VALUES

[RCSaunders]

Of course you do not have to answer it, and I'm sorry if you won't. I'll be forced to conclude you don't have an answer, and that's OK.

Track my discussion with Peter on the "objective morality" thread, and you'll find a discussion over that very point. It's easier to point you there than to attempt to repeat all my explanations and Peter's objections here.

It's been done, though. That's what you'll find.

That's your answer? "Go read everything I've written someplace else?"

Well I read as much of it as I could. It's like reading something written by Dostoevsky, a conversation between two psychotics. I saw no answer to my question, just some assertions based on your personal theistic views, and the only supposed values you addressed were what you call moral values.

My question had nothing to do with any particular class of values, like ethics, but the meaning of the term, "values," itself. Ethical values are not the only kind of values there are. "Important," "vital," "necessary," "essential," "easy," "benevolent," "benign," "great," "grand," "effective," "efficient," "just," "fair," "helpful," "useful," and their converse negative values, such as, "unimportant," "unnecessary," "non-essential," "difficult," "malevolent," "malignant," "modest," "ineffective," "inefficient," "unjust," "unfair," "unhelpful," and "useless," are all value terms.

How can anything be intrinsically important, necessary, effective, helpful, or good without there being something it is important to, or necessary for, of effective in achieving, helpful toward, or good for? How can anything be good if it is good for nothing?

If your intrinsic view were correct, things could just be important, necessary, effective, helpful, or good for no reason at all except that God said so.

[Immanuel Can]

My question had nothing to do with any particular class of values, like ethics, but the meaning of the term, "values," itself. Ethical values are not the only kind of values there are. "Important," "vital," "necessary," "essential," "easy," "benevolent," "benign," "great," "grand," "effective," "efficient," "just," "fair," "helpful," "useful," and their converse negative values, such as, "unimportant," "unnecessary," "non-essential," "difficult," "malevolent," "malignant," "modest," "ineffective," "inefficient," "unjust," "unfair," "unhelpful," and "useless," are all value terms.

That's why the moral value of something cannot be severed from the question of the legitimacy of the goal.

That's really important, so I want to camp on that point for a moment.

To say that something is "valuable" is not enough to say that it is also "moral," or "worthy of being valued."

To illustrate that truth, we might say a gas chamber is "valued" for killing human beings; but only in a very limited and amoral sense, meaning, "It will work efficiently for that." It is not "morally worthy of being valued," as in, "we should all have gas chambers," nor is the end, purpose or goal to which it tends "moral." It's a killing chamber. The action of murdering human beings in one en masse is just not moral.

If your intrinsic view were correct, things could just be important, necessary, effective, helpful, or good for no reason at all except that God said so.

No, that's not correct. It's not an either-or.

Something can be good-for (achieving something), and also morally good (an example: giving food to children is good-for their health, but also a morally good action). Or it can be good-for, but not morally good (like a gas chamber, as above). Something can also be bad-for, but good (as in, a screwdriver is a poor tool for pulling nails, but by pulling nails, I help you with your work, which is morally good). And, of course, things can be bad-for and morally bad (such as slowly drowning puppies...inefficient for the purpose of killing them, and also morally bad).

So to say something is "valuable" is unfortunately ambiguous. Valuing something as a tool (i.e. "instrumentally") does not tell us whether or not the purpose-in-view is morally good or bad. Efficiency-for-purpose is not morality.

If you want to have a talk about merely efficiency-values, then that's all you can get out of that...no moral information at all, just a conversation about things like, "Well, a hammer works better than a screwdiverl for pulling nails," and "A gas chamber works better than a drowning pool for killing things," without any consideration of moral status of the action you're contemplating -- or whether the thing you're "valuing" is actually morally valuable (i.e. worthy of value).

[RCSaunders]

To say that something is "valuable" is not enough to say that it is also "moral," or "worthy of being valued."

Well, duh! Who said it was. I specifically said this is only about values, not any particular kind or any particular values. All values must have something they are valuable to or for. If there are such things as, "moral," values, what they are valuable to or for must be specified.

If your intrinsic view were correct, things could just be important, necessary, effective, helpful, or good for no reason at all except that God said so.

No, that's not correct. It's not an either-or.

Something can be good-for (achieving something), and also morally good (an example: giving food to children is good-for their health, but also a morally good action). ...

If the food killed them, would it still be morally good to give them the food? That is the whole problem with the abdsurd view of intrinsic values. It completely disconnects values from any possible relationship to anything. If, "morally good," means, "good no matter what," it is not only a wrong-headed idea, but very dangerous. But if, "morally good," does not mean, "good no matter what," than "the what to which it matters," must be specified.

And, of course, things can be bad-for and morally bad (such as slowly drowning puppies...inefficient for the purpose of killing them, and also morally bad).

Can't you see how meaningless that is? Would it be, "morally bad," to drown the puppies if the puppies liked it? Isn't it the fact you believe the puppies suffer that you believe it is, "morally bad?"

So to say something is "valuable" is unfortunately ambiguous.

That is exactly my point. To say something is valuable or good, morally or any other way, without specifying how it is valuable is exactly like saying something is, "big," or, "necessary," without saying what a thing is bigger than or necessary for.

If you want to have a talk about merely efficiency-values, ....

I am only interested in what the term, "value," means. There is, as far as I know, no special class of values called, "efficiency values," (it should not be hyphenated, it's not an adjective or adverb). Some values pertain to efficiency as an objective, but most, like "important," "vital," "essential," "benevolent," and "just," certainly are not.

If what you mean by, "moral values," cannot be explained in terms of any objective or purpose, they are not values, but mandates, imposed obligations, or arbitrary dictates. Call those values, if you like, just don't expect others to be taken in by that duplicity. "This is good just because it is," does not describe any value.

[Immanuel Can]

To say that something is "valuable" is not enough to say that it is also "moral," or "worthy of being valued."

Well, duh! Who said it was. I specifically said this is only about values, not any particular kind or any particular values. All values must have something they are valuable to or for.

Then the whole issue simply reduces to the trivial. All it means is, "Can somebody 'value" whatever they want?" And of course, we can answer that very simply, "Yes."

So I'm surprised you think it worthy of discussion, if that's all it was.

But I don't think it is all you actually had in mind.

If there are such things as, "moral," values, what they are valuable to or for must be specified.

Yes. But not merely instrumentally. As I say, to say that a gas chamber works well for killing people doesn't make it worthy of us declaring the moral value of gas chambers.

So now you'd be having a very different discussion.

Something can be good-for (achieving something), and also morally good (an example: giving food to children is good-for their health, but also a morally good action). ...

If the food killed them, would it still be morally good to give them the food?

We have a different word for that. We call it "poisoning" them. And it has a different moral standing, as well.

That is the whole problem with the abdsurd view of intrinsic values. It completely disconnects values from any possible relationship to anything.

So, say, your wife...she's not intrinsically valuable? She's only valuable for the instrumental purposes one could have for her, or for the extent to which she serves your "goal, end or purpose"? She can't matter in her own right?

Just asking. Have you told her?

Would it be, "morally bad," to drown the puppies if the puppies liked it?

That doesn't happen. So we have to ask if the puppies' distaste for drowning is merely arbitrary, or indicates something. Likewise our own antipathy to doing it; does it signal only that we happen not to like drowning puppies, or does it signal that what we're doing is objectively bad?

Isn't it the fact you believe the puppies suffer that you believe it is, "morally bad?"

No. There could be other reasons. One could be that they're not my puppies. Another could be that drowning helpless puppies is actually universally bad, because that's not what puppies are created for.

So to say something is "valuable" is unfortunately ambiguous.

That is exactly my point. To say something is valuable or good, morally or any other way, without specifying how it is valuable is exactly like saying something is, "big," or, "necessary," without saying what a thing is bigger than or necessary for.

But the point you're missing, so far, is that mere human purposes are themselves either moral or immoral. So one can't improve the situation merely by saying that somebody has a reason or value for what they're doing.

Like I say, gas chambers were selected by the Third Reich as most highly effective for purpose. But saying that they were "for" that, and that they were very "good" for the "purpose" of killing people, with the "end" of eliminating Jews from Europe, does not confer one ounce of moral dignity on that situation. It was still a hideous evil.

Human purposes and ends are judged by God. There are good human values, and bad human values. And "efficiency for" in the first may be a virtue; but it's an outright vice in the second.

There is, as far as I know, no special class of values called, "efficiency values,"

And yet, there are. So I'm happy to fill that knowledge out for you.

... "benevolent," and "just," certainly are not.

There it is!

You've now imported moral language into a situation in which you claimed earlier that "values" are not moral terms. "Benevolence" is only good if it's a moral imperative for us be benevolent. And "just" implies that people get exactly what is fitting for them, what they "deserve," so to speak. But human beings, on their own, cannot "deserve" anything; nor is there any sense of what "fitting" might mean, since there is no secular definition of what a human being is for.

Secularly speaking, we are not even "for" whatever we might happen to value at a given time. We're "for" oblivion. Given that, what do human "values" and "purposes" do to deserve dignity or special "value"? They have none. They reflect only the inherently objectively-meaningless and contingent projects of dying beings, who live in a doomed race on a fated planet, in the middle of an uncaring solar system, constituting one infinitesimally small 'blip' in cosmic time and scale.

If what you mean by, "moral values," cannot be explained in terms of any objective or purpose, they are not values, but mandates, imposed obligations, or arbitrary dictates.

Not, they aren't.

Again, if you value another human being, like your wife, do you "value" her only as means to your purposes? I trust not. And, of course, Kant would point out that that was quite the opposite of at least one version of the categorical imperative, though I know that will not impress you. But Kant wasn't entirely wrong there. There are a lot of people who find a common-sense rightness in Kant's claim that we cannot use people as means instead of ends-in-themselves. And while I agree with you i you say that Kant didn't go far enough in specifying why, I don't think he was ultimately wrong about that. He had the right idea...just not enough justification for it.

"This is good just because it is," does not describe any value.

Good thing nobody said that. I certainly didn't.

[Nick_A]

R C

I know you believe that values must have a subjective dualistic origin like light and dark but do you believe the "good" described by Plato and is a reality? If it is, what exactly is it that Jesus was not? What is the Good?

Mark 10:18 King James Version (KJV)
18 And Jesus said unto him, Why callest thou me good? there is none good but one, that is, God.

If there is an objective good it stands to reason that there are objective values which express the good. Is it possible that the good spoken of by Plato and referred to by Jesus is a reality? Can a person become aware of the source that awakens us into the direction of the objective good or is it pure imagination?

[RCSaunders]

To say that something is "valuable" is not enough to say that it is also "moral," or "worthy of being valued."

Well, duh! Who said it was. I specifically said this is only about values, not any particular kind or any particular values. All values must have something they are valuable to or for.

Then the whole issue simply reduces to the trivial. All it means is, "Can somebody 'value" whatever they want?" And of course, we can answer that very simply, "Yes."

So I'm surprised you think it worthy of discussion, if that's all it was.

Of course you would, since you are only interested is in putting over your view of morality by obfuscating the nature of values themselves. What values are is hardly a trivial question. The whole history of philosophy has wrestled with the question and unfortunately almost no progress at all in answering it has been made. The worst mistake of all is the tacit assumption of intrinsic values.

That is the whole problem with the absurd view of intrinsic values. It completely disconnects values from any possible relationship to anything.

So, say, your wife...she's not intrinsically valuable? She's only valuable for the instrumental purposes one could have for her, or for the extent to which she serves your "goal, end or purpose"? She can't matter in her own right?

My wife shares my view of love. Neither of use wants to be loved in spite of what we are, but because of what we are as one worth loving. I love my wife because she embodies the sum all I value in another human being, which makes loving and pleasing her my greatest single joy.

If you love your wife for no reason or in spite of who she is, your love for here is no different from, loving, a homeless tramp on the street, or complete stranger. That kind of love says, "there is nothing about you worth loving, and my love is just unasked for gift." I cannot imagine anything more insulting to someone than that.

But the point you're missing, so far, is that mere human purposes are themselves either moral or immoral. So one can't improve the situation merely by saying that somebody has a reason or value for what they're doing.

I haven't missed the point at all. You keep wanting to drag in your view of moral values before what values themselves are has been settled, much less what any particular values are. If we can settle the issue of what values are, we can go on to discuss those values you think are moral or ethical values. Since it is unlikely we are going to agree what values are, there is no point in discussing what kind of objectives or purposes are appropriate to human beings and would determine those values you call moral or ethical.

Human purposes and ends are judged by God. ...

What is "God?" The idea of intrinsic values is impossible to explain without appeal to superstition and the supernatural.[/quote]

[Immanuel Can]

The idea of intrinsic values is impossible to explain without appeal to the supernatural.

Truer words were never spoken.

And without intrinsic valuableness, "valuing" is nothing but either an instrumental use of things, on the one hand, or a complete arbitrary activity involving the making of assessments that have no legitimacy and with which nobody is even theoretically obligated to agree, on the other.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Before any specific values can be identified or explained, whether they are called, ethics, or morals, or something else, what values are, what their purpose is, and some wrong views of values must be addressed. That is the purpose of this chapter.

....

There Are No Collective Values

Values have no other purpose than to be used by human beings to guide their choices in the pursuit of their objective. Values tell them which actions will succeed (are good and right) and which will fail or worse (are bad or wrong).

The ability to choose is a faculty unique to individual human beings. Only individual human beings can use values because only individual human beings have the faculty of choice. Two or more human beings can certainly make the same choices, and the sum of those choices may be regarded as a so-called collective decision, but that decision is only the sum of the choices of each individual in the collective.

In the same way, the ability to have and use values is only possible to individual human beings. Two or more human beings may have the same or similar values and the sum of those values may be regarded as a so-called collective value, but that value is only the sum of the values of each individual in the collective.
The collective itself has no value other than the sum value of the individuals.

Human Objectives

Since human beings are the only beings that need values or have any use for them, those value called ethical or moral values will be those that pertain the objective of human life itself. What those values are can only be answered by identifying what human beings are and what their nature requires of them to be a human beings. [That question is not addressed in this chapter.]

I agree with the points in your article except the following;

First I agree there are no ontological values i.e. value-in-itself as expressed in the article.

Re collective values;
-the values of the individual[s] are subsets of the Collective Values, i.e. the collective value of the species as empirically identified and verified.
We cannot deny humans exist collectively as the human-species which is different from other species and sub-species.

What is of value to the individual facilitates the individual's survival optimally which in turn support the value of the collective, i.e. the preservation of the human species.

The highest [critical] values attributed by the individual[s] to air for breathing, food, security, sex, and the likes serve primarily the collective rather than the individual[s].
It is very evident the collective [species] leveraged on conservatism of large-numbers and will sacrifice some percentile of individuals [e.g. risk takers] to ensure the collective [human species] is preserved.

What is the optimal value to the individual is that which aligns with the secular objective moral oughts [ideals as GUIDES] which are abstracted from empirical evidence and justified with philosophical reasonings.

[RCSaunders]

Before any specific values can be identified or explained, whether they are called, ethics, or morals, or something else, what values are, what their purpose is, and some wrong views of values must be addressed. That is the purpose of this chapter.

....

There Are No Collective Values

Values have no other purpose than to be used by human beings to guide their choices in the pursuit of their objective. Values tell them which actions will succeed (are good and right) and which will fail or worse (are bad or wrong).

The ability to choose is a faculty unique to individual human beings. Only individual human beings can use values because only individual human beings have the faculty of choice. Two or more human beings can certainly make the same choices, and the sum of those choices may be regarded as a so-called collective decision, but that decision is only the sum of the choices of each individual in the collective.

In the same way, the ability to have and use values is only possible to individual human beings. Two or more human beings may have the same or similar values and the sum of those values may be regarded as a so-called collective value, but that value is only the sum of the values of each individual in the collective.
The collective itself has no value other than the sum value of the individuals.

Human Objectives

Since human beings are the only beings that need values or have any use for them, those value called ethical or moral values will be those that pertain the objective of human life itself. What those values are can only be answered by identifying what human beings are and what their nature requires of them to be as human beings. [That question is not addressed in this chapter.]

I agree with the points in your article except the following;

First I agree there are no ontological values i.e. value-in-itself as expressed in the article.

Re collective values;
-the values of the individual[s] are subsets of the Collective Values, i.e. the collective value of the species as empirically identified and verified.
We cannot deny humans exist collectively as the human-species which is different from other species and sub-species.

What is of value to the individual facilitates the individual's survival optimally which in turn support the value of the collective, i.e. the preservation of the human species.

The highest [critical] values attributed by the individual[s] to air for breathing, food, security, sex, and the likes serve primarily the collective rather than the individual[s].
It is very evident the collective [species] leveraged on conservatism of large-numbers and will sacrifice some percentile of individuals [e.g. risk takers] to ensure the collective [human species] is preserved.

What is the optimal value to the individual is that which aligns with the secular objective moral oughts [ideals as GUIDES] which are abstracted from empirical evidence and justified with philosophical reasonings.

The point of the last paragraph was to point out no specific values were addressed in the article, only what values are. That last sentence, "What those values are can only be answered by identifying what human beings are and what their nature requires of them to be as human beings," is based on the fact that only human beings can make choices or use values, but what those values must be based on is whatever the ultimate of objective or purpose of human beings themselves are.

The ultimate purpose or objective of an individual's life must be the individual's own life, or something other than his own life. All theists and mystics place the ultimate purpose of individual lives outside the life of the individual, like a God or some other mystic ideal. You have done the same thing. You have placed the ultimate purpose of an individual's life outside himself, only instead of God, you have made it the, "human species." Unless you are saying the value of the, "human species," is intrinsic, (like theists and mystics) the, "human species," would have to have some purpose or objective relative to which it is value. If the highest value is the, "human species," just because it is, that would make its value intrinsic. What is the, "human species," good for and to whom?

[RCSaunders]

The idea of intrinsic values is impossible to explain without appeal to the supernatural.

Truer words were never spoken.

And without intrinsic valuableness, "valuing" is nothing but either an instrumental use of things, on the one hand, or a complete arbitrary activity involving the making of assessments that have no legitimacy and with which nobody is even theoretically obligated to agree, on the other.

What strange ideas mysticism causes people to have: Agreement is not something people come to by using their own minds to understand similar things, but because they are obliged to agree. A value is not a "legitimate" value if it is only, "instrumental," like indoor plumbing is instrumental to human comfort and sanitation or antibiotics are instrumental in curing diseases. Legitimate values are those that have no discoverable purpose, but are a value simply because some authority says so.

[Immanuel Can]

Agreement is not something people come to by using their own minds to understand similar things, but because they are obliged to agree.

This is not my idea.

My contention is that by using sound and correct judgment, people can come to understand the truth about what the real moral value of a thing is -- by reason, they get the privilege of being right, of knowing and being able to act in concert with moral truth, in other words.

It's moral realism.

A value is not a "legitimate" value if it is only, "instrumental," like indoor plumbing is instrumental to human comfort and sanitation or antibiotics are instrumental in curing diseases.

What I said is that a value is merely instrumental if it is used for an unlegitimized purpose. Consequently, the purpose must be judged on moral grounds -- is it a good purpose or a bad purpose -- and failure to do that puts us in a frame of mind that is amoral. For it has no category for judging among "values," so that whatever a man may happen to "value" becomes, to that way of thinking, rightly "valuable."

Not everything a human being can "value" is worthy of value, or has objective value.

Legitimate values are those that have no discoverable purpose, but are a value simply because some authority says so.

No. Legitimate values often do have a purpose; one may pound nails in order to build a shed (instrumental value), and thereby help one's neighbour (moral value). There's no conflict if there are both instrumental AND moral values entailed.

But it is always the purpose-in-view that must be judged as moral or immoral. And anything that's "valuable" for bad purposes, is not legitimately valuable.

This is all pretty straightforward, actually.

[RCSaunders]

Agreement is not something people come to by using their own minds to understand similar things, but because they are obliged to agree.

This is not my idea.

Somebody using your ID wrote:

And without intrinsic valuableness, "valuing" is nothing but either an instrumental use of things, on the one hand, or a complete arbitrary activity involving the making of assessments that have no legitimacy and with which nobody is even theoretically obligated to agree, on the other.

Saying, "without intrinsic values, "'valuing' is ... a complete arbitrary activity involving the making of assessments that have no legitimacy and with which nobody is even theoretically obligated to agree," sure sounds like intrinsic values would be those with which one is obligated to agree.

My contention is that by using sound and correct judgment, people can come to understand the truth about what the real moral value of a thing is -- by reason, they get the privilege of being right, of knowing and being able to act in concert with moral truth, in other words.

Once again, the article has nothing to do with whatever you mean by moral values, only the nature of values themselves. No particular values or kinds of values are relevant. It has not even been established if there are such things as moral values, much less what they might be.[/quote]

I'm not commenting on the rest since it is totally irrelevant to the discussion of what values are.
[/quote]

[Immanuel Can]

Saying, "without intrinsic values, "'valuing' is ... a complete arbitrary activity involving the making of assessments that have no legitimacy and with which nobody is even theoretically obligated to agree," sure sounds like intrinsic values would be those with which one is obligated to agree.

Well, one is obligated to agree if one wants to be rational, and if one wants to be right. Of course, one always has the option of obstinately choosing to be wrong, and eating the consequences of not conforming oneself to moral realities...but I don't think either of us is interested in that option, right?

No particular values or kinds of values are relevant.

Then no "values" are relevant at all. No "particular values" conform to what you're "generally" saying, then.

It has not even been established if there are such things as moral values, much less what they might be.

I think it has. You think it has not.

I'm not what sort of "establishing" you're looking for there. Are you thinking that science, which concerns itself exclusively with "is's", is suddenly going to generate "oughts"? That's a hopeless hope, as Hume pointed out so concisely long ago. If moral realities exist, it will only by their being revealed generally, in conscience, or specifically, as in Divine revelation, that they are going to be known.

Who could tell us what reality was "made for" except the One who made it for something? And isn't it you who says all moral values require intentionality for purpose?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Before any specific values can be identified or explained, whether they are called, ethics, or morals, or something else, what values are, what their purpose is, and some wrong views of values must be addressed. That is the purpose of this chapter.

....

There Are No Collective Values

Values have no other purpose than to be used by human beings to guide their choices in the pursuit of their objective. Values tell them which actions will succeed (are good and right) and which will fail or worse (are bad or wrong).

The ability to choose is a faculty unique to individual human beings. Only individual human beings can use values because only individual human beings have the faculty of choice. Two or more human beings can certainly make the same choices, and the sum of those choices may be regarded as a so-called collective decision, but that decision is only the sum of the choices of each individual in the collective.

In the same way, the ability to have and use values is only possible to individual human beings. Two or more human beings may have the same or similar values and the sum of those values may be regarded as a so-called collective value, but that value is only the sum of the values of each individual in the collective.
The collective itself has no value other than the sum value of the individuals.

Human Objectives

Since human beings are the only beings that need values or have any use for them, those value called ethical or moral values will be those that pertain the objective of human life itself. What those values are can only be answered by identifying what human beings are and what their nature requires of them to be as human beings. [That question is not addressed in this chapter.]

I agree with the points in your article except the following;

First I agree there are no ontological values i.e. value-in-itself as expressed in the article.

Re collective values;
-the values of the individual[s] are subsets of the Collective Values, i.e. the collective value of the species as empirically identified and verified.
We cannot deny humans exist collectively as the human-species which is different from other species and sub-species.

What is of value to the individual facilitates the individual's survival optimally which in turn support the value of the collective, i.e. the preservation of the human species.

The highest [critical] values attributed by the individual[s] to air for breathing, food, security, sex, and the likes serve primarily the collective rather than the individual[s].
It is very evident the collective [species] leveraged on conservatism of large-numbers and will sacrifice some percentile of individuals [e.g. risk takers] to ensure the collective [human species] is preserved.

What is the optimal value to the individual is that which aligns with the secular objective moral oughts [ideals as GUIDES] which are abstracted from empirical evidence and justified with philosophical reasonings.

The point of the last paragraph was to point out no specific values were addressed in the article, only what values are. That last sentence, "What those values are can only be answered by identifying what human beings are and what their nature requires of them to be as human beings," is based on the fact that only human beings can make choices or use values, but what those values must be based on is whatever the ultimate of objective or purpose of human beings themselves are.

The ultimate purpose or objective of an individual's life must be the individual's own life, or something other than his own life. All theists and mystics place the ultimate purpose of individual lives outside the life of the individual, like a God or some other mystic ideal. You have done the same thing.
You have placed the ultimate purpose of an individual's life outside himself, only instead of God, you have made it the, "human species."
Unless you are saying the value of the, "human species," is intrinsic, (like theists and mystics) the, "human species," would have to have some purpose or objective relative to which it is value. If the highest value is the, "human species," just because it is, that would make its value intrinsic. What is the, "human species," good for and to whom?

The "human species" is good for and to itself, i.e. it has its own inherent values.

I have not placed the ultimate purpose of an individual's life 'outside' [i.e. absolutely external and independent] himself.
The individual human is intra-connected to his own species which he is part and parcel of.
I have not place the human individual within the dog-species nor any non-human species.

The "human species" is an empirical fact.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homo
Do you dispute this?

Species [e.g. human species] has its own specific attributes - an empirical fact.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/a ... 0717311394
These species' specific attributes are to sustain, maintain and reinforce its survival and preservation.
You have to do more research into this biological aspects of 'species'.

Thus the human species itself which the individual is a part of has values.
Since the individual human is part and parcel of the whole human species, the values of the species will naturally be imbued within the individual human.

Note however the "human species" as a "species" is intra-connected the individual human beings collectively.

[RCSaunders]

First I agree there are no ontological values i.e. value-in-itself as expressed in the article.

Now you write:

The "human species" is good for and to itself, i.e. it has its own inherent values.

These completely contradict each other.

The point is there are no, "intrinsic," values. Nothing is a, "value in itself."

The words, "inerent," and, "intrinsic," mean the same thing. They are synonyms.

Inherent: Existing as an essential constituent or characteristic; intrinsic

Intrinsic: Of or relating to the essential nature of a thing; inherent.

The human species has no objective or purpose. Only individual human beings have purposes and objectives. If the human species has a value, it could only be a value to individual human beings. From my point of view, the human species, as a species, is the most dangerous and vile species on the planet, and, as a species, a totally negative value to human beings.

As far as I can see, VA, you have rejected the God of the theists, and made the human species your god.

For a theist, teleology begins with God.
For a collectivist,teleology begins with evolution.
For a realist, teleology begins with individual human beings.