Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Tue May 05, 2020 2:03 pm
I've made them to you earlier, several times. You seem uninterested: I can't beat that.
Nah! what you have sounded is you have read Hume's Treatise of Human Nature. That is irrelevant to the above.
What I have linked are the various interpretations of Hume's is-ought contention which exposed your narrow mindedness in sticking to the wrong interpretation. So what you have to say about this exposure and how would you counters the other different interpretations of the is-ought issue, especially the moral-sense view?
As the point stated, Hume critiqued Roman Catholic in particular.
Yeah. I'm not an RC, myself. I actually agree with some of his objections to Natural Law arguments. Such evidences are at best indicative, and Natural Law theory, in itself, does not provide the bridge over Hume's Is-Ought gap. It's not a conclusive way to argue, even if at the end of the day it turns out to be partly right. It depends too heavily on clerical say-so, which I think we have reason to reject.
You are too superficial with Hume's Moral Principles.
It is not say-so, rather Hume relied on the Law of Non-Contradiction, i.e.
What is empirical [is] and non-empirical [ought] cannot be the same.
There is no way one can conflate and equivocate the above p and non-p directly.
Hume is not totally against the Natural Law Theory.
You have to read Hume's work to understand this point.
What Hume is against is the use of Reason-Alone to infer moral distinctions without any consideration for the primary role of the passions. [the rationalists' position].
What Hume contended was Morality is an inherent impulse dominated by the human passions-sentiments [Hume's empiricism] and merely supported secondarily by reasons.
Thus the task is to investigate empirically into these passion-sentiments and understand how it works.
From how it works and verified to empirical evidence and supported by reasonings,
moral objectives can be established like how Science produce its relative objective truths.
I quoted this from SEP;
SEP wrote:
His method in that work differs from that of the Treatise: instead of explicating the nature of virtue and vice and our knowledge of them in terms of underlying features of the human mind,
he proposes to collect all the traits we know from common sense to be virtues and vices,
observe what those in each group have in common,
and from that observation discover the “foundation of ethics.”
(EPM 1.10).
Thus Hume's establishment of the "foundation of ethics" [moral objectives] are inferred [reasoned] on empirical observations.
Most interpreters recognized "utility" as a basis for Hume's moral evaluation, but utility [one man's meat another's poison] is so subjective to individuals and groups, thus cannot be a solid ground for morality.
You definitely do not understand Hume's Principles of Morality fully and thoroughly but merely following the herd's say-so.
Suggest you read Hume's
Treatise and
Enquiry fully and thoroughly to understand [not necessary agree with] Hume's actual position.