Moral Supervenience

[Harbal]

One example is the moral principle,
"torturing babies for pleasure is morally wrong"
and this moral principle supervenes on
non-moral facts arising from being human being.
Obviously there are loads of moral principles [moral facts] which supervene on non-moral facts.

A moral or any other kind of principle is not a fact.

Person A thinks it is morally wrong to torture babies for pleasure, so for him, torturing babies for pleasure is morally wrong.

Person B thinks that torturing babies for pleasure is morally fine, so for him, torturing babies for pleasure is not morally wrong.


So are both of those underlined statements/principles facts?

[Veritas Aequitas]

I have one example of a supposed moral fact, but you may have "been there already and binned that t-shirt as well".

To me, in order to keep living and existing human beings, and other animals, must breathe clean enough air, or they will die. Therefore, it would be morally wrong for 'us', human beings, to over pollute the air that 'we', human beings, and other animals, NEED in order to keep surviving.

Or do I have this wrong and this is not a 'moral fact'?

One example is the moral principle,
"torturing babies for pleasure is morally wrong"

What makes this a principle?

and this moral principle supervenes on
non-moral facts arising from being human being.

So supervene is some for of verb. what does it actually mean?

Obviously there are loads of moral principles [moral facts] which supervene on non-moral facts.

If there are moral facts, and moral principles, then why are you choosing to conflate them here?

Instead of dealing with each moral principles or moral facts, most of the arguments provided by the various philosophers do not track to the empirical facts of the supervenient-base.
However they argued in general as a principle that ethics is an impossibility without the principle of moral supervenience as defined.
You have to read them up, it is not easy to grasp.

You'll definitely have to express what supervene means. Otherwise no one, not even you, shall understand what is going on.
You might want to think about how supervention actually works, who or what is doing the supervening.

We have gone tru this before, i.e. that principles can be facts as intended in this case.

principle. ... Principles might, that is, be facts in the broader sense of “fact” in which all truths, including, there- fore, true principles (if there are any), represent facts.
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs ... 03.00211.x

As for the rest, the OP "discuss" is an open invitations for anyone to present their views on the subject.

One point, Mathew Kramer offer this definition of Supervenience as follows;

• Supervenience as understood throughout this chapter is handily encapsulated in two formulations propounded by Simon Blackburn in a deservedly famous essay:
  
  (S) A property M is supervenient upon properties N1 ... Nn
  if M is not identical with any of N1 ... Nn nor with any truth function of them,
  and it is impossible that a world should become M, or cease to be M, or become more or less M than before,
  without changing in respect of some member of N1 ... Nn.
  
  (S2) A property M is supervenient upon properties N1 ... Nn
  if M is not identical with any of N1 ... Nn or with any truth function of them,
  and it is impossible that two things
  should each possess the same properties from the set N1 ... Nn to the same degree,
  without both failing to possess [property] M, or both possessing [property] M,
  to the same degree.
  (Blackburn 1993, 115)

Kramer presented this conclusion re Supervenience and the caution against begging the question;

10.4.. Conclusion
The supervenience of ethical properties on empirical properties is a central and indispensable feature of the ethical domain.
No worthwhile theory of that domain can deny or ignore the phenomenon of supervenience, and indeed every such theory – if it is to be worthwhile – must offer a satisfactory explanation of that phenomenon.

What the present chapter has contended, in line with the rest of this book, is that any such explanation will have to consist in substantive ethical argumentation.
Attempts to furnish logical or austerely metaphysical arguments in vindication of the requirement of ethical supervenience cannot succeed.
Either an ostensibly logical/metaphysical argument will turn out actually to be an ethical argument that adduces ethical considerations in support of an ethical thesis, or else it will founder by committing some lapse(s) of reasoning such as a fatal begging of the question.

Accounts of ethical supervenience go nowhere unless they are ethical accounts. [not logical ones]
They address conceptual questions, undoubtedly, but those conceptual questions are abstract and fundamental matters of substantive ethics.

[Age]

Provide one example of a supposed moral fact, and show how it's 'supervenient upon' an actual, natural fact. Or are we supposed to just take your word for it that such things exist?

Hint: if your example is 'people must breathe or they die - therefore it's morally wrong to prevent people from breathing' - don't bother. Been there and binned the t-shirt.

I have one example of a supposed moral fact, but you may have "been there already and binned that t-shirt as well".

To me, in order to keep living and existing human beings, and other animals, must breathe clean enough air, or they will die. Therefore, it would be morally wrong for 'us', human beings, to over pollute the air that 'we', human beings, and other animals, NEED in order to keep surviving.

Or do I have this wrong and this is not a 'moral fact'?

One example is the moral principle,

What is the, so called, 'moral principle'?

"torturing babies for pleasure is morally wrong"

To 'who', exactly?

Obviously not to the ones who are torturing babies, for pleasure. Otherwise they would not do it, obviously.

If you want to take this line of, so called, "arguing", then I could just say that some of what "veritas aequitas" says and does is morally wrong.

Which, by the way, it is anyway.

and this moral principle supervenes on

'What' 'moral principle'?

non-moral facts arising from being human being.

Obviously there are loads of moral principles [moral facts] which supervene on non-moral facts.

Did you MISS the part where the "other" poster asked for 'one example of a supposed moral fact', and nothing about a 'non-moral fact'?

Or, have I MISSED some thing here?

Instead of dealing with each moral principles or moral facts, most of the arguments provided by the various philosophers do not track to the empirical facts of the supervenient-base.
However they argued in general as a principle that ethics is an impossibility without the principle of moral supervenience [as defined] as a moral necessity.
You have to read them up, it is not easy to grasp.

I lot of what you say is NOT easy to grasp. But this is because you just expressing and are 'trying to' 'justify' your ALREADY HELD ASSUMPTIONS about what BELIEVE is already true, right, and correct.

[Veritas Aequitas]

One example is the moral principle,
"torturing babies for pleasure is morally wrong"
and this moral principle supervenes on
non-moral facts arising from being human being.
Obviously there are loads of moral principles [moral facts] which supervene on non-moral facts.

A moral or any other kind of principle is not a fact.

Person A thinks it is morally wrong to torture babies for pleasure, so for him, torturing babies for pleasure is morally wrong.

Person B thinks that torturing babies for pleasure is morally fine, so for him, torturing babies for pleasure is not morally wrong.


So are both of those underlined statements/principles facts?

Your views are rhetoric in sliding in the term 'think'.

'torturing babies for pleasure is wrong' is a natural inhibition within the brain of each human being that is represented by its referent of a neural algorithm.

The state is natural and spontaneous.

Whenever one thinks about it, that is secondary and that is a fact of thinking and not a moral fact per se.

[Harbal]

'torturing babies for pleasure is wrong' is a natural inhibition within the brain of each human being that is represented by its referent of a neural algorithm.

I feel sure that there are people in this world who do not have that inhibition.

[Veritas Aequitas]

'torturing babies for pleasure is wrong' is a natural inhibition within the brain of each human being that is represented by its referent of a neural algorithm.

I feel sure that there are people in this world who do not have that inhibition.

The neural algorithm is there inherently but for some [if any, very rare] it can be defective.
For example all humans has the inhibition not to kill another human but psychopaths [1% of people] has defects in that particular inhibiting system and thus has the high potential to murder people as evidently proven within psychiatry and psychology.

[Age]

'torturing babies for pleasure is wrong' is a natural inhibition within the brain of each human being that is represented by its referent of a neural algorithm.

I feel sure that there are people in this world who do not have that inhibition.

In fact was there not some experiment done by adult human beings on young human beings to see if the young ones (babies) could live or survive with food but without attention. That experiment, to my knowledge, led to the conclusion that attention is actually needed for human beings survival. To discover this conclusion young human beings (babies) had to be left to die, which could be classified as 'torture', and classified as 'for pleasure', as well. As this 'experiment/torture' was done just to satisfy some adult human beings curiosity, or pleasure.

Now, obviously if this story I just presented is true, then any, so called, "natural inhibition within the brain of each human being" had to be overridden by some one or some thing. And, who or what could override what is said to be NATURAL?

I have also witnessed and observed people, in this world, 'torturing human babies for pleasure', but some adult human beings just do NOT see this as being 'torture'. So, I am pretty certain what you feel sure of here is completely and utterly true and correct.

[Harbal]

For example all humans has the inhibition not to kill another human but psychopaths [1% of people] has defects in that particular inhibiting system and

That is not true. There are examples throughout history and right up to the present day of cohorts of people routinely massacring other human beings, without the slightest inhibition.

Homicide is not a good example for discussion because all of us here -it is to be hoped- do think it is morally wrong. Something like homosexuality would be a better subject for the purposes of illustration.

[Age]

'torturing babies for pleasure is wrong' is a natural inhibition within the brain of each human being that is represented by its referent of a neural algorithm.

I feel sure that there are people in this world who do not have that inhibition.

The neural algorithm is there inherently but for some [if any, very rare] it can be defective.

WHY do you make up these words, like; "neural algorithm is there inherently", and then present those words, as though they have some sort of resemblance to Truth and to Reality?

For example all humans has the inhibition not to kill another human but psychopaths [1% of people] has defects in that particular inhibiting system and thus has the high potential to murder people as evidently proven within psychiatry and psychology.

OBVIOUSLY if a human being does some thing, then there WAS NOTHING inhibiting them from doing it.

Also, and by the way, WHY do you make up these figures, like; "1% of people", and then present those figures, as though they have some sort of resemblance to Truth and to Reality?

And, stating some thing like; ALL human beings have the inhibition to do some 'thing', BUT, when some human beings do do that 'thing', then they have a defect or have NO inhibition to do that 'thing' is just speaking the OBVIOUS FACT.

What is also OBVIOUS is, when stating some thing like; 'ALL human beings have some thing, but some do not', then this is just absurdity at one of the higher levels.

[Harbal]

In fact was there not some experiment done by adult human beings on young human beings to see if the young ones (babies) could live or survive with food but without attention. That experiment, to my knowledge, led to the conclusion that attention is actually needed for human beings survival. To discover this conclusion young human beings (babies) had to be left to die, which could be classified as 'torture', and classified as 'for pleasure', as well. As this 'experiment/torture' was done just to satisfy some adult human beings curiosity, or pleasure.

Now, obviously if this story I just presented is true, then any, so called, "natural inhibition within the brain of each human being" had to be overridden by some one or some thing. And, who or what could override what is said to be NATURAL?

I have also witnessed and observed people, in this world, 'torturing human babies for pleasure', but some adult human beings just do NOT see this as being 'torture'. So, I am pretty certain what you feel sure of here is completely and utterly true and correct.

Actually, I think it likely that "normal" human beings are hard wired to be protective of babies; nothing to do with algorithms. Although we are born with the faculty for morality, what constitutes "moral" is very much a product of social conditioning, and can vary very widely between different cultures.

[Age]

In fact was there not some experiment done by adult human beings on young human beings to see if the young ones (babies) could live or survive with food but without attention. That experiment, to my knowledge, led to the conclusion that attention is actually needed for human beings survival. To discover this conclusion young human beings (babies) had to be left to die, which could be classified as 'torture', and classified as 'for pleasure', as well. As this 'experiment/torture' was done just to satisfy some adult human beings curiosity, or pleasure.

Now, obviously if this story I just presented is true, then any, so called, "natural inhibition within the brain of each human being" had to be overridden by some one or some thing. And, who or what could override what is said to be NATURAL?

I have also witnessed and observed people, in this world, 'torturing human babies for pleasure', but some adult human beings just do NOT see this as being 'torture'. So, I am pretty certain what you feel sure of here is completely and utterly true and correct.

Actually, I think it likely that "normal" human beings are hard wired to be protective of babies; nothing to do with algorithms. Although we are born with the faculty for morality, what constitutes "moral" is very much a product of social conditioning, and can vary very widely between different cultures.

And, within this body is the exact same thinking.

[Harbal]

And, within this body is the exact same thinking.

Is that your way of saying you agree?

[Sculptor]

One example is the moral principle,
"torturing babies for pleasure is morally wrong"

What makes this a principle?

and this moral principle supervenes on
non-moral facts arising from being human being.

So supervene is some for of verb. what does it actually mean?

Obviously there are loads of moral principles [moral facts] which supervene on non-moral facts.

If there are moral facts, and moral principles, then why are you choosing to conflate them here?

Instead of dealing with each moral principles or moral facts, most of the arguments provided by the various philosophers do not track to the empirical facts of the supervenient-base.
However they argued in general as a principle that ethics is an impossibility without the principle of moral supervenience as defined.
You have to read them up, it is not easy to grasp.

You'll definitely have to express what supervene means. Otherwise no one, not even you, shall understand what is going on.
You might want to think about how supervention actually works, who or what is doing the supervening.

We have gone tru this before, i.e. that principles can be facts as intended in this case.

principle. ... Principles might, that is, be facts in the broader sense of “fact” in which all truths, including, there- fore, true principles (if there are any), represent facts.
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs ... 03.00211.x

As for the rest, the OP "discuss" is an open invitations for anyone to present their views on the subject.

One point, Mathew Kramer offer this definition of Supervenience as follows;

• Supervenience as understood throughout this chapter is handily encapsulated in two formulations propounded by Simon Blackburn in a deservedly famous essay:
  
  (S) A property M is supervenient upon properties N1 ... Nn
  if M is not identical with any of N1 ... Nn nor with any truth function of them,
  and it is impossible that a world should become M, or cease to be M, or become more or less M than before,
  without changing in respect of some member of N1 ... Nn.
  
  (S2) A property M is supervenient upon properties N1 ... Nn
  if M is not identical with any of N1 ... Nn or with any truth function of them,
  and it is impossible that two things
  should each possess the same properties from the set N1 ... Nn to the same degree,
  without both failing to possess [property] M, or both possessing [property] M,
  to the same degree.
  (Blackburn 1993, 115)

Kramer presented this conclusion re Supervenience and the caution against begging the question;

10.4.. Conclusion
The supervenience of ethical properties on empirical properties is a central and indispensable feature of the ethical domain.
No worthwhile theory of that domain can deny or ignore the phenomenon of supervenience, and indeed every such theory – if it is to be worthwhile – must offer a satisfactory explanation of that phenomenon.

What the present chapter has contended, in line with the rest of this book, is that any such explanation will have to consist in substantive ethical argumentation.
Attempts to furnish logical or austerely metaphysical arguments in vindication of the requirement of ethical supervenience cannot succeed.
Either an ostensibly logical/metaphysical argument will turn out actually to be an ethical argument that adduces ethical considerations in support of an ethical thesis, or else it will founder by committing some lapse(s) of reasoning such as a fatal begging of the question.

Accounts of ethical supervenience go nowhere unless they are ethical accounts. [not logical ones]
They address conceptual questions, undoubtedly, but those conceptual questions are abstract and fundamental matters of substantive ethics.

I've shown you patience. Asked nicely, and all you give me is this regurgitation.
The most simple question has been ignored, and you seem to have no clue what you are saying

[Sculptor]

The principle of moral supervenience states that moral predicates (e.g., permissible, obligatory, forbidden, etc.), and hence moral facts attributing these predicates to various particular actions or action-types, supervene, or are defined by and depend, upon non-moral facts.

It will clear up the confusion if you simply demonstrate which particulars of a given moral principles supervene upon which particular moral facts.

It looks like a childish bit of circular argument, especially since moral principles have already been conflated with moral facts in this very thread!!

[Age]

And, within this body is the exact same thinking.

Is that your way of saying you agree?

It is one way.