Qualia Blindness

[Brent.Allsop]

Even if functionalism "wins" it doesn't solve anything. it just re-words the question "Never mind qualia, do functions exist?"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2 ... _principle

Descartes was also quite the skeptic, but he realized he could not doubt his existence because of the necessary “I think, therefor I am”. I’m in the camp that says the same thing about qualia, out of which our conscious thoughts are composed. If you are looking at a strawberry, you can doubt the existence of the strawberry (you could be a brain in a vat, the strawberry being only a bunch of functions) but you cannot doubt the existence, and quality of your knowledge of that strawberry composed of elemental qualities like redness and greenness, which must exist, even if only in that brain, in that vat. As it points out in question 5.

[Impenitent]

rene saw what the church did to galileo...

the cogito was simply a way to appease the church when his mathematics showed the church was wrong...

-Imp

[Skepdick]

Descartes was also quite the skeptic, but he realized he could not doubt his existence because of the necessary “I think, therefor I am”. I’m in the camp that says the same thing about qualia, out of which our conscious thoughts are composed. If you are looking at a strawberry, you can doubt the existence of the strawberry (you could be a brain in a vat, the strawberry being only a bunch of functions) but you cannot doubt the existence, and quality of your knowledge of that strawberry composed of elemental qualities like redness and greenness, which must exist, even if only in that brain, in that vat. As it points out in question 5.

If you are a brain in a vat, but you can't doubt the existence of a strawberry then you are an anti-realist.

You are using "exists" to refer to percepts of your mind.

But do observe, Descartes went too far also. Merely having a concept for "I" and uttering the word is sufficient evidence for recursion/self-reference.

Recursion is computation.

[Brent.Allsop]

Also, there is a methodical error with the approach you are taking re: falsification.

If you remove glutamite - there's no redness. And the representationalists celebrate.
If you remove glutamite receptors - there's no redness. And the interactivists celebrate.
If you remove parts of the brain - there's no redness. And the functionalists celebrate.

But that's not really falsification and it certainly tells us nothing about qualia - that's just removing critical components from the causal chain necessary (but not sufficient) for subjective experience.

Wait, I don’t follow. The prediction is that there will be one theory that can’t be falsified. For example, if everyone always experiences redness, when glutamate is computationally bound in with the rest of that persons consciousness, and if nobody can experience redness, without glutamate, it will be verified and unfalsifiable. In other words, if we can’t falsify that glutamate = redness, and functionalists, recursionists, and all other theories can’t create a redness experience, all the crap in the gap theories will be falsified, and we will have a definitive scientific consensus about what it is, in this world, that has an intrinsic redness quality, and that would be only and always glutamate.

[Brent.Allsop]

If you are a brain in a vat, but you can't doubt the existence of a strawberry then you are an anti-realist.

Here you are failing to distinguish between the strawberry and knowledge of a strawberry. The initial qualia blind sin described in question number one. I said you can doubt the existence of the perceived strawberry, not the resulting knowledge of that strawberry. Maybe this video would help with this?

You are using "exists" to refer to percepts of your mind.

But do observe, Descartes went too far also. Merely having a concept for "I" and uttering the word is sufficient evidence for recursion/self-reference.

Recursion is computation.

This is evidence that you are not yet understanding the difference between computation abstracted away from physics so it can be substrate independent (necessarily more complex) and computation running directly on intrinsic qualities.

Abstract simulations represent information in a way that is abstracted away from physical properties. The only way any set of physics can represent 1s and 0s, or the word 'red', is if you have a dictionary interpretation mechanism to tell you which physics represent the ones and zeros. You can’t be “substrate independent” without this kind of additional abstracting machinery. We, on the other hand, represent 'red' information directly on intrinsic qualities like redness and greenness. The word red isn’t physically red. Intrinsic redness is the definition of the word red. That is the end, no recursion.

[Skepdick]

Here you are failing to distinguish between the strawberry and knowledge of a strawberry.

IF you are a brain in a vat, there is no strawberry only your knowledge of a strawberry-experience.

In fact if you are a brain in a vat, you would have absolutely no knowledge of the vat or "your" brain either.
The brain you might perceive is not your actual brain.

You are off by 1 (level of abstraction).

This is evidence that you are not yet understanding the difference between computation abstracted away from physics so it can be substrate independent (necessarily more complex) and computation running directly on intrinsic qualities.
Abstract simulations represent information in a way that is abstracted away from physical properties.

No. Quantum Entanglement corresponds to computation.

This supports the CTD principle

The only way any set of physics can represent 1s and 0s, or the word 'red', is if you have a dictionary interpretation mechanism to tell you which physics represent the ones and zeros.

Then don't take Classical information. Take Quantum information. In fact - don't represent the numbers at all - work straight with the wave functions.

You can’t be “substrate independent” without this kind of additional abstracting machinery.

Yeah. But all language is abstract, and all models of reality we have are linguistic so where does that leave you?

We, on the other hand, represent 'red' information directly on intrinsic qualities like redness and grenness.

We don't "represent" color - either we can differentiate between red and green or we are part of the 10% colourblind population.

The word red isn’t physically red. Intrinsic redness is the definition of the word red. That is the end, no recursion.

If you are a brain in a vat what is redness intrinsic to? There's your recursion.

[Brent.Allsop]

If you are a brain in a vat what is redness intrinsic to? There's your recursion.

Wait, are you claiming your claims are not falsifiable? This statement is evidence to me that you don't understand recursion. There is no recursion in what you are saying, just lack of knowledge. Lack of knowledge which can be overcome by a non recursive neural ponytail.

Again, you keep talking about theories that I predict will be falsified. I’m talking about something different. You must have not understood the post pointing out how a neural ponytail would falsify skeptical theories like solipsism and that you are a brains in a vat, just like both of your brain hemispheres absolutely know that the other hemisphere exists. It is the neural ponytail that enables one to prove they are not in a vat by directly subjectively experiencing intrinsic qualities outside of the skull, bound with the intrinsic qualities in both hemispheres, inside the skull.

Evidently you also misunderstood the post where I pointed out how experimentalists could prove that subjective word for redness, and the objective word for glutamate, were the same thing, and could not be falsified. IF scientists demonstrated this, that would be the end, recursion theory falsified.

[Atla]

The physical-qualia gap is probably a philosophical problem, and can't be addressed by experiments. That would be like trying to bite your own teeth, or like trying to measure a ruler with that ruler.

You don't seem to be understanding the 3 different types of effing the ineffable, as it directly contradicts these "can't be addressed by experiments" assertions of yours.

It sounds like you are in the consciousness (or at least qualia) are not approachable via objective science camp? If so, you should give more support to your still minority camp. As you can see 50 or so of the 60 (The numbers by the camp indicate number of participants) or so total expert participants (including the likes of Steven Lehar, David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, Stuart Hameroff and others) are in the Approachable Via Science camp, and 40 of those are supporting the emerging "Representational Qualia Theory" all predicting just how to prove what qualia are, by not being qualia blind, which if experimentally verified would falsify your qualia "can't be addressed by experiments" claim.

I guess you can put me into the Advaita group. The "approachable via science" camp are of course wrong as things stand, all we can do is get better and better at finding correlates between physical structures and qualia.

You can't pin down qualia/consciousness using physical instruments, because the physical world and the consciousness world are one and the same thing. Most of those experts are still epicycling withing Western philosophy, but that's a dead end. We have developed an extraordinary cultural double vision (physical vs consciousness).

My position is the default position and requires no evidence. Qualia representationalism, which is a form of dualism no matter how subtle, requires evidence but there isn't any. (Note that qualia representationalism and representational realism are two different things that get often conflated.)

[Skepdick]

Wait, are you claiming your claims are not falsifiable?

I am saying that not only is recursion unfalsifiable, it's self-affirming. DOING science is evidence for recursion.

The observer is an essential component of the scientific method.
The observer observing itself (which is recursive!) is a positive feedback loop!
The observer is equivalent to the "Witness" in Advaita.

You can't explain "observation" with glutamite (or any other neurotransmitter) because you are too high up the abstraction tower.

Explaining the observer/observation is the measurement problem in quantum physics.

This statement is evidence to me that you don't understand recursion.

Well. Maybe. Do you think you understand understanding?

Explain what it means to understand.
Explain what it means to explain also.

Can you do either of those things without closing the explanatory gap first?

There is no recursion in what you are saying, just lack of knowledge. Lack of knowledge which can be overcome by a non recursive neural ponytail. Again, you keep talking about theories that I predict will be falsified. I’m talking about something different. You must have not understood the post pointing out how a neural ponytail would falsify skeptical theories like solipsism and that you are a brains in a vat, just like both of your brain hemispheres absolutely know that the other hemisphere exists. It is the neural ponytail that enables one to prove they are not in a vat by directly subjectively experiencing intrinsic qualities outside of the skull, bound with the intrinsic qualities in both hemispheres, inside the skull.

You don't know how knowledge (read: memories) is (are) represented in the brain, let alone encoded/encapsulated, let alone communicated/transferred between parts of the brain, let alone between two different brains, and you need this understanding prior to constructing any such "neural ponytail" (a physical communication channel).

Your "neural ponytail" is an interface. Mapping different knowledge-ontologies is fundamentally an impedance mismatching problem

Evidently you also misunderstood the post where I pointed out how experimentalists could prove that subjective word for redness, and the objective word for glutamate, were the same thing, and could not be falsified. IF scientists demonstrated this, that would be the end, recursion theory falsified.

But this is the part you miss. Scientists can't demonstrate this. To whom would the scientist be demonstrating this?
To the subject of the experiment; or to an audience observing the subject under experimentation?

Who would be "convinced" after the demonstration?
The subject experiencing the redness; or the audience experiencing the glutamate?

The notion of "sameness" and "difference" are the foundation of abstract thought. There are two perspectives to be had:

1. Metaphysically/Ontologically: No two things can ever be "the same" because their spacetime coordinates are different.
2. Epistemically: Any two things can be seen as being "the same" if you abstract away all of their differences.

You don't get to draw a distinction between the objective thing (glutamate) the subjective thing (redness) and then insist that they are "the same thing". Especially since glutamate is not even red in color.

All you would have produced is a mapping function between subjective and objective correlates, but that function is a black box.

So, what's a function? Do functions exist? Is the mapping function between objective and subjective correlates injective, bijective or surjective?
What's inside the mapping function?

But the issue is much more obvious and semantic: In order to close the explanatory gap you have to explain how explanation works.
What neurotransmitter do you think that maps to? Could we just pump people's brains full of "explanations" and "understanding" in the form of pills?

[Sculptor]

Sadly the quiz seems written by someone to whom English is not a first language

Not quite. Even though I aced my science and philosophy courses, I flunked my english courses.
We would love to have some help. Please?

I think the problem seems to be that you are starting with an assumption. Not sure exactly how I would characterise it, but I certainly don't share it.
I'm assuming that by "Qualia Blindness" you mean that people are blind to the concept of qualia - or am I missing your aim?

[RCSaunders]

Everyone thinks there is a “hard” mind body problem.
But isn’t it just sloppy epistemology of color, that is the only problem?

I would love to hear if everyone does or does not agree with the “correct” answers to this Socratic method test to help people understand the epistemology of intrinsic qualities, asking: “Are you Qualia Blind”?

The second question is already off the rails:

If you are consciously aware of something, must there be something, physical, that is that knowledge?

Perception (seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling, and tasting) is not knowledge. It is only conscious awareness. Knowledge requires concepts which identify what is perceived.

Is it the strawberry that has an intrinsically red quality, or the reflected light?

More nonsense. No one has ever seen light, light is our means of seeing. There is no light sans entities. All light that is seen is light that has been emitted, relfected or transmitted by some entity.

(since we are directly aware of the intrinsic qualities of our knowledge, our knowledge of what our redness is like, and how this is different than our greenness, cannot be mistaken.)

More confusion between perception and knowledge.

If scientists developed a device that could detect or observe qualia in the brain, what would the data from such a machine be like?

The brain does not perceive (see, hear, feel, smell, or taste) anything, so there are no perceived qualities in the brain to test. All that can be tested in the brain is how the instrument of perception is working. It's like examining the behavior of a television thinking all the electronic processes are the actual picture.

[Brent.Allsop]

I think the problem seems to be that you are starting with an assumption. Not sure exactly how I would characterise it, but I certainly don't share it.

The ”assumption” is contained in the emerging consensus camp being built around “Representational Qualia Theory”. Which is already being supported by the likes of Daniel Dennett, Steven Lehar, John Smythies, Stuart Hameroff, and a growing number of others. This set of questions is intended to help people understand the concepts contained in that emerging consensus theory.

I'm assuming that by "Qualia Blindness" you mean that people are blind to the concept of qualia - or am I missing your aim?

Qualia blindness, as described in question 8 is simply having language that has a single word for all things ‘red’. A quale, is an intrinsic quality. If you use one word for everything (the strawberry, the light, the ‘red’ receptors in the eye, the ‘red’ signal…), this tells you nothing of any specific intrinsic quality – hence your language is blind to any such intrinsic qualities. You must be able to model multiple intrinsic qualities using multiple words for different intrinsic qualities like : “My redness is like your greenness, both of which we call red.”

It sounds like you don’t agree with some of this. If so, I encourage you to canonize your view, in an existing or new competing camp to “Representational Qualia Theory” to see if anyone else agrees with you, compared to this and other theories. We'd be happy to do all we can to help with any such. Our goal is to amplify the wisdom of the crowd, and to build and track consensus arround the best theories.

[Brent.Allsop]

The brain does not perceive (see, hear, feel, smell, or taste) anything, so there are no perceived qualities in the brain to test. All that can be tested in the brain is how the instrument of perception is working. It's like examining the behavior of a television thinking all the electronic processes are the actual picture.

As I’ve mentioned elsewhere, this set of questions is meant to help people understand the ideas contained in the emerging consensus “Representational Qualia Theory”. Which is already being supported by the likes of Daniel Dennett, Steven Lehar, John Smythies, Stuart Hameroff, and a growing number of others. This set of questions is intended to help people understand the concepts contained in that emerging consensus theory.

As I said in the last response, if you do disagree, you should help amplify the wisdom of the crowd and ‘canonize’ your view in a competing camp. We’d be happy to help.

[Sculptor]

I think the problem seems to be that you are starting with an assumption. Not sure exactly how I would characterise it, but I certainly don't share it.

The ”assumption” is contained in the emerging consensus camp being built around “Representational Qualia Theory”. Which is already being supported by the likes of Daniel Dennett, ... This set of questions is intended to help people understand the concepts contained in that emerging consensus theory.

You are missing the point. I am taking about your personal working assumption when you devised the questions. Offering these questions, cold, with an unexpressed assumption, renders them ambiguous at best,or incomprehensible at worst.

I'm assuming that by "Qualia Blindness" you mean that people are blind to the concept of qualia - or am I missing your aim?

Qualia blindness, as described in question 8 is simply having language that has a single word for all things ‘red’. A quale, is an intrinsic quality. If you use one word for everything (the strawberry, the light, the ‘red’ receptors in the eye, the ‘red’ signal…), this tells you nothing of any specific intrinsic quality – hence your language is blind to any such intrinsic qualities. You must be able to model multiple intrinsic qualities using multiple words for different intrinsic qualities like : “My redness is like your greenness, both of which we call red.”

This does not make sense. Red is not intrinsic to the object but a quality of the subject's perception. "Redness" is a perceived quality.
Not sure what you mean by having a single word for red things. A strawberry is a strawberry, I call a Ferrari a car. Both might look red but it will not be the same red. And I know that redness occurs in my mind.
Am I qualia blind?
If I was qualia blind what would change about these points I just made?

It sounds like you don’t agree with some of this. If so, I encourage you to canonize your view, in an existing or new competing camp to “Representational Qualia Theory” to see if anyone else agrees with you, compared to this and other theories. We'd be happy to do all we can to help with any such. Our goal is to amplify the wisdom of the crowd, and to build and track consensus arround the best theories.

Just want a bit of clarification.

[Sculptor]

Qualia blindness, as described in question 8 is simply having language that has a single word for all things ‘red’.

No it does not.
It says "If experimentalists want to objectively observe an elemental redness quale, can they use one word like red as a label for all the physics they are observing?"
That is not a description in any sense.