Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Apr 30, 2020 5:49 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Apr 30, 2020 4:32 am
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Apr 29, 2020 10:32 am
Okay. You think that, if there's empirical evidence and philosophical reasoning to justify the belief that X is the case, then X is the case.
But that's obviously false. X is or isn't the case regardless of what anyone believes. What you really mean is: it's rational to believe X is the case iff there's empirical evidence and philosophical reasoning to justify the belief.
Do you agree with my formulation? (If not, this conversation is over.)
You are being rhetoric and forcing the term 'case' I never used nor agreed with.
The term "case" itself is irrelevant in this case, what is relevant is the contexts of the case.
Note again note - this is what I meant,
- if there's empirical evidence and philosophical reasoning to justify [collectively] the belief that X is the true, then X is objective, i.e. independent of any individual's belief.
The argument is whether X, i.e. the secular moral ought is objective [independent of individual opinions and beliefs].
You are ignoring the main argument.
It is your discretion whether to continue or not.
You are running away with that 'is/ought' trope without understanding its context and its place in the Philosophy of Morality.
As I had suggested you must track the 'is/ought' issue back to its roots and source.
In this case you have to read Hume's
- Treatise of Human Nature and
"An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals".
Then we can argue from the basis of Hume's original idea.
I have refreshed on the above two books of Hume and is ready.
Note as far as I understand, Hume's point on 'is/ought' was not intended to be used in the manner you had abused it and argued for re objective secular moral oughts.
Don't run away from this, else you are shirking your philosophical responsibility and integrity.
Yeah, it looks like this conversation is over again. But you managed to agree that the following is true:
You believe we should adopt 'secular objective moral oughts/rules/laws/maxims which are solely to be used as a GUIDE only.' And you have empirical evidence and philosophical reasoning to justify your belief.
Of course, it's not a fact that we should do this - it's your belief, which is subjective, and others can believe something different. No moral objectivity here.
Note my belief is adopted from a supposedly a shared-belief by human beings generically as justified from empirical evidences and philosophical reasoning.
I have already provided the generic justification and argument for this.
- E.g. The moral fact, "all humans ought to breathe" [and the likes] as justified is objective and is independent of any individual subjective belief and opinion.
And in the expression 'secular objective moral ought', the word 'objective' is redundant or meaningless. An 'ought' that we can choose to adopt isn't objective - independent from belief. No moral objectivity here.
So all you're doing - and have ever done - is propose a course of action, which, in your judgement, will produce the best outcome for all of us. And that's fine. Just leave moral objectivity out of it, because there are no moral facts, but only more or less rational moral judgements.
You have conflated an objective
moral fact as justified with
empirical fact.
A moral fact that is justified empirically and philosophically is objective.
How can you decide what is a more or less rational moral judgment if you don't have a fixed-standard to judge upon?
This is why we need a fixed grounded objective moral ought as a standard.
Note I have not provided any course of moral action.
What I have presented is an objective moral ought as a GUIDE.
The individual has to initiate his own actions in alignment with his inherent moral function to align with the objective moral GUIDE.
If you don't read Hume's book related to the issue, you will continue to grope blindly.
The latter-Hume definitely would had agreed to my proposals - here is a clue to that;
SEP wrote:Late in his life Hume deemed the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals [1751] [EPM] his best work, and in style it is a model of elegance and subtlety.
His method in that work differs from that of the Treatise: instead of explicating the nature of Virtue and Vice and our knowledge of them in terms of underlying features of the human mind,
he proposes to collect all the traits we know from common sense to be Virtues and Vices, observe what those in each group have in common, and from that observation discover the “foundation of ethics” (EPM 1.10).
What do you gather from the above?
Hume's "is/ought" dichotomy was from his earlier "
Treatise of Human Nature" where many of his views were overridden by the latter '
Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals' [1751] [EPM]
That's is how Hume would have derived his secular objective moral oughts [foundation, grounds, standards] from observations and empirical evidences.
Can you counter this?