What could make morality objective?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Veritas Aequitas wrote:
a) If by "inward to themselves" you mean understanding and awareness of subjectivity and psychology you are mistaken. Most people by the time they finish secondary education are aware of how they themselves impact on what they experience and believe. Narcissists are deficient at this level of understanding.

b) If by "Inward to themselves" you mean humans have innate knowledge of ultimate reality you may be right. I understand this is|Roman Catholic doctrine. It is a hopeful doctrine but the downside is people who believe it are easily manipulated by traditional authorities like kings and priests.

You missed my point which is actually quite subtle;

I wrote, they are ignorant of;
"whether they as human themselves play a critical role is realizing what-is-reality"
the end result is they are clinging to Philosophical Realism;

In metaphysics, [philosophical] realism about a given object is the view that this object exists in reality independently of our conceptual scheme. In philosophical terms, these objects are ontologically independent of someone's conceptual scheme, perceptions, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc.

If they had understood themselves internally and the role they play in realizing reality, they would not be dogmatically philosophical realists as the majority of people at present are.

"whether they as human themselves play a critical role is realizing what-is-reality"
the end result is they are clinging to Philosophical Realism;

Is also called naive realism. I'd be surprised if anyone with a basic knowledge of metaphysics was a naive realist. I agree most people most of whom have no knowledge of philosophy are naive realists.
I seem to have forgotten what this discussion about how we might know stuff has got to do with whether or not morality is objective. The title would be better "what could make ethics objective? ".

Naive Realism is a type of Philosophical Realism.

I would appear you agree with Philosophical Realism as defined above.
The point is you are condemning Moral Realism without realizing you are kicking your own back because Moral Realism [ontological] and ontological Philosophical Realism are grounded on the same fundamental principles.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here's my argument:

It's objective morality, or no morality: those are the choices.
There is no such thing as justifiable subjective morality.
There is only Nihilism.
Subjective morality is an illusion, because nothing legitimizes subjective moralizing.

Note Moral Relativism is Moral Subjectivism.

Moral relativism or ethical relativism (often reformulated as relativist ethics or relativist morality) is a term used to describe several philosophical positions concerned with the differences in moral judgments across different peoples and their own particular cultures. An advocate of such ideas is often labeled simply as a relativist for short.

justifiable subjective morality is thus that which is justified within the specified Moral Framework of Subjective Morality or Moral Relativity.

The problem and limitation of justifiable subjective morality is they are justified upon the groups sentiments, emotions and shared-needs. This can end up in the extreme with a Nazi-justified subjective morality.

Moral relativism is objective but only relatively objective to its specific Moral Framework.

Your claim is that of ontological absolutely-absolute objective moral oughts which is illusory. It is pseudo if such ontological absolutely-absolute objective moral oughts are from a God which is an impossibility to real, thus illusory.

My claim is empirical moral realism or relative-absolute objective moral realism which is grounded on empirical facts.

[Veritas Aequitas]

No, you're introducing terms that are not necessary to moral nihilism. which as a minimum denies that there are moral facts - so that morality isn't and can't be objective. That position is perfectly compatible with a rational and justifiable morality. That you think it isn't is your problem - a requirement of your invented straw-man. You need to demonise moral nihilism, so you have to misrepresent it.

You seem to be ignorant of the full range of Moral Skepticism as with most of other knowledge on Morality.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_skepticism

Moral skepticism (or moral scepticism) is a class of metaethical theories all members of which entail that no one has any moral knowledge. Many moral skeptics also make the stronger, modal claim that moral knowledge is impossible.

Forms of moral skepticism
Moral skepticism divides into three subclasses:
1. moral error theory (or moral nihilism),
2. epistemological moral skepticism, and
3. noncognitivism.[1]

• Moral error theory (or moral nihilism) holds that we do not know that any moral claim is true because
  
  • (i) all moral claims are false,
    (ii) we have reason to believe that all moral claims are false, and
    (iii) since we are not justified in believing any claim we have reason to deny, we are not justified in believing any moral claims.

[Peter Holmes]

No, you're introducing terms that are not necessary to moral nihilism. which as a minimum denies that there are moral facts - so that morality isn't and can't be objective. That position is perfectly compatible with a rational and justifiable morality. That you think it isn't is your problem - a requirement of your invented straw-man. You need to demonise moral nihilism, so you have to misrepresent it.

You seem to be ignorant of the full range of Moral Skepticism as with most of other knowledge on Morality.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_skepticism

Moral skepticism (or moral scepticism) is a class of metaethical theories all members of which entail that no one has any moral knowledge. Many moral skeptics also make the stronger, modal claim that moral knowledge is impossible.

Forms of moral skepticism
Moral skepticism divides into three subclasses:
1. moral error theory (or moral nihilism),
2. epistemological moral skepticism, and
3. noncognitivism.[1]

• Moral error theory (or moral nihilism) holds that we do not know that any moral claim is true because
  
  • (i) all moral claims are false,
    (ii) we have reason to believe that all moral claims are false, and
    (iii) since we are not justified in believing any claim we have reason to deny, we are not justified in believing any moral claims.

Rubbish. In epistemology, skepticism refers to doubting something until there is good evidence for it. But with regard to morality, that assumes there is something that exists, for which we may or may not have evidence - and that's a realist and objectivist assumption.

Moral nihilists aren't skeptical about moral claims. They simply say that moral assertions have no truth-value, because they don't make factual claims: all moral claims are 'false' in the sense that they can be neither true nor false. Truth and falsehood are functions only of factual assertions which claim something about reality that may or may not be the case.

For example, the moral wrongness of eating animals isn't something that may or may not be the case, so it isn't an epistemological matter. The 'error' is thinking such issues are about cognition - thinking - and knowledge.

The 'nihil' in nihilism - the nothingness - need not mean moral anarchy, which is what some terrified moral realists and objectivists insist. In fact, the clearing-of-the-decks that moral nihilism advocates liberates us from the clutter of false and usually self-interested objectivist claims: it's a fact that women are designed for church, cooking and children; my god says that homosexuals should be murdered; we are the chosen volk, and we need this lebensraum - and so on.

So we can rationally examine and develop our moral values and judgements: no, economic inequality is neither inevitable nor necessary for social progress; equality of opportunity can only come from equality of outcomes. (There are no moral facts, but only moral opinions - and that's one of mine.)

[Belinda]

You missed my point which is actually quite subtle;

I wrote, they are ignorant of;
"whether they as human themselves play a critical role is realizing what-is-reality"
the end result is they are clinging to Philosophical Realism;



If they had understood themselves internally and the role they play in realizing reality, they would not be dogmatically philosophical realists as the majority of people at present are.

"whether they as human themselves play a critical role is realizing what-is-reality"
the end result is they are clinging to Philosophical Realism;

Is also called naive realism. I'd be surprised if anyone with a basic knowledge of metaphysics was a naive realist. I agree most people most of whom have no knowledge of philosophy are naive realists.
I seem to have forgotten what this discussion about how we might know stuff has got to do with whether or not morality is objective. The title would be better "what could make ethics objective? ".

Naive Realism is a type of Philosophical Realism.

I would appear you agree with Philosophical Realism as defined above.
The point is you are condemning Moral Realism without realizing you are kicking your own back because Moral Realism [ontological] and ontological Philosophical Realism are grounded on the same fundamental principles.

Naive realism is not enough. There may be a material reality but as we are subject to our separate perceptions we cannot know material reality.

If there be material reality it is made of two aspects. One aspect is the workings of change, and the other aspect is the total items that compose reality throughout time and space..

As a practical strategy for staying alive all creatures that can learn do so partly by trusting there is something to be learned from empirical observations. As we know from history especially perhaps history of science empirical observations are often wrongly interpreted by humans who , unlike other animals, deal in theories. Moreover there is no evidence nor can there be of the theory of material reality to end all theories of material reality.

[Veritas Aequitas]

No, you're introducing terms that are not necessary to moral nihilism. which as a minimum denies that there are moral facts - so that morality isn't and can't be objective. That position is perfectly compatible with a rational and justifiable morality. That you think it isn't is your problem - a requirement of your invented straw-man. You need to demonise moral nihilism, so you have to misrepresent it.

You seem to be ignorant of the full range of Moral Skepticism as with most of other knowledge on Morality.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_skepticism

Moral skepticism (or moral scepticism) is a class of metaethical theories all members of which entail that no one has any moral knowledge. Many moral skeptics also make the stronger, modal claim that moral knowledge is impossible.

Forms of moral skepticism
Moral skepticism divides into three subclasses:
1. moral error theory (or moral nihilism),
2. epistemological moral skepticism, and
3. noncognitivism.[1]

• Moral error theory (or moral nihilism) holds that we do not know that any moral claim is true because
  
  • (i) all moral claims are false,
    (ii) we have reason to believe that all moral claims are false, and
    (iii) since we are not justified in believing any claim we have reason to deny, we are not justified in believing any moral claims.

Rubbish. In epistemology, skepticism refers to doubting something until there is good evidence for it. But with regard to morality, that assumes there is something that exists, for which we may or may not have evidence - and that's a realist and objectivist assumption.

Moral nihilists aren't skeptical about moral claims. They simply say that moral assertions have no truth-value, because they don't make factual claims: all moral claims are 'false' in the sense that they can be neither true nor false. Truth and falsehood are functions only of factual assertions which claim something about reality that may or may not be the case.

For example, the moral wrongness of eating animals isn't something that may or may not be the case, so it isn't an epistemological matter. The 'error' is thinking such issues are about cognition - thinking - and knowledge.

The 'nihil' in nihilism - the nothingness - need not mean moral anarchy, which is what some terrified moral realists and objectivists insist. In fact, the clearing-of-the-decks that moral nihilism advocates liberates us from the clutter of false and usually self-interested objectivist claims: it's a fact that women are designed for church, cooking and children; my god says that homosexuals should be murdered; we are the chosen volk, and we need this lebensraum - and so on.

So we can rationally examine and develop our moral values and judgements: no, economic inequality is neither inevitable nor necessary for social progress; equality of opportunity can only come from equality of outcomes. (There are no moral facts, but only moral opinions - and that's one of mine.)

You are beating a dead horse.

Note the point i, ii and iii that describes Moral Nihilism.

Note point iii,
(iii) since we are not justified in believing any claim we have reason to deny, we are not justified in believing any moral claims.

Here is another definition of Moral Nihilism;

Nihilism comes from the Latin word "nihil" -- which means, nothing.
Nihilists assert that there are no moral values, principles, truths.
A nihilist is not the same thing as a skeptic, because although a nihilist will agree with the skeptic -- that humans cannot have knowledge about moral realities, not all skeptics will agree with nihilists.
A nihilist has a particular reason for being a skeptic -- we cannot know moral realities for the very simple reason that there is nothing to know.
But a skeptic may be a skeptic for other reasons. S/he may think that the problem lies not in the reality of moral values or truths, but in our cognitional faculties.
https://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialsciences ... hilism.htm

Note 'there is nothing to know', i.e. nihil = nothing.

Why beat around the bush, if you are for morality other than ontological moral realism that would be Moral Relativism.

[Belinda]

You are beating a dead horse.

Why the obscene and outdated cliche ?

[uwot]

Let me put it this way: To argue that morality is objective is the same as arguing that our taste in food is objective.

That's exactly what I am arguing. Your taste in food is objective to me. Your taste in food is objective from every perspective except yours.

Ah well, there's taste and there's taste. Sure you can discover what sort of food someone prefers by going through their rubbish. Going through Skepdick's would, I'm told, reveal a taste for ice cream.

I can observe you and I can study your eating habits - I can reasonably learn the kinds of food you like and dislike.

If I can develop a statistical profile/model which can predict your food choices then your taste is objective.

Yes, but you cannot recreate the aesthetic experience, nor the emotional response - same with morality.

[uwot]

The 'nihil' in nihilism - the nothingness - need not mean moral anarchy, which is what some terrified moral realists and objectivists insist. In fact, the clearing-of-the-decks that moral nihilism advocates liberates us from the clutter of false and usually self-interested objectivist claims: it's a fact that women are designed for church, cooking and children; my god says that homosexuals should be murdered; we are the chosen volk, and we need this lebensraum - and so on.

True dat. The scary answer to your original question is 'Eliminating anyone who dissents'.

[Harbal]

That's exactly what I am arguing. Your taste in food is objective to me. Your taste in food is objective from every perspective except yours.

The fact that I have a taste in food is an objective fact about me. People have a taste in food, and they also have a sense of morality; they are just two objective facts that could be included in a description of any particular person. My actual taste in food is mine and mine alone, as is my morality; neither can be experienced by anyone other than me, which defines them as subjective.

I can observe you and I can study your eating habits

I would prefer you not to.

If I can develop a statistical profile/model which can predict your food choices then your taste is objective.

Information about my taste might be objective, but my taste, itself, isn't. You seem to be arguing against the existence of subjectivity, which you are perfectly entitled to do, but, as far as this thread is concerned, I think it a bit unfair to remove one choice when there were only two to start with.

[Skepdick]

Yes, but you cannot recreate the aesthetic experience, nor the emotional response - same with morality.

I don't have to re-create your emotional response to know you disapprove of murder; or you dislike icecream.

[Skepdick]

My actual taste in food is mine and mine alone, as is my morality;

Not even remotely relevant.

Your taste in food and your morality are knowable by others. Your behaviour is predictable.

I'd also have a pretty hard time believing that your morality is unique, special and very different to mine.
I am betting you disapprove of murder, slavery, gratuitous violence etc. Just like me.

neither can be experienced by anyone other than me, which defines them as subjective.

I don't need to share your experiences to learn, understand and know your preferences.
Wives/husbands do that on regular basis - they understand their partners better than their partners understands themselves.

That's how relationships work. If you were unpredictable - you would be a terrible partner.

I would prefer you not to.

OK. Your wife/husband can do that instead.

Information about my taste might be objective, but my taste, itself, isn't.

Philosophical objection. Scientifically/epistemically irrelevant.

You seem to be arguing against the existence of subjectivity, which you are perfectly entitled to do, but, as far as this thread is concerned, I think it a bit unfair to remove one choice when there were only two to start with.

I am not removing your choice. I am only predicting it.

[uwot]

Yes, but you cannot recreate the aesthetic experience, nor the emotional response - same with morality.

I don't have to re-create your emotional response to know you disapprove of murder; or you dislike icecream.

Well of course I disapprove of murder. What I call murder is any killing of another human being that I object to morally - same as everyone else. There are instances of killing people that I do not think are murder, but others do. Some think that the people at Dignitas are murderers, I don't. Others think lethal injection is justice, I think it's murder. So well done Skepdick, you have demonstrated that people disapproving of the things they disapprove of is objective. Now all ya gotta do is show that everyone objects to the same examples of killing another person, and we can wrap up this thread.

[Harbal]

If that is the truth, then there is no such thing as "morality" at all. All there is are the individual preferences of individual people. Nothing about one's personal choices merits bestowing them with any such gloss of honour as to call them "moral" -- they're just preferences.

But that is exactly my definition of morality; it is merely a category of individual preferences. And that is exactly why we bestow them with a gloss of honour, because without the gloss, we wouldn't have quite the same compulsion to choose those particular preferences. This perhaps explains our difficulty in agreeing on this subject, which I seem to remember us arguing about in the past; we have differing opinions on what morality actually is.

I was saying to Peter that he should explain why his "subjective morality" amounts to anything more than "Peter doesn't like X," or "Peter likes Y." Why should we think it amounts to something like, "Peter plus Harbal plus IC plus all good people should dislike X or like Y?" There's no reason to think Peter's subjective feeling or "moral sensibility" has any implications for anyone else at all -- especially if it belongs uniquely and only to him, like a fingerprint.

We come into the World with an empty jar, labelled morality. We don't just innately know what to fill that jar with as we go through life. We seem to have an innate sense that the jar needs filling, but what we fill it with is given to us by the society in which we live. For this reason, all the members of any particular society will have most of their moral attitudes in common. This moral code might feel like something objective, because it comes from somewhere outside of the individual, but the fact that it is the product of a collective human consciousness, rather than an individual one, still gives it a subjective quality.

If morality were objective we would all have the same opinion of what is right and what isn't.

Well, why would we think so? It's not obvious that all people would automatically have the same opinion about anything, even anything objective.

Not having the same opinion on things is the essence of subjectivity, isn't it?

For instance, it might be objective that smoking causes cancer...but not all people have thought it is. For a long while, the Rothman's company insisted it wasn't. So did Winston and Camel. Now, that doesn't suggest those who think smoking is fine are right, nor does it suggest that smoking doesn't cause cancer. It just means people are fallible, or that they sometimes have reasons to lie about what they actually do know to be moral.

The data suggesting that smoking causes cancer is objective, our decision whether to accept that data is subjective. The data is available should we have the inclination and knowhow to verify its accuracy for ourselves. Where is the objective data supporting any particular code of morality, and what is its source?

The generally held moral values of today are different from those of our predecessors.

Some, but not others. But again, that doesn't tell us that nobody's values were objectively right...it might well be the case that our forebears were wrong, as when they allowed slavery; but it might also be that we are wrong, as when we drug our children, promote porn, invade foreign countries, or murder our own infants.

But "wrong" and "right" are subjective, human concepts. There is no wrong or right in Nature, and we are part of Nature.

If morality were objective, it wouldn't change as societies develop, it would be fixed.

That doesn't follow, H, because morality isn't even stable between contemporaneous societies. Again, this may well only indicate that people can get morality wrong; it doesn't tell us whether or not it's possible to get it objectively right. We don't have a higher precept that tells us that newer cultures are automatically more moral in all ways than older ones, or that all cultures in the world have an equally moral set of precepts that they follow.

You seem to be saying that, even though we might adopt our own personal and subjective set of moral values, that doesn't mean there isn't an objective set that we should be adopting instead. But I'm not saying that there couldn't be an objective set in existence somewhere, all I'm saying is that there isn't one.

Anyway, from where would we even get such a precept?

Human beings are social animals, and for any social group to function, there has to be a set of rules to which its members conform. Our innate sense of morality is one device that natural selection has settled on to make us stick to the rules. The precepts are not really a mystery. If I think it is fine to kill you and take all your possessions, then I have to allow that it is fine for you to do the same to me. That would be in neither of our interests.

P.S. -- Good to have you back, H.

Thank you IC.

Can I ask that you dismiss all my points one by one? Dealing with it all at once like this is making my head spin, and I'm sure that isn't your deliberate tactical intention.

[Harbal]

Not even remotely relevant.

Skepdick, rather than addressing each of your comments, none of which contain any logical justification that is apparent to me, can I ask you to give an example of something you consider to be subjective. That might help bring us closer to the same page, or, indeed, the same book.