Paul O’Mahoney considers the awful fate Nietzsche predicts for humanity.
https://philosophynow.org/issues/137/Our_Nietzschean_Future
Our Nietzschean Future
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Gary Childress
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Re: Our Nietzschean Future
It's hard to believe that one sick, convalescent little man who thought our morality was for "slaves" has had so much effect on so many philosophers. I can think of far better role models.
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Impenitent
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Re: Our Nietzschean Future
this virtuous collective of slaves must be better than others...
the unmitigated gall (leave Asterix alone) of some slaves believing they have choices or are free
USSR Forever!!!
-Imp
the unmitigated gall (leave Asterix alone) of some slaves believing they have choices or are free
USSR Forever!!!
-Imp
Re: Our Nietzschean Future
Society follows cycles and often these cycles are described by the author. Beliefs become doubts leading to nihilism and the struggle for power leads to its destruction. Then it starts again.What is the nature of this predicted crisis? The most common reading of it represents, I believe, a misconception or underestimation of its nature and scope. This common idea is that Nietzsche is speaking of the gradual erosion among humankind of our belief in any binding, transcendental values. This process is exemplified by, but not restricted to, the decline in religious faith. Without the foundational belief in a divine sanction for human systems of morality, and without faith in a reward beyond it for our conduct in this brief life, the idea that one’s life and actions (and especially one’s efforts and sufferings) are meaningful becomes inestimably more difficult to accept. The result is nihilism: a renunciation not only of religious belief but also of the sustaining convictions of antiquity that the continued flourishing of the community to which one belonged might supply a suitable end for one’s action.
But the way of society does not have to be the way of individuals. They don't believe but instead experience. Instead of the universe having no meaning and purpose, experience reveals it. The question becomes how and why it is possible to experience universal purpose. A very difficult concept and I've learned it is best avoided so as not to disturb the peace.
Re: Our Nietzschean Future
In Paul O'Mahoney's article, “Our Nietzschean Future” (Philosophy Now, #137), he discusses “the awful fate Nietzsche predicts for humanity.” He tells us that Nietzsche saw himself “as humanity's guide through and beyond the coming upheaval,” and that Nietzsche predicted that one day his name would be associated with “a crisis unprecedented in human history.”
Though the nature of this crisis is commonly thought to be the “gradual erosion among humankind of our belief in any binding, transcendental values,” exemplified by a decline in religious belief and the rise of nihilism, O'Mahoney sees all of this merely as preliminaries to the real crisis, which is the recognition and acknowledgment of our lack of free will. He tells us that “Nietzsche did not conceive of human beings as being in any traditional sense free agents, responsible for their actions,” and that nothing “grants us responsibility for our choices and actions,” a view similar to that of contemporary philosopher Galen Strawson.
Moreover, according to O'Mahoney, the expulsion of free-will from our pantheon of illusions would lead inevitably to a world where no one would be held responsible for their actions; where we could not hold anyone criminally accountable; and where even the notions of justice and injustice would have no traction. He says there is “no doubt that the renunciation of the idea of freedom would represent an irreversible debasement of humanity as traditionally understood, inducing a kind of vertigo in our species.” A dark vision, indeed.
He then goes on to suggest a way that we might orient ourselves in such a “vertiginous climate,” positing the “appropriate conception of life” as being that of a game: “a grand, ongoing, purposeless and all encompassing piece of play, each person with no more agency that a cast die or caroming billiard ball,” a game of “choose your illusion.”
I shall not address this rather strange conception. But I would like to address O'Mahoney's characterization of determinism as an “irreversible debasement of humanity.” I do so because my own reading of determinism stands in stark contrast to this view. Indeed, I see in determinism a great blessedness, perhaps the same blessedness Spinoza understood, experienced and wrote about with perspicuity and concision.
In The Story of Philosophy, Will Durant encapsulates Spinoza's hard determinism and nobler freedom—a freedom beyond free will (p.141):
“This is a nobler freedom than that which men call free will; for the will is not free, and perhaps there is no “will.” And let no one suppose that because he is no longer “free,” he is no longer morally responsible for his behavior and the structure of his life. Precisely because men's actions are determined by their memories, society must for its protection form its citizens through their hopes and fears into some measure of social order and cooperation. All education presupposes determinism, and pours into the open mind of youth a store of prohibitions which are expected to participate in determining conduct. [Defending himself in Letter 43, Spinoza said:] 'The evil which ensues from evil deeds is not therefore less to be feared because it comes of necessity; whether our actions are free or not, our motives still are hope and fear. Therefore, the assertion is false that I would leave no room for precepts and commands.'”
Durant continues with a beautiful summary of the 'Concluding Note' to Part II of Spinoza's Ethics: “Determinism makes for a better moral life: it teaches us not to despise or ridicule anyone, or be angry with anyone; men are not "guilty"; and though we punish miscreants, it will be without hate; we forgive them because they know not what they do.”
"Above all, determinism fortifies us to expect and bear both faces of fortune with an equal mind; we remember that all things follow by the eternal decrees of God [i.e. the laws of nature, the eternal sequence and structure of the world]. Perhaps even it will teach us the 'intellectual love of God,' whereby we shall accept the laws of nature gladly, and find our fulfillment within her limitations. He who sees all things as determined cannot complain, though he may resist; for he 'perceives things under a certain species of eternity,' and he understands that his mischances are not chances in the total scheme; that they find some justification in the eternal sequence and structure of the world. So minded, he rises from the fitful pleasures of passion to the high serenity of contemplation which sees all things as part of an eternal order and development; he learns to smile in the face of the inevitable, and "whether he comes into his own now, or in a thousand years, he sits content (Walt Whitman, Song of Myself, Sec. 20).” “That which is necessary,” says Nietzsche, "does not offend me.. Amor fati"—love of fate—"is the core of my nature (Nietzsche, Ecce Homo)." Or Keats:
To bear all naked truths,
And to envisage circumstance, all calm:
That is the top of sovereignty. (Hyperion, II, 203)
"Such a philosophy teaches us to say Yea to life, and even to death—"a free man thinks nothing less than of death; and his wisdom is a meditation not on death but on life (Spinoza, Ethics, IV, 67)." It calms our fretted egos with its large perspective; it reconciles us to the limitations within which our purposes must be circumscribed. It may lead to resignation and an Oriental supine passivity; but it is also the indispensable basis of all wisdom and all strength."
This is what may be had from a true understanding of determinism, not “an irreversible debasement of humanity,” but a deep and abiding sense of acceptance, equanimity, and good-will.
Though the nature of this crisis is commonly thought to be the “gradual erosion among humankind of our belief in any binding, transcendental values,” exemplified by a decline in religious belief and the rise of nihilism, O'Mahoney sees all of this merely as preliminaries to the real crisis, which is the recognition and acknowledgment of our lack of free will. He tells us that “Nietzsche did not conceive of human beings as being in any traditional sense free agents, responsible for their actions,” and that nothing “grants us responsibility for our choices and actions,” a view similar to that of contemporary philosopher Galen Strawson.
Moreover, according to O'Mahoney, the expulsion of free-will from our pantheon of illusions would lead inevitably to a world where no one would be held responsible for their actions; where we could not hold anyone criminally accountable; and where even the notions of justice and injustice would have no traction. He says there is “no doubt that the renunciation of the idea of freedom would represent an irreversible debasement of humanity as traditionally understood, inducing a kind of vertigo in our species.” A dark vision, indeed.
He then goes on to suggest a way that we might orient ourselves in such a “vertiginous climate,” positing the “appropriate conception of life” as being that of a game: “a grand, ongoing, purposeless and all encompassing piece of play, each person with no more agency that a cast die or caroming billiard ball,” a game of “choose your illusion.”
I shall not address this rather strange conception. But I would like to address O'Mahoney's characterization of determinism as an “irreversible debasement of humanity.” I do so because my own reading of determinism stands in stark contrast to this view. Indeed, I see in determinism a great blessedness, perhaps the same blessedness Spinoza understood, experienced and wrote about with perspicuity and concision.
In The Story of Philosophy, Will Durant encapsulates Spinoza's hard determinism and nobler freedom—a freedom beyond free will (p.141):
“This is a nobler freedom than that which men call free will; for the will is not free, and perhaps there is no “will.” And let no one suppose that because he is no longer “free,” he is no longer morally responsible for his behavior and the structure of his life. Precisely because men's actions are determined by their memories, society must for its protection form its citizens through their hopes and fears into some measure of social order and cooperation. All education presupposes determinism, and pours into the open mind of youth a store of prohibitions which are expected to participate in determining conduct. [Defending himself in Letter 43, Spinoza said:] 'The evil which ensues from evil deeds is not therefore less to be feared because it comes of necessity; whether our actions are free or not, our motives still are hope and fear. Therefore, the assertion is false that I would leave no room for precepts and commands.'”
Durant continues with a beautiful summary of the 'Concluding Note' to Part II of Spinoza's Ethics: “Determinism makes for a better moral life: it teaches us not to despise or ridicule anyone, or be angry with anyone; men are not "guilty"; and though we punish miscreants, it will be without hate; we forgive them because they know not what they do.”
"Above all, determinism fortifies us to expect and bear both faces of fortune with an equal mind; we remember that all things follow by the eternal decrees of God [i.e. the laws of nature, the eternal sequence and structure of the world]. Perhaps even it will teach us the 'intellectual love of God,' whereby we shall accept the laws of nature gladly, and find our fulfillment within her limitations. He who sees all things as determined cannot complain, though he may resist; for he 'perceives things under a certain species of eternity,' and he understands that his mischances are not chances in the total scheme; that they find some justification in the eternal sequence and structure of the world. So minded, he rises from the fitful pleasures of passion to the high serenity of contemplation which sees all things as part of an eternal order and development; he learns to smile in the face of the inevitable, and "whether he comes into his own now, or in a thousand years, he sits content (Walt Whitman, Song of Myself, Sec. 20).” “That which is necessary,” says Nietzsche, "does not offend me.. Amor fati"—love of fate—"is the core of my nature (Nietzsche, Ecce Homo)." Or Keats:
To bear all naked truths,
And to envisage circumstance, all calm:
That is the top of sovereignty. (Hyperion, II, 203)
"Such a philosophy teaches us to say Yea to life, and even to death—"a free man thinks nothing less than of death; and his wisdom is a meditation not on death but on life (Spinoza, Ethics, IV, 67)." It calms our fretted egos with its large perspective; it reconciles us to the limitations within which our purposes must be circumscribed. It may lead to resignation and an Oriental supine passivity; but it is also the indispensable basis of all wisdom and all strength."
This is what may be had from a true understanding of determinism, not “an irreversible debasement of humanity,” but a deep and abiding sense of acceptance, equanimity, and good-will.