There are no moral facts

[Ishamael]

Not sure of your precise point.
If you are not sure of 'what is a fact' this is the thread to explore;

What is a Fact?
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29486
The moral fact deniers has a different definition of 'fact' from the norm.

If you are not sure whether there are moral facts, then this thread;

• There are Moral Facts
  viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29777

If you do not agree there are moral facts, then, provide your arguments and justifications.

If you are accept there are moral facts, don't expect the moral-facts-denier to be "gentle", they will simply tear you to pieces as driven by their dogmatic ideology.

I'll start by thanking you for linking the relevant threads, just in case I hadn't read them. But rather than having issues with understanding them, I've taken issue with the way they've been accepted/posed.

So, I'll try to be more clear as to my arguments here.

I'll say that there are 2 ways that we can look at morality: Morality is objective; and, Morality is not objective.
Personally, I believe the former is a superior argument to the latter, but that's for a different thread.
I'm going to continue on the assumption of truth for morality being objective. You want to approach these arguments from the presumption that it is not objective, just let me know. I just think that argument is less interesting.

I'd say that, independently of us, moral facts would not exist. Only moral truths would exist.

P1: Facts are not truths, because 100% of empirical evidence is circumstantial.
P2: Truths exist independent of experience and verification, and must be discovered not created.
P3: If morality is objective, then morality exists independent of experience and verification.
C: There are no moral facts, only moral truths.

Now, as with everything in life, humans seem to personalize concepts. If you take the argument above from a personal perspective, we still need to discover what those "truths" are. Until we are able to verify the claims we make, they remain unverified -- facts. I suppose that argument would look like this:

Definition: Unverified claims, which aim to tell us something about the universe, are facts.
P1: Truths are accessible through the logical verification of facts, beyond circumstantial evidence.
P2: Facts only have utility when truths are not immediately apparent.
P3: Truths are not immediately apparent to moral agents, and must be discovered through verification.
C: Moral facts exist, only within the purview of a moral agent.

Would that not mean that the only way facts/moral facts exist is because of the fallibility of humanity? Hell, the fallibility of any agent with a perspective limited by experience and a faculty of logic that must develop?

[Peter Holmes]

Moral condemnation does not 'invoke the agreement of others'...

Then explain what "this is wrong" means, more than "Peter doesn't happen to like X." If you can't, then you're obviously wrong about that. A condemnation that is strictly private is no moral condemnation at all.

Rubbish. There's no reason why moral condemnation must be public to be real or valid. You're talking nonsense. And my condemnation of slavery isn't 'private' anyway. I'm proud to proclaim it from the rooftops - and to condemn you for condoning slavery while pretending that you don't. Rank hypocrisy.

In fact, at least in many cases, it just might be effectively the same as silent complicity: "I refuse to condemn in general or in public, so I will passively permit anyone who does it to keep doing it."

Crap.

But you say there is no factual basis whatsoever to justify your condemnation beyond the level of "Peter doesn't like.." for you insist,

And you ask,

Because you can't expect anyone else to feel they SHOULD agree with your alleged condemnation.

More nonsense. I can provide strong justifications for my moral opinions.

But you say that you don't expect anyone else to have to listen to those justifications. They're just Peter's opinions with, you say, no agreement by others required. So they aren't justifications for anyone else. You insist they have no public or universal implications.

Fine "justification," that: so weak nobody else needs to take it to heart.

More bollocks. Is moral condemnation real only if we expect others to agree with us, and can make them do so? This is some kind of perversion of morality - consonant with your craven moral submission to a devil, perhaps.

So you're not actually condemning those things at all...you're just saying, by implication of your above theory, "Peter doesn't happen to like them; but if you others do, go ahead, because I have no basis to say otherwise." I doubt that such a pseudo-condemnation gives any consolation to the victims of the crimes you're avoiding really condemning. In fact, if you hold that theory, you're allowing that such evils could flourish without any legitimated moral censure, let alone a collective penalty or justice.

Bollocks. My condemnation of slavery is perfectly rational.

Who are you "rationalizing" to? You don't need a "rationalization," since you say you're not convincing anybody else. You're just talking about your own "opinion," you say, which you seem to need to "rationalize" to yourself, you say, but in which you have so little general confidence you don't think you can make any public or universal case for it.

Don't be pathetic. Rationality and rationalisation are completely different things.

And your lack of a moral compass - 'whatever I think my invented thinks is morally good and bad is morally good and bad' - is, frankly, reprehensible.

That's not anything like what I said, but I find your feigned moral indignation invoked in misrepresenting it not only disingenuous, but actually funny...and given your view, irrational.

It's an accurate account of your position. Don't lie.

What does your indignation, after all, actually signal? Nothing can anything be "reprehensible" objectively when you don't think any of your moral "opinions" can be obligatory for a single other person on earth. Nobody then needs to "reprehend" anything.

Instead, it just means, "Peter doesn't like it," again. Is anyone obligated to care what Peter happens to like or dislike? You haven't shown that they are.

Take your "slavery" case, since we agree it's evil. Explain what you mean by your condemnation of it, but do that without implying anyone else has to agree. Because those are the terms you've set for yourself: morality does not invoke the agreement of others, you said.

And I stand by it. The slavery condoned by the buybull devil you worship was, is and always will be wicked - in my opinion. I can explain why that's my opinion rationally, but it remains an opinion. I'm glad others share this opnion widely now, so that the wickedness perpetrated by those who used biblical justification for their wickedness is at least less publically prevalent than it was. But to claim that others have to agree with me is absurd. That's what moral objectivist fascists do, and have always done.

[Immanuel Can]

Moral condemnation does not 'invoke the agreement of others'...

Then explain what "this is wrong" means, more than "Peter doesn't happen to like X." If you can't, then you're obviously wrong about that. A condemnation that is strictly private is no moral condemnation at all.

Rubbish.

Can't do it. I see.

In fact, at least in many cases, it just might be effectively the same as silent complicity: "I refuse to condemn in general or in public, so I will passively permit anyone who does it to keep doing it."

Crap.

You're growing less articulate and intelligible by the moment. No refutation, just reference to refuse.

More nonsense. I can provide strong justifications for my moral opinions.

But you say that you don't expect anyone else to have to listen to those justifications. They're just Peter's opinions with, you say, no agreement by others required. So they aren't justifications for anyone else. You insist they have no public or universal implications.

Fine "justification," that: so weak nobody else needs to take it to heart.

More bollocks.

Speak on, great sage.

Is moral condemnation real only if we expect others to agree with us,

Yes.

Don't you provide reasons in the expectation others will come to agree with you? Everybody else does.

And don't you provide justifications so as to reassure yourself (and others) that you are correct or warranted in your judgments? Everyone else does.

Bollocks. My condemnation of slavery is perfectly rational.

Who are you "rationalizing" to? You don't need a "rationalization," since you say you're not convincing anybody else. You're just talking about your own "opinion," you say, which you seem to need to "rationalize" to yourself, you say, but in which you have so little general confidence you don't think you can make any public or universal case for it.

Don't be pathetic. Rationality and rationalisation are completely different things.

In this context, rationality is what one shows when one provides reasons, which then demonstrates rationalization of a position. "Rationality" is a noun concept of which "rationalization," in my present usage, is straightforwardly the verb form of the same.

Take your "slavery" case, since we agree it's evil. Explain what you mean by your condemnation of it, but do that without implying anyone else has to agree. Because those are the terms you've set for yourself: morality does not invoke the agreement of others, you said.

And I stand by it.

Nobody cares.

Your opinion, you said yourself, has no implications for other people. What does it matter if you "stand by" something? Why should that impress anyone? In their world, you may not even be right. And you refuse to admit the implication of showing rationality for your view, so you've got no means to persuade them, even if you -- in defiance of your own claim -- decided you wanted to.

So how does "Peter does not like slavery" translate to "It is wrong to enslave people?" Is it a moral imperative that everybody must like what Peter likes? Or does Peter not really care about slavery enough to condemn it in any way that might actually make a difference?

[Peter Holmes]

Then explain what "this is wrong" means, more than "Peter doesn't happen to like X." If you can't, then you're obviously wrong about that. A condemnation that is strictly private is no moral condemnation at all.

Rubbish.

Can't do it. I see.

In fact, at least in many cases, it just might be effectively the same as silent complicity: "I refuse to condemn in general or in public, so I will passively permit anyone who does it to keep doing it."

Crap.

You're growing less articulate and intelligible by the moment. No refutation, just reference to refuse.

But you say that you don't expect anyone else to have to listen to those justifications. They're just Peter's opinions with, you say, no agreement by others required. So they aren't justifications for anyone else. You insist they have no public or universal implications.

Fine "justification," that: so weak nobody else needs to take it to heart.

More bollocks.

Speak on, great sage.

Is moral condemnation real only if we expect others to agree with us,

Yes.

Don't you provide reasons in the expectation others will come to agree with you? Everybody else does.

And don't you provide justifications so as to reassure yourself (and others) that you are correct or warranted in your judgments? Everyone else does.

Who are you "rationalizing" to? You don't need a "rationalization," since you say you're not convincing anybody else. You're just talking about your own "opinion," you say, which you seem to need to "rationalize" to yourself, you say, but in which you have so little general confidence you don't think you can make any public or universal case for it.

Don't be pathetic. Rationality and rationalisation are completely different things.

In this context, rationality is what one shows when one provides reasons, which then demonstrates rationalization of a position. "Rationality" is a noun concept of which "rationalization," in my present usage, is straightforwardly the verb form of the same.

Take your "slavery" case, since we agree it's evil. Explain what you mean by your condemnation of it, but do that without implying anyone else has to agree. Because those are the terms you've set for yourself: morality does not invoke the agreement of others, you said.

And I stand by it.

Nobody cares.

Your opinion, you said yourself, has no implications for other people. What does it matter if you "stand by" something? Why should that impress anyone? In their world, you may not even be right. And you refuse to admit the implication of showing rationality for your view, so you've got no means to persuade them, even if you -- in defiance of your own claim -- decided you wanted to.

So how does "Peter does not like slavery" translate to "It is wrong to enslave people?" Is it a moral imperative that everybody must like what Peter likes? Or does Peter not really care about slavery enough to condemn it in any way that might actually make a difference?

This is unbelievably tedious, as ever. You can't demonstrate moral objectivity - you can't produce a moral fact - so you deflect attention from that failure. WAFWOT.

[Ishamael]

Take your "slavery" case, since we agree it's evil. Explain what you mean by your condemnation of it, but do that without implying anyone else has to agree. Because those are the terms you've set for yourself: morality does not invoke the agreement of others, you said.

And I stand by it.

So how does "Peter does not like slavery" translate to "It is wrong to enslave people?" Is it a moral imperative that everybody must like what Peter likes? Or does Peter not really care about slavery enough to condemn it in any way that might actually make a difference?

What if it's not a matter of "Peter does not like slavery, therefore it is wrong to enslave people"? What if it's a matter of "Peter does not like slavery, and we ought to respect the presence of that opinion as we interact with him"?

You can't demonstrate moral objectivity - you can't produce a moral fact - so you deflect attention from that failure. WAFWOT.

Would moral objectivity not be that underlying principle that is guiding us to proper interactions with each other? Rather than it being the content of the moral fact that an individual is espousing, moral objectivity would be an independent principle that tells us to take that opinion and weigh it.

"Christian believes that abortion is wrong. Sarah believes that abortion isn't wrong, but an exercising of her personal rights to choose." Both are two sides of the same abortion coin. Morality isn't the content of the values they hold, as values can shift. However, the importance of each agent holding a value could be considered a moral imperative. There's your objective morality.

[Sculptor]

Again, the opposite is historically true.

All ancient societies had concepts of gods, or in the case of the Hebrews, the God. Invention and tools are about equally old, so far as we know. "Science" on the other hand, did not emerge until the 17th Century A.D.

You have to have a very wretched view of science to say that.

Oh, Sculpy...you're back. How nice of you to return.

You might also want to look at the etymology of science too.

Do you think the pyramids were made without science; or Stonehenge?

[Immanuel Can]

This is unbelievably tedious, as ever. WAFWOT.

Run, Peter, run.

You can't answer the question. How is the claim "Peter doesn't like X" important to anyone but Peter? And how is that "moral"?

[Immanuel Can]

And I stand by it.

So how does "Peter does not like slavery" translate to "It is wrong to enslave people?" Is it a moral imperative that everybody must like what Peter likes? Or does Peter not really care about slavery enough to condemn it in any way that might actually make a difference?

What if it's not a matter of "Peter does not like slavery, therefore it is wrong to enslave people"? What if it's a matter of "Peter does not like slavery, and we ought to respect the presence of that opinion as we interact with him"?

Well, what does "respect the presence of that opinion" mean? Do you mean "be scared to disagree with him, if we think he's wrong"? Do you mean, "Not have slaves, while Peter is watching?" Does it mean "lying to him, and saying he's right when he's not, so he will like us"? Or does it mean, "Not doing philosophy because a name is attached to the idea expressed"?

What does that phrase mean, as you see it?

Or does "respecting the presence of his opinion" mean "treating his claim as a serious philosophical postulate, and thus putting it to the test of logic"?

I'll vote for the latter.

Would moral objectivity not be that underlying principle that is guiding us to proper interactions with each other?

What is "proper"? And what is the "underlying principle" of which you speak, that is "guiding us"? If it's real, I think you should be able to say what it is.

Rather than it being the content of the moral fact that an individual is espousing, moral objectivity would be an independent principle that tells us to take that opinion and weigh it.

How do you "weigh" something for which you don't allow there to be a scale? Peter says there are no objective moral values, and in fact, his own moral claims only impinge on himself. So what do you use to "weigh" his view?

"Christian believes that abortion is wrong. Sarah believes that abortion isn't wrong, but an exercising of her personal rights to choose."

One causes a human being to die, torn apart horribly. The other harms nobody, and preserves all human life. And you say they're "two sides of the same coin"? Not to the victims, they're not...and in that term "victim," I include not only the baby but the woman who has been violated and will have to live thereafter with the knowledge she murdered a child she could have brought into the world.

In that equation, nobody wins but the Planned Parenthood abortion "doctor," who picks up the fee for the butchery and sells the child's body parts afterward. All other participants lose.

[Immanuel Can]

[Do you think the pyramids were made without science; or Stonehenge?

Silly boy.

He thinks every use of a tool, every wheel, hammer or chisel, every potion cooked up in a shaman's pot is "science."

Better look up "scientific method."

[Sculptor]

[Do you think the pyramids were made without science; or Stonehenge?

Silly boy.

He thinks every use of a tool, every wheel, hammer or chisel, every potion cooked up in a shaman's pot is "science."

Better look up "scientific method."

Moron

[Ishamael]

You can't answer the question. How is the claim "Peter doesn't like X" important to anyone but Peter? And how is that "moral"?

But you're recognizing the wrong question. It isn't a question of why the content of Peter's claim is important to anyone, because the content is a value a part of Peter's personal ethics. Personal ethics =/= moral truth. Thus, questioning that content makes the question a bad question.

It's a matter of why Peter making any claim is important to anyone but Peter. Well, you and I make claims. All moral agents make claims, and then take what they believe (values) and make it apart of their personal ethics. The morality is found in the importance of the right we have: To make a claim, hold a value, and make it part of our personal ethic.

Following this, we can see that if we have that ability to make those claims and hold those values, others do as well. Still, the content of those values/claims is not what's in question yet (You need to work from the ground up). What's in question is "why should we take that person's claims/value set seriously?"
Well, perhaps if we take their's seriously, then they will take our's seriously?
That would mean that there is value in people's opinions being taken in as claims with some value to them.

Would moral objectivity not be that underlying principle that is guiding us to proper interactions with each other?

What is "proper"? And what is the "underlying principle" of which you speak, that is "guiding us"? If it's real, I think you should be able to say what it is.

Now, we're starting to look at morality from a basis of "underlying principles" that guide our interactions with each other. AND it is something that exists outside of the content of our opinions. Meaning it protects our opinions.

How do you "weigh" something for which you don't allow there to be a scale? Peter says there are no objective moral values, and in fact, his own moral claims only impinge on himself. So what do you use to "weigh" his view?

What's comical here is that the mere denial of a scale for measure does not a lack of scale for measure make. If Peter is saying that there are no objective moral values, I agree with him. However, I agree in that values are dynamic and slave to forces, whereas objective morality is not dynamic. The idea of an independently existing system, to govern our willful behaviour, must be discover-able not alterable.

Saying "there are no objective moral values" is accurate. Saying "objective moral values are synonymous with objective moral truths" is false.

One causes a human being to die, torn apart horribly. The other harms nobody, and preserves all human life. And you say they're "two sides of the same coin"? Not to the victims, they're not...and in that term "victim," I include not only the baby but the woman who has been violated and will have to live thereafter with the knowledge she murdered a child she could have brought into the world.

In that equation, nobody wins but the Planned Parenthood abortion "doctor," who picks up the fee for the butchery and sells the child's body parts afterward. All other participants lose.

Of the coin of for or against abortion, there is a position for it and a position against it. Your phrasing of these couple paragraphs is just one method of arguing against abortion. The content of whether or not abortion is right or wrong is not as morally important here as myself granting value to your stance of abortion.
Why?
Because if I do not grant your position any value, then I cannot discuss the content of your position with you in a meaningful and productive way. After we set that groundwork of our interaction, I can then look into your content and discuss you. The example I gave of abortion was not to say that I had an answer to the topic, but to show you that, regardless of the side in a debate, you have to grant value to other views for meaningful and productive results.

By measure of discovering moral truths, you can only achieve that productively. So, another attempt at perceiving a moral truth is the fact that we ought to approach morality productively, for the best chance of applying reason.

[Sculptor]

"Morals are formed out of a person's values. Values are the foundation of a person's ability to judge between right and wrong. Morals build on this to form specific, context-driven rules that govern a person's behavior. They're formed from a person's life experience and are subject to opinion.

For example, someone's morals might indicate they're opposed to murder. That's a pretty general rule of thumb. But what about something more mundane? While one person's morals might tell them not to gossip, another person's morals might be quite different. They might not consider gossip to be a bad thing. Consider the following examples of morals and see how many line up with your core values and beliefs."
https://examples.yourdictionary.com/exa ... orals.html

The idea that there are moral facts, or that moral rules are objectively true seems to be reserved to a small confused cadre of posters, since it does not appear in any serious philosophical literature.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/

[Ishamael]

"Morals are formed out of a person's values. Values are the foundation of a person's ability to judge between right and wrong. Morals build on this to form specific, context-driven rules that govern a person's behavior. They're formed from a person's life experience and are subject to opinion.

I challenge that. First off, claiming that "values are the foundation" puts the cart before the horse, as you don't adopt values until after you've judged. Thus, values are the results of a person's ability to judge between right and wrong, which is directly impacted by a person's life experiences and rearing. Values are subject to opinion, as they are also subject to change.

Even if we play fast and loose with the correlation of "morals" to "morality", the difference between a moral (by that definition) and a moral truth, by my definition, can be seen in the nature of the weight that an individual chooses to place on those "life experiences". It isn't a moral/value that governs your decision to take one experience and apply reason to it. It's a matter of some inherent moral truth given to the idea that "you ought to grant value to all opinions, experiences, and personal values". Otherwise, you cannot subject anything to opinion. You cannot have productive discourse. It also devalues your own opinions' inherent importance, in relation to other people.

For example, someone's morals might indicate they're opposed to murder. That's a pretty general rule of thumb. But what about something more mundane? While one person's morals might tell them not to gossip, another person's morals might be quite different. They might not consider gossip to be a bad thing. Consider the following examples of morals and see how many line up with your core values and beliefs."
https://examples.yourdictionary.com/exa ... orals.html

The example is also another example of the difference between a moral truth and a person's personal value. It also shows a massive flaw: If you kill someone that believes killing isn't immoral --whereas you do believe it's immoral, who's view of immorality is correct? The victim might have given you a pass. Removed from yourself, you'd say you were guilty. Now facing the inevitable jail-time or punishment, you might all of a sudden change your opinion of what is or isn't immoral about killing. That's not a moral truth, that's flip-flopping on a value.

Personal values =/= morality.

The idea that there are moral facts, or that moral rules are objectively true seems to be reserved to a small confused cadre of posters, since it does not appear in any serious philosophical literature.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/

Argument appealing to authority. The intricacies of the impact Barney and Friends has on the development of children's values, during their formative years also doesn't appear in any serious philosophical literature. Does that mean that a discussion, about the morality behind the benefits and issues that conditioning children from such a young age, when they haven't the ability think for themselves, isn't allowed?

Or perhaps you believe that we aren't here to discuss these finer points of morality, so it's easier to say "Stanford doesn't worry about it, neither should we"? Do you really believe that is a good enough argument to pass here, when you still haven't challenge any part of what I've said?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Not sure of your precise point.
If you are not sure of 'what is a fact' this is the thread to explore;

What is a Fact?
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29486
The moral fact deniers has a different definition of 'fact' from the norm.

If you are not sure whether there are moral facts, then this thread;

• There are Moral Facts
  viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29777

If you do not agree there are moral facts, then, provide your arguments and justifications.

If you are accept there are moral facts, don't expect the moral-facts-denier to be "gentle", they will simply tear you to pieces as driven by their dogmatic ideology.

I'll start by thanking you for linking the relevant threads, just in case I hadn't read them. But rather than having issues with understanding them, I've taken issue with the way they've been accepted/posed.

So, I'll try to be more clear as to my arguments here.

I'll say that there are 2 ways that we can look at morality: Morality is objective; and, Morality is not objective.
Personally, I believe the former is a superior argument to the latter, but that's for a different thread.
I'm going to continue on the assumption of truth for morality being objective. You want to approach these arguments from the presumption that it is not objective, just let me know. I just think that argument is less interesting.

My position is 'Morality is Objective'.
Objective = justified true beliefs and are independent of individuals opinions and beliefs

I have been arguing my position in these threads;

• What could make morality objective?
  viewtopic.php?f=8&t=24601
  
  Is morality objective or subjective?
  viewtopic.php?f=8&t=24531
  
  What could make morality objective? 2
  viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29390

Your views 'Morality is objective' would be very much welcome in the above threads.

I'd say that, independently of us, moral facts would not exist. Only moral truths would exist.

P1: Facts are not truths, because 100% of empirical evidence is circumstantial.
P2: Truths exist independent of experience and verification, and must be discovered not created.
P3: If morality is objective, then morality exists independent of experience and verification.
C: There are no moral facts, only moral truths.

I view facts as synonymous with truths, knowledge and justified true beliefs. The difference is merely different degrees, contexts and perspectives.

Generally, truth is also fact

• Truth:
  -The quality or state of being true.
  -That which is true or in accordance with fact or reality.
  -A fact or belief that is accepted as true.
  https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/truth

Philosophically, truth is also fact

• Facts may be understood as information that makes a true sentence true.[13] Facts may also be understood as those things to which a true sentence refers. The statement "Jupiter is the largest planet in the solar system" is about the fact Jupiter is the largest planet in the solar system.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fact

There are two perspective to objectivity, i.e. absolute objectivity and relative objective.
While I view Morality as objective, it is only relatively objective, i.e. ultimately it is interdependent with the human conditions.
What is absolute objectivity is claimed by theists, i.e. moral facts are from an absolute God.

However note my argument;

• God is an Impossible to be real
  viewtopic.php?f=11&t=24704

Therefore there is no absolute objective morality from a non-existent God.

The other objective morality I do not accept is those related to Platonic Forms or Ideas.

What are moral facts to me must be justified and/or justifiable empirically and philosophically.

Now, as with everything in life, humans seem to personalize concepts. If you take the argument above from a personal perspective, we still need to discover what those "truths" are. Until we are able to verify the claims we make, they remain unverified -- facts. I suppose that argument would look like this:

Definition: Unverified claims, which aim to tell us something about the universe, are facts.
P1: Truths are accessible through the logical verification of facts, beyond circumstantial evidence.
P2: Facts only have utility when truths are not immediately apparent.
P3: Truths are not immediately apparent to moral agents, and must be discovered through verification.
C: Moral facts exist, only within the purview of a moral agent.

Would that not mean that the only way facts/moral facts exist is because of the fallibility of humanity? Hell, the fallibility of any agent with a perspective limited by experience and a faculty of logic that must develop?

At the more refined philosophical level, I do not agree truths pre-exist and are waiting for humans to discover them.
What is facts, truths, knowledge and reality are emergence with humans as contributors;

• Reality is an Emergence
  viewtopic.php?f=5&t=28671

There is no reality that exists independently by itself.

True, when we reflect philosophically we are bound to reach an infinite regression, therefrom Wittgenstein's maxim applies;

"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." (Tractatus 7)

[Veritas Aequitas]

Note: all your above moral-facts-denying impulses are not based on sound reasoning but merely based on an active ideological impulse - where its origin is from the Logical Positivists. I will prepare a justification on this thesis later.

There are a long list of very good reasons why the Logical-Positivists are thoroughly discredited in the dusts of 20thC history.
LP has failed to produce anything of worth. The first glimmmers of LP started nearly 100 years ago, but by 1970 was as dead as a duck.
It had nothing to offer then and nothing is going to change that.

Your arguments do not come near to their formulation which were clever but useless. Your argument is too full of holes to get near to what their vision was. So how much less worthy is your position?

LP is now a dead duck, but a lot of its principles are still adopted by the Analytic Philosophy and people like you in arguing on 'what is fact' which is no different from what the LPs argued as 'fact'.

You missed my point?
I meant I will produce an explanation [later] on how your view of 'what is fact' is inherited from the bastardized philosophy of the logical positivists.