'Speech Acts' Relevant to 'Is-Ought' Problem.

[Veritas Aequitas]

The concept of 'Speech Acts' is relevant to the 'Is-Ought' Problem.

In Searle's derivation of 'Ought from Is' argument he relied on the concept of 'Speech Acts' to support his justifications.
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If you like, then, we have shown that "promise" is an evaluative word, but since it is also purely descriptive, we have really shown that the whole distinction needs to be re-examined.
The alleged distinction between descriptive and evaluative statements is really a conflation of at least two distinctions.

On the one hand there is a distinction between different kinds of speech acts, one family of speech acts including evaluations, another family including descriptions.
This is a distinction between different kinds of illocutionary force.9
On the other hand there is a distinction between utterances which involve claims objectively decidable as true or false and those which involve claims not objectively decidable, but which are "matters of personal decision" or "matters of opinion."

It has been assumed that the former distinction is (must be) a special case of the latter, that if something has the illocutionary force of an evaluation, it cannot be entailed by factual premises.

Part of the point of my argument is to show that this contention is false, that factual premises can entail evaluative conclusions.

If I am right, then the alleged distinction between descriptive and evaluative utterances is useful only as a distinction between two kinds of illocutionary force, describing and evaluating,
and it is not even very useful there, since if we are to use these terms strictly, they are only two among hundreds of kinds of illocutionary force; and utterances of sentences of the form (5) "Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars" would not characteristically fall in either class.

Re what is Speech Act,

see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speech_act
In the philosophy of language and linguistics, speech act is something expressed by an individual that not only presents information, but performs an action as well.

Speech acts serve their function once they are said or communicated. These are commonly taken to include acts such as apologizing, promising, ordering, answering, requesting, complaining, warning, inviting, refusing, and congratulating.

The concept of speech acts is contrasted to the views held by Peter Holmes, Sculptor, Pantflasher and their gangs who insist a statement of fact is purely descriptive and never prescriptive like the Logical Positivists insisted, i.e. fact is state of affairs blah, blah, blah,

For much of the history of the positivist philosophy of language, language was viewed primarily as a way of making factual assertions, and the other uses of language tended to be ignored, as Austin states at the beginning of Lecture 1, "It was for too long the assumption of philosophers that the business of a 'statement' can only be to 'describe' some state of affairs, or to 'state some fact', which it must do either truly or falsely."

Therefrom;

Wittgenstein came up with the idea of "don't ask for the meaning, ask for the use," showing language as a new vehicle for social activity.[5] Speech act theory hails from Wittgenstein's philosophical theories. Wittgenstein believed meaning derives from pragmatic tradition, demonstrating the importance of how language is used to accomplish objectives within specific situations. By following rules to accomplish a goal, communication becomes a set of language games. Thus, utterances do more than reflect a meaning, they are words designed to get things done.[6]

And;

The work of J. L. Austin, particularly his How to Do Things with Words, led philosophers to pay more attention to the non-declarative uses of language. The terminology he introduced, especially the notions "locutionary act", "illocutionary act", and "perlocutionary act", occupied an important role in what was then to become the "study of speech acts". All of these three acts, but especially the "illocutionary act", are nowadays commonly classified as "speech acts".

And it was further developed by John Searle;

The speech act theory was introduced by Oxford philosopher J.L. Austin in How to Do Things With Words and further developed by American philosopher J.R. Searle. It considers the degree to which utterances are said to perform locutionary acts, illocutionary acts, and/or perlocutionary acts.
https://www.thoughtco.com/speech-act-theory-1691986#:

Peter Holmes, Sculptor, Pantflasher and gang, what do you have to say to the above and don't keep blaring and clutching to your dogmatic 'fact is fact' and 'value is value' never the twain shall meet, without taking the above into consideration.

View from others?

Cut all the flim flam and the copy&pasting.

There is one way to solve this problem. Give one solid example!
Just one!
And we'll try to show how the argument relies on more than just a set of ises.

Note the Searle's argument where he used the concept of 'constitution of promise'. I have quoted the relevant. See the relevant argument in the link above.

[Sculptor]

The concept of 'Speech Acts' is relevant to the 'Is-Ought' Problem.

In Searle's derivation of 'Ought from Is' argument he relied on the concept of 'Speech Acts' to support his justifications.
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Re what is Speech Act,


The concept of speech acts is contrasted to the views held by Peter Holmes, Sculptor, Pantflasher and their gangs who insist a statement of fact is purely descriptive and never prescriptive like the Logical Positivists insisted, i.e. fact is state of affairs blah, blah, blah,



Therefrom;

And;

And it was further developed by John Searle;




Peter Holmes, Sculptor, Pantflasher and gang, what do you have to say to the above and don't keep blaring and clutching to your dogmatic 'fact is fact' and 'value is value' never the twain shall meet, without taking the above into consideration.

View from others?

Cut all the flim flam and the copy&pasting.

There is one way to solve this problem. Give one solid example!
Just one!
And we'll try to show how the argument relies on more than just a set of ises.

Note the Searle's argument where he used the concept of 'constitution of promise'. I have quoted the relevant. See the relevant argument in the link above.

The (ahem!) "argument" above relies on a supposed conflation of descriptive and evaluative statements. Where none such effectively exists.
Even in a sentence where "is" appears can be evaluative. You have to be dull not to see that "killing is bad", implies an ought, but is not really an "is", as it already contians a judgement that killing ought not be done, because bad things should not happen. In one statement that appears to be an "is", it contains a whole host of preconceptions.
If that is all Searle has got then we might as well dump him in the trash.
I imagine that this is just a willful misunderstanding of Hume and a willful ignorance of the time Hume was living in.

So, in your own words, if there is anything else..
Cut all the flim flam and the copy&pasting.

There is one way to solve this problem. Give one solid example!
Just one!
And we'll try to show how the argument relies on more than just a set of ises.