How to Derive "Ought" From "Is" J. Searle

[Sculptor]

Views to the above argument by John Searle?

Note Searle's argument re Constitution of the Respective Institution is similar to my Framework and System of Knowledge.

Here's a good one.

Searle is a randy old bastard (IS).
Therefore Searle should sexually abuse his co-workers (ought)

And another.
Searle is a really good philosopher (IS)
Therefore Searle's university should fail to follow up on numerous complaints of sexual harrassment by Searle.

Searle is a philospher who does not like Hume (IS)
Therefore Searle ought to re-define what is meant by "factual statements" and the meaning of "evaluative" so as to attempt to undermine a theory he cannot actually achieve. (OUGHT)

[Immanuel Can]

This is what he wrote at the end of the article;

In contrast to all this [all the above arguments, Searles, Margolis, Peter, ..], as Joseph Kaipuyil has observed, “always, ontology precedes ethics, both in theory and in practice.” (Critical Ontology, 2002, p.28.)
What he is saying is that morality is based not on just any kind of neutral observations, but rather on what we believe to be true about the basic nature of reality.

Moral conclusions begin with fundamental premises about existence.

• For example, if we believe in the existence of some kind of Supreme Being (and most particularly, one concerned with morality) then it becomes reasonable to speak of a supreme moral order reflecting this Being’s identity, character and expressed wishes, or perhaps with natural laws established by that Being.

Right. And that's true. But it is the opposite of Searle, who in order to justify his Is-ought scheme, has to imagine that morality does not require such premises. Searle's wrong.

• "So Searle cannot show that it is objectively wrong to break a promise. He can show it messes up the game of promising, but this is short of showing it’s wrong in a wider sense."

He missed the mark.
Searle Title is 'How To Derive 'Ought' from "Is'.
based on "Thick Ethical Concept".

Mentioning the idea of a "thick" ethical concept doesn't help save the case. "Thick" 'just means "a fuller, deeper description," essentially. He's still got to show that the description he offers, however "thin" or "thick," is apt and somehow warrants getting moral precepts from mere empirical facts.

Let's check his case.

Searle thinks that if you make a promise, then you are obligated to keep it, simply because you made it. But why should that be, and how would Searle show that it was true? He would need already to know that there was some prior law written into the universe, that read something like, "Thou shalt not lie," or "Thou shalt play all the games thou playest without cheating at them." But who wrote such a law, and why should we believe Searle about that?

After all, it's not written in the stars. And meanwhile, plenty of people lie and cheat, and by doing so get ahead in the various "games" they play. Searle would need to show such people that what they were doing was already objectively morally wrong, and that they were morally obligated not to depart the rules of the particular promising "game" they were playing. This, he cannot and does not do. So his attempt fails, for lack of that prior principle being established.

Now, you'll note that that critique does not require you to believe in God. It could -- and in fact would -- be raised by someone who was a Nihilist, an Nietzschean, a Relativist, a Pragmatist, or a believer in any one of a dozen other non-religions schools of ethics. Even a Utilitarian would ask, "Why, if I can break the rules and produce more happiness by that means, should I deny myself an opportunity to do so?" and would insist that if much more happiness were generated by a transgressing of the rules of the game, especially for more people, then it would actually conceivably be immoral NOT to cheat in such a case.

So Searle doesn't just have a weakness relative to religious people...he hasn't got an argument that practically any other school of ethics will have reason to accept.

[Belinda]

Where I mentioned 'justifiable' it related to possible and verifiable.
As such the objective of an institution can be good or evil which are justifiable.

It one were to claim the institution is to comprise merely of animals and aliens, that would not be possible in the expected context.

Do you agree with John Searle's argument,
"Ought" can be derived from "Is" ?

I agree with Searle's "an ought can be derived from an is".

In my answer I have proposed humans are social animals whose communities depend upon solidarity which is impossible without honesty. Indeed, dishonest individuals are a drain upon the energy of any community.This naturalistic theory of morality may be verified by any number of examples of honest men versus dishonest men, and of how the community is a tragic one when dishonesty is rampant either through internal aliens(criminals) or external aliens ( invaders/colonists).

We can derive an 'ought' from anything we like, including an 'is'. But an 'is' can never entail an 'ought', so that to negate the 'ought' produces a logical contradiction. The claim that honesty is essential for human society is factual. But the claim that we should be honest is not factual - not true or false.

All moral claims are constructed conditionally . E.g." If you love God then you will obey Him."

(If everybody obeys God then everybody will cooperate.)

E.g. "You should not murder because if murder were legal nobody would be safe."

(If murder is forbidden then everybody is a little safer.)

E.g. " You should give to the refugees charity because refugees need your help"

(If everybody helps everybody else when they are in need then we have more safety and happiness within and among communities).

E.g." I should be vegetarian".
( If I am vegetarian then there will be a little less animal suffering, and a little less waste of natural resources.)
E.g. "You should join ISIS."

(If you join ISIS then you will help to bring the Caliphate.)

NB If p then q does not imply if q then p , applies to all cases.
An ought implies an is.

[Atla]

Entering into a situation of promise is an objective fact.
A contract entered into accepted and signed by two parties is an objective fact.

Yes it's an objective fact that a promise / contract with made up (non-objective) rules happened. Your trick isn't working.

[Veritas Aequitas]

This is what he wrote at the end of the article;

In contrast to all this [all the above arguments, Searles, Margolis, Peter, ..], as Joseph Kaipuyil has observed, “always, ontology precedes ethics, both in theory and in practice.” (Critical Ontology, 2002, p.28.)
What he is saying is that morality is based not on just any kind of neutral observations, but rather on what we believe to be true about the basic nature of reality.

Moral conclusions begin with fundamental premises about existence.

• For example, if we believe in the existence of some kind of Supreme Being (and most particularly, one concerned with morality) then it becomes reasonable to speak of a supreme moral order reflecting this Being’s identity, character and expressed wishes, or perhaps with natural laws established by that Being.

Right. And that's true. But it is the opposite of Searle, who in order to justify his Is-ought scheme, has to imagine that morality does not require such premises. Searle's wrong.

Note a Christian has to enter into a covenant with God [illusory] and thus generate oughts on the operation of that covenant.

However, note my point;
Impossible for God to Exists as Real
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=24704

When you ground your morality in an illusory God, your grounding is an illusion.

• "So Searle cannot show that it is objectively wrong to break a promise. He can show it messes up the game of promising, but this is short of showing it’s wrong in a wider sense."

He missed the mark.
Searle Title is 'How To Derive 'Ought' from "Is'.
based on "Thick Ethical Concept".

Mentioning the idea of a "thick" ethical concept doesn't help save the case. "Thick" 'just means "a fuller, deeper description," essentially. He's still got to show that the description he offers, however "thin" or "thick," is apt and somehow warrants getting moral precepts from mere empirical facts.

Let's check his case.

Searle thinks that if you make a promise, then you are obligated to keep it, simply because you made it. But why should that be, and how would Searle show that it was true? He would need already to know that there was some prior law written into the universe, that read something like, "Thou shalt not lie," or "Thou shalt play all the games thou playest without cheating at them." But who wrote such a law, and why should we believe Searle about that?

After all, it's not written in the stars. And meanwhile, plenty of people lie and cheat, and by doing so get ahead in the various "games" they play. Searle would need to show such people that what they were doing was already objectively morally wrong, and that they were morally obligated not to depart the rules of the particular promising "game" they were playing. This, he cannot and does not do. So his attempt fails, for lack of that prior principle being established.

Now, you'll note that that critique does not require you to believe in God. It could -- and in fact would -- be raised by someone who was a Nihilist, an Nietzschean, a Relativist, a Pragmatist, or a believer in any one of a dozen other non-religions schools of ethics. Even a Utilitarian would ask, "Why, if I can break the rules and produce more happiness by that means, should I deny myself an opportunity to do so?" and would insist that if much more happiness were generated by a transgressing of the rules of the game, especially for more people, then it would actually conceivably be immoral NOT to cheat in such a case.

So Searle doesn't just have a weakness relative to religious people...he hasn't got an argument that practically any other school of ethics will have reason to accept.

Searle argument is proving an 'ought can be derived from is'.
Searle is not arguing about moral contents.

Note Hume rejected the -'ought from is' premise, but he still dealt with moral contents which are disputable.

The fact is, when a contract [promise] is signed and consummated, the ought is invoked logically. This is true and a fact.

Whether the nature and contents of the agreement and promises are good or evil, oughts are automatically generated within promises, i.e. the constitution of promising.

Whether the person making the promise follow through and comply with what is promised does not refute the fact that oughts are generated automatically the moment the contract and promise is made.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I agree with Searle's "an ought can be derived from an is".

In my answer I have proposed humans are social animals whose communities depend upon solidarity which is impossible without honesty. Indeed, dishonest individuals are a drain upon the energy of any community.This naturalistic theory of morality may be verified by any number of examples of honest men versus dishonest men, and of how the community is a tragic one when dishonesty is rampant either through internal aliens(criminals) or external aliens ( invaders/colonists).

We can derive an 'ought' from anything we like, including an 'is'. But an 'is' can never entail an 'ought', so that to negate the 'ought' produces a logical contradiction. The claim that honesty is essential for human society is factual. But the claim that we should be honest is not factual - not true or false.

All moral claims are constructed conditionally . E.g." If you love God then you will obey Him."

(If everybody obeys God then everybody will cooperate.)

E.g. "You should not murder because if murder were legal nobody would be safe."

(If murder is forbidden then everybody is a little safer.)

E.g. " You should give to the refugees charity because refugees need your help"

(If everybody helps everybody else when they are in need then we have more safety and happiness within and among communities).

E.g." I should be vegetarian".
( If I am vegetarian then there will be a little less animal suffering, and a little less waste of natural resources.)
E.g. "You should join ISIS."

(If you join ISIS then you will help to bring the Caliphate.)

NB If p then q does not imply if q then p , applies to all cases.
An ought implies an is.

Good points and well argued.

[Immanuel Can]

However, note my point;
Impossible for God to Exists as Real
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=24704

Not only is your logic wrong there, your grammar isn't even correct.

Searle argument is proving an 'ought can be derived from is'.

It doesn't "prove" that at all. It proposes how Searle hoped, ultimately ineffectively, to bridge the gap.

He failed, for just the reasons I listed above.

[Peter Holmes]

I agree with Searle's "an ought can be derived from an is".

In my answer I have proposed humans are social animals whose communities depend upon solidarity which is impossible without honesty. Indeed, dishonest individuals are a drain upon the energy of any community.This naturalistic theory of morality may be verified by any number of examples of honest men versus dishonest men, and of how the community is a tragic one when dishonesty is rampant either through internal aliens(criminals) or external aliens ( invaders/colonists).

We can derive an 'ought' from anything we like, including an 'is'. But an 'is' can never entail an 'ought', so that to negate the 'ought' produces a logical contradiction. The claim that honesty is essential for human society is factual. But the claim that we should be honest is not factual - not true or false.

All moral claims are constructed conditionally . E.g." If you love God then you will obey Him."

(If everybody obeys God then everybody will cooperate.)

Not so. The claim 'slavery is morally wrong' is unconditional.
And anyway, these are not moral claims. They don't mention right or wrong, good or bad.

E.g. "You should not murder because if murder were legal nobody would be safe."

But why should everyone be safe? That's an opinion - not a fact.

(If murder is forbidden then everybody is a little safer.)

Same point. 'Everyone should be safer' is an opinion - with which I agree - not a fact.

E.g. " You should give to the refugees charity because refugees need your help"

(If everybody helps everybody else when they are in need then we have more safety and happiness within and among communities).

Again, that we should aim for more safety and happiness - with which i agree - is an opinion, not a fact.

E.g." I should be vegetarian".
( If I am vegetarian then there will be a little less animal suffering, and a little less waste of natural resources.)

That we should reduce animal suffering and the waste of resources - with which i agree - is an opinion, not a fact.

E.g. "You should join ISIS."

(If you join ISIS then you will help to bring the Caliphate.)

NB If p then q does not imply if q then p , applies to all cases.
An ought implies an is.

Sorry, not following. I agree a conditional isn't a biconditional. But how can an ought in any way entail an is? Or what does 'imply' mean?

[Veritas Aequitas]

However, note my point;
Impossible for God to Exists as Real
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=24704

Not only is your logic wrong there, your grammar isn't even correct.

It is a heading, no need to be so pedantic.
Grammar is secondary if one can get the point across.

Show me where is my logic wrong in that argument?

Note my argument, morality-proper is independent of God, religion and politic.
Thus bringing in God into a specific and rigorous moral argument is a non-starter.

Searle argument is proving an 'ought can be derived from is'.

It doesn't "prove" that at all. It proposes how Searle hoped, ultimately ineffectively, to bridge the gap.

He failed, for just the reasons I listed above.

Searle provided his argument.
His detailed argument in the other pages of the article, I only provided a summary of few pages.
You have not countered his argument at all, but merely provided superficial remarks.

Note,
When you make a 'promise' to do X to your wife, kin or anyone, it is implied you ought to do X. That is the constitutional fact of promising.
Don't you accept you have a obligation [an ought] to do what you have promise to do?
If you cannot carry out what you ought to do X, at least you would seek consensus from the other party.
If it is a commercial promise, i.e. a contract, you would be sued for compensations if you break the agreed 'ought' on your part.

If verbal, you can intentionally lie you 'promised,' that in essence is not a 'promise' but in truth is a lie.
You can break a promise, but that is beside the point a promise was made in the first place and an ought was invoked corresponding to that promise.

Searle proved an "ought" can be derived from "is" on the principle of 'constitutional fact' as opposed to 'brute facts' where he used the example of a "promise".

Why keeping a promise, i.e. the ought is a moral issue is justified by a load of justifications, e.g. the golden rule, universality, basic human dignity, integrity, reciprocity is inherent in human nature, etc. etc.

[Veritas Aequitas]

We can derive an 'ought' from anything we like, including an 'is'. But an 'is' can never entail an 'ought', so that to negate the 'ought' produces a logical contradiction. The claim that honesty is essential for human society is factual. But the claim that we should be honest is not factual - not true or false.

All moral claims are constructed conditionally . E.g." If you love God then you will obey Him."

(If everybody obeys God then everybody will cooperate.)

Not so. The claim 'slavery is morally wrong' is unconditional.
And anyway, these are not moral claims. They don't mention right or wrong, good or bad.

E.g. "You should not murder because if murder were legal nobody would be safe."

But why should everyone be safe? That's an opinion - not a fact.

(If murder is forbidden then everybody is a little safer.)

Same point. 'Everyone should be safer' is an opinion - with which I agree - not a fact.

E.g. " You should give to the refugees charity because refugees need your help"

(If everybody helps everybody else when they are in need then we have more safety and happiness within and among communities).

Again, that we should aim for more safety and happiness - with which i agree - is an opinion, not a fact.

E.g." I should be vegetarian".
( If I am vegetarian then there will be a little less animal suffering, and a little less waste of natural resources.)

That we should reduce animal suffering and the waste of resources - with which i agree - is an opinion, not a fact.

E.g. "You should join ISIS."

(If you join ISIS then you will help to bring the Caliphate.)

NB If p then q does not imply if q then p , applies to all cases.
An ought implies an is.

Sorry, not following. I agree a conditional isn't a biconditional. But how can an ought in any way entail an is? Or what does 'imply' mean?

There you go with your opinionated 'opinion.'

"Murder is morally wrong" as justified upon a Moral Framework and System is a moral fact and not an opinion.
As Searle had argued, it is a constitutional moral fact.

The ultimate is, if 'murder' is morally right [morality is universal] then it is possible the human species will be extinct [the last surviving man will not last]. This is a moral fact, not an empirical fact as you would expect.

Veganism is either religiously driven or ideological which has nothing to do with morality-proper. It would be preferable that humans are less cruel in their treatment of other living creatures, but that is not a moral obligation per se.

[Immanuel Can]

Show me where is my logic wrong in that argument?

We had this conversation already. You don't seem to get it.

Searle argument is proving an 'ought can be derived from is'.

It doesn't "prove" that at all. It proposes how Searle hoped, ultimately ineffectively, to bridge the gap.

He failed, for just the reasons I listed above.

Searle provided his argument.[/quote]
He did; and his argument was no good. So he "provided" nothing convincing.

When you make a 'promise' to do X to your wife, kin or anyone, it is implied you ought to do X.

No, it's not. All that it shows is that you understand hearer's expectations, and you are using those expectations to make them believe you are going to do X, for some purpose you have in mind. That doesn't show you have an obligation to keep your word. You may be effectively gaming them. What shows that you are "wrong" to do that?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Searle provided his argument.

He did; and his argument was no good. So he "provided" nothing convincing.

You did not justify why Searle's argument is no good other than the noises you have made.

When you make a 'promise' to do X to your wife, kin or anyone, it is implied you ought to do X.

No, it's not. All that it shows is that you understand hearer's expectations, and you are using those expectations to make them believe you are going to do X, for some purpose you have in mind. That doesn't show you have an obligation to keep your word. You may be effectively gaming them. What shows that you are "wrong" to do that?

You missed my point as usual.

When you make a unilateral promise, it is not about the hearer.
In a promise to do X unilaterally, there is already an automatically 'ought' to do X.
If you do not do X, that is besides the point.

With a unilateral promise to yourself, it is more like a personal resolution rather than a promise.
What is critical and of concern is whether the 'promise' made has any moral impact.
If you promise to yourself not to murder anyone again but you then do it again, that would be contravening your own 'ought' and that has moral impact.

Searle argument is against the point,
what is descriptive cannot be prescriptive nor evaluative.
Searle has proved otherwise with an example of a 'promise'.
Thus in the moral context, a prescriptive moral ought can be derived from a descriptive 'is.'

There are examples with 'Thick Ethical Concepts' e.g. the word 'cruel' and hundreds of others. Note this thread I raised.

Thick Ethical Concepts Posed a Challenge to 'No Ought From Is'

I expect it you will just brush it off without reading and tracing it to its essential arguments.

[Immanuel Can]

I expect it you will just brush it off without reading and tracing it to its essential arguments.

Well, you know that the main thing I want to do with my life is live up to your expectations.

I've done much better. I've actually read and understood Searle. So, based on your own comments, it's my guess that that puts me one ahead of where you are right now.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I expect it you will just brush it off without reading and tracing it to its essential arguments.

Well, you know that the main thing I want to do with my life is live up to your expectations.

I've done much better. I've actually read and understood Searle. So, based on your own comments, it's my guess that that puts me one ahead of where you are right now.

If you have read Searle's article how is that you are unable to argue precisely against his points.

Here is the core of Searle's argument in Section I of the paper;

• (1) Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars."
  (2) Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.
  (3) Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
  (4) Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
  (5) Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.

Searle [if you really have read his article] had provided detailed explanation for his above argument.

If you think Searle had failed, you should at least made references to what he stated, and not generating your own noises.

After presenting his argument in Section 1, he presented three objections in Section II.

• Section II
  First 0bjection
  Second Objection
  Third 0bjection

The above would have covered all the objections you raised.
If not, which of your objections are excluded?

[Veritas Aequitas]

To make his argument clearer, Searle expanded his argument with additional premises, i.e.

• (1) Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars."
  
  • (1a) Under certain conditions C anyone who utters the words (sentence) "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars" promises to pay Smith five dollars.
    (1b) Conditions C obtain.
  
  (2) Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.
  
  • (2a) All promises are acts of placing oneself (undertaking) an obligation to do the thing promised.
  
  (3) Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
  
  • (3a) Other things are equal.
    (3b) All those who place themselves under an obligation are, other things being equal, under an obligation
  
  (4) Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
  
  • (4a) Other things are equal.
  
  (5) Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.