What could make morality objective?

[Belinda]

I think that's partly true. But I also think there are some ways of resolving that.

If morality is "merely a category of individual preferences," then we need to say more about what kind of preferences we're speaking of. Can a preference be "immoral," for example? Or does the mere fact that a preference is "personal" guarantee that it is also deserving of the honorific additional title of "moral"?

So, for example, if my personal preference were for eating cats, would we call that a "moral" preference, or just a plain "preference"? Or what if my preference were for something others consider evil, such as molesting children? Would the fact that it were "my preference" be sufficient to warrant my claim that I was "morally right" to do it?

I don't doubt that calling my predilections "moral" might indeed make them more "compelling" to me. I might, for example, excuse my cruelty to cats or pedophiliac practices by way of calling them "alternate lifestyles," or even "right for me." I have no doubt that would help a cat-eater or pedophile feel much better about himself or herself...but would we, because they are personal preference, be content to concede that those were also "moral" preferences?

I'm suggesting we tend to ask more of the word "moral" than a synonym for "personal." And I'm wondering what quality we might think that is, the quality that "moral" adds, that "personal" does not have.

IC, I think we’ve strayed away from the original question of the thread., which I interpret to mean: under what circumstances would morality have to exist in order to be legitimately called objective?

To my way of thinking, it would have to exist in the same way as a law of physics -or nature- exists. It would act on us whether we were willing subjects or not. We don’t have a choice when it comes to gravity, and it would have to be the same with morality. That, it seems to me, would mean that it is not an exclusively human thing, as laws of nature don’t tend to discriminate. But, even keeping it to a human context, there is a problem. Some people seem to be born with no sense of morality; no concept of right and wrong. The fact that they are categorised as having a psychological disorder doesn’t explain how they avoid the effects of this outside force; morality.

There are other ways of thinking of morality as an objective/outside/independent thing, other than the one I have described, but even that one is too unrealistic for my taste; I wouldn’t really want to go any further.

So, if morality isn’t a purely human concept that we have constructed to correspond with an impulse, or instinct we are born with, what would you say it is?


I will respond to your questions in the quoted text if you want me to, but it just seemed that we weren't sticking the the original question of the thread.

but just because there is a law of nature (or of science) doesn't imply we know what that law is. Similarly just because morality is be in harmony with nature doesn't imply we can know how to be in harmony with nature.

[Belinda]

I think that's partly true. But I also think there are some ways of resolving that.

If morality is "merely a category of individual preferences," then we need to say more about what kind of preferences we're speaking of. Can a preference be "immoral," for example? Or does the mere fact that a preference is "personal" guarantee that it is also deserving of the honorific additional title of "moral"?

So, for example, if my personal preference were for eating cats, would we call that a "moral" preference, or just a plain "preference"? Or what if my preference were for something others consider evil, such as molesting children? Would the fact that it were "my preference" be sufficient to warrant my claim that I was "morally right" to do it?

I don't doubt that calling my predilections "moral" might indeed make them more "compelling" to me. I might, for example, excuse my cruelty to cats or pedophiliac practices by way of calling them "alternate lifestyles," or even "right for me." I have no doubt that would help a cat-eater or pedophile feel much better about himself or herself...but would we, because they are personal preference, be content to concede that those were also "moral" preferences?

I'm suggesting we tend to ask more of the word "moral" than a synonym for "personal." And I'm wondering what quality we might think that is, the quality that "moral" adds, that "personal" does not have.

IC, I think we’ve strayed away from the original question of the thread., which I interpret to mean: under what circumstances would morality have to exist in order to be legitimately called objective?

To my way of thinking, it would have to exist in the same way as a law of physics -or nature- exists. It would act on us whether we were willing subjects or not. We don’t have a choice when it comes to gravity, and it would have to be the same with morality. That, it seems to me, would mean that it is not an exclusively human thing, as laws of nature don’t tend to discriminate. But, even keeping it to a human context, there is a problem. Some people seem to be born with no sense of morality; no concept of right and wrong. The fact that they are categorised as having a psychological disorder doesn’t explain how they avoid the effects of this outside force; morality.

There are other ways of thinking of morality as an objective/outside/independent thing, other than the one I have described, but even that one is too unrealistic for my taste; I wouldn’t really want to go any further.

So, if morality isn’t a purely human concept that we have constructed to correspond with an impulse, or instinct we are born with, what would you say it is?


I will respond to your questions in the quoted text if you want me to, but it just seemed that we weren't sticking the the original question of the thread.

but just because there is a law of nature (or of science) doesn't imply we know what that law is. Similarly just because morality is be in harmony with nature doesn't imply we can know how to be in harmony with nature.

If I substitute 'God' for 'nature' my argument is the same argument.

[Sculptor]

What you offer humans as a right you deny to the humble eelworm.

That is so stupid beyond common sense.

All you have here is a series of half baked opinions.

There you go again, abusing the term 'opinion' [as defined] whereas I have provided empirical evidences supported with rational philosophical reasoning.

You simply continually fail to understand the most basic philosophical reasoning..
A justification is an OPINION.

[Harbal]

but just because there is a law of nature (or of science) doesn't imply we know what that law is. Similarly just because morality is be in harmony with nature doesn't imply we can know how to be in harmony with nature.

Well I don't think morality is a law of nature, Belinda, I was just saying that it would have to be something like a law of nature to be called an objective thing. I suppose the fact that we have got a capacity for empathy leading to a desire to behave in a certain way towards others is a result of natural laws, but the actual specifics of what will appeal to that desire are conditioned by our social environment, and are variable. They emanate from the minds of human beings, and in that respect, are the epitome of subjectivity.

[Skepdick]

The meaning of a word is not the thing (real or abstract) to which it refers. Meaning is use.

The idea that an abstract noun, such as morality, is the name of a kind of thing that either does or doesn't exist is the ancient metaphysical delusion at the heart of Platonism. So the question 'does morality exist?' misfires. Instead, all we can ask is 'how do we use the word 'morality' and its cognates?'
...
So the question 'does morality exist?' misfires. Instead, all we can ask is 'how do we use the word 'morality' and its cognates?'

Que?

If "morality" is just an abstract noun, then what are you even asking in the OP?

Are you asking "What could make an abstract noun objective?"
Are you asking "What could make the use of the word 'morality' objective?"

What does the question even mean?

[Skepdick]

They emanate from the minds of human beings, and in that respect, are the epitome of subjectivity.

It's not the epitome, just the epitome of the definition you subscribe to. If your definition is wrong then so is all of the reasoning based on that definition.

[Harbal]

It's not the epitome, just the epitome of the definition you subscribe to. If your definition is wrong then so is all of the reasoning based on that definition.

That problem does not arise, Skepdick, because I am not wrong.

[Skepdick]

That problem does not arise, Skepdick, because I am not wrong.

But "wrongness" is subjective (according to you). So objectively speaking, you could be wrong about not being wrong.

[Harbal]

But "wrongness" is subjective (according to you). So objectively speaking, you could be wrong about not being wrong.

Wrong in the moral sense is subjective, but wrong meaning lack of accuracy, isn't necessarily subjective. And yes, I could be wrong, but I'm not.

[Veritas Aequitas]

What you offer humans as a right you deny to the humble eelworm.

That is so stupid beyond common sense.

All you have here is a series of half baked opinions.

There you go again, abusing the term 'opinion' [as defined] whereas I have provided empirical evidences supported with rational philosophical reasoning.

You simply continually fail to understand the most basic philosophical reasoning..
A justification is an OPINION.

As I had stated you are trapped in a very tall and tight silo in this case.
Your thinking is kindergartenish and attitude childish.

Note the alternative views;

The Fact/Opinion Distinction
John Corvino argues: When debating ethics and other controversial topics, one frequently hears the claim “That’s just your opinion.”
It is a pernicious claim, devoid of clear meaning, and it should be consigned to the flames – or so I shall argue here.

• Why worry about the fact/opinion distinction?
  One reason is that precise thinking is valuable for its own sake.
  But there’s another, more pragmatic reason.
  Despite its unclear meaning, the claim “That’s just your opinion” has a clear use: It is a conversation-stopper.
  It’s a way of diminishing a claim, reducing it to a mere matter of taste which lies beyond dispute.
  (De gustibus non est disputandum: there’s no disputing taste.)
  Indeed, the “opinion” label is used not only to belittle others’ stances, but also to deflate one’s own.
  In recognising that a personal belief differs sharply from that of other individuals and cultures, one may conclude, “I guess that’s just my opinion – no better than anyone else’s.”
  This conclusion may stem from an admirable humility.
  On the other hand, it can have pernicious effects: it leads to a kind of wishy-washiness, wherein one refrains from standing up for one’s convictions for fear of imposing “mere opinions”.
  Such reticence conflicts with common sense: surely some opinions are more thoughtful, more informed, more coherent, and more important than others.
  
  This diminishment is especially troubling in moral debates.
  Moral debates are practical – they’re debates about what to do – and they concern our values: things that matter to us.
  • Either we send troops to Syria or we don’t.
    Either we allow same-sex couples to marry or we don’t.
    Either we lie to our parents about what happened to the car or we don’t.
  Categorising these issues as “matters of opinion” doesn’t make them any less urgent or vital.
  
  I therefore propose that we abandon the ambiguous fact/opinion distinction, and especially the dismissive retort “That’s just your opinion.”
  We should focus instead on whether people can offer good reasons for the claims they make – reasons that might compel us to share their views.
  
  That’s my opinion, anyway.
  If you think yours is better, don’t merely say so: Say why.

https://www.philosophersmag.com/essays/ ... istinction

[Veritas Aequitas]

When we speak of morality at present it is always in relation to human beings.

That's dead easy to show untrue.

Not only have most people in history been Theistic or Polytheistic, but 96% of the people on the planet at this present moment hold it at least possible (4%) or plausible (92%) that there is a god or Gods.

Note;
DNA/RNA wise ALL humans are "programmed" [not by God] with a potential of an existential crisis.
Humans since then, had been resorting to all sorts of ways to relieve the inherent unavoidable crisis. The earliest balms they turned to was animism [still in limited practice] and then the latest relief is theism, despite its illusory ground, is very effective - works immediately.

Since the emergence of the illusory God, there had been no direct empirical evidence to justify God exists as empirically real.

The only valid and pragmatic reason to 'believe God exists' is solely from desperate psychology driven by the inherent unavoidable existential crisis - experienced and believed not only by theists but also by those with mental illness, brain damage, drug addicts, and others.

The fact is how can you extricate morality [theory and applied] from human beings. No way! If so, how?

If God exists, God is supposedly totally independent from human beings. Thus it is claimed by theists that God's moral laws are independent of human beings and their conceptions.

Yes. And?

If a God exists, God's morality is still relative

No. It would then be absolute and objective.

I think you don't understand how the word "relative" is applied to morality. But I'll try to give you a charitable reading on that, and say that maybe what you mean is that morality does not exist "out there" in some realm of ideal forms, or some conceptual space that no one, even God occupies.

And of course, that's true, but very trivial; because nobody (except perhaps Plato) ever thinks that's what morality is, or how it works.

IF God exists, God's morality in one sense is logically conditioned upon God thus relative.
But there is no way God exists as real, it is an impossibility as I had demonstrated in a specific thread.

Yes, in addition, there is no absolute morality "out there" in the realm of ideal forms.

[Veritas Aequitas]

You are insisting on your own definition of "Moral Nihilism"

Not at all. I'm just saying what Moral Nihilism rationally entails.

In other words, I'm saying that if you want to take Moral Nihilism seriously, you don't get to hold back any values, and say,
"Well, there are no objective moral truths...but it's still wrong to murder."
Those two statements are absolutely morally contradictory, and in a very obvious way. If there are any objective moral values at all, one is not a "Nihilist," because "nihil" is the Latin word meaning "nothing."

Moral Nihilist is one who do not believe there are justification for any form of morality. I believe they will be very dogmatic with "is/ought" dichotomy.

Moral Nihilists will not insist murder is morally wrong.
Right/Wrong do not necessary pertains to Morality.
Rather Moral Nihilists believe in political justice which murder is a serious crime and punish murderers via political laws.
Politics is independent of morality. Note I had argued Morality is modulated by one own conscience rather than by external forces of threats/commands of punishments from political laws or from a God.

If there's "something" in a "nothing," then there's not a "nothing" anymore. And if there's "nothing," then by definition, there is not even one bit of "something." Thus, Moral Nihilism entails the absolute, total and unequivocal denial that there are any true, objective or real values at all.
Pull up short of that, and you're no longer a Moral Nihilist.

Values are not exclusively related only to Morality.

Moral Nihilist [as generally defined - I have linked it] is one who do not believe there are justification for any form of morality as they define it.

When have I ever claimed I am a moral nihilist?
I had claimed I am an empirical-moral-realist who relied on justified secular absolute moral laws that are justified from empirical evidences and philosophical reasoning.

[Peter Holmes]

My OP question was 'What could make morality objective?'

And someone asked if I think morality exists. I made the obvious point that abstract nouns are not the names of kinds of things that do or don't exist - and that to think that is to suffer from a metaphysical delusion.

But perhaps this isn't obvious to some people here.

Does anyone think so-called abstract things exist? And if so, can you explain what and where they are, and in what way they exist? (Saying they're concepts in minds - more abstract things - doesn't explain anything.)

[uwot]

It is demonstrably the case that people disagree over what killings are justifiable.

It is also demonstrably the case that people agree over what killings aren't justifiable.

To assign equal weight to both view-points because some dissent exists, is to assign equal weight to round and flat-earth theories because some dissent exists.

Well then, you'd be a fucking idiot to do so.

I figured the right attitude for an epistemologist is to accept both hypotheses on equal footing...

Whoops! Too late.

[Veritas Aequitas]

My OP question was 'What could make morality objective?'

And someone asked if I think morality exists. I made the obvious point that abstract nouns are not the names of kinds of things that do or don't exist - and that to think that is to suffer from a metaphysical delusion.

But perhaps this isn't obvious to some people here.

Does anyone think so-called abstract things exist?
And if so, can you explain what and where they are, and in what way they exist?
(Saying they're concepts in minds - more abstract things - doesn't explain anything.)

As usual your thinking is too shallow and narrow.
You just cannot be so hasty as to insist 'abstract things' do not exist as described below;

Abstract and concrete are classifications that denote whether the object that a term describes has physical referents.
Abstract objects have no physical referents, whereas concrete objects do.
An abstract object is an object that does not exist at any particular time or place, but rather exists as a type of thing—i.e., an idea, or abstraction.
-wiki

The point is emotions and other impulses like 'love' exist as abstract things in a particular time and place. An orchestra, a team, and the likes are abstract things.
What is critical is whether the so-called abstract thing is supervened over a collective of physical referents that can be justified with empirical evidence and philosophical reasoning. [point 1]

Obvious an abstract thing like "God" do not exists at all [except as a idea in the brain/mind] because God cannot be justified with empirical evidence plus philosophical reasoning.

"Morality" is an inherent impulse like 'love' and other mental functions which is supervened upon the empirical human brain and its mental activities.
Thus 'morality' exists as an abstract thing as per point 1 above.