Searles' Is-Ought Argument

[Veritas Aequitas]

It is very obvious for you to jump to conclusion based on your dogmatic view.
You see an evaluative conclusion and because of your dogmatism, hastily jumped to the conclusion it is 'begging the question' which based on flimsy thinking.

As I had stated you OUGHT to read Searle's full article explaining his argument.

In that paper Searle anticipated the possible objections [yours included] and he provided three, i.e.:

• 1. The charge of begging the question with hidden evaluative elements in 1b.
  
  2. Why Opponents Failed to Understand the existence of Two Tautologies – Three Reasons.
  
  3. Used of oratio oblipua, hence disguised statements of fact - fact/value distinction still exists.

It is so obvious Searle understood basic logic, i.e. it is fallacious and one cannot deduce directly from a descriptive premise to an evaluative conclusion. This is why he did not present the typical 3 line syllogism in this case, but presented his argument within a 15 page paper.

If you note Searle did not jump in stating his P1 plainly as;
Jones made a promise to pay Smith five dollars.

Searle was very specific, i.e. he put it precisely to get to this point;

• (P1) Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars."

The bolded terms has heavy implication in his argument and the point that what is uttered is in inverted commas.

Nothing evaluative is assumed at this stage of P1.
The sense of obligation is only brought forth in P4
which logically follow into P5 as an evaluative conclusion.

In his paper Searle provided detailed explanation on how he moved from P1 to P2 to P3 to P4 and then how the conclusion is deduced.

Besides, we can make promises that we ought not to keep, because keeping them is immoral. And that falsifies the premise.

Seale had also anticipated and covered this by the Ceteris Paribus as in Premise 3a

• (3) Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
  (3a) Other things are equal.

We need the ceteris paribus ="Other things are equal" clause to eliminate the possibility that something extraneous to the relation of "obligation" to "ought" might interfere.5
The force of the expression "other things being equal" in the present instance is roughly this.
Unless we have some reason that is, unless we are actually prepared to give some reason, for supposing
the obligation is void (step 4)
or the agent ought not to keep the promise (step 5),
then the obligation holds and he ought to keep the promise.

As I had stated, you ought to read Searle's full article to ensure what you are to counter him was not accounted for by Searle.
Searle was not a philosopher God, so he could NOT be omniscient but he had at least presented his argument with very high rigor and serious standards.

What you are sticking to is merely theory using crude semantics which is analogous to a surgeon using a blade to do brain surgery, i.e. not taking the very realistic micro details and nuances into considerations.

What Searle argued for is also carried out in practice within various constitutional institutions without giving a damn F to Hume's Law.

One good example are "ought" [presumably moral] are derived from "is" within criminal laws within the constitution of a parliament, e.g.
"No person ought to killing/murder, else s/he will be punished legally"
I believe 99.999% of people in the World are subject to the above 'ought' given the whole world is covered by sovereign nations which had such laws re killing/murder.

I believe the above legal 'ought' is intuitively derived from the natural inherent moral fact,
"no person ought to kill another"
which I had justified empirically and philosophically.

And the claim 'we ought not to make promises that we ought not to keep' isn't a factual assertion. it just expresses an opinion.

As I have argued countless times, 'ought to keep promises' is the same as,
"no person ought to kill another" is a moral fact
which I had justified empirically and philosophically from a moral FSK,
where all FSK produce their specific facts.

The problem with 'other things being equal', is that it assumes or smuggles in premises which need to be explicit. So what are the things that must be the case in order for the premise 'we make promises' to entail - which means 'make logically necessary' - the moral conclusion 'therefore we ought to keep promises'?

You cite what 'other things' need to be equal as follows: 'Unless we have some reason that is, unless we are actually prepared to give some reason, for supposing; the obligation is void (step 4); or the agent ought not to keep the promise (step 5)'. But both of those assume the obligation exists in the first place - which is the question at issue.

My point is that, boiled down, the only thing that can produce the 'ought' entailment is the belief that making a promise entails keeping it - and that begs the question. Yes, in practice, the language game of making promises usually involves making a commitment to keeping them - for obvious reasons. But this has nothing to do with logical entailment - which is why it's not a logical contradiction to break a promise.

Many opponents to the argument also mentioned and questioned the ceteris paribus condition but Searle also had that covered.
You have to give it to Searle, he is not that stupid in simply bringing in the ceteris paribus point without deep reflection and thinking on it.
The fact that he brought it in already indicated he has given his argument a lot of thought to that extent, so he is not likely to be ignorant of the begging the question charge.

Searle covered his ceteris paribus clause with this points;

I am therefore inclined to think that there is nothing necessarily evaluative about the ceteris paribus condition, even though deciding whether it is satisfied will frequently involve evaluations.

But suppose I am wrong about this: would that salvage the belief in an unbridgeable logical gulf between "is" and "ought"?
I think not, for we can always rewrite my steps (4), and (5) so that they include the ceteris paribus clause as part of the conclusion.

Thus from our premises we would then have derived
"Other things being equal Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars,"
and that would still be sufficient to refute the tradition, for we would still have shown a relation of entailment between descriptive and evaluative statements.

It was not the fact that extenuating circumstances can void obligations that drove philosophers to the naturalistic fallacy fallacy; it was rather a theory of language, as we shall see later on.

As Searle noted the problem is with the rigid thinking of 'no ought from is' is due to the then existing messy theory of language that philosophy is burdened with.
Searle had contributed very significantly to the evolution within the philosophy of language so he knew what he was talking about.

[Peter Holmes]

It is very obvious for you to jump to conclusion based on your dogmatic view.
You see an evaluative conclusion and because of your dogmatism, hastily jumped to the conclusion it is 'begging the question' which based on flimsy thinking.

As I had stated you OUGHT to read Searle's full article explaining his argument.

In that paper Searle anticipated the possible objections [yours included] and he provided three, i.e.:

• 1. The charge of begging the question with hidden evaluative elements in 1b.
  
  2. Why Opponents Failed to Understand the existence of Two Tautologies – Three Reasons.
  
  3. Used of oratio oblipua, hence disguised statements of fact - fact/value distinction still exists.

It is so obvious Searle understood basic logic, i.e. it is fallacious and one cannot deduce directly from a descriptive premise to an evaluative conclusion. This is why he did not present the typical 3 line syllogism in this case, but presented his argument within a 15 page paper.

If you note Searle did not jump in stating his P1 plainly as;
Jones made a promise to pay Smith five dollars.

Searle was very specific, i.e. he put it precisely to get to this point;

• (P1) Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars."

The bolded terms has heavy implication in his argument and the point that what is uttered is in inverted commas.

Nothing evaluative is assumed at this stage of P1.
The sense of obligation is only brought forth in P4
which logically follow into P5 as an evaluative conclusion.

In his paper Searle provided detailed explanation on how he moved from P1 to P2 to P3 to P4 and then how the conclusion is deduced.


Seale had also anticipated and covered this by the Ceteris Paribus as in Premise 3a



As I had stated, you ought to read Searle's full article to ensure what you are to counter him was not accounted for by Searle.
Searle was not a philosopher God, so he could NOT be omniscient but he had at least presented his argument with very high rigor and serious standards.

What you are sticking to is merely theory using crude semantics which is analogous to a surgeon using a blade to do brain surgery, i.e. not taking the very realistic micro details and nuances into considerations.

What Searle argued for is also carried out in practice within various constitutional institutions without giving a damn F to Hume's Law.

One good example are "ought" [presumably moral] are derived from "is" within criminal laws within the constitution of a parliament, e.g.
"No person ought to killing/murder, else s/he will be punished legally"
I believe 99.999% of people in the World are subject to the above 'ought' given the whole world is covered by sovereign nations which had such laws re killing/murder.

I believe the above legal 'ought' is intuitively derived from the natural inherent moral fact,
"no person ought to kill another"
which I had justified empirically and philosophically.


As I have argued countless times, 'ought to keep promises' is the same as,
"no person ought to kill another" is a moral fact
which I had justified empirically and philosophically from a moral FSK,
where all FSK produce their specific facts.

The problem with 'other things being equal', is that it assumes or smuggles in premises which need to be explicit. So what are the things that must be the case in order for the premise 'we make promises' to entail - which means 'make logically necessary' - the moral conclusion 'therefore we ought to keep promises'?

You cite what 'other things' need to be equal as follows: 'Unless we have some reason that is, unless we are actually prepared to give some reason, for supposing; the obligation is void (step 4); or the agent ought not to keep the promise (step 5)'. But both of those assume the obligation exists in the first place - which is the question at issue.

My point is that, boiled down, the only thing that can produce the 'ought' entailment is the belief that making a promise entails keeping it - and that begs the question. Yes, in practice, the language game of making promises usually involves making a commitment to keeping them - for obvious reasons. But this has nothing to do with logical entailment - which is why it's not a logical contradiction to break a promise.

Many opponents to the argument also mentioned and questioned the ceteris paribus condition but Searle also had that covered.
You have to give it to Searle, he is not that stupid in simply bringing in the ceteris paribus point without deep reflection and thinking on it.
The fact that he brought it in already indicated he has given his argument a lot of thought to that extent, so he is not likely to be ignorant of the begging the question charge.

Searle covered his ceteris paribus clause with this points;

I am therefore inclined to think that there is nothing necessarily evaluative about the ceteris paribus condition, even though deciding whether it is satisfied will frequently involve evaluations.

But suppose I am wrong about this: would that salvage the belief in an unbridgeable logical gulf between "is" and "ought"?
I think not, for we can always rewrite my steps (4), and (5) so that they include the ceteris paribus clause as part of the conclusion.

Thus from our premises we would then have derived
"Other things being equal Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars,"
and that would still be sufficient to refute the tradition, for we would still have shown a relation of entailment between descriptive and evaluative statements.

It was not the fact that extenuating circumstances can void obligations that drove philosophers to the naturalistic fallacy fallacy; it was rather a theory of language, as we shall see later on.

As Searle noted the problem is with the rigid thinking of 'no ought from is' is due to the then existing messy theory of language that philosophy is burdened with.
Searle had contributed very significantly to the evolution within the philosophy of language so he knew what he was talking about.

Good philosophers do think long and deeply about their arguments and conclusions. But the soundness of their arguments has nothing to do with the effort and intelligence that goes into them. They stand or fall alone. And I'm not the only person to point out that the ceteris paribus condition demolishes Searle's argument. And buiding it into the conclusion, once again, merely begs the question.

Instead of whining and hiding behind authority, have a go at my explanation of this, and try to show why it's incorrect.

[Veritas Aequitas]

The problem with 'other things being equal', is that it assumes or smuggles in premises which need to be explicit. So what are the things that must be the case in order for the premise 'we make promises' to entail - which means 'make logically necessary' - the moral conclusion 'therefore we ought to keep promises'?

You cite what 'other things' need to be equal as follows: 'Unless we have some reason that is, unless we are actually prepared to give some reason, for supposing; the obligation is void (step 4); or the agent ought not to keep the promise (step 5)'. But both of those assume the obligation exists in the first place - which is the question at issue.

My point is that, boiled down, the only thing that can produce the 'ought' entailment is the belief that making a promise entails keeping it - and that begs the question. Yes, in practice, the language game of making promises usually involves making a commitment to keeping them - for obvious reasons. But this has nothing to do with logical entailment - which is why it's not a logical contradiction to break a promise.

Many opponents to the argument also mentioned and questioned the ceteris paribus condition but Searle also had that covered.
You have to give it to Searle, he is not that stupid in simply bringing in the ceteris paribus point without deep reflection and thinking on it.
The fact that he brought it in already indicated he has given his argument a lot of thought to that extent, so he is not likely to be ignorant of the begging the question charge.

Searle covered his ceteris paribus clause with this points;

I am therefore inclined to think that there is nothing necessarily evaluative about the ceteris paribus condition, even though deciding whether it is satisfied will frequently involve evaluations.

But suppose I am wrong about this: would that salvage the belief in an unbridgeable logical gulf between "is" and "ought"?
I think not, for we can always rewrite my steps (4), and (5) so that they include the ceteris paribus clause as part of the conclusion.

Thus from our premises we would then have derived
"Other things being equal Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars,"
and that would still be sufficient to refute the tradition, for we would still have shown a relation of entailment between descriptive and evaluative statements.

It was not the fact that extenuating circumstances can void obligations that drove philosophers to the naturalistic fallacy fallacy; it was rather a theory of language, as we shall see later on.

As Searle noted the problem is with the rigid thinking of 'no ought from is' is due to the then existing messy theory of language that philosophy is burdened with.
Searle had contributed very significantly to the evolution within the philosophy of language so he knew what he was talking about.

Good philosophers do think long and deeply about their arguments and conclusions. But the soundness of their arguments has nothing to do with the effort and intelligence that goes into them. They stand or fall alone. And I'm not the only person to point out that the ceteris paribus condition demolishes Searle's argument. And buiding it into the conclusion, once again, merely begs the question.

Instead of whining and hiding behind authority, have a go at my explanation of this, and try to show why it's incorrect.

What do you mean hiding behind authority?
The issue here re the argument [see OP] is between you and Searle, not me.
I am just the middle-person providing info and explanation to lazy people like you who still refuse to read Searle's full article.

As I had stated there are many other philosophers who had countered Seale's argument, but as far as I can see they had not been convincing because they are stuck with the traditional views. Here is Searle's warning;

This summary of the traditional empirical view has been very brief, but I hope it conveys something of the power of this picture.
In the hands of certain modern authors, especially Hare and Nowell-Smith, the picture attains considerable subtlety and sophistication.

You stated the ceteris paribus condition allow people to smuggle in hidden elements. Searle stated the following in relation to the premises, btw, not the conclusion.

And as far as I can see, no moral premises are lurking in the logical woodpile.

As I have quoted, Searle had covered this point and deny there is any smuggling on his side.
As in the Searle's case, you need to explain how he had smuggled in any evaluative element.

I have highlighted there are serious semantic issue in relation to this argument, but I don't you are able to grasp it due to confirmation bias.

[Peter Holmes]

Many opponents to the argument also mentioned and questioned the ceteris paribus condition but Searle also had that covered.
You have to give it to Searle, he is not that stupid in simply bringing in the ceteris paribus point without deep reflection and thinking on it.
The fact that he brought it in already indicated he has given his argument a lot of thought to that extent, so he is not likely to be ignorant of the begging the question charge.

Searle covered his ceteris paribus clause with this points;



As Searle noted the problem is with the rigid thinking of 'no ought from is' is due to the then existing messy theory of language that philosophy is burdened with.
Searle had contributed very significantly to the evolution within the philosophy of language so he knew what he was talking about.

Good philosophers do think long and deeply about their arguments and conclusions. But the soundness of their arguments has nothing to do with the effort and intelligence that goes into them. They stand or fall alone. And I'm not the only person to point out that the ceteris paribus condition demolishes Searle's argument. And buiding it into the conclusion, once again, merely begs the question.

Instead of whining and hiding behind authority, have a go at my explanation of this, and try to show why it's incorrect.

What do you mean hiding behind authority?
The issue here re the argument [see OP] is between you and Searle, not me.
I am just the middle-person providing info and explanation to lazy people like you who still refuse to read Searle's full article.

As I had stated there are many other philosophers who had countered Seale's argument, but as far as I can see they had not been convincing because they are stuck with the traditional views. Here is Searle's warning;

This summary of the traditional empirical view has been very brief, but I hope it conveys something of the power of this picture.
In the hands of certain modern authors, especially Hare and Nowell-Smith, the picture attains considerable subtlety and sophistication.

You stated the ceteris paribus condition allow people to smuggle in hidden elements. Searle stated the following in relation to the premises, btw, not the conclusion.

And as far as I can see, no moral premises are lurking in the logical woodpile.

As I have quoted, Searle had covered this point and deny there is any smuggling on his side.
As in the Searle's case, you need to explain how he had smuggled in any evaluative element.

I have highlighted there are serious semantic issue in relation to this argument, but I don't you are able to grasp it due to confirmation bias.

Okay, but he can say what he likes. The truth of the matter isn't in his gift. And anyway, don't be slippery. If you think his argument is valid and sound, you need to show that it is. If you can't, there's no reason for you to think it is. That's how we play this game.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Good philosophers do think long and deeply about their arguments and conclusions. But the soundness of their arguments has nothing to do with the effort and intelligence that goes into them. They stand or fall alone. And I'm not the only person to point out that the ceteris paribus condition demolishes Searle's argument. And buiding it into the conclusion, once again, merely begs the question.

Instead of whining and hiding behind authority, have a go at my explanation of this, and try to show why it's incorrect.

What do you mean hiding behind authority?
The issue here re the argument [see OP] is between you and Searle, not me.
I am just the middle-person providing info and explanation to lazy people like you who still refuse to read Searle's full article.

As I had stated there are many other philosophers who had countered Seale's argument, but as far as I can see they had not been convincing because they are stuck with the traditional views. Here is Searle's warning;

This summary of the traditional empirical view has been very brief, but I hope it conveys something of the power of this picture.
In the hands of certain modern authors, especially Hare and Nowell-Smith, the picture attains considerable subtlety and sophistication.

You stated the ceteris paribus condition allow people to smuggle in hidden elements. Searle stated the following in relation to the premises, btw, not the conclusion.

And as far as I can see, no moral premises are lurking in the logical woodpile.

As I have quoted, Searle had covered this point and deny there is any smuggling on his side.
As in the Searle's case, you need to explain how he had smuggled in any evaluative element.

I have highlighted there are serious semantic issue in relation to this argument, but I don't you are able to grasp it due to confirmation bias.

Okay, but he can say what he likes. The truth of the matter isn't in his gift. And anyway, don't be slippery. If you think his argument is valid and sound, you need to show that it is. If you can't, there's no reason for you to think it is. That's how we play this game.

I have shown enough of his argument already.
It is your dogmatism of being stuck in the traditional view [which Searle critiqued] that do not enable to see through the argument.
This is like the fundy theists [psychological embedded] who will never see the non-theists' view.

[Peter Holmes]

Okay, but he can say what he likes. The truth of the matter isn't in his gift. And anyway, don't be slippery. If you think his argument is valid and sound, you need to show that it is. If you can't, there's no reason for you to think it is. That's how we play this game.

I have shown enough of his argument already.
It is your dogmatism of being stuck in the traditional view [which Searle critiqued] that do not enable to see through the argument.
This is like the fundy theists [psychological embedded] who will never see the non-theists' view.

Sorry - nowhere near good enough. I've shown you why his argument is fallacious. Abusing me is pathetic. Either show why my refutation is incorrect, or, frankly, fuck off.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Okay, but he can say what he likes. The truth of the matter isn't in his gift. And anyway, don't be slippery. If you think his argument is valid and sound, you need to show that it is. If you can't, there's no reason for you to think it is. That's how we play this game.

I have shown enough of his argument already.
It is your dogmatism of being stuck in the traditional view [which Searle critiqued] that do not enable to see through the argument.
This is like the fundy theists [psychological embedded] who will never see the non-theists' view.

Sorry - nowhere near good enough. I've shown you why his argument is fallacious. Abusing me is pathetic. Either show why my refutation is incorrect, or, frankly, fuck off.

Sound like you are losing the argument on your part.

[Peter Holmes]

I have shown enough of his argument already.
It is your dogmatism of being stuck in the traditional view [which Searle critiqued] that do not enable to see through the argument.
This is like the fundy theists [psychological embedded] who will never see the non-theists' view.

Sorry - nowhere near good enough. I've shown you why his argument is fallacious. Abusing me is pathetic. Either show why my refutation is incorrect, or, frankly, fuck off.

Sound like you are losing the argument on your part.

WAFWOT.

[PeteJ]

I find Searle's argument entirely ineffective and cannot grasp why anyone would think it works.

On what grounds does he argue we 'ought' to keep our promises? Perhaps we 'ought' not to make promises in the first place.

If I want to become known as an untrustworthy person then I 'ought' not to keep my promises.

It's all a muddle of words.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I find Searle's argument entirely ineffective and cannot grasp why anyone would think it works.

On what grounds does he argue we 'ought' to keep our promises? Perhaps we 'ought' not to make promises in the first place.

If I want to become known as an untrustworthy person then I 'ought' not to keep my promises.

It's all a muddle of words.

The muddle of words are from your muddled thinking.

Generally and typically and via classical logic rules and simple language one cannot derive 'ought' from 'is' directly. You are trapped dogmatically into this simple perspective.

But the argument from by Searle is special when linguistic 'speech acts' and constitutional facts and not brute facts are involved.

In the above case, the person, Jones-the promisor, uttered in actions to the Smith-the promisee, "I hereby promise[/b] to pay you, Smith, five dollars."
This utterance invoke a state of obligation, i.e. an ought to keep the promise by the effects of the constitution of promising.

On the other hand if Jones merely made the statement "I will give you $5", this is a simple statement of declaration without the constitution of promise, thus there is no constitutional ought that Jones must pay Smith $5.

Note the specific premises in the OP's argument.

• P(1) Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars."

What is different and critical with the above P1 are the terms 'uttered' and "I hereby promise ..."

In this case, what that follows from P1 is the triggering of the ought to keep his promise.

If Jones did not utter "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars" then no constitutional oughts are invoked.

Thereafter, if Jones decide not to keep the promise at t2, that is a different issue subsequently after the fact that the state of 'ought' is invoked at t1.

If Jones had intended to deceive but merely pretend to utter "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars" this would be an issue of deception [actual state of affair in his brain] which is immoral in the first place, but nevertheless despite the deception, a state of 'ought_ness' is still invoked in such a constitutional situation. Note the term 'constitutional' in this case.

I believe [quantum of $ aside] in principle, if there are sufficient witnesses Smith can even sue Jones in court to enforce that ought.

[PeteJ]

The muddle of words are from your muddled thinking.

Generally and typically and via classical logic rules and simple language one cannot derive 'ought' from 'is' directly. You are trapped dogmatically into this simple perspective.

I have no trouble deriving an ought from and is and believe this is the only way to do it. But I find Searle's argument poor and ineffective.

[Veritas Aequitas]

The muddle of words are from your muddled thinking.

Generally and typically and via classical logic rules and simple language one cannot derive 'ought' from 'is' directly. You are trapped dogmatically into this simple perspective.

I have no trouble deriving an ought from and is and believe this is the only way to do it. But I find Searle's argument poor and ineffective.

Why?
What is wrong with Searle's argument?

What is your own argument in having no trouble deriving ought from is then?

[PeteJ]

What is wrong with Searle's argument?

I find it weak and rather desperate. It isn't clear enough to be persuasive.

What is your own argument in having no trouble deriving ought from is then?

My view is that everything is as it is because of what is fundamental, as is the perennial view. As Lao Tsu says, the laws of Heaven and Earth derive from 'Tao being what it is'. There are too many subtleties to get into this here, but I would question whether there is such a thing as an 'ought'.

[Skepdick]

I would question whether there is such a thing as an 'ought'.

Of course there is! You don't have desires?

[Veritas Aequitas]

What is wrong with Searle's argument?

I find it weak and rather desperate. It isn't clear enough to be persuasive.

What is your own argument in having no trouble deriving ought from is then?

My view is that everything is as it is because of what is fundamental, as is the perennial view. As Lao Tsu says, the laws of Heaven and Earth derive from 'Tao being what it is'. There are too many subtleties to get into this here, but I would question whether there is such a thing as an 'ought'.

You ought to breathe.
This ought can be verified and justified empirically and philosophically.

Just as there are biological and existential oughts, there are moral oughts which in all cases must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically.