What could make morality objective?

[Peter Holmes]

Nope it is not an opinion.
It is objective because such an ought can be verified and justified from empirical evidences.
Such moral facts are justified as supervening upon empirical facts which are objective.

If you do not agree [ignorantly] with the above, are you insisting on the opposite or you are just a morally indifferent irresponsible selfish person?

Do you have a counter to my other accusation of you, i.e. 'kicking your own ass' in the following;

• Nah, the point is you are trapped inside the SILO of ontological moral realism, i.e. morality is a thing [like external objects or Plato's universals] that exist via floating within reality.
  These days within the discussion of the Philosophy of Morality, there are rarely anyone supporting this version of ontological moral realism.
  If you think so, name me one modern secular philosopher of morality who support such an ontological moral realism.
  The only ones are the theists whose morality is pseudo-morality and insist God [itself immoral] commands ontological moral laws that believers must comply else they are threaten with hell fire.
  
  Btw, whilst you are condemning the ontological moral realists to the ground, you are ignorant you are exactly like them in your claim of ontological philosophical realism.
  Actually with your strawman on ontological moral realism you are actually kicking your own ass as an ontological philosophical realist.
  I bet you don't understand how you ended up kicking your own ass.

Nope. You still don't get it. Only factual assertions, such as 'people must breathe or they die' can be verified or falsified with evidence.
But a moral assertion, such 'people should be allowed to breathe' doesn't make a factual claim with a truth-value, so it can't be verified or falsified.
We can explain and try to justify holding the opinion that people should be allowed to breathe - but nothing can turn it into a fact - a true factual assertion.

When did I ever use the following moral statement 'people should be allowed to breathe' ?

The empirical and moral fact is;
"ALL humans ought to breathe else they die."

The objective moral absolute in this case is;
"No human ought to prevent another human from breathing"

I had condemned your view of your dogmatic philosophical realist view of "what is a fact", i.e. a true factual assertion which is ultimate an illusion.
I had explained there are many types of fact which are objective as justified within a Framework of Knowledge.
You have not disputed the above to support your dogmatic "what is a fact."

And you can stuff your nonsense about ontological philosophical and moral realism where the sun don't shine. Not interested. Nothing to see here.

The above is due to your ignorance.
Ontological Philosophical realism and ontological moral realism are very valid topics within Philosophy.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
In metaphysics, realism about a given object is the view that this object exists in reality independently of our conceptual scheme. In philosophical terms, these objects are ontologically independent of someone's conceptual scheme, perceptions, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc.
Realism can also be a view about the nature of reality in general, where it claims that the world exists independent of the mind, as opposed to non-realist views.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism
Moral realism (also ethical realism or moral Platonism)[1] is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately.

Note the similarities between the above Philosophical Realism and Moral Realism.
Since you are a philosophical realist, you are kicking your own ass when you condemn Moral Realism.

Ignoring the above and not defending your position tantamount to being a philosophical retard.

Remind me - are you a philosophical anti-realist?

And if so, remind me - are you a moral realist?

And if so, how do you reconcile your philosophical anti-realism with your moral realism?

[Skepdick]

Remind me - are you a philosophical anti-realist?

And if so, remind me - are you a moral realist?

And if so, how do you reconcile your philosophical anti-realism with your moral realism?

I imagine the same way everybody handles cognitive dissonance? By discarding one.

When philosophy and morality clash - I discard philosophy.

If philosophy is immoral and you are a philosopher then you are immoral.

[Immanuel Can]

objectivity = justified inter-subject-ive consensus

No, it isn't. The "inter-subjective consensus" bit doesn't matter at all, in the matter of objectivity.

Yes, at one time, all people on the planet thought the world was flat. They were all wrong. That is "group delusion." But such a belief was not justified true belief that is objective like Science and other credible Framework of Knowledge.

Then, if we're going to understand one another, you'd better explain what a "justified" belief is, in your usage. Because you said it was "inter-subjective," but clearly, it's not, if everybody in the world could have "consensus" and still not be "justified" in it.

So by what process is a belief "justified," as you see it?

[Immanuel Can]

Theism Driven by Desperate Psychology
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=29316

I can't even make sense of this alleged line of thought. You're going to have to help me out, there.

[Immanuel Can]

So you side with Nietzsche against George Eliot.

Sure.

Nietzsche's right, in this case. Histrionic though he may have sometimes been.

2 I have no time for Nietzsche's histrionics. He wasn't a philosopher - more a zeitgeist pundit - and he was wrong about the god-morality link.

Well, let's not be ad hominem. If Nietzsche were the Devil himself, we would still be faced with the question of whether or not, as Shakespeare put it, the Devil can "speak true." Let us concede that Nietzsche was "histrionic" -- but what about his assertion? Is this one of the instances in which he's got it wrong, or is he actually right? You're going to have to show reasons for dismissing a point of view for which all the good reasons seem to be on his side. If subjective morality is a real thing, on what basis does it stand?

Let's be precise. Nietzsche's claim is this: if there's no god, then there are no moral facts. This says nothing about moral subjectivism.

No, actually, that's not the limit of the implication, as Nietzsche well understood. It was the point on which he took issue with Eliot et al. Nietzsche well understood that if God is dead, then we are putting ourselves "beyond good and evil," i.e., into a realm in which the terms "good" and "evil" don't even have a referent.

In such a realm, there is no substance to moral subjectivism. As Nietzsche rightly saw, it's only a "lack of discernment" that could allow people like Eliot to think otherwise.

So if you think Nietzsche's wrong, you can disprove him very easily: just say what the real justification for subjective moralizing is.

His focus, if you see, is on AEN -- the "Argument from Evolutionary Naturalism." But you could argue there is some other way of grounding a subjective morality apart from evolutionism, if you want; but if you don't want to, then you've got to grant that, as Plantinga, Dawkins and Rosenberg have argued from opposite sides (the first, a Theist, the others, Naturalists) that Darwin is the only game in town. (394)

And if that's right, you've got to defend some version of an argument that shows an AEN can rationally legitimize morality. So that's the next step.

But the premise - that morality is an epistemological matter, so that moral assertions need a grounding in the way that factual assertions do - is the matter in dispute.

It shouldn't be. Either a moral statement has a justification, or it does not. There's no "sort of" option possible there. And while I agree that it will not be precisely the kind of justification one would seek for a physical fact, it is very clear that nobody has any reason to take any moral judgment at all with any seriousness if it lacks justification.

What does 'legitimise morality' mean? Why does it need legitimising?

Morality needs legitimizing because it asks groups of people to agree on a value judgment. More than that, it calls them to agree on that value judgment on peril of having been "immoral" or "amoral" or "having done the wrong thing."

If it does not achieve this, then what you're calling "morality" is not compelling to anyone but the person who happens to believe it at the present moment: in other words, it amounts to nothing more persuasive than "Peter doesn't like X." And why should anyone be concerned whether or not Peter "likes" or "doesn't like" things, especially since, lacking any justification even to himself, Peter might change his mind in the next ten seconds?

We can't logically argue from the existence of moral facts to the existence of a god, but then claim that the existence of moral facts depends on the existence of a god.

Actually, we could. If two quantities are mutually necessary, you can argue from either one to the other, and it's valid and logical to do so. To deny that logic, you'd have to show that there was another circumstance under which one or the other could exist. Then you could call it "question-begging." But not if both are mutually necessary.

No. To assume a conclusion in a premise is circular. And establishing each conclusion - 'there is a god' and 'there are moral facts' - is a separate opertaion.

Not at all.

You can deduce the existence of the tides from the existence of the moon, or the existence of the moon from the existence of the ocean tides. Both ways, the deduction works, if a moon is necessary to the generating of tides...which, of course, it is.

If the existence of morality and the existence of God are mutually necessary, as both I and Nietzsche would agree (oddly enough), then the proof of one is the proof of both. So to show that people can't argue that way, you'd have to show that morality can be justified apart from reference to God. If it cannot, then you have to drop all this talk of "subjective morality" of which you've been speaking, because "subjective" then denies the meaning of "morality." To be "subjective" is to say that you have only your perception, and no information about praise or blame, proscriptions or prescriptions pertaining to anyone else, and no information even about their evaluation of your own actions or intentions -- and hence no "moral" information, by definition.

I understand that you agree with Nietzsche

Well, only when what he says is actually right. And he certainly had this right.

If there are no moral facts anyway - if moral facts are impossible - then a god is irrelevant here

Well, you need to show that there are no moral facts, then. But if there are no moral facts, neither is there such thing as morality. So then, subjective morality is closeted Nihilism.

And I'm not saying you can't be a Nihilist: I'm just pointing out that you've rationally got no choice, once you say that morality isn't objective. Subjectivism isn't a stopping point, because it's not rationally explicable or justifiable in any way.

And that's what I'm waiting to see, now...you've pitched for subjective morality (oddly enough, for its existence being objective, though its substance is supposed to remain subjective -- at some point, you'll have to show how that can work). But how can morality be "subjective" and be morality at all?

Burden of proof.

...became yours, the very second you said, "morality is subjective." If you went for Nihilism, then the burden of proof would remain on me.

Do you want to opt for AEN, and hence, to refute Linville's argument in some way, or do you want to make some argument for subjective morality that does not take as any premise, or presuppose, that AEN is true?

I'm not making an argument for moral subjectivism.

Then are you a Nihilist? It's the only option you've got left.

[Belinda]

"People should be allowed to breathe" is objectively true only if it refers to some overarching criterion such as God, or a recognisable law. There are no natural rights but there are rights within an arbitrary code of rights such as the law or God. So rights (oughts) depend from what is socially accepted as real. Moral realists don't understand God is dead.

It is true we have mirror neurons and are social animals. If we are nature realists we believe in the basic orderliness of reality. I do so believe despite having no proof of it. My native culture is built upon the natural orderliness of reality and I like and respect my native culture, and I have faith in the orderliness of nature including what socially-moral behaviour is right. I don't however claim to know for a fact my native culture of belief is the best ever and the best that could ever be, so the tenets of my native culture are not objectively true.

One does not know the source of Veritas's beliefs which tend to philosophical jingoism.

You are stretching Peter's strawman.

Note my correction to his straw-man;
viewtopic.php?p=455011#p455011

I read your link, Veritas. But if nature is orderly and we can reason and acquire empirical knowledge about nature it is possible the knowledge we have acquired might sometimes fortunately hit the mark even while we cannot know whether or not. After all, fantasies are vastly improbable predictions while much modern scientific knowledge yields probable predictions and explanations ; there are degrees of probability and there is an element of chance mixed in with all choices.

Similarly, some of our ethics could be true to the order of nature while we cannot be certain this is so. Fortune could play its part in ethical claims just like it can in empirical claims.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Nope. You still don't get it. Only factual assertions, such as 'people must breathe or they die' can be verified or falsified with evidence.
But a moral assertion, such 'people should be allowed to breathe' doesn't make a factual claim with a truth-value, so it can't be verified or falsified.
We can explain and try to justify holding the opinion that people should be allowed to breathe - but nothing can turn it into a fact - a true factual assertion.

When did I ever use the following moral statement 'people should be allowed to breathe' ?

The empirical and moral fact is;
"ALL humans ought to breathe else they die."

The objective moral absolute in this case is;
"No human ought to prevent another human from breathing"

I had condemned your view of your dogmatic philosophical realist view of "what is a fact", i.e. a true factual assertion which is ultimate an illusion.
I had explained there are many types of fact which are objective as justified within a Framework of Knowledge.
You have not disputed the above to support your dogmatic "what is a fact."

And you can stuff your nonsense about ontological philosophical and moral realism where the sun don't shine. Not interested. Nothing to see here.

The above is due to your ignorance.
Ontological Philosophical realism and ontological moral realism are very valid topics within Philosophy.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
In metaphysics, realism about a given object is the view that this object exists in reality independently of our conceptual scheme. In philosophical terms, these objects are ontologically independent of someone's conceptual scheme, perceptions, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc.
Realism can also be a view about the nature of reality in general, where it claims that the world exists independent of the mind, as opposed to non-realist views.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism
Moral realism (also ethical realism or moral Platonism)[1] is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately.

Note the similarities between the above Philosophical Realism and Moral Realism.
Since you are a philosophical realist, you are kicking your own ass when you condemn Moral Realism.

Ignoring the above and not defending your position tantamount to being a philosophical retard.

Remind me - are you a philosophical anti-realist?

And if so, remind me - are you a moral realist?

And if so, how do you reconcile your philosophical anti-realism with your moral realism?

I am a philosophical anti-realist in the Kantian mode.

I am not an ontological moral realist.
I am an empirical-moral-realist and an absolutist moral realist.
I justifies my moral-realism from empirical evidences and philosophical reasoning [e.g. breathing, hunger, killing, slavery, death, etc.]

An empirical moral realist aligns with philosophical anti-realism because the underlying 'empirical' elements are meta-subjective, i.e. not absolutely independent of the subjects.

[Veritas Aequitas]

objectivity = justified inter-subject-ive consensus

No, it isn't. The "inter-subjective consensus" bit doesn't matter at all, in the matter of objectivity.

I believe you are conflating the various perspectives of 'objectivity'.
What you are cling on is 'ontological objectivity' which is not tenable.
This is what the Correspondence Theory of Truth is blindly chasing after.

What I am proposing is objectivity relative to a specific type Framework of Knowledge.
I have always used the Scientific Framework of Knowledge which peer review is imperative. Thus the intersubjective consensus element is imperative with Scientific Objectivity.
Do you deny scientific truths are objective, albeit they are merely polished conjectures.

Note Science merely conclude the scientific-truths are objective, but do not prove what the truth is about exists as ontologically and objectively real, i.e. the ontological thing is an objective reality that in independent to the individual humans.

What-the-truth-is-about is not something that is independent of the individuals. What-the-truth-is-about is an emergence that is co-dependent with humans collectively as part and parcel of that emergence.

Another point is it is only classical Science like Newtonian Physics that ASSUME the ontology thing of objective reality exists independent of the scientists who conclude their objective scientific truths.

Einsteinian and Quantum Physics however do not insist of the independent observers thus cannot claim there is an ontological objective reality.

From the above, do you understand where you are making the error?

Yes, at one time, all people on the planet thought the world was flat. They were all wrong. That is "group delusion." But such a belief was not justified true belief that is objective like Science and other credible Framework of Knowledge.

Then, if we're going to understand one another, you'd better explain what a "justified" belief is, in your usage. Because you said it was "inter-subjective," but clearly, it's not, if everybody in the world could have "consensus" and still not be "justified" in it.

So by what process is a belief "justified," as you see it?

"Justified" means justified in according to the imperative processes and principles of the specific Framework of Knowledge.
As such scientific objectivity must satisfy the requirements of the Scientific Methods, verifiability, testability, repeatability, falsifiability, peer review.

In the past, those who believe [based on intersubjective consensus nevertheless] the world was flat did not rely on a thorough well justified true belief.
They relied on very limited empirical evidence, i.e. only as far as their eyes can see but did not explore and verify the whole Earth fully within the empirical and philosophical realm.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Theism Driven by Desperate Psychology
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=29316

I can't even make sense of this alleged line of thought. You're going to have to help me out, there.

No problem, pose your queries in that OP.

[Veritas Aequitas]

"People should be allowed to breathe" is objectively true only if it refers to some overarching criterion such as God, or a recognisable law. There are no natural rights but there are rights within an arbitrary code of rights such as the law or God. So rights (oughts) depend from what is socially accepted as real. Moral realists don't understand God is dead.

It is true we have mirror neurons and are social animals. If we are nature realists we believe in the basic orderliness of reality. I do so believe despite having no proof of it. My native culture is built upon the natural orderliness of reality and I like and respect my native culture, and I have faith in the orderliness of nature including what socially-moral behaviour is right. I don't however claim to know for a fact my native culture of belief is the best ever and the best that could ever be, so the tenets of my native culture are not objectively true.

One does not know the source of Veritas's beliefs which tend to philosophical jingoism.

You are stretching Peter's strawman.

Note my correction to his straw-man;
viewtopic.php?p=455011#p455011

I read your link, Veritas.
But if nature is orderly and we can reason and acquire empirical knowledge about nature it is possible the knowledge we have acquired might sometimes fortunately hit the mark even while we cannot know whether or not.
After all, fantasies are vastly improbable predictions while much modern scientific knowledge yields probable predictions and explanations ; there are degrees of probability and there is an element of chance mixed in with all choices.

I agree there are degrees of probability of hitting the mark.
As with Science - modern or classical, scientific truths are merely polished conjectures [hypothesis] and can never reflect absolute reality which is non-existent any way.
What is critical is we reach justified and reliable knowledge that will facilitate to optimize the well being of the individual and therefrom humanity.

But there are certain empirical knowledge that even with common sense are very certain [99.99%] e.g. mortality, the imperative to breathe, drink and eat.
Don't think you can dispute the above.
Obviously we have to refine the above with more sophisticated empirical justifications [science, etc.] and philosophical reasoning to establish greater certainty, i.e. 99.9999999..99 certainty.

Similarly, some of our ethics could be true to the order of nature while we cannot be certain this is so. Fortune could play its part in ethical claims just like it can in empirical claims.

There is no need for fortune, chance or luck.
Point is it is imperative we ground whatever are the moral and ethical principles based on the empirical evidences that are very justified to be certain [99.99999..999%].
Then we use this moral principles as ground to make other moral reasoning and evaluations.
Even with 99.999999999..9% certainty, there is no enforcement within morality but these are only to be used as GUIDES only.

[Peter Holmes]

When did I ever use the following moral statement 'people should be allowed to breathe' ?

The empirical and moral fact is;
"ALL humans ought to breathe else they die."

The objective moral absolute in this case is;
"No human ought to prevent another human from breathing"

I had condemned your view of your dogmatic philosophical realist view of "what is a fact", i.e. a true factual assertion which is ultimate an illusion.
I had explained there are many types of fact which are objective as justified within a Framework of Knowledge.
You have not disputed the above to support your dogmatic "what is a fact."


The above is due to your ignorance.
Ontological Philosophical realism and ontological moral realism are very valid topics within Philosophy.





Note the similarities between the above Philosophical Realism and Moral Realism.
Since you are a philosophical realist, you are kicking your own ass when you condemn Moral Realism.

Ignoring the above and not defending your position tantamount to being a philosophical retard.

Remind me - are you a philosophical anti-realist?

And if so, remind me - are you a moral realist?

And if so, how do you reconcile your philosophical anti-realism with your moral realism?

I am a philosophical anti-realist in the Kantian mode.

I am not an ontological moral realist.
I am an empirical-moral-realist and an absolutist moral realist.
I justifies my moral-realism from empirical evidences and philosophical reasoning [e.g. breathing, hunger, killing, slavery, death, etc.]

An empirical moral realist aligns with philosophical anti-realism because the underlying 'empirical' elements are meta-subjective, i.e. not absolutely independent of the subjects.

Codswallop. You're making this shit up as you go along.

An empirical moral realist is nonetheless a moral realist. So name one moral feature of reality - one real moral thing - that you say we can know about by means of intersubjective consensus. And this time, try really hard.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Remind me - are you a philosophical anti-realist?

And if so, remind me - are you a moral realist?

And if so, how do you reconcile your philosophical anti-realism with your moral realism?

I am a philosophical anti-realist in the Kantian mode.

I am not an ontological moral realist.
I am an empirical-moral-realist and an absolutist moral realist.
I justifies my moral-realism from empirical evidences and philosophical reasoning [e.g. breathing, hunger, killing, slavery, death, etc.]

An empirical moral realist aligns with philosophical anti-realism because the underlying 'empirical' elements are meta-subjective, i.e. not absolutely independent of the subjects.

Codswallop. You're making this shit up as you go along.

An empirical moral realist is nonetheless a moral realist. So name one moral feature of reality - one real moral thing - that you say we can know about by means of intersubjective consensus. And this time, try really hard.

Making up as I go along??
Point is I still have a lot of reserved fundamental knowledge I have not brought up for discussion. But should you get near any of them [as in this case] I will bring them up to counter you.

As I had stated earlier;

• The empirical and moral fact is;
  "ALL humans ought to breathe else they die."
  
  The objective moral absolute in this case is;
  "No human ought to prevent another human from breathing"

The above are the moral features of an empirical moral realist.

Your problem which you cannot disentangled is you are stuck with ontological moral realism which is parallel to ontological philosophical realism which is not fundamentally realistic.

Here again;

In metaphysics, [philosophical] realism about a given object is the view that this object exists in reality independently of our conceptual scheme. In philosophical terms, these objects are ontologically independent of someone's conceptual scheme, perceptions, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc.
-wiki

I am refreshing on what is Practical Reason which is differentiated from Theoretical Reason.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Practical_reason

Do you understand the difference between the above reasons in terms of morality and ethics- I don't think you do, due to ignorance and your dogmatic desperation.
It is theoretical reasons [what do I know] that deal and argue about 'state of affairs' and 'matter of fact' from the ontological, literal and semantics basis.

Practical Reasoning is about 'what can I do' and this Framework of Practical Reason generates moral facts as I had presented them.

Don't forget you are still kicking your own ass when you condemned ontological moral realism which I am aware no modern moral philosophers are arguing for and promoting it directly.
Name me one if you disagree.

[Skepdick]

I am refreshing on what is Practical Reason which is differentiated from Theoretical Reason.

Ha! You've almost cured yourself from that dreaded Dumbus Philsopohicus.

Is much worse than COVID-19, I tell you.

[Peter Holmes]

As I had stated earlier;
The empirical and moral fact is;
"ALL humans ought to breathe else they die."

The objective moral absolute in this case is;
"No human ought to prevent another human from breathing"
The above are the moral features of an empirical moral realist.

Wrong, as ever.

Fact: humans must breathe or they die.
Opinion: humans ought to breathe.
Question: why ought humans to breathe?
Answer: so that they live.
Question: why ought humans to live?
Answer: because if they don't, they die.
Question: why ought humans not to die?
Answer: because they ought to live.

And on and on and on, in an utterly fatuous spiral down into nothingness.

I asked you to produce one real moral thing - a moral feature of reality - because you believe such things exist - and all you could produce was a linguistic assertion: all humans ought to breathe else they die.

Now, I asked you to try really hard this time - which meant to think about it as hard as you can with your tiny, conceited brain. And this was the result. Looking back, and reflecting on the fruit of your intellectual endeavours - does what you produced strike you as a tiny wee bit off the mark? Could it possibly be that a linguistic assertion doesn't qualify as the supposed MORAL THING that moral realists claim exists? Could something have gone ever so slightly wrong with this way of thinking? Could it be that moral realists have no f*****g clue how to demonstrate the truth of their idiotic claim?

Well, who knows? Why let abject failure get in the way of a pious belief - one as absurdly irrational as belief in gods?

[Belinda]

You are stretching Peter's strawman.

Note my correction to his straw-man;
viewtopic.php?p=455011#p455011

I read your link, Veritas.
But if nature is orderly and we can reason and acquire empirical knowledge about nature it is possible the knowledge we have acquired might sometimes fortunately hit the mark even while we cannot know whether or not.
After all, fantasies are vastly improbable predictions while much modern scientific knowledge yields probable predictions and explanations ; there are degrees of probability and there is an element of chance mixed in with all choices.

I agree there are degrees of probability of hitting the mark.
As with Science - modern or classical, scientific truths are merely polished conjectures [hypothesis] and can never reflect absolute reality which is non-existent any way.
What is critical is we reach justified and reliable knowledge that will facilitate to optimize the well being of the individual and therefrom humanity.

But there are certain empirical knowledge that even with common sense are very certain [99.99%] e.g. mortality, the imperative to breathe, drink and eat.
Don't think you can dispute the above.
Obviously we have to refine the above with more sophisticated empirical justifications [science, etc.] and philosophical reasoning to establish greater certainty, i.e. 99.9999999..99 certainty.

Similarly, some of our ethics could be true to the order of nature while we cannot be certain this is so. Fortune could play its part in ethical claims just like it can in empirical claims.

There is no need for fortune, chance or luck.
Point is it is imperative we ground whatever are the moral and ethical principles based on the empirical evidences that are very justified to be certain [99.99999..999%].
Then we use this moral principles as ground to make other moral reasoning and evaluations.
Even with 99.999999999..9% certainty, there is no enforcement within morality but these are only to be used as GUIDES only.

Alas there is no way we can know nature is orderly or chaotic ! We have to presume it is orderly so we can predict as well as we can what happens next.The mark to hit is a matter of faith and there may be no mark to hit.
The claim that fortune or chance is an element of each choice is to claim nobody knows everything nor has perfect judgement. Uncertainty is a virtue of good science and ethical living.

I agree we can aim to be as certain as we possibly can and we should aim to be as certain as we possibly can as to the consequences of any choice. Some of these consequences are affective, and that is where morality matters.