Searles' Is-Ought Argument

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here is Searle's refutation of the Is-Ought Problem via his argument with additional explanations;

• (1) Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars."
  (1a) Under certain conditions C anyone who utters the words (sentence) "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars" promises to pay Smith five dollars.
  (1b) Conditions C obtain.
  
  (2) Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.
  (2a) All promises are acts of placing oneself (undertaking) an obligation to do the thing promised.
  
  (3) Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
  (3a) Other things are equal.
  (3b) All those who place themselves under an obligation are, other things being equal, under an obligation.
  
  (4) Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
  (4a) Other things are equal.
  
  (5) Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.

The critical details are in this post;

How to Derive "Ought" From "Is" J. Searle
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29824

The Original and Full article here;
How to Derive "Ought" From "Is"
John R. Searle
The Philosophical Review
Vol. 73, No. 1 (Jan., 1964), pp. 43-58
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183201?seq=1[/list]

[Peter Holmes]

Here is Searle's refutation of the Is-Ought Problem via his argument with additional explanations;

• (1) Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars."
  (1a) Under certain conditions C anyone who utters the words (sentence) "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars" promises to pay Smith five dollars.
  (1b) Conditions C obtain.
  
  (2) Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.
  (2a) All promises are acts of placing oneself (undertaking) an obligation to do the thing promised.
  
  (3) Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
  (3a) Other things are equal.
  (3b) All those who place themselves under an obligation are, other things being equal, under an obligation.
  
  (4) Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
  (4a) Other things are equal.
  
  (5) Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.

The critical details are in this post;

How to Derive "Ought" From "Is" J. Searle
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29824

The Original and Full article here;
How to Derive "Ought" From "Is"
John R. Searle
The Philosophical Review
Vol. 73, No. 1 (Jan., 1964), pp. 43-58
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183201?seq=1[/list]

This argument is specious: we make promises; therefore we ought to keep promises. The premise doesn't entail the conclusion, unless it begs the question: we ought to keep promises because making promises entails keeping them.

Or here it is as a conditional premise: if we make promises, we ought to keep them.

So here's an example. If I promise to kill VA, I ought to kill him. Why? Because making a promise entails keeping it. Ah, but it's possible to make a promise that we really ought not to keep. - But this is special pleading, which falsifies the premise. It doesn't always follow that making a promise entails keeping it.

Footnote.

Being a fuckwit is okay. We're all fuckwits about some things, some of the time. But what really pisses me off about you is that not once have you had the honesty and integrity to acknowledge the refutation of one of your crap arguments.

For example, above I've demonstrated that Searle's argument begs the question, and so is fallacious. Now, to play the game, you're supposed to try to rebut the refutation - to show why it's wrong.

But instead, you slide away and come up with another crap argument to be shot down. The proliferation of your OPs here testifies. But, as well as being irritating for the rest of us, this is bad for your intellectual development - as it would be for any of us.

And this evasive technique reminds me of nothing so much as the slipperiness of swivel-eyed theist apologists.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here is Searle's refutation of the Is-Ought Problem via his argument with additional explanations;

• (1) Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars."
  (1a) Under certain conditions C anyone who utters the words (sentence) "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars" promises to pay Smith five dollars.
  (1b) Conditions C obtain.
  
  (2) Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.
  (2a) All promises are acts of placing oneself (undertaking) an obligation to do the thing promised.
  
  (3) Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
  (3a) Other things are equal.
  (3b) All those who place themselves under an obligation are, other things being equal, under an obligation.
  
  (4) Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
  (4a) Other things are equal.
  
  (5) Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.

The critical details are in this post;

How to Derive "Ought" From "Is" J. Searle
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29824

The Original and Full article here;
How to Derive "Ought" From "Is"
John R. Searle
The Philosophical Review
Vol. 73, No. 1 (Jan., 1964), pp. 43-58
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183201?seq=1[/list]

This argument is specious: we make promises; therefore we ought to keep promises. The premise doesn't entail the conclusion, unless it begs the question: we ought to keep promises because making promises entails keeping them.

Or here it is as a conditional premise: if we make promises, we ought to keep them.

So here's an example. If I promise to kill VA, I ought to kill him. Why? Because making a promise entails keeping it. Ah, but it's possible to make a promise that we really ought not to keep. - But this is special pleading, which falsifies the premise. It doesn't always follow that making a promise entails keeping it.

Footnote.

Being a fuckwit is okay. We're all fuckwits about some things, some of the time. But what really pisses me off about you is that not once have you had the honesty and integrity to acknowledge the refutation of one of your crap arguments.

For example, above I've demonstrated that Searle's argument begs the question, and so is fallacious. Now, to play the game, you're supposed to try to rebut the refutation - to show why it's wrong.

But instead, you slide away and come up with another crap argument to be shot down. The proliferation of your OPs here testifies. But, as well as being irritating for the rest of us, this is bad for your intellectual development - as it would be for any of us.

And this evasive technique reminds me of nothing so much as the slipperiness of swivel-eyed theist apologists.

Nah!! You are the ignorant one.

Searle's argument is to justify the principle,
i.e. 'promising' is "is" but it is also a constitutional act that by default entails an 'ought'.
In making a promise, i.e. "is" - the 'ought' is implied.
Therefore an "ought" can be derived from "is."

Fuckwits are too hasty in jumping to conclusion.
Where is the 'begging the question?'

The argument is of the following basis format;

• P1 J made a promise to do X
  P2 A promise imply an ought/obligation to do X
  C1. Therefore J ought to do X

The fuckwit_ness of it is, you a gnat in philosophy has the guile to accuse Searle - a giant of philosophy publishing his argument in a notable philosophical journal - in committing a logical fallacy of begging the question, when he peers did not accuse him of such. That is an embarrassment on you rather than on Searle.
I am aware there are philosophers who countered Searle's argument, albeit unsuccessfully, but not by accusing him of "begging the question".

You will soon note, NonCognitivism [plain and superficial logical stance] face a conundrum with Conditional Premises just as with thick concepts, speech acts, illocutionary sentences etc. which are very relevant within a Moral FSK.

.....................................
Your addition of 'promise to kill' is very rhetorical and where it entails two moral elements [I have already explained to you before, but as usual you are blind to it].
The two moral elements are;

• 1. The moral fact of promise entail one ought to keep the promise.
  2. The moral fact - no human ought to kill another.

Within a moral FSK there are degree and gradation of morality and immorality, i.e. good and evil.
Surely it is obvious the degree of murdering another human has to be of a much higher degree of immorality or evilness that petty crimes or even raping another person.

In the case of keeping a promise, it has to be related to moral matters, but keeping a promise has to be in the context of the degree of morality or immorality on the content of the promise.
The content of the promise will always override the need to keep the promise.

[Peter Holmes]

Here is Searle's refutation of the Is-Ought Problem via his argument with additional explanations;

• (1) Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars."
  (1a) Under certain conditions C anyone who utters the words (sentence) "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars" promises to pay Smith five dollars.
  (1b) Conditions C obtain.
  
  (2) Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.
  (2a) All promises are acts of placing oneself (undertaking) an obligation to do the thing promised.
  
  (3) Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
  (3a) Other things are equal.
  (3b) All those who place themselves under an obligation are, other things being equal, under an obligation.
  
  (4) Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
  (4a) Other things are equal.
  
  (5) Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.

The critical details are in this post;

How to Derive "Ought" From "Is" J. Searle
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29824

The Original and Full article here;
How to Derive "Ought" From "Is"
John R. Searle
The Philosophical Review
Vol. 73, No. 1 (Jan., 1964), pp. 43-58
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183201?seq=1[/list]

This argument is specious: we make promises; therefore we ought to keep promises. The premise doesn't entail the conclusion, unless it begs the question: we ought to keep promises because making promises entails keeping them.

Or here it is as a conditional premise: if we make promises, we ought to keep them.

So here's an example. If I promise to kill VA, I ought to kill him. Why? Because making a promise entails keeping it. Ah, but it's possible to make a promise that we really ought not to keep. - But this is special pleading, which falsifies the premise. It doesn't always follow that making a promise entails keeping it.

Footnote.

Being a fuckwit is okay. We're all fuckwits about some things, some of the time. But what really pisses me off about you is that not once have you had the honesty and integrity to acknowledge the refutation of one of your crap arguments.

For example, above I've demonstrated that Searle's argument begs the question, and so is fallacious. Now, to play the game, you're supposed to try to rebut the refutation - to show why it's wrong.

But instead, you slide away and come up with another crap argument to be shot down. The proliferation of your OPs here testifies. But, as well as being irritating for the rest of us, this is bad for your intellectual development - as it would be for any of us.

And this evasive technique reminds me of nothing so much as the slipperiness of swivel-eyed theist apologists.

Nah!! You are the ignorant one.

Searle's argument is to justify the principle,
i.e. 'promising' is "is" but it is also a constitutional act that by default entails an 'ought'.
In making a promise, i.e. "is" - the 'ought' is implied.
Therefore an "ought" can be derived from "is."

Fuckwits are too hasty in jumping to conclusion.
Where is the 'begging the question?'

The argument is of the following basis format;

• P1 J made a promise to do X
  P2 A promise imply an ought/obligation to do X
  C1. Therefore J ought to do X

The fuckwit_ness of it is, you a gnat in philosophy has the guile to accuse Searle - a giant of philosophy publishing his argument in a notable philosophical journal - in committing a logical fallacy of begging the question, when he peers did not accuse him of such. That is an embarrassment on you rather than on Searle.
I am aware there are philosophers who countered Searle's argument, albeit unsuccessfully, but not by accusing him of "begging the question".

You will soon note, NonCognitivism [plain and superficial logical stance] face a conundrum with Conditional Premises just as with thick concepts, speech acts, illocutionary sentences etc. which are very relevant within a Moral FSK.

.....................................
Your addition of 'promise to kill' is very rhetorical and where it entails two moral elements [I have already explained to you before, but as usual you are blind to it].
The two moral elements are;

• 1. The moral fact of promise entail one ought to keep the promise.
  2. The moral fact - no human ought to kill another.

Within a moral FSK there are degree and gradation of morality and immorality, i.e. good and evil.
Surely it is obvious the degree of murdering another human has to be of a much higher degree of immorality or evilness that petty crimes or even raping another person.

In the case of keeping a promise, it has to be related to moral matters, but keeping a promise has to be in the context of the degree of morality or immorality on the content of the promise.
The content of the promise will always override the need to keep the promise.

Searle is trying to show that a factual premise can entail a moral conclusion: we make promises; therefore we ought to keep promises.

But then he assumes that making a promise 'contains' or 'entails' keeping a promise. So he assumes his conclusion in his premise. And that is as blatant an example of begging the question as you'll ever see.

Gives a shit how famous and important and clever and qualified and respected he is. It's the argument that counts - and this one is fallacious.

Now, either show me why I'm misrepresenting his argument, or show me why my refutation is incorrect. If you can do neither, then you need to consign this argument to the waste bin.

[Veritas Aequitas]

This argument is specious: we make promises; therefore we ought to keep promises. The premise doesn't entail the conclusion, unless it begs the question: we ought to keep promises because making promises entails keeping them.

Or here it is as a conditional premise: if we make promises, we ought to keep them.

So here's an example. If I promise to kill VA, I ought to kill him. Why? Because making a promise entails keeping it. Ah, but it's possible to make a promise that we really ought not to keep. - But this is special pleading, which falsifies the premise. It doesn't always follow that making a promise entails keeping it.

Footnote.

Being a fuckwit is okay. We're all fuckwits about some things, some of the time. But what really pisses me off about you is that not once have you had the honesty and integrity to acknowledge the refutation of one of your crap arguments.

For example, above I've demonstrated that Searle's argument begs the question, and so is fallacious. Now, to play the game, you're supposed to try to rebut the refutation - to show why it's wrong.

But instead, you slide away and come up with another crap argument to be shot down. The proliferation of your OPs here testifies. But, as well as being irritating for the rest of us, this is bad for your intellectual development - as it would be for any of us.

And this evasive technique reminds me of nothing so much as the slipperiness of swivel-eyed theist apologists.

Nah!! You are the ignorant one.

Searle's argument is to justify the principle,
i.e. 'promising' is "is" but it is also a constitutional act that by default entails an 'ought'.
In making a promise, i.e. "is" - the 'ought' is implied.
Therefore an "ought" can be derived from "is."

Fuckwits are too hasty in jumping to conclusion.
Where is the 'begging the question?'

The argument is of the following basis format;

• • P1 J made a promise to do X
    P2 A promise imply an ought/obligation to do X
    C1. Therefore J ought to do X

The fuckwit_ness of it is, you a gnat in philosophy has the guile to accuse Searle - a giant of philosophy publishing his argument in a notable philosophical journal - in committing a logical fallacy of begging the question, when he peers did not accuse him of such. That is an embarrassment on you rather than on Searle.
I am aware there are philosophers who countered Searle's argument, albeit unsuccessfully, but not by accusing him of "begging the question".
For one thing, you are just an ignorant gnat [philosophical] who has not read of the various counters - from the reputable philosophers - against Searle's argument.

You will soon note, NonCognitivism [plain and superficial logical stance] face a conundrum with Conditional Premises just as with thick concepts, speech acts, illocutionary sentences etc. which are very relevant within a Moral FSK.

.....................................
Your addition of 'promise to kill' is very rhetorical and where it entails two moral elements [I have already explained to you before, but as usual you are blind to it].
The two moral elements are;

• 1. The moral fact of promise entail one ought to keep the promise.
  2. The moral fact - no human ought to kill another.

Within a moral FSK there are degree and gradation of morality and immorality, i.e. good and evil.
Surely it is obvious the degree of murdering another human has to be of a much higher degree of immorality or evilness that petty crimes or even raping another person.

In the case of keeping a promise, it has to be related to moral matters, but keeping a promise has to be in the context of the degree of morality or immorality on the content of the promise.
The content of the promise will always override the need to keep the promise.

Searle is trying to show that a factual premise can entail a moral conclusion: we make promises; therefore we ought to keep promises.

But then he assumes that making a promise 'contains' or 'entails' keeping a promise. So he assumes his conclusion in his premise. And that is as blatant an example of begging the question as you'll ever see.

Gives a shit how famous and important and clever and qualified and respected he is. It's the argument that counts - and this one is fallacious.

Now, either show me why I'm misrepresenting his argument, or show me why my refutation is incorrect. If you can do neither, then you need to consign this argument to the waste bin.

Searle did not assume "making a promise 'contains' or 'entails' keeping a promise."
Searle differentiated institutional fact from brute facts.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29864
It is a fact of institutional fact that it has the quality of 'ought'.

The points in blue are explanatory for those who are ignorant.

You could be right, but very unlikely.
In this case that the reputable philosophers who countered Searle's argument did not bring up the very common 'begging the question fallacy' should prompt you to hesitate that you are likely to be wrong, thus you need to explore why they are not bringing it up.

I present you the summarized version again:

1. J made a promise to do X
2. A promise as a constitutional fact has quality of ought_ness / obligation of compliance.
3. Therefore J ought to keep his promise to do X.

Where is the begging the question?

There are justifications why 'keeping a promise' is a moral issue.
Won't go into this here.

[Peter Holmes]

Nah!! You are the ignorant one.

Searle's argument is to justify the principle,
i.e. 'promising' is "is" but it is also a constitutional act that by default entails an 'ought'.
In making a promise, i.e. "is" - the 'ought' is implied.
Therefore an "ought" can be derived from "is."

Fuckwits are too hasty in jumping to conclusion.
Where is the 'begging the question?'

The argument is of the following basis format;

• • P1 J made a promise to do X
    P2 A promise imply an ought/obligation to do X
    C1. Therefore J ought to do X

The fuckwit_ness of it is, you a gnat in philosophy has the guile to accuse Searle - a giant of philosophy publishing his argument in a notable philosophical journal - in committing a logical fallacy of begging the question, when he peers did not accuse him of such. That is an embarrassment on you rather than on Searle.
I am aware there are philosophers who countered Searle's argument, albeit unsuccessfully, but not by accusing him of "begging the question".
For one thing, you are just an ignorant gnat [philosophical] who has not read of the various counters - from the reputable philosophers - against Searle's argument.

You will soon note, NonCognitivism [plain and superficial logical stance] face a conundrum with Conditional Premises just as with thick concepts, speech acts, illocutionary sentences etc. which are very relevant within a Moral FSK.

.....................................
Your addition of 'promise to kill' is very rhetorical and where it entails two moral elements [I have already explained to you before, but as usual you are blind to it].
The two moral elements are;

• 1. The moral fact of promise entail one ought to keep the promise.
  2. The moral fact - no human ought to kill another.

Within a moral FSK there are degree and gradation of morality and immorality, i.e. good and evil.
Surely it is obvious the degree of murdering another human has to be of a much higher degree of immorality or evilness that petty crimes or even raping another person.

In the case of keeping a promise, it has to be related to moral matters, but keeping a promise has to be in the context of the degree of morality or immorality on the content of the promise.
The content of the promise will always override the need to keep the promise.

Searle is trying to show that a factual premise can entail a moral conclusion: we make promises; therefore we ought to keep promises.

But then he assumes that making a promise 'contains' or 'entails' keeping a promise. So he assumes his conclusion in his premise. And that is as blatant an example of begging the question as you'll ever see.

Gives a shit how famous and important and clever and qualified and respected he is. It's the argument that counts - and this one is fallacious.

Now, either show me why I'm misrepresenting his argument, or show me why my refutation is incorrect. If you can do neither, then you need to consign this argument to the waste bin.

Searle did not assume "making a promise 'contains' or 'entails' keeping a promise."
Searle differentiated institutional fact from brute facts.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29864
It is a fact of institutional fact that it has the quality of 'ought'.

The points in blue are explanatory for those who are ignorant.

You could be right, but very unlikely.
In this case that the reputable philosophers who countered Searle's argument did not bring up the very common 'begging the question fallacy' should prompt you to hesitate that you are likely to be wrong, thus you need to explore why they are not bringing it up.

I present you the summarized version again:

1. J made a promise to do X
2. A promise as a constitutional fact has quality of ought_ness / obligation of compliance.
3. Therefore J ought to keep his promise to do X.

Where is the begging the question?

There are justifications why 'keeping a promise' is a moral issue.
Won't go into this here.

Defining a so-called constitutional fact as a fact that 'has the quality of ought-ness' very clearly begs the question. Searle uses his conclusion in his premise. Sorry - there's no way around the fallacy.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Searle is trying to show that a factual premise can entail a moral conclusion: we make promises; therefore we ought to keep promises.

But then he assumes that making a promise 'contains' or 'entails' keeping a promise. So he assumes his conclusion in his premise. And that is as blatant an example of begging the question as you'll ever see.

Gives a shit how famous and important and clever and qualified and respected he is. It's the argument that counts - and this one is fallacious.

Now, either show me why I'm misrepresenting his argument, or show me why my refutation is incorrect. If you can do neither, then you need to consign this argument to the waste bin.

Searle did not assume "making a promise 'contains' or 'entails' keeping a promise."
Searle differentiated institutional fact from brute facts.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29864
It is a fact of institutional fact that it has the quality of 'ought'.

The points in blue are explanatory for those who are ignorant.

You could be right, but very unlikely.
In this case that the reputable philosophers who countered Searle's argument did not bring up the very common 'begging the question fallacy' should prompt you to hesitate that you are likely to be wrong, thus you need to explore why they are not bringing it up.

I present you the summarized version again:

1. J made a promise to do X
2. A promise as a constitutional fact has quality of ought_ness / obligation of compliance.
3. Therefore J ought to keep his promise to do X.

Where is the begging the question?

There are justifications why 'keeping a promise' is a moral issue.
Won't go into this here.

Defining a so-called constitutional fact as a fact that 'has the quality of ought-ness' very clearly begs the question. Searle uses his conclusion in his premise. Sorry - there's no way around the fallacy.

Nah..where is your sense of logic?

Note

• All humans are mortal
  Socrates is a man
  Therefore Socrates is mortal

Does asserting humans has the quality of mortality begs the question?

[Peter Holmes]

Searle did not assume "making a promise 'contains' or 'entails' keeping a promise."
Searle differentiated institutional fact from brute facts.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29864
It is a fact of institutional fact that it has the quality of 'ought'.

The points in blue are explanatory for those who are ignorant.

You could be right, but very unlikely.
In this case that the reputable philosophers who countered Searle's argument did not bring up the very common 'begging the question fallacy' should prompt you to hesitate that you are likely to be wrong, thus you need to explore why they are not bringing it up.

I present you the summarized version again:

1. J made a promise to do X
2. A promise as a constitutional fact has quality of ought_ness / obligation of compliance.
3. Therefore J ought to keep his promise to do X.

Where is the begging the question?

There are justifications why 'keeping a promise' is a moral issue.
Won't go into this here.

Defining a so-called constitutional fact as a fact that 'has the quality of ought-ness' very clearly begs the question. Searle uses his conclusion in his premise. Sorry - there's no way around the fallacy.

Nah..where is your sense of logic?

Note

• All humans are mortal
  Socrates is a man
  Therefore Socrates is mortal

Does asserting humans has the quality of mortality begs the question?

Gosh. You don't understand the fallacy of question-begging. That explains a lot. It explains why you think a factual premise can entail a moral conclusion. Do some research and come back when you do understand it.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Defining a so-called constitutional fact as a fact that 'has the quality of ought-ness' very clearly begs the question. Searle uses his conclusion in his premise. Sorry - there's no way around the fallacy.

Nah..where is your sense of logic?

Note

• All humans are mortal
  Socrates is a man
  Therefore Socrates is mortal

Does asserting humans has the quality of mortality begs the question?

Gosh. You don't understand the fallacy of question-begging. That explains a lot. It explains why you think a factual premise can entail a moral conclusion. Do some research and come back when you do understand it.

Don't make a fool of yourself based on ignorance and incompetence in logic.
You are making noises again without justifications.
I don't have to do any research on such a basic issue but most of all I have confidence in Searle's credibility and reputation.

I believe you have not read the whole of Searle's proof within the whole article he presented.
It is likely you did not understand Searles explanation of the theory behind his argument I posted earlier,
How to Derive "Ought" From "Is" J. Searle
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29824

If I were you I will take the trouble to read the full article before I ever claim a person of Searle's philosophical stature would have committed the begging the question fallacy in an argument he presented in a reputable journal 'The Philosophical Review'.
Normally, philosophers in such a case would have asked their peers to read their paper before they sent it to a reputable journal. If there is a 'begging the question' it would have been picked out like easily.
Even if he had mistakenly done so, the editors [who are credible in philosophy] of the 'The Philosophical Review' would have pointed out to him.

As I had stated, I have read Searle's article more than 20 times and based on his detailed explanation of how he progress from each of 4 premises to the conclusion, I know his proof do not include any 'begging the question'.

Are you prepared to take the challenge that Searle's argument do not entail 'begging the question'?
If you lose, then you should apologize to Searle and make 5 standalone posts declaring you are stupid in logic?
If I lose, then I will do the same.
Accept challenge?

If you cannot get access to the full article, I will post it for you to read.

Do some research and come back when you do understand it.

Coming from you?? one who is not inclined to researching??

I have downloaded 3 of Searles' book;

• 1. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (1969)
  2. Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (essay collection; 1979)
  3. Foundations of Illocutionary Logic

His other books, I will look into them;
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (1983)
Minds, Brains and Science: The 1984 Reith Lectures (lecture collection; 1984)

You should wonder how the hell did Searle write a book related to logic if he did not understand nor is aware of the usage of the begging the question fallacy -- and the possibility of begging the question in his "is-ought' proof.

[Peter Holmes]

Nah..where is your sense of logic?

Note

• All humans are mortal
  Socrates is a man
  Therefore Socrates is mortal

Does asserting humans has the quality of mortality begs the question?

Gosh. You don't understand the fallacy of question-begging. That explains a lot. It explains why you think a factual premise can entail a moral conclusion. Do some research and come back when you do understand it.

Don't make a fool of yourself based on ignorance and incompetence in logic.
You are making noises again without justifications.
I don't have to do any research on such a basic issue but most of all I have confidence in Searle's credibility and reputation.

I believe you have not read the whole of Searle's proof within the whole article he presented.
It is likely you did not understand Searles explanation of the theory behind his argument I posted earlier,
How to Derive "Ought" From "Is" J. Searle
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29824

If I were you I will take the trouble to read the full article before I ever claim a person of Searle's philosophical stature would have committed the begging the question fallacy in an argument he presented in a reputable journal 'The Philosophical Review'.
Normally, philosophers in such a case would have asked their peers to read their paper before they sent it to a reputable journal. If there is a 'begging the question' it would have been picked out like easily.
Even if he had mistakenly done so, the editors [who are credible in philosophy] of the 'The Philosophical Review' would have pointed out to him.

As I had stated, I have read Searle's article more than 20 times and based on his detailed explanation of how he progress from each of 4 premises to the conclusion, I know his proof do not include any 'begging the question'.

Are you prepared to take the challenge that Searle's argument do not entail 'begging the question'?
If you lose, then you should apologize to Searle and make 5 standalone posts declaring you are stupid in logic?
If I lose, then I will do the same.
Accept challenge?

If you cannot get access to the full article, I will post it for you to read.

Do some research and come back when you do understand it.

Coming from you?? one who is not inclined to researching??

I have downloaded 3 of Searles' book;

• 1. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (1969)
  2. Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (essay collection; 1979)
  3. Foundations of Illocutionary Logic

His other books, I will look into them;
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (1983)
Minds, Brains and Science: The 1984 Reith Lectures (lecture collection; 1984)

You should wonder how the hell did Searle write a book related to logic if he did not understand nor is aware of the usage of the begging the question fallacy -- and the possibility of begging the question in his "is-ought' proof.

This is all blather and deflection.

If you know what question-begging is, show why my refutation of Searle's argument as question-begging is incorrect. The fact that you think Searle's argument has the same structure as the Socrates inference - which is used to demonstrate validity and (probable) soundness - indicates to me that you really don't understand question-begging. So - prove me wrong.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Gosh. You don't understand the fallacy of question-begging. That explains a lot. It explains why you think a factual premise can entail a moral conclusion. Do some research and come back when you do understand it.

Don't make a fool of yourself based on ignorance and incompetence in logic.
You are making noises again without justifications.
I don't have to do any research on such a basic issue but most of all I have confidence in Searle's credibility and reputation.

I believe you have not read the whole of Searle's proof within the whole article he presented.
It is likely you did not understand Searles explanation of the theory behind his argument I posted earlier,
How to Derive "Ought" From "Is" J. Searle
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29824

If I were you I will take the trouble to read the full article before I ever claim a person of Searle's philosophical stature would have committed the begging the question fallacy in an argument he presented in a reputable journal 'The Philosophical Review'.
Normally, philosophers in such a case would have asked their peers to read their paper before they sent it to a reputable journal. If there is a 'begging the question' it would have been picked out like easily.
Even if he had mistakenly done so, the editors [who are credible in philosophy] of the 'The Philosophical Review' would have pointed out to him.

As I had stated, I have read Searle's article more than 20 times and based on his detailed explanation of how he progress from each of 4 premises to the conclusion, I know his proof do not include any 'begging the question'.

Are you prepared to take the challenge that Searle's argument do not entail 'begging the question'?
If you lose, then you should apologize to Searle and make 5 standalone posts declaring you are stupid in logic?
If I lose, then I will do the same.
Accept challenge?

If you cannot get access to the full article, I will post it for you to read.

Do some research and come back when you do understand it.

Coming from you?? one who is not inclined to researching??

I have downloaded 3 of Searles' book;

• 1. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (1969)
  2. Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (essay collection; 1979)
  3. Foundations of Illocutionary Logic

His other books, I will look into them;
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (1983)
Minds, Brains and Science: The 1984 Reith Lectures (lecture collection; 1984)

You should wonder how the hell did Searle write a book related to logic if he did not understand nor is aware of the usage of the begging the question fallacy -- and the possibility of begging the question in his "is-ought' proof.

This is all blather and deflection.

If you know what question-begging is, show why my refutation of Searle's argument as question-begging is incorrect. The fact that you think Searle's argument has the same structure as the Socrates inference - which is used to demonstrate validity and (probable) soundness - indicates to me that you really don't understand question-begging. So - prove me wrong.

You think begging the question fallacy is so difficult to understand?
See:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question

You are the one who is accusing Searle of 'begging the question', therefore the onus is on you to prove your claim.
You have to read the full Searle's argument then show where in his full explanation is his 'begging the question'.
Note my offer of the challenge is still on.

[Peter Holmes]

Gosh. You don't understand the fallacy of question-begging. That explains a lot. It explains why you think a factual premise can entail a moral conclusion. Do some research and come back when you do understand it.

Don't make a fool of yourself based on ignorance and incompetence in logic.
You are making noises again without justifications.
I don't have to do any research on such a basic issue but most of all I have confidence in Searle's credibility and reputation.

I believe you have not read the whole of Searle's proof within the whole article he presented.
It is likely you did not understand Searles explanation of the theory behind his argument I posted earlier,
How to Derive "Ought" From "Is" J. Searle
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29824

If I were you I will take the trouble to read the full article before I ever claim a person of Searle's philosophical stature would have committed the begging the question fallacy in an argument he presented in a reputable journal 'The Philosophical Review'.
Normally, philosophers in such a case would have asked their peers to read their paper before they sent it to a reputable journal. If there is a 'begging the question' it would have been picked out like easily.
Even if he had mistakenly done so, the editors [who are credible in philosophy] of the 'The Philosophical Review' would have pointed out to him.

As I had stated, I have read Searle's article more than 20 times and based on his detailed explanation of how he progress from each of 4 premises to the conclusion, I know his proof do not include any 'begging the question'.

Are you prepared to take the challenge that Searle's argument do not entail 'begging the question'?
If you lose, then you should apologize to Searle and make 5 standalone posts declaring you are stupid in logic?
If I lose, then I will do the same.
Accept challenge?

If you cannot get access to the full article, I will post it for you to read.

Do some research and come back when you do understand it.

Coming from you?? one who is not inclined to researching??

I have downloaded 3 of Searles' book;

• 1. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (1969)
  2. Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (essay collection; 1979)
  3. Foundations of Illocutionary Logic

His other books, I will look into them;
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (1983)
Minds, Brains and Science: The 1984 Reith Lectures (lecture collection; 1984)

You should wonder how the hell did Searle write a book related to logic if he did not understand nor is aware of the usage of the begging the question fallacy -- and the possibility of begging the question in his "is-ought' proof.

This is all blather and deflection.

If you know what question-begging is, show why my refutation of Searle's argument as question-begging is incorrect. The fact that you think Searle's argument has the same structure as the Socrates inference - which is used to demonstrate validity and (probable) soundness - indicates to me that you really don't understand question-begging. So - prove me wrong.

No, I don't think it's difficult to understand. I just think you don't understand it.

Searle is trying show how a factual assertion (an 'is') can entail a moral assertion (an 'ought'). But in his example - the act of promising - he claims that the 'ought' - a promise ought to be kept - is, as it were, built-in, included, implied, and so on. So his argument doesn't show that the factual premise entails the moral conclusion. He just asserts that the conclusion is part of the premise. And that begs the question.

If you can't show why my refutation of his argument is incorrect, then just bleating that it is incorrect is useless.

Besides, we can make promises that we ought not to keep, because keeping them is immoral. And that falsifies the premise.

And the claim 'we ought not to make promises that we ought not to keep' isn't a factual assertion. it just expresses an opinion.

[Skepdick]

No, I don't think it's difficult to understand. I just think you don't understand it.

If it's not difficult to understand then how come you don't understand it?

According to you it is a fact that you don't want to be murdered.
According to you it is not a fact that you ought not be murdered.

If there is no entailment between the present and future - explain why?

[Veritas Aequitas]

No, I don't think it's difficult to understand. I just think you don't understand it.

Searle is trying show how a factual assertion (an 'is') can entail a moral assertion (an 'ought'). But in his example - the act of promising - he claims that the 'ought' - a promise ought to be kept - is, as it were, built-in, included, implied, and so on. So his argument doesn't show that the factual premise entails the moral conclusion. He just asserts that the conclusion is part of the premise. And that begs the question.

If you can't show why my refutation of his argument is incorrect, then just bleating that it is incorrect is useless.

Besides, we can make promises that we ought not to keep, because keeping them is immoral. And that falsifies the premise.

And the claim 'we ought not to make promises that we ought not to keep' isn't a factual assertion. it just expresses an opinion.

It is very obvious for you to jump to conclusion based on your dogmatic view.
You see an evaluative conclusion and because of your dogmatism, hastily jumped to the conclusion it is 'begging the question' which based on flimsy thinking.

As I had stated you OUGHT to read Searle's full article explaining his argument.

In that paper Searle anticipated the possible objections [yours included] and he provided three, i.e.:

• 1. The charge of begging the question with hidden evaluative elements in 1b.
  
  2. Why Opponents Failed to Understand the existence of Two Tautologies – Three Reasons.
  
  3. Used of oratio oblipua, hence disguised statements of fact - fact/value distinction still exists.

It is so obvious Searle understood basic logic, i.e. it is fallacious and one cannot deduce directly from a descriptive premise to an evaluative conclusion. This is why he did not present the typical 3 line syllogism in this case, but presented his argument within a 15 page paper.

If you note Searle did not jump in stating his P1 plainly as;
Jones made a promise to pay Smith five dollars.

Searle was very specific, i.e. he put it precisely to get to this point;

• (P1) Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars."

The bolded terms has heavy implication in his argument and the point that what is uttered is in inverted commas.

Nothing evaluative is assumed at this stage of P1.
The sense of obligation is only brought forth in P4
which logically follow into P5 as an evaluative conclusion.

In his paper Searle provided detailed explanation on how he moved from P1 to P2 to P3 to P4 and then how the conclusion is deduced.

Besides, we can make promises that we ought not to keep, because keeping them is immoral. And that falsifies the premise.

Seale had also anticipated and covered this by the Ceteris Paribus as in Premise 3a

• (3) Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
  (3a) Other things are equal.

We need the ceteris paribus ="Other things are equal" clause to eliminate the possibility that something extraneous to the relation of "obligation" to "ought" might interfere.5
The force of the expression "other things being equal" in the present instance is roughly this.
Unless we have some reason that is, unless we are actually prepared to give some reason, for supposing
the obligation is void (step 4)
or the agent ought not to keep the promise (step 5),
then the obligation holds and he ought to keep the promise.

As I had stated, you ought to read Searle's full article to ensure what you are to counter him was not accounted for by Searle.
Searle was not a philosopher God, so he could NOT be omniscient but he had at least presented his argument with very high rigor and serious standards.

What you are sticking to is merely theory using crude semantics which is analogous to a surgeon using a blade to do brain surgery, i.e. not taking the very realistic micro details and nuances into considerations.

What Searle argued for is also carried out in practice within various constitutional institutions without giving a damn F to Hume's Law.

One good example are "ought" [presumably moral] are derived from "is" within criminal laws within the constitution of a parliament, e.g.
"No person ought to killing/murder, else s/he will be punished legally"
I believe 99.999% of people in the World are subject to the above 'ought' given the whole world is covered by sovereign nations which had such laws re killing/murder.

I believe the above legal 'ought' is intuitively derived from the natural inherent moral fact,
"no person ought to kill another"
which I had justified empirically and philosophically.

And the claim 'we ought not to make promises that we ought not to keep' isn't a factual assertion. it just expresses an opinion.

As I have argued countless times, 'ought to keep promises' is the same as,
"no person ought to kill another" is a moral fact
which I had justified empirically and philosophically from a moral FSK,
where all FSK produce their specific facts.

[Peter Holmes]

No, I don't think it's difficult to understand. I just think you don't understand it.

Searle is trying show how a factual assertion (an 'is') can entail a moral assertion (an 'ought'). But in his example - the act of promising - he claims that the 'ought' - a promise ought to be kept - is, as it were, built-in, included, implied, and so on. So his argument doesn't show that the factual premise entails the moral conclusion. He just asserts that the conclusion is part of the premise. And that begs the question.

If you can't show why my refutation of his argument is incorrect, then just bleating that it is incorrect is useless.

Besides, we can make promises that we ought not to keep, because keeping them is immoral. And that falsifies the premise.

And the claim 'we ought not to make promises that we ought not to keep' isn't a factual assertion. it just expresses an opinion.

It is very obvious for you to jump to conclusion based on your dogmatic view.
You see an evaluative conclusion and because of your dogmatism, hastily jumped to the conclusion it is 'begging the question' which based on flimsy thinking.

As I had stated you OUGHT to read Searle's full article explaining his argument.

In that paper Searle anticipated the possible objections [yours included] and he provided three, i.e.:

• 1. The charge of begging the question with hidden evaluative elements in 1b.
  
  2. Why Opponents Failed to Understand the existence of Two Tautologies – Three Reasons.
  
  3. Used of oratio oblipua, hence disguised statements of fact - fact/value distinction still exists.

It is so obvious Searle understood basic logic, i.e. it is fallacious and one cannot deduce directly from a descriptive premise to an evaluative conclusion. This is why he did not present the typical 3 line syllogism in this case, but presented his argument within a 15 page paper.

If you note Searle did not jump in stating his P1 plainly as;
Jones made a promise to pay Smith five dollars.

Searle was very specific, i.e. he put it precisely to get to this point;

• (P1) Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars."

The bolded terms has heavy implication in his argument and the point that what is uttered is in inverted commas.

Nothing evaluative is assumed at this stage of P1.
The sense of obligation is only brought forth in P4
which logically follow into P5 as an evaluative conclusion.

In his paper Searle provided detailed explanation on how he moved from P1 to P2 to P3 to P4 and then how the conclusion is deduced.

Besides, we can make promises that we ought not to keep, because keeping them is immoral. And that falsifies the premise.

Seale had also anticipated and covered this by the Ceteris Paribus as in Premise 3a

• (3) Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
  (3a) Other things are equal.

We need the ceteris paribus ="Other things are equal" clause to eliminate the possibility that something extraneous to the relation of "obligation" to "ought" might interfere.5
The force of the expression "other things being equal" in the present instance is roughly this.
Unless we have some reason that is, unless we are actually prepared to give some reason, for supposing
the obligation is void (step 4)
or the agent ought not to keep the promise (step 5),
then the obligation holds and he ought to keep the promise.

As I had stated, you ought to read Searle's full article to ensure what you are to counter him was not accounted for by Searle.
Searle was not a philosopher God, so he could NOT be omniscient but he had at least presented his argument with very high rigor and serious standards.

What you are sticking to is merely theory using crude semantics which is analogous to a surgeon using a blade to do brain surgery, i.e. not taking the very realistic micro details and nuances into considerations.

What Searle argued for is also carried out in practice within various constitutional institutions without giving a damn F to Hume's Law.

One good example are "ought" [presumably moral] are derived from "is" within criminal laws within the constitution of a parliament, e.g.
"No person ought to killing/murder, else s/he will be punished legally"
I believe 99.999% of people in the World are subject to the above 'ought' given the whole world is covered by sovereign nations which had such laws re killing/murder.

I believe the above legal 'ought' is intuitively derived from the natural inherent moral fact,
"no person ought to kill another"
which I had justified empirically and philosophically.

And the claim 'we ought not to make promises that we ought not to keep' isn't a factual assertion. it just expresses an opinion.

As I have argued countless times, 'ought to keep promises' is the same as,
"no person ought to kill another" is a moral fact
which I had justified empirically and philosophically from a moral FSK,
where all FSK produce their specific facts.

The problem with 'other things being equal', is that it assumes or smuggles in premises which need to be explicit. So what are the things that must be the case in order for the premise 'we make promises' to entail - which means 'make logically necessary' - the moral conclusion 'therefore we ought to keep promises'?

You cite what 'other things' need to be equal as follows: 'Unless we have some reason that is, unless we are actually prepared to give some reason, for supposing; the obligation is void (step 4); or the agent ought not to keep the promise (step 5)'. But both of those assume the obligation exists in the first place - which is the question at issue.

My point is that, boiled down, the only thing that can produce the 'ought' entailment is the belief that making a promise entails keeping it - and that begs the question. Yes, in practice, the language game of making promises usually involves making a commitment to keeping them - for obvious reasons. But this has nothing to do with logical entailment - which is why it's not a logical contradiction to break a promise.