VALUES

[RCSaunders]

Before any specific values can be identified or explained, whether they are called, ethics, or morals, or something else, what values are, what their purpose is, and some wrong views of values must be addressed. That is the purpose of this chapter.

Values, like "good," "bad," "right," and "wrong," are concepts of relationship. Things only have values relative to some objective (purpose, end, or goal). The purpose of values is to guide human choice and action in the pursuit of their objectives.

Values Are Relationships

Before there can be a value there must be an objective (purpose, end, or goal) relative to which a thing has some value; a positive value like, "good," or, "right," if it achieves or advances the objective, or negative value like, "bad," or, "wrong," if it prevents or hinders the objective.

Values Pertain Only To Human Beings

Only human beings have objectives, purposes, ends, or goals. At least they are the only beings who must choose their objectives and then must choose how to pursue them. Values are the principles that identify which things and which kinds of actions will achieve one's objectives, and which will not.

Values Are Absolute

Since values are relationships it might seem that values being absolute contradicts that fact. This dual aspect of values is very much the same as the dual aspect of most of the physical world. In one sense how the physical world is used is entirely arbitrary. Nothing in the sciences determines whether one uses chemicals to make explosives or fertilizer, for example, but how the chemicals must be used to make either is absolutely determined by the nature of the chemicals and what one needs the chemicals to do.

What individual human beings choose as their real life goals and purposes will determine what will or will not be of value to them, but while they can choose their objectives, they cannot choose which things or actions will succeed or fail to achieve those objectives, because it is reality itself that determines what will work and what will not, and therefore what will be valuable in achieving those ends, and what will not.

Values Are Not Intrinsic

Nothing is just good, bad, right, or wrong. Before a thing can have a value, the objective of the value must specified—what is it good for or why is it right. Since only human beings have objectives, anything (an entity, a substance, an event, an attribute, a relationship, an organism, a man, or an idea) can only be good, bad, right, or wrong relative to some objective of some human being.

Nothing is, "just good," or, "good in itself." It is exactly like saying something is "just left" or, "left in itself," without specifying what it is left of, or saying something is just, "inside," without specifying what it is inside of. Nothing can be just, "inside," it must be inside something. Nothing can be just, "good," it must be good for something.

Many things are regarded as good or bad without specifying what they are good or bad for, because the objective, purpose, end, or goal is implied. Water is good. Poison is bad. Water is good to drink, for washing, and for watering one's lawn because drinking, washing and watering the lawn are human objectives. Water is not good for watering one's library, or if one drowns in it, or it causes a flood. Poison is bad if ingested, because it makes one sick or kills them. Poison is good for eliminating rats and malaria mosquitoes. But nothing is good or bad in itself.

Loaded Concepts

There are a number of concepts that include in their definition an implied object which is tacitly assumed. It is sometimes suggested that things like murder, rape, assault, theft, and vandalism are intrinsically bad. Each of those words assumes an objective (the welfare of a human being) in their definition. Murder is taking the life of a human being. Theft and vandalism deprives another human being of their property. Rape and assault harm another human being's body. Each of these concepts means, "doing something bad to someone. Of course doing something bad someone is bad. If there were no victims with their own objectives and purposes, none of those words would identify anything bad or wrong.

Once the fact that all such concepts implying values, both positive and negative, tacitly assume human goals and purposes as the objective of the values it is obvious they are not examples of intrinsic values. Nothing can be.

Intrincism Is Mysticism

Though it finds its way into popular culture, the concept of intrinsic values, (that things are just good or bad, "in themselves,") without being good for anything to anyone is a concept derived entirely from religion and superstition. It is necessary to almost all mystic beliefs. If a mystic or theist admits that values only exist as relationships to specific objectives, purposes, goals, or ends, then it is not possible for them to say their deities, spiritual laws, mystical imperatives, holy duties or heavenly obligations are either good or right. Why is it good? What is it good for? What does it even mean to say it is good? Intrincism cannot answer any of these questions.

Intrincism is a very dangerous concept. If a value were possible without an objective or purpose, just anything could be put over as, "good," which makes it difficult to question or challenge. Who wants to be the one who is against what is, "good."

There Are No Collective Values

Values have no other purpose than to be used by human beings to guide their choices in the pursuit of their objective. Values tell them which actions will succeed (are good and right) and which will fail or worse (are bad or wrong).

The ability to choose is a faculty unique to individual human beings. Only individual human beings can use values because only individual human beings have the faculty of choice. Two or more human beings can certainly make the same choices, and the sum of those choices may be regarded as a so-called collective decision, but that decision is only the sum of the choices of each individual in the collective.

In the same way, the ability to have and use values is only possible to individual human beings. Two or more human beings may have the same or similar values and the sum of those values may be regarded as a so-called collective value, but that value is only the sum of the values of each individual in the collective. The collective itself has no value other than the sum value of the individuals.

Human Objectives

Since human beings are the only beings that need values or have any use for them, those value called ethical or moral values will be those that pertain the objective of human life itself. What those values are can only be answered by identifying what human beings are and what their nature requires of them to be a human beings. [That question is not addressed in this chapter.]

[NOTE: This post is from notes made for a pending chapter on ethics and morality in another publication. All comments, questions, and criticisms will be appreciated.]

[Peter Holmes]

I think your premise - that values are things that can be described - is a metaphysical delusion. We 'value things' and 'have values', but to mistake the abstract noun 'value' for a thing of some kind is to be dazzled by a linguistic device. And from this initial mistake, everything else you say - such as that good, bad, right and wrong are values - and that values are relationships - is wrong. And appealing to another metaphysical fiction - concepts - doesn't help.

[RCSaunders]

I think your premise - that values are things that can be described - is a metaphysical delusion. We 'value things' and 'have values', but to mistake the abstract noun 'value' for a thing of some kind is to be dazzled by a linguistic device. And from this initial mistake, everything else you say - such as that good, bad, right and wrong are values - and that values are relationships - is wrong. And appealing to another metaphysical fiction - concepts - doesn't help.

So, Peter, if none of your words are symbols for concepts, what are they? If there are no concepts in what you wrote, it is just a string of meaningless symbols.

[Immanuel Can]

Values, like "good," "bad," "right," and "wrong," are concepts of relationship. Things only have values relative to some objective (purpose, end, or goal). The purpose of values is to guide human choice and action in the pursuit of their objectives.

In order to believe this claim, we would have to be prepared to swallow, without any reasons provided, a whole lot of assumptions.

1. One key one is that human "objectives" ought to be realized. Or to put it another way, it asks us to take completely for granted the various objectives a human may have. But it has to be obvious to anyone that one can have bad "objectives," such as to obtain heroin or acquire sex slaves.

2. Another is that moral values are instrumental values: that "bad" or "good" can never mean more than "bad for X purpose," or "good for Y purpose." But it's also clear that valuing something instrumentally can be done without any moral content at all, such as "I value my hammer for pounding nails; it works way better than my screwdriver, at that task." What actual value involvement is there in my preferring my hammer? It seems to me that the preference there is entirely a matter of convenience of function, and lacks any moral value at all.

3. Another is that the act of "valuing" is itself intrinsically legitimizing. If a human has an "objective," do we just move straight on without reference to any moral questions about that objective, and leap to the question, "How well is that working for him, to get him what he values?" That doesn't seem like it allows any actual value judgment at all.

4. And another is that values have a transcendent purpose: not just that of guiding your or my provisional choices for this or that particular object, but the transcendent "purpose" of "guid[ing all] human choice and action" in some direction. But who "purposed" that human beings should have values, and that these should provide the compass for their (presumably legitimate) desires? You're now implying a deliberate creation, with "purpose" being built into the structure of human cognition. And if you weren't then how do you get #1, that the actualizing of these "purposes" or "objectives" is a good thing?

Again, I think you have a persistent confusion between "values" as noun, the claim that something "has value, in itself," and "valuing" the verb, the thing people do. The mere fact that somebody "values" something does not imply that thing is morally good, even if it's "good for getting him the thing he wants." If a man "values" a cage for keeping his slaves where he wants them, does that mean it's a morally "good" cage? Is his slave-keeping "good" because he "values" it so much? And if he's great at keeping and holding slaves, or making them work for him, does that make him a "good" slave owner, and a "good" person?

All of that seems to me to be far, far too much for anyone to swallow.

[Peter Holmes]

I think your premise - that values are things that can be described - is a metaphysical delusion. We 'value things' and 'have values', but to mistake the abstract noun 'value' for a thing of some kind is to be dazzled by a linguistic device. And from this initial mistake, everything else you say - such as that good, bad, right and wrong are values - and that values are relationships - is wrong. And appealing to another metaphysical fiction - concepts - doesn't help.

So, Peter, if none of your words are symbols for concepts, what are they? If there are no concepts in what you wrote, it is just a string of meaningless symbols.

What and where are concepts and other abstract things? In the mind - another abstract thing? And what and where is the mind? In the head or the brain? And how does a real thing, such as a brain, contain an abstract thing, such as a concept?

What is the relationship between a word or other sign (a real thing) and a concept (an abstract thing)?

What concept does the word 'concept' supposedly denote?

And so on, and so on. The myth of abstract things is ancient, potent and pervasive. Of course there are abstract things! We've been talking about them for at least two and a half thousand years! (Rather like we've been talking about gods.)

Time to wake up.

[RCSaunders]

I think your premise - that values are things that can be described - is a metaphysical delusion. We 'value things' and 'have values', but to mistake the abstract noun 'value' for a thing of some kind is to be dazzled by a linguistic device. And from this initial mistake, everything else you say - such as that good, bad, right and wrong are values - and that values are relationships - is wrong. And appealing to another metaphysical fiction - concepts - doesn't help.

So, Peter, if none of your words are symbols for concepts, what are they? If there are no concepts in what you wrote, it is just a string of meaningless symbols.

What and where are concepts and other abstract things? In the mind - another abstract thing? And what and where is the mind? In the head or the brain? And how does a real thing, such as a brain, contain an abstract thing, such as a concept?

What is the relationship between a word or other sign (a real thing) and a concept (an abstract thing)?

What concept does the word 'concept' supposedly denote?

And so on, and so on. The myth of abstract things is ancient, potent and pervasive. Of course there are abstract things! We've been talking about them for at least two and a half thousand years! (Rather like we've been talking about gods.)

Time to wake up.

I suspect you think your view is better than mine, else you'd have mine rather than yours. Is that true?

[RCSaunders]

Values, like "good," "bad," "right," and "wrong," are concepts of relationship. Things only have values relative to some objective (purpose, end, or goal). The purpose of values is to guide human choice and action in the pursuit of their objectives.

In order to believe this claim, we would have to be prepared to swallow, without any reasons provided, a whole lot of assumptions.

Since not one of your supposed assumptions was made or implied, I have no idea what you are talking about. The four things you made up are not even suggested by anything I wrote.

1. One key one is that human "objectives" ought to be realized. Or to put it another way, it asks us to take completely for granted the various objectives a human may have. But it has to be obvious to anyone that one can have bad "objectives," such as to obtain heroin or acquire sex slaves.

It was never suggested that human objectives, "ought to be realized." It says if one is going to be realized values will determine what is and what is not good for achieving that objective.

2. Another is that moral values are instrumental values: that "bad" or "good" can never mean more than "bad for X purpose," or "good for Y purpose." But it's also clear that valuing something instrumentally can be done without any moral content at all, such as "I value my hammer for pounding nails; it works way better than my screwdriver, at that task." What actual value involvement is there in my preferring my hammer? It seems to me that the preference there is entirely a matter of convenience of function, and lacks any moral value at all.

Can you read? The last paragraph specifically addresses, "ethical or moral values," stating,
"what those values are ... is not addressed in this chapter. There is nothing in this article about moral or ethical values. This article only addresses the nature of values themselves, not any particular values.

3. Another is that the act of "valuing" is itself intrinsically legitimizing. If a human has an "objective," do we just move straight on without reference to any moral questions about that objective, and leap to the question, "How well is that working for him, to get him what he values?" That doesn't seem like it allows any actual value judgment at all.

Irrelevant to anything in the article. We're not even addressing which objective are appropriate, only the nature of values relative to objectives. You want to come up with the recipe before deciding what's to be cooked.

4. And another is that values have a transcendent purpose: not just that of guiding your or my provisional choices for this or that particular object, but the transcendent "purpose" of "guid[ing all] human choice and action" in some direction. But who "purposed" that human beings should have values, and that these should provide the compass for their (presumably legitimate) desires? You're now implying a deliberate creation, with "purpose" being built into the structure of human cognition. And if you weren't then how do you get #1, that the actualizing of these "purposes" or "objectives" is a good thing?

Never said achieving any particular objective was a, "good," thing. No matter what the purpose or objective it is, yours, God's, retrograde, or transcendent, what achieves that objective has a positive value and whatever prevents the objective has a negative value relative to that objective. Objectives are not addressed in this article, only the relationship of values to objectives, whatever they are.

Again, I think you have a persistent confusion between "values" as noun, the claim that something "has value, in itself," and "valuing" the verb, the thing people do. The mere fact that somebody "values" something does not imply that thing is morally good, ...

Someone is definitely confused here, but it's not me. The mere fact that somebody "values" something only implies it is a value to them, that it is good relative to some purpose or objective of there own. There is nothing there about whether the objective is moral or ethical. You are equating the word, "value," with, "moral." Until you get it straight what a value is, whether there even are moral values or what they are cannot even be discussed.[/quote]

... even if it's "good for getting him the thing he wants." If a man "values" a cage for keeping his slaves where he wants them, does that mean it's a morally "good" cage? Is his slave-keeping "good" because he "values" it so much? And if he's great at keeping and holding slaves, or making them work for him, does that make him a "good" slave owner, and a "good" person?

The question of values is NOT, "is it morally good?" That is a question of ethics, a particular class of values. The question of values is, "good for what to whom." You have so mixed up these concepts you end by saying things like, "good" slave owner, and a "good" person, as thought what would make a slave owner "good" (the purpose their existence achieved) or a person good (the purpose their existense achieved) were already specified. When you have no idea what values are, you begin using value terms, like good, bad, right, and wrong as floating abstractions with no connection to anything.

All of that seems to me to be far, far too much for anyone to swallow.

If I had written or suggested the nonsense you implied I did, I wouldn't swallow it either. Maybe you should read it again, without prejudice, to see what I actually wrote and address that.

[Immanuel Can]

If I had written or suggested the nonsense you implied I did, I wouldn't swallow it either. Maybe you should read it again, without prejudice, to see what I actually wrote and address that.

Well, "assumptions," in this case, means, as I said at the start, "without any reasons provided." Now, the fact that you have not realized you're making them doesn't imply you're not; it means that you haven't thought about the fact that they are required for the rest of what you argue to even be possibly true. That's why you gave no reasons for them: you didn't think you needed to. But you did.

One example: you think "values" means "instrumentally-useful." That's entirely presumptive and arbitrary, on your part. Most people think (and, ironically, you even acknowledge in your own objections) that "values" also refer to moral properties, not merely instrumental ones...and absent any speaking of how and what moral values are, most people are going to find your exposition extremely narrow and unsatisfactory...and, for that matter, unfortunately trivial.

They won't be content with letting you unilateral legislate that "values" are not moral, and they won't think you're dealing with real "values" at all, consequently. You'll have lost them at that point -- and rightly so. There's no reason they should accept your re-definition, since it is so far from familiar usage.

But I can see you can't entertain even that one gaping hole in your exposition without feeling personally affronted, so I shall subside here. My goal is to promote a remedy, not to criticize destructively. I just suggest there are some ways in which your exposition could be improved; if you don't wish to improve it, then it will have to stand as it is. However, I suspect you'll get few people to agree with you.

[RCSaunders]

One example: you think "values" means "instrumentally-useful."

Please feel free to criticize my views, but please do no make up your own views and impute them to me. Read the article. You will not find, "instrumentally-useful," there. Everything can be boiled down to this simple statement, nothing has a value except in relationship to some objective, goal, end, or purpose. Nothing is just good, bad, right or wrong.[/quote]

Most people think (and, ironically, you even acknowledge in your own objections) that "values" also refer to moral properties, ...

That's exactly why the monograph is needed. Most people have been taken in by the lie of the mystics that there are intrinsic values, that something can just be good, without being good for anything and without any explanation of what it means to say it is good.

But I can see you can't entertain even that one gaping hole in your exposition ...

If there is a, "gaping hole," in my exposition, I'd be delighted to have it discovered. If, for example, you can explain how anything can just be, "good," without being good for anything, and what, "good," means in such a case, I would appreciate it.

[Impenitent]

are their (individual humans') objectives (the target of choice and action) ever objective?

if the target is health and happiness, is that a private and personal objective? exclusively?

the desire of the physician to facilitate healthy (or not) practices to another autonomous being may cause problems...

euthanasia and abortion may be wonderful to the doctor, but...

there is no value without purpose... and purposes seldom match...

interesting start...

-Imp

[Immanuel Can]

One example: you think "values" means "instrumentally-useful."

Please feel free to criticize my views, but please do no make up your own views and impute them to me. Read the article. You will not find, "instrumentally-useful," there. Everything can be boiled down to this simple statement, nothing has a value except in relationship to some objective, goal, end, or purpose. Nothing is just good, bad, right or wrong.

Ummm... Sorry to tell you, RC...but that's what "instrumentally useful" means.

It means nothing has value except to the extent in contributes to a particular goal, end or purpose. It means "valuing" something only to the extent that it has a "use" as an "instrument" (or means) in making some "purpose or objective" happen.

So you're telling me not to say it, then confirming it's true.

If there is a, "gaping hole," in my exposition, I'd be delighted to have it discovered.

Apparently not.

[RCSaunders]

If there is a, "gaping hole," in my exposition, I'd be delighted to have it discovered.

Apparently not.

I made a sincere, and I thought, very simple request:

If, for example, you can explain how anything can just be, "good," without being good for anything, and what, "good," means in such a case, I would appreciate it.

Of course you do not have to answer it, and I'm sorry if you won't. I'll be forced to conclude you don't have an answer, and that's OK.

[RCSaunders]

Ummm... Sorry to tell you, RC...but that's what "instrumentally useful" means.

It means nothing has value except to the extent in contributes to a particular goal, end or purpose. It means "valuing" something only to the extent that it has a "use" as an "instrument" (or means) in making some "purpose or objective" happen.

Of course you can make up your own terms, but in philosophy instrumentalism only pertains to concepts, not values.

In philosophy of science and in epistemology, instrumentalism is a methodological view that ideas are useful instruments, and that the worth of an idea is based on how effective it is in explaining and predicting phenomena.[1] Instrumentalism is a pragmatic philosophy of John Dewey that thought is an instrument for solving practical problems, and that truth is not fixed but changes as problems change. Instrumentalism is the view that scientific theories are useful tools for predicting phenomena instead of true or approximately true descriptions.

[Immanuel Can]

Of course you do not have to answer it, and I'm sorry if you won't. I'll be forced to conclude you don't have an answer, and that's OK.

Track my discussion with Peter on the "objective morality" thread, and you'll find a discussion over that very point. It's easier to point you there than to attempt to repeat all my explanations and Peter's objections here.

It's been done, though. That's what you'll find.

[Immanuel Can]

instrumentalism only pertains to concepts, not values.

You had the same confusion between "objective" and "Objectivism," RC...that of thinking that a particular philosophical school was implicated in any use of a particular adjective. But it is not the case that when you use adjectives like "instrumental" or "objective" that one is automatically also invoking the schools of the associated names. The names can be apt or not.

I did not allude to "Instrumentalism," the ideology. I was referring adjectivally to making something "instrumental," meaning the more general idea of valuing anything only for it's functional utility in achieving a particular purpose...which is what you also claimed your view of values was doing.