What could make morality objective?

[Immanuel Can]

At the risk of being misunderstood and having to explain forever what I mean... If I ask the same question of each of the other commandments would you have the same answer, that it is moral to obey the commandment and immoral to disobey it?

Well, with certain provisos. For example, the commandment to Sabbath-keep is directed specifically to Jewish people, because Christ clarified Sabbath-keeping beyond a mere adherence to a policy of no-working, and the early Christians met on "the first day of the week," i.e. Sunday, not the Sabbath. Not all Christians believe even that commandment is not universal -- Seventh Day Adventists, for example. They're strict sabbatarians.

On the other hand, "Thou shalt not commit adultery" is obviously universal, as is "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God...," because both are affirmed in the New Testament as well as the Old.

But I'm pretty sure that question was preliminary to something else, no?

[RCSaunders]

No. I mean it's sentient it feels pain and terror.

It might, but you cannot possibly know it. You cannot even know what the conscious experience of another human being is, much less a bird.

[Sculptor]

As I had stated you are trapped in a very tall and tight silo in this case.
Your thinking is kindergartenish and attitude childish.

Note the alternative views;

It's like talking to a brick wall.
Moral justifications are not objective.
There is no escape from it, and it is clear that you have not advanced your absurd claims by one inch.
You are started with the assumption that life is sacred. There is not objective statement able to establish this claim, but buckets of empirical evidence to say that it cannot be so.

Btw, after refreshing on Hume's Treatise and Enquiry, I have by now read more that 40 articles [including part of books] on the topic of 'what is morality'.
From my readings of morality extensively and deeply, it tell me your thinking re Morality & Ethics is too shallow and narrow - i.e. kindergartenish. In fact, you are a very thick brick wall.

As a counter to your above ignorance on 'what is morality' note my response to Peter above.

What is objective is independent from the individuals' opinion and beliefs.
As long as the judgment is collective, it is objective as qualified to a Framework of Knowledge, e.g. the Scientific Framework with its Scientific Method, peer reviews, etc.
Moral judgments as moral facts are objective since they are independent of individuals' opinion and beliefs from a Moral Framework.

Nope I do not start from the assumption that life is sacred.
I started with empirical evidences with scientific justifications from the Scientific Framework, using logical and philosophical reasoning to arrive moral judgments [objective] from within a specified Moral Framework.

Your bucket of empirical evidences are merely various forms and deviations from the fundamental [substance] objective standards.
We had used the example of 'hunger' which is fundamental and generic [of substance] to ALL humans, but how each individual and group resolve their hunger is of infinite forms of producing, processing and taking in the essential food and nutrients.
I anticipate this critical point will not even 'blink' on your cheapskate radar.

Please refer to the statements I made above.
Please look up definitions of "objective", and "fact".

[RCSaunders]

At the risk of being misunderstood and having to explain forever what I mean... If I ask the same question of each of the other commandments would you have the same answer, that it is moral to obey the commandment and immoral to disobey it?

Well, with certain provisos. For example, the commandment to Sabbath-keep is directed specifically to Jewish people, because Christ clarified Sabbath-keeping beyond a mere adherence to a policy of no-working, and the early Christians met on "the first day of the week," i.e. Sunday, not the Sabbath. Not all Christians believe even that commandment is not universal -- Seventh Day Adventists, for example. They're strict sabbatarians.

On the other hand, "Thou shalt not commit adultery" is obviously universal, as is "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God...," because both are affirmed in the New Testament as well as the Old.

But I'm pretty sure that question was preliminary to something else, no?

I do have another question, suggested by your using the New Testament to explain the change of the Sabbath from last day of the week to the first.

Do you also accept the New Testament interpretation of what it means to, "honor," one's father and mother meaning, "obey," one's father and mother.

Children, obey your parents in the Lord: for this is right. Honour thy father and mother; (which is the first commandment with promise;) That it may be well with thee, and thou mayest live long on the earth. [Eph. 6:1-3] [also Col. 3:20]

As part of that question, since it is taught in both the Old and New Testament, would it be moral to execute disobedient children?

And he that smiteth his father, or his mother, shall be surely put to death. [Exodus 21:15]

If a man have a stubborn and rebellious son, which will not obey the voice of his father, or the voice of his mother, and [that], when they have chastened him, will not hearken unto them: Then shall his father and his mother lay hold on him, and bring him out unto the elders of his city, and unto the gate of his place; And they shall say unto the elders of his city, This our son [is] stubborn and rebellious, he will not obey our voice; [he is] a glutton, and a drunkard. And all the men of his city shall stone him with stones, that he die: so shalt thou put evil away from among you; and all Israel shall hear, and fear. [Deuteronomy 21:18-21]

For God commanded, saying, Honour thy father and mother: and, He that curseth father or mother, let him die the death. [Matt. 15:4] (Jesus explaining to the scribes and Pharisees what the law of God actually is.)

Comment, if you choose to.

[RCSaunders]

Lying to someone intent on doing you harm to prevent that harm is actually a virtue. I always lie on all government question forms because I regard the government a dangerous enemy.

Bein' untruthful with an enemy is self-defense. Lyin' to an ally or non-adversarial stranger is wrong.


Doesn't every animal belong to itself?

Not all; mebbe some.


I have no interest in any principles that only tells me what not to do.

Me neither. I do have an interest in certain codifications of principle (fact/moral fact). For me, those codifications are the equivalent of a fence (makin' for good neighbors).

I won't lie to you and we certainly have no quarrel about the facts. Our approach is different, but if push comes to shove, we'll be on the same side.

[Immanuel Can]

I do have another question, suggested by your using the New Testament to explain the change of the Sabbath from last day of the week to the first.

Sure...go ahead.

Do you also accept the New Testament interpretation of what it means to, "honor," one's father and mother meaning, "obey," one's father and mother.

Ceteris paribus, yes. But it's clear that commandment is only ceteris paribus.

It's not absolute, because the NT also makes it clear there is a hierarchy of authority, with loyalty to God being the highest value. So no human authority, whether parent or government, can command a Christian to do something God has commanded him/her not to do, or to do anything that violates the spirit or letter of duty to God. As Peter said, "We must obey God rather than men." (Act 5:29). But all else being equal...that is, the parents not commanding something immoral, children should obey their parents.

Do you think otherwise? I wouldn't think so.

As for the OT injunctions, they have to do with the legal system of the nation of Israel. What's more, we don't have a single instance of this threat amounting to more than a threat...it seems to have proved an effective deterrent, with no fatalities, so far as we know. So I doubt you have to stay up at night weeping over how many ancient Jewish teens were stoned for rebellion against parents. You might only be imagining that.

Additionally, there are no injunctions as to how common law is to be shaped in the New Testaments, and none at all for Gentiles. In fact, the New Testament has no political, legal or governmental program, save the injunction that (again, ceteris paribus) secular authorities are to be obeyed too.

What's transferrable, though is that God is clearly no lover of rebels, and that Christians have a duty to respect both secular authorities, even those unsympathetic, as the caesars were, and paternal/maternal authority as well. Under all ordinary circumstances, human authorities are to be respected and obeyed -- save when their demands come into conflict with one's relationship with God, which is always primary.

Why the sudden concern for Torah Law?

[Veritas Aequitas]

And your source for these two claims is...?

I have gone through this before.

Not with me, if you have.

We have, I will search when free.

Basically it is because ALL normal humans are endowed...etc.

No, no...not that. I really don't care about your own wild guesses: they don't constitute any evidence of anything. I've heard those, alright.

I'm asking for your DNA evidence. I want proof of this link between DNA and "programming" to have an existential crisis, that translates, in your telling, into religious enthusiasm.

Cite the research. That's what I want.

You can make your own inference from common knowledge of genetics;

• Basically it is because ALL normal humans are endowed with a high self-consciousness to trigger a cognitive dissonance between the evident "must survive at all costs" with the fact of inevitable mortality. This is the dilemma and existential crisis.

1. Where did your own inherent self-consciousness and that of all normal humans came from? if it is not already "preprogrammed" in your DNA/RNA handed down from your parents and their human ancestors.
2. It is the same with your own inherent mortality and that of all normal humans.
3. It is the same with your inherent propensity to survive at present.

The existential crisis emerge from the combination of the above 3 elements within ALL human beings.

Do you really need me to quote research finding on the above?
Surely you are not that incompetent on such common knowledge.

The existential crisis drive the majority of people to theism, religions and other 'isms' and activities.

GOD for the majority associated with Salvation and eternal life is clung to defeat the fact of mortality [doomed_ness] and its inherent associated fears. You cannot dispute this, especially for the Abrahamic religions.
There are loads of evidence to justify the existence of this factual existential crisis.

[Immanuel Can]

Cite the research. That's what I want.

You can make your own inference from common knowledge of genetics;

I'm asking you to prove your own case...and that means citing the research you say stands behind your claim to have located the DNA feature that conduces to existential crises and religious enthusiasms.

The appeal to "common knowledge" of a non-existent type and "inference" of an unspecified sort, and "making your own" in lieu of having proof yourself, is simple nonsense. It's your case: make it.

Go ahead.

[Veritas Aequitas]

It's like talking to a brick wall.
Moral justifications are not objective.
There is no escape from it, and it is clear that you have not advanced your absurd claims by one inch.
You are started with the assumption that life is sacred. There is not objective statement able to establish this claim, but buckets of empirical evidence to say that it cannot be so.

Btw, after refreshing on Hume's Treatise and Enquiry, I have by now read more that 40 articles [including part of books] on the topic of 'what is morality'.
From my readings of morality extensively and deeply, it tell me your thinking re Morality & Ethics is too shallow and narrow - i.e. kindergartenish. In fact, you are a very thick brick wall.

As a counter to your above ignorance on 'what is morality' note my response to Peter above.

What is objective is independent from the individuals' opinion and beliefs.
As long as the judgment is collective, it is objective as qualified to a Framework of Knowledge, e.g. the Scientific Framework with its Scientific Method, peer reviews, etc.
Moral judgments as moral facts are objective since they are independent of individuals' opinion and beliefs from a Moral Framework.

Nope I do not start from the assumption that life is sacred.
I started with empirical evidences with scientific justifications from the Scientific Framework, using logical and philosophical reasoning to arrive moral judgments [objective] from within a specified Moral Framework.

Your bucket of empirical evidences are merely various forms and deviations from the fundamental [substance] objective standards.
We had used the example of 'hunger' which is fundamental and generic [of substance] to ALL humans, but how each individual and group resolve their hunger is of infinite forms of producing, processing and taking in the essential food and nutrients.
I anticipate this critical point will not even 'blink' on your cheapskate radar.

Please refer to the statements I made above.
Please look up definitions of "objective", and "fact".

You have not define what is objective and what is fact.


What is objective?

Objective = (of a person or their judgement) not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts.
-Google Dictionary

What is fact?
I have already present and explain the definition of what is fact many times and there are many types of fact relative to the specific Framework of Knowledge. A Moral fact is a fact derived from the Moral Framework.

A fact is a thing that is known to be consistent with objective reality and can be proven to be true with evidence.

For example, "This sentence contains words." is a linguistic fact, and
"The sun is a star." is a cosmological fact.
Further, "Abraham Lincoln was the 16th President of the United States." and "Abraham Lincoln was assassinated." are also both facts, of history.
-wiki

Do you dispute the above?

I have done further reading on morality and Ethics.
From my readings of morality extensively and deeply, it tell me your thinking re Morality & Ethics is too shallow and narrow - i.e. kindergartenish.

I am at present reading various books on Moral Realism and here is one;

In Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism David Enoch develops, argues for, and defends a strongly realist and objectivist view of ethics and normativity more broadly.
This view-according to which there are perfectly objective, universal, moral and other normative truths that are not in any way reducible to other, natural truths-is familiar, but this book is the first in-detail development of the positive motivations for the view into reasonably precise arguments.
And when the book turns defensive-defending Robust Realism against traditional objections-it mobilizes the original positive arguments for the view to help with fending off the objections.

The main underlying motivation for Robust Realism developed in the book is that no other metaethical view can vindicate our taking morality seriously.
The positive arguments developed here-the argument from the deliberative indispensability of normative truths, and the argument from the moral implications of metaethical objectivity (or its absence)-are thus arguments for Robust Realism that are sensitive to the underlying, pre-theoretical motivations for the view.
https://www.amazon.com/Taking-Morality- ... 0199683174

My argument as an empirical-moral-realist is, moral facts are justified from naturalism's empirical facts within a Moral/Ethics Framework.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Cite the research. That's what I want.

You can make your own inference from common knowledge of genetics;

I'm asking you to prove your own case...and that means citing the research you say stands behind your claim to have located the DNA feature that conduces to existential crises and religious enthusiasms.

The appeal to "common knowledge" of a non-existent type and "inference" of an unspecified sort, and "making your own" in lieu of having proof yourself, is simple nonsense. It's your case: make it.

Go ahead.

How come you are so ignorant?
Do you want me to give you an education of genetics and genomics?

Don't be lazy, read these up;

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genetics
  
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genomics
  
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNA
  
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RNA

I don't have to cite research at this point.
I have made my own argument and inference from the above knowledge.

I have provided my argument in my post,
show me which [or all] premise about self-consciousness, mortality, survival at all cost, is false?

[Peter Holmes]

Things have got a bit fragmented, with the discussion proceeding on three or four different OPs. Here's something I posted elsewhere that, I think, summarises much of my argument against moral objectivism. Apologies for the repetition.

I keep asking for an example of a moral fact - because I don't think such things exist. But here's what I think a moral fact would have to be.

A fact is either a state-of-affairs or a description of a state-of-affairs. So a moral fact, if there is such a thing, is either a moral state-of-affairs or a description of a moral state-of-affairs.

A state-of-affairs either is or isn't the case. So its existence is independent from what anyone believes or claims to know; and the truth-value of a factual assertion - one that asserts a state-of-affairs - is independent from what anyone believes or claims to know.

Moral realists and objectivists claim there are moral states-of-affairs whose existence is independent from what anyone believes or claims to know; that therefore moral assertions have a truth-value; and that their truth-value is independent from what anyone believes or claims to know. In short, they claim that there can be moral facts.

A moral realist or objectivist has to demonstrate the independent existence of a moral state-of-affairs, and therefore the truth of an assertion asserting that moral state-of-affairs. And theirs is the burden of proof - unmet, so far, in my opinion.

So, if you think there are moral facts, stop dodging and whingeing - and produce the goods. Or don't - because you realise you can't - and be rational and change your mind.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Things have got a bit fragmented, with the discussion proceeding on three or four different OPs. Here's something I posted elsewhere that, I think, summarises much of my argument against moral objectivism. Apologies for the repetition.

I keep asking for an example of a moral fact - because I don't think such things exist. But here's what I think a moral fact would have to be.

A fact is either a state-of-affairs or a description of a state-of-affairs. So a moral fact, if there is such a thing, is either a moral state-of-affairs or a description of a moral state-of-affairs.

A state-of-affairs either is or isn't the case. So its existence is independent from what anyone believes or claims to know; and the truth-value of a factual assertion - one that asserts a state-of-affairs - is independent from what anyone believes or claims to know.

Moral realists and objectivists claim there are moral states-of-affairs whose existence is independent from what anyone believes or claims to know; that therefore moral assertions have a truth-value; and that their truth-value is independent from what anyone believes or claims to know. In short, they claim that there can be moral facts.

A moral realist or objectivist has to demonstrate the independent existence of a moral state-of-affairs, and therefore the truth of an assertion asserting that moral state-of-affairs. And theirs is the burden of proof - unmet, so far, in my opinion.

So, if you think there are moral facts, stop dodging and whingeing - and produce the goods. Or don't - because you realise you can't - and be rational and change your mind.

Your problem is you are stuck in a very tall narrow silo on the subject of morality.

At present, beside others, I am reading

Moral Realism and The Foundations of Ethics
David O. Brink

https://www.amazon.com/Realism-Foundati ... 0521359376
This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundations of ethics. These issues concern the objectivity of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalist world-view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person's rational lifeplan.
In striking contrast to traditional and more recent work in the field, David Brink offers an integrated defense of the objectivity of ethics.

Brink's thesis is;

I argue that a realist metaethics, a coherentist moral epistemology, an externalist moral psychology, a nonreductive form of ethical naturalism, an objective theory of value, and an objective form of utilitarianism are individually plausible and mutually supporting.

In the IS/OUGHT Chapter,
Chapter 6. MORAL REALISM AND THE IS/OUGHT THESIS 144
Brink concluded,

9. CONCLUSION
The truth or plausibility of moral realism does not require, as many assume it does, the falsity of the is/ought thesis.
One may raise doubts about the existence of an is/ought gap, in particular, about the semantic thesis, but the moral realist can concede the is/ought thesis.
Even if there is an is/ought gap, no antirealist consequences follow.
Consideration of analogous is/is gaps shows that nonnaturalism need not make moral realism queer, that ethical naturalism (or, for that matter, ethical supernaturalism) is defensible, that there can be moral facts, and that there can be evidential relations between moral and nonmoral beliefs as coherentism requires.

Your continuous harping from the semantics, and facts from the Philosophical Realists' perspective reflect a very immature sense of morality.
I suggest you research more on the subject of Morality and Ethics.

In any case, I have presented my argument of how I derived moral facts as justified from empirical facts with philosophical reasoning and invite you to counter my arguments. You just don't have the capacity to understand [not necessary agree] to counter my arguments.

[Skepdick]

I keep asking for an example of a moral fact - because I don't think such things exist. But here's what I think a moral fact would have to be.

And I keep asking you for a testable/falsifiable conception of "morality" - an example of the phenomenon you might be referring to because I don't think you think morality exists.

You have said so yourself - to you "morality" is just an abstract noun - it does not correspond to any phenomenon.
If morality is just an abstract noun, then you are metaphysically deluded - not us.

A fact is either a state-of-affairs or a description of a state-of-affairs. So a moral fact, if there is such a thing, is either a moral state-of-affairs or a description of a moral state-of-affairs.

So what state of affairs does "morality" describe?

[Peter Holmes]

Things have got a bit fragmented, with the discussion proceeding on three or four different OPs. Here's something I posted elsewhere that, I think, summarises much of my argument against moral objectivism. Apologies for the repetition.

I keep asking for an example of a moral fact - because I don't think such things exist. But here's what I think a moral fact would have to be.

A fact is either a state-of-affairs or a description of a state-of-affairs. So a moral fact, if there is such a thing, is either a moral state-of-affairs or a description of a moral state-of-affairs.

A state-of-affairs either is or isn't the case. So its existence is independent from what anyone believes or claims to know; and the truth-value of a factual assertion - one that asserts a state-of-affairs - is independent from what anyone believes or claims to know.

Moral realists and objectivists claim there are moral states-of-affairs whose existence is independent from what anyone believes or claims to know; that therefore moral assertions have a truth-value; and that their truth-value is independent from what anyone believes or claims to know. In short, they claim that there can be moral facts.

A moral realist or objectivist has to demonstrate the independent existence of a moral state-of-affairs, and therefore the truth of an assertion asserting that moral state-of-affairs. And theirs is the burden of proof - unmet, so far, in my opinion.

So, if you think there are moral facts, stop dodging and whingeing - and produce the goods. Or don't - because you realise you can't - and be rational and change your mind.

Your problem is you are stuck in a very tall narrow silo on the subject of morality.

At present, beside others, I am reading

Moral Realism and The Foundations of Ethics
David O. Brink

https://www.amazon.com/Realism-Foundati ... 0521359376
This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundations of ethics. These issues concern the objectivity of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalist world-view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person's rational lifeplan.
In striking contrast to traditional and more recent work in the field, David Brink offers an integrated defense of the objectivity of ethics.

Brink's thesis is;

I argue that a realist metaethics, a coherentist moral epistemology, an externalist moral psychology, a nonreductive form of ethical naturalism, an objective theory of value, and an objective form of utilitarianism are individually plausible and mutually supporting.

In the IS/OUGHT Chapter,
Chapter 6. MORAL REALISM AND THE IS/OUGHT THESIS 144
Brink concluded,

9. CONCLUSION
The truth or plausibility of moral realism does not require, as many assume it does, the falsity of the is/ought thesis.
One may raise doubts about the existence of an is/ought gap, in particular, about the semantic thesis, but the moral realist can concede the is/ought thesis.
Even if there is an is/ought gap, no antirealist consequences follow.
Consideration of analogous is/is gaps shows that nonnaturalism need not make moral realism queer, that ethical naturalism (or, for that matter, ethical supernaturalism) is defensible, that there can be moral facts, and that there can be evidential relations between moral and nonmoral beliefs as coherentism requires.

Your continuous harping from the semantics, and facts from the Philosophical Realists' perspective reflect a very immature sense of morality.
I suggest you research more on the subject of Morality and Ethics.

In any case, I have presented my argument of how I derived moral facts as justified from empirical facts with philosophical reasoning and invite you to counter my arguments. You just don't have the capacity to understand [not necessary agree] to counter my arguments.

So, people have written books making claims that you agree with. So what? Other people have written books in which they falsify the claims that you agree with. When you've had enough confirmation bias reinforcement, have a go at the cogently argued bias trashing you can find elsewhere.

Meanwhile, it's the arguments that count, and I prefer to stick to them.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Things have got a bit fragmented, with the discussion proceeding on three or four different OPs. Here's something I posted elsewhere that, I think, summarises much of my argument against moral objectivism. Apologies for the repetition.

I keep asking for an example of a moral fact - because I don't think such things exist. But here's what I think a moral fact would have to be.

A fact is either a state-of-affairs or a description of a state-of-affairs. So a moral fact, if there is such a thing, is either a moral state-of-affairs or a description of a moral state-of-affairs.

A state-of-affairs either is or isn't the case. So its existence is independent from what anyone believes or claims to know; and the truth-value of a factual assertion - one that asserts a state-of-affairs - is independent from what anyone believes or claims to know.

Moral realists and objectivists claim there are moral states-of-affairs whose existence is independent from what anyone believes or claims to know; that therefore moral assertions have a truth-value; and that their truth-value is independent from what anyone believes or claims to know. In short, they claim that there can be moral facts.

A moral realist or objectivist has to demonstrate the independent existence of a moral state-of-affairs, and therefore the truth of an assertion asserting that moral state-of-affairs. And theirs is the burden of proof - unmet, so far, in my opinion.

So, if you think there are moral facts, stop dodging and whingeing - and produce the goods. Or don't - because you realise you can't - and be rational and change your mind.

Your problem is you are stuck in a very tall narrow silo on the subject of morality.

At present, beside others, I am reading

Moral Realism and The Foundations of Ethics
David O. Brink

https://www.amazon.com/Realism-Foundati ... 0521359376
This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundations of ethics. These issues concern the objectivity of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalist world-view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person's rational lifeplan.
In striking contrast to traditional and more recent work in the field, David Brink offers an integrated defense of the objectivity of ethics.

Brink's thesis is;

I argue that a realist metaethics, a coherentist moral epistemology, an externalist moral psychology, a nonreductive form of ethical naturalism, an objective theory of value, and an objective form of utilitarianism are individually plausible and mutually supporting.

In the IS/OUGHT Chapter,
Chapter 6. MORAL REALISM AND THE IS/OUGHT THESIS 144
Brink concluded,

9. CONCLUSION
The truth or plausibility of moral realism does not require, as many assume it does, the falsity of the is/ought thesis.
One may raise doubts about the existence of an is/ought gap, in particular, about the semantic thesis, but the moral realist can concede the is/ought thesis.
Even if there is an is/ought gap, no antirealist consequences follow.
Consideration of analogous is/is gaps shows that nonnaturalism need not make moral realism queer, that ethical naturalism (or, for that matter, ethical supernaturalism) is defensible, that there can be moral facts, and that there can be evidential relations between moral and nonmoral beliefs as coherentism requires.

Your continuous harping from the semantics, and facts from the Philosophical Realists' perspective reflect a very immature sense of morality.
I suggest you research more on the subject of Morality and Ethics.

In any case, I have presented my argument of how I derived moral facts as justified from empirical facts with philosophical reasoning and invite you to counter my arguments. You just don't have the capacity to understand [not necessary agree] to counter my arguments.

So, people have written books making claims that you agree with. So what? Other people have written books in which they falsify the claims that you agree with. When you've had enough confirmation bias reinforcement, have a go at the cogently argued bias trashing you can find elsewhere.

Meanwhile, it's the arguments that count, and I prefer to stick to them.

Note Brink's conclusion obviously imply he had presented an argument to arrive at that conclusion.
I suggest you read Brinks' book to understand [not necessary agree with] his argument then provide your counter to his argument.

In any case, Brink's view is your sort of argument is very immature and outdated.

Note Brink's view;

Partly as a result of the dominance of this kind of noncognitivism, moral philosophy came to many, I think, to seem a fairly sterile and boring intellectual place.

Your argument belong to the category of noncognitivism, i.e. there are no moral facts which is very outdated.
The latest trend in the debate of Morality and Ethics are;

Indeed, concern with normative ethics, including both moral theory and substantive moral problems, has dominated moral philosophy for the last two decades.

It is my view that the main features of the noncognitivist legacy are fundamentally flawed.

Obviously Brink provided arguments and justification for his above views.

Note it is not only David Brink but there are tons of moral philosophers who argued for Moral Realism which is getting more and more popular as supported by the latest knowledge from neurosciences, neuropsychology, genomics and other fields of knowledge.

Your reliance on the Principles from Philosophical Realism is false and stale.