is thus: that one can be known to be meaningful and one cannot. Yet for either, there must be an actual distinction between one thing and another thing: patterns must exist.

3. Meaning is built on the assumption that patterns of truth exist. The difference between one thing and another is not meaningful unless there is a pattern which describes why one thing is, and the other is not (actually). Therefore, meaning is reliant on an actual perception of patterns.

4. The human brain perceives in patterns. The human brain is predisposed to structure states in the form of patterns. Therefore, our minds are predisposed to see meaningful and meaningless states prior to any possible knowledge that such states exist.

5. Since the human mind can only perceive in such patterns, one cannot know whether a structure is truly meaningful (expresses an actual pattern) or truly meaningless (does not express an actual pattern), as our minds are wired to see the world in patterns.

6. Outside of the minds pattern seeking, it may be possible to find a true proposition at the end of a series of false statements, or a false proposition at the end of a series of true statements.

7. It is impossible to know the difference between of meaning or meaninglessness, when we intrinsically perceive reality in patterns; and therefore within a mechanism of meaning, for, we cannot say which is an actual pattern and which is a formed pattern, from a perspective that only perceives in patterns.

8. It is possible that truth is random, and that no set of statements can be put together to make a proposition meaningful. The fact that some truths appear to work together (are logically coherent) and some do not (are paradoxes), supports this claim.

9. To claim that life has meaning, or indeed that it does not, is to presuppose the existence of patterns outside of our pattern seeking brains, which is impossible to verify.
(It is impossible for us to conceive anything which is outside of the boundaries of patterns: absolute nothing, infinity etc, etc. Though these things may exist, simply outside the forms of all possible patterns).

10. We are wrong to assume that states contain meaning intrinsically, as such a states are reliant on the knowledge of the existence of patterns. And since the perception of patterns is the starting point for all which we can know (from the existence of colours, to the truth of propositions), and is therefore the lever with which we separate one thing from another, it is impossible to withdraw from this perspective and verify whether patterns actually exist or not.

11. One must, therefore, accept that the human brain cannot witness, or think, of anything which lays outside of the evolved perception of patterns, and so, it is impossible to know whether patterns truly exist or not; and so whether meaning exists or not

12. Though what we consider meaningful may follow from what we consider the pattern of meaning, we cannot understand anything apart from with patterns (and so in a system of meaning): therefore it is impossible to conceive a world in which meaning and the meaninglessness do not follow from our natural notion of meaning and meaninglessness themselves.

[Wyman]

1. The meaning of a statement relies on the possibility that it can be known to be true or false. Meaningful statements cannot exist without the possibility of meaningless statements. The mechanism of meaning exists not in one statement, but in all statements. Therefore, it is impossible to know whether a statement is meaningful or not without prior knowledge of all other possible statements.

2. It is possible to build a structure of meaningless statements, which, in every aspect but what is called meaning, resembles that of a meaningful statement. The distinction is thus: that one can be known to be meaningful and one cannot. Yet for either, there must be an actual distinction between one thing and another thing: patterns must exist.

I think this describes the difference between syntax and semantics. Syntax consists of mechanical rules, semantics sometimes does, but often depends on something else, which you are trying to tackle here.

Donald Davidson formulated a similar problem as central to his philosophy of language - how, upon merely knowing the definitions of a finite set of words, can humans understand an infinite set of sentences - combinations of words never actually seen before by the individual - and understand them immediately.

But I think you are wrong that we have to know all other possible statements to understand the meaning of one statement. Although logic points that way, the facts we witness provide a counter example, making the issue somewhat of a paradox. For instance, general statements, such as an algebraic equation, applies to an infinite number of actual instantiations, yet we somehow understand the meaning of an equation without first understanding every use - i.e. for all right triangles, etc., a squared plus b squared equals c squared. We know this statement to be true in every case, under certain conditions (axioms, rules of syntax, etc.) without checking every case to make sure.

How this is possible is a profound philosophical question.

3. Meaning is built on the assumption that patterns of truth exist. The difference between one thing and another is not meaningful unless there is a pattern which describes why one thing is, and the other is not (actually). Therefore, meaning is reliant on an actual perception of patterns.

4. The human brain perceives in patterns. The human brain is predisposed to structure states in the form of patterns. Therefore, our minds are predisposed to see meaningful and meaningless states prior to any possible knowledge that such states exist.

5. Since the human mind can only perceive in such patterns, one cannot know whether a structure is truly meaningful (expresses an actual pattern) or truly meaningless (does not express an actual pattern), as our minds are wired to see the world in patterns.

6. Outside of the minds pattern seeking, it may be possible to find a true proposition at the end of a series of false statements, or a false proposition at the end of a series of true statements.

7. It is impossible to know the difference between of meaning or meaninglessness, when we intrinsically perceive reality in patterns; and therefore within a mechanism of meaning, for, we cannot say which is an actual pattern and which is a formed pattern, from a perspective that only perceives in patterns.

This is what I would call the problem of perception, or of perception as knowledge - first articulated in Plato's Theaetetus. We learn general concepts (patterns?) through experience and subsequently perceive the world through 'goggles' that impose these same concepts or patterns (some of which may be innate rather than learned). Plato described it as seeing 'with the mind, through the senses.' How do we know what patterns we perceive are real and which are imposed on reality by our perceptive faculties.

This also describes Cartesian doubt and the Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena (he derived this from Cartesian principles).

Your use of 'patterns,' though, is vague throughout and may cover up important distinctions in perception and conceptualization. I don't understand number 6.

I can give my opinion of the rest if you want - preliminarily, you introduce the term 'states' in 10 without definition. I would also challenge whether it is so obvious that we cannot know that 'patterns' exist. Perhaps we cannot know what causes these patterns, but considering these are what we constantly experience, what do you mean when you say we cannot know them?

Pertaining to the above problem of the subjective nature of perception, consider the solution put forth by the scientific method. Subjective perceptions are replaced by instruments which are calibrated to give highly objective 'observations.' When a hundred scientists agree on the validity of a measurement by a advanced scientific instrument, is there really cause for skepticism?

Also, consider the unit of truth, not as the proposition, but as a larger unit, perhaps all of scientific knowledge or all of one individual's knowledge. Quine and Rorty, among others, adopted such a position - termed 'holism.'

[Advocate]

The human brain cannot perceive outside of patterns. Mathematics is an understanding of that perception of patterns. Physics is the application of the understanding of that perception of patterns. And our picture of the world is the experience of that perception of patterns.

That's basically the answer to ontology: Everything is patterns.

1. The meaning of a statement relies on the possibility that it can be known to be true or false. Meaningful statements cannot exist without the possibility of meaningless statements. The mechanism of meaning exists not in one statement, but in all statements. Therefore, it is impossible to know whether a statement is meaningful or not without prior knowledge of all other possible statements.

>The meaning of a statement in that sense is it's communicative power, not whether it is, or is intended to be taken as true. Also, every meaning of certain Enough, not an infinite regress. To the extent people agree on the basic nature of whatever's being discussed, it's sufficient. It's meaningful if it gets work done.

3. Meaning is built on the assumption that patterns of truth exist. The difference between one thing and another is not meaningful unless there is a pattern which describes why one thing is, and the other is not (actually). Therefore, meaning is reliant on an actual perception of patterns.

Every"thing" is a pattern with a purpose and the resolution of the purpose determines the resolution of the pattern. That's the solution to metaphysics.

You've moved willy-nilly between two definitions of meaning, one being descriptive and semantic and the other being care/salience. I can help you clear that up.

[Advocate]

>We know this statement to be true in every case, under certain conditions (axioms, rules of syntax, etc.) without checking every case to make sure.

>How this is possible is a profound philosophical question.

But it's not. Logic describes the relationships between other concepts. To the extent those relationships are the ones logic expresses, the result can be known with certainty. Math is a subset of that exercise dealing exclusively with relationships of quantity.

>This is what I would call the problem of perception, or of perception as knowledge - first articulated in Plato's Theaetetus. We learn general concepts (patterns?) through experience and subsequently perceive the world through 'goggles' that impose these same concepts or patterns (some of which may be innate rather than learned). Plato described it as seeing 'with the mind, through the senses.' How do we know what patterns we perceive are real and which are imposed on reality by our perceptive faculties.

A difference that makes no difference is no difference. Even if this experience of reality we're having is completely an illusion, as long as it acts exactly the same as what we expect reality to be, it's reality "for all intents and purposes". There are three layers of filter between Actuality and the reality we experience, the other two being our cultural (roughly subconscious) and psychological (bespoke, personal, chosen) understandings.

>This also describes Cartesian doubt and the Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena (he derived this from Cartesian principles).

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/ ... y_X2Kbneo/

>Perhaps we cannot know what causes these patterns, but considering these are what we constantly experience, what do you mean when you say we cannot know them?

They are caused first by perception itself, then distinction, then recognition, then danger potential, etc.

>Pertaining to the above problem of the subjective nature of perception, consider the solution put forth by the scientific method. Subjective perceptions are replaced by instruments which are calibrated to give highly objective 'observations.' When a hundred scientists agree on the validity of a measurement by a advanced scientific instrument, is there really cause for skepticism?

All empirical measurements are subject to replication. As long as the same input produces the same output, it's verified. That's also the basis for logic. All languages are descriptive of our experience of external reality. Science is rigor. It doesn't matter how many scientist say something, if you can create a replicable experiment that denies the truth of their contention, they lose.

Subjectivity is a matter of perspective in this example. If perspective (knowledge available exclusively to an individual) is accounted for, which isn't normally a problem in science, the result isn't subjective in any way that matters.