What could make morality objective?

[henry quirk]

I bet Henry does not apply justice to cats and dogs.

Justice is for man; humaneness for animals

The two-legged mad dog gets one; the four-legged kind, the other.

[Immanuel Can]

According to Hume, there is no such thing as causation.

No. According to Hume, we do not have the means to prove causation. That's quite different from a claim it doesn't exist.

We can't prove the size of the universe. That doesn't imply the universe doesn't have a size. We can't prove how much water is in the ocean at any given moment; that doesn't remotely imply there's no water in the ocean.

[Immanuel Can]

Sounds like you believe you OUGHT/SHOULD/WOULD speak.

These three are different.

"Should" implies "has not yet." "Ought implies "has not yet, but owes, or is duty bound, to do so in future." "Would" merely implies "will do so, or wants to do so, but does not owe anybody to do so."

It makes a big difference whether or not we believe a person can "owe" somebody else to do something for him/her.

Or are you now saying, "We have power, therefore we are right"?

No. I am saying I have power AND I am right.

What is the property, quality or criterion that actually makes you right or constitutes you as right, then, since it is not power?

That's question-begging. It allows the person who claims to be "tolerant" to define and dismiss anyone who disagrees with him/her...not "tolerant" at all.

You mean, it allows them to Philosophise/rationalise their wrongness? Yeah! That's why Philosophy is bullshit.

No. I mean it allows the intolerant person to fool himself into thinking he's tolerant, when by definition, he's not.

If you were "genuinely tolerant" you would tolerate murderers, slavers and child rapists, and people robbing you.

Not necessarily. For there are certainly things that ought not to be tolerated, and you've named some. It is not wrong to refuse to tolerate evil; indeed, it's right. But what is hypocritical is claiming one is being tolerant when one is not. And that is the skill of our modern Left...they simply define evil as anything that is not on their own agenda, and yet pride themselves on "tolerance" of all opinions with which they already agree anyway.

But to be "tolerant" is literally, from the Latin, to "put up with" something with which one does NOT agree...not evil stuff, but controversial stuff, stuff that takes issue with one's own opinions or plans, or is different from what one is disposed to like.

You would be "tolerant" to hear others objections to your views, for example. Yet you would never have to "tolerate" someone giving you a hundred dollars (pounds, euros). No "tolerance" would ever be required for the latter, since no sense of offence is even present.

What establishes it, then? It's not establishable historically, or on preference, or on culture, or on power, or on an objective moral scheme. So what makes them wrong?

Objectivity makes it wrong.

Objectivity has no moral opinions. Hume. Facts are not values.

Scientific consensus.

"Consensus" in science is data corruption. At one time, every human being on the planet believed the world was flat. What was that "scientific consensus" worth? Consensus is only as good as it's data.

Meanwhile, science is not engaged in moral but in technical and empirical investigations. No stage of the scientific method involves the question, "Is this good?" Moral investigations are philosophical or theological matters. Science doesn't do that: it concerns itself with what can be observed or done, and has no scientific criteria for whether it's moral or not to do it. Oppenheimer said that. He was involved in the atomic bomb project.

Social norms.

Not helpful, since they differ among both cultures and individuals, contradicting each other. If social norms make the case, then slavery is just fine in Islamic countries. Child labour's dandy in Southeast Asia. Revenge rape is moral in Northern Pakistan, and exterminating dissidents is moral in China. For in all those places, the society approves the deed.

You've got no groundwork there.

Why do I need groundwork to be moral?

You need it to be able to explain to yourself, if not to others, WHY it is that what you are contemplating is "moral."

If you cannot, then you have no reasonable assurance at all that what you are contemplating actually IS moral. It might be (by accident), or it might not; but you'll have absolutely no way of really knowing which it is. And you'll have no ability to convince any rational other that they ought to agree with you.

[Immanuel Can]

Maybe, but I bet Henry does not apply justice to cats and dogs.

Cats and dogs do not apply justice to cats and dogs.

To apply a concept of justice takes a human being.

So what is it, exactly, that convinces you that we human beings, among all creatures, are uniquely obligated to apply concepts of justice to other things?

Note: I'm not saying we're not...I'm asking, "How do YOU know that we are?" How did you come to obtain that certitude?

[henry quirk]

Skep: Why do I need groundwork to be moral?

Well, it's nice to know why what you do is right or wrong.

Also, like I say up-thread...

Seems to me morality is just a high-falutin' word for how folks interact.

A principle, like a person belongs to himself acts as foundation for those interactions. Joe owns Joe, Stan owns Stan: understandin' that, Joe and Stan steer clear of slavery, theft, lies, and other abuses.

So: morality isn't about codes so much as not havin' to negotiate the boundaries of communication & behavior every damn time you meet somebody.

It's slapdash and imperfect, but it works...sometimes.

[Immanuel Can]

So: morality isn't about codes so much as not havin' to negotiate the boundaries of communication & behavior every damn time you meet somebody.

That's certainly one of its pragmatic functions, sure. Absolutely. It's not the only one, by any means, and it's not the one that constitutes morality as moral.

For example, a society could have a rule about slavery, like "Child slaves are only worth 1/2 of an adult slave." If the slave price of the day is $25, that means that without "having to negation the boundaries of communication and behaviour," I can know before I meet you that you have a right to charge me $12.50 for the slave I buy...that won't go one step in the direction of making what you and I are doing "moral."

Fair enough?

[henry quirk]

That's certainly one of its pragmatic functions, sure.

And not the only one, but I'm not addressin' the other (which I stated over in RC's why be moral? thread cuz I'm just pointin' out to Skep why a framework is a good thing.


Fair enough?

Not in the context of my full post...

Seems to me morality is just a high-falutin' word for how folks interact.

A principle, like a person belongs to himself acts as foundation for those interactions. Joe owns Joe, Stan owns Stan: understandin' that, Joe and Stan steer clear of slavery, theft, lies, and other abuses.

So: morality isn't about codes so much as not havin' to negotiate the boundaries of communication & behavior every damn time you meet somebody.

It's slapdash and imperfect, but it works...sometimes.

In your example: there's no principle ('cept mebbe every-thing and -one is a commodity, which no damn principle at all).

[Skepdick]

"Should" implies "has not yet." "Ought implies "has not yet, but owes, or is duty bound, to do so in future." "Would" merely implies "will do so, or wants to do so, but does not owe anybody to do so."

Distinction without a difference.

The sun should come up tomorrow.
The sun ought to come up tomorrow.
The sun would come up tomorrow.

Each of the above sentences represents the same probability distribution.

It makes a big difference whether or not we believe a person can "owe" somebody else to do something for him/her.

How big? 7? 42? 172712123?

What is the property, quality or criterion that actually makes you right or constitutes you as right, then, since it is not power?

Your inability to prove me wrong makes me right. The power is an optional extra.

No. I mean it allows the intolerant person to fool himself into thinking he's tolerant, when by definition, he's not.

You mean like Philosophers constantly fool themselves into thinking that they are thinking, when they actually aren't?

Yeah. How do you propose we solve that?

Not necessarily. For there are certainly things that ought not to be tolerated, and you've named some.

Not tolerating things that ought not be tolerated still makes you intolerant of intolerable things.

That's only a problem for you. Not for me. Two-fold problem at that.

1. You are violating the is-ought gap (that you apparently cherish).
2. You are trapped in a self-referential paradox: Does intolerance of intolerance make you intolerant?

Your insistence on (recursive) language isn't working out very well for you...

It is not wrong to refuse to tolerate evil; indeed, it's right.

Evil is just a fancy word for immoral.

If your axioms lead you to conclude that murder or slavery is right, then you are evil.

Potato/potato.

But what is hypocritical is claiming one is being tolerant when one is not. And that is the skill of our modern Left...they simply define evil as anything that is not on their own agenda, and yet pride themselves on "tolerance" of all opinions with which they already agree anyway.

It is also hypocritical claiming that one is being moral when one is being immoral.

Same difference.

But to be "tolerant" is literally, from the Latin, to "put up with" something with which one does NOT agree...not evil stuff, but controversial stuff, stuff that takes issue with one's own opinions or plans, or is different from what one is disposed to like.

You don't's strike me as somebody who agrees with murder or slavery. Why don't you tolerate it?

You would be "tolerant" to hear others objections to your views, for example. Yet you would never have to "tolerate" someone giving you a hundred dollars (pounds, euros). No "tolerance" would ever be required for the latter, since no sense of offence is even present.

What sense of offence is present when somebody tries to murder or enslave others, but not you directly?

Objectivity has no moral opinions. Hume. Facts are not values.

I am yet to hear a valid ontological argument for the double standard you are employing.

Facts exist, but not moral facts.

"Consensus" in science is data corruption. At one time, every human being on the planet believed the world was flat. What was that "scientific consensus" worth? Consensus is only as good as it's data.

Obviously. As we learn more - we become more moral. Can't you tell?

Meanwhile, science is not engaged in moral but in technical and empirical investigations. No stage of the scientific method involves the question, "Is this good?" Moral investigations are philosophical or theological matters. Science doesn't do that: it concerns itself with what can be observed or done, and has no scientific criteria for whether it's moral or not to do it. Oppenheimer said that. He was involved in the atomic bomb project.

Anecdotes are not data.

Not helpful, since they differ among both cultures and individuals, contradicting each other. If social norms make the case, then slavery is just fine in Islamic countries. Child labour's dandy in Southeast Asia. Revenge rape is moral in Northern Pakistan, and exterminating dissidents is moral in China. For in all those places, the society approves the deed.

Then zoom out, you silly reductionist. Look at the bigger picture - more data.

There is an anecdote for every misunderstanding.

You need it to be able to explain to yourself, if not to others, WHY it is that what you are contemplating is "moral."

Why do I need to explain myself and to whom?

If you cannot, then you have no reasonable assurance at all that what you are contemplating actually IS moral. It might be (by accident), or it might not; but you'll have absolutely no way of really knowing which it is.

I know that. Which is why I am insisting that if you know better, then please - correct me.

If you think I am wrong in saying "murder and slavery are wrong" then go ahead and correct my mistake.
If you can't correct me - I shall remain at this position.

Being moral by accident is still morality.

And you'll have no ability to convince any rational other that they ought to agree with you.

But I don't have to convince you, do I? Surely you already agree with me?

Unless you are actually saying that murder and slavery are right. And if you do think that then how "rational" are you really?

Never attribute to malice that can be adequately explained by stupidity...

[Immanuel Can]

The sun should come up tomorrow.

This is a probability claim, not a moral one. You don't mean, "The Sun is morally required to rise."

The sun ought to come up tomorrow.

This is again, a probability estimate, not a moral one. You're not saying that the Sun "owes it" to come up...just that you think it will.

The sun would come up tomorrow.

This, you would not say, unless you had reason to believe it can't, as in "The Sun would come up tomorrow if it hadn't burned out already." So that's not even something one would be inclined to say.

It makes a big difference whether or not we believe a person can "owe" somebody else to do something for him/her.

How big?

Rationally big, as in "significant" or "substantial."

What is the property, quality or criterion that actually makes you right or constitutes you as right, then, since it is not power?

Your inability to prove me wrong makes me right. The power is an optional extra.

No. Even if I couldn't prove you wrong, that wouldn't suggest you were right. It would only suggest we don't know how to disprove your argument. But I do, in any case.

Just answer the question: if it's not power that makes your morally right, what is it that does?

No. I mean it allows the intolerant person to fool himself into thinking he's tolerant, when by definition, he's not.

You mean like...[/quote]
No. I mean simply that "tolerance" implies, very literally, the willingness to "put up with" dissent. If one isn't, then by definition, one is not "tolerant."

Not necessarily. For there are certainly things that ought not to be tolerated, and you've named some.

Not tolerating things that ought not be tolerated still makes you intolerant of intolerable things.

Not a problem.

There are simply things one should tolerate, and things one should not. That's not at all mysterious. It means "tolerance" itself is not a universal virtue, but more of a "middle quality," or "Golden Mean" quality, of the sort Aristotle pointed out...namely, one that can be unvirtuous two ways: through too little or too much. Too little tolerance is authoritarianism. Too much is permissiveness of evil. Virtuous tolerance stands in the middle of those two extremes.

It is not wrong to refuse to tolerate evil; indeed, it's right.

Evil is just a fancy word for immoral.

If you say so. I won't dispute that for the moment.

But to be "tolerant" is literally, from the Latin, to "put up with" something with which one does NOT agree...not evil stuff, but controversial stuff, stuff that takes issue with one's own opinions or plans, or is different from what one is disposed to like.

You don't's strike me as somebody who agrees with murder or slavery. Why don't you tolerate it?

Because it is evil. It falls into the "too much" zone of toleration. Again, that's not problematic if you understand tolerance is a middle virtue.

You would be "tolerant" to hear others objections to your views, for example. Yet you would never have to "tolerate" someone giving you a hundred dollars (pounds, euros). No "tolerance" would ever be required for the latter, since no sense of offence is even present.

What sense of offence is present when somebody tries to murder or enslave others, but not you directly?

That's where the debate gets interesting. Do we "owe it" (ought) to the slave who is being abused by our neighbour to fight for his freedom? I say, "Yes." What do you say?

Objectivity has no moral opinions. Hume. Facts are not values.

Facts exist, but not moral facts.

That's what Hume said.

Obviously. As we learn more - we become more moral. Can't you tell?

No. What I see is the COVID-19 virus, nuclear warfare, a thriving sex-slave and child-slave trade, rampant pornography, Socialism rearing its ugly head again, and 140 million dead in wars in the last "modern" century. I don't think you can make a good case that we are becoming more moral. We are, however, becoming much more powerful at producing consequences for our immorality.

Meanwhile, science is not engaged in moral but in technical and empirical investigations. No stage of the scientific method involves the question, "Is this good?" Moral investigations are philosophical or theological matters. Science doesn't do that: it concerns itself with what can be observed or done, and has no scientific criteria for whether it's moral or not to do it. Oppenheimer said that. He was involved in the atomic bomb project.

Anecdotes are not data.

Not an anecdote. It's a description of what science consists in. That Oppenheimer agrees merely tells you that scientists also know it.

You need it to be able to explain to yourself, if not to others, WHY it is that what you are contemplating is "moral."

Why do I need to explain myself and to whom?

That's only on the assumption that you are a rational person, and one who thinks he might owe other people the respect of being treated the same. If not, you don't need to explain yourself at all.

[Belinda]

Skepdick wrote:

Facts exist, but not moral facts.

If St Augustine is right, and good is basic such that evil is departure from or absence of good, then there are moral facts.

Explanation.
If evil is absence of good then the more I know of good the more I know.
If evil is absence of good then the more I know of good the more I can do good: ignorance is evil.
Knowledge is compounded of facts and judgements. Reason i.e. facts and judgement, in the fullest sense of reason which includes human sympathy,is the way to knowledge.
Relative knowledge is attainable and relatively ( pro tem) verifiable therefore the good is also relatively (and pro tem) factual.

Suggest any actual events, e.g. slavery, pandemic, famine, liberty to own a gun, and so forth, and the conclusion above will fit.

[RCSaunders]

Not "without basis." It's manifest that not everything here, if anything, is "necessary," so it is, by all accounts contingent.

It is absolutely NOT manifest. [/quote}
Actually, it is. Since Hubble and Doppler, there's no longer a reasonable doubt. But we ought to have know it earlier, from things like entropy. Still, at least we know now.

The word, "necessary," is slippery. If you mean everything here is "made necessary by something else," nothing here is necessary. If you mean, everything here is what it is and cannot be anything else, everything here is necessary. I'm sure you are equivocating.

No. I'm speaking of the formal difference between "necessary" and "contingent." I'm not equivocating.

No, no...again, I'm not asking you to "assume" anything. I'm pointing out what is called "an argument to the best explanation." I'm saying we need to view the comprehensibility and rationality of the universe as data, and inductively decide from that data what the best explanation for that particular kind of data would be. That's all.

I'm not saying you are asking me to assume anything, I'm saying you are assuming that something other than the fact of existence and its nature is needed to explain that nature, and there is no basis for assuming any such explanation is required.

It is required. You can't argue from the observation that things exist to the argument that they exist "necessarily" -- at least, not in the formal, philosophical sense of that word. What "contingent" implies is that they could have not-existed, but it so happens that they did.

For example, that your initials are RC is contingent. You could have been given the initials TW. Or NBC. But it just so happens that you were given RC.

Here's a quick summary of philosophy's "necessary/contingent" distinction, just to clear this up. http://faculty.washington.edu/wtalbott/ ... aepist.htm

The only contingent facts in this world are those which, before the fact, depended on some human choice, i.e. the man made. (Note, all your examples.) The rest is pure Kantian nonsense based on his bad epistemology. It is exactly the kind of equivocation I meant.

Before I throw the light switch, I know, if the lights are going to come on it is necessary there be a connection (wires) between the switch, the power source and the lights for the lights to come on when I throw the switch. Whether the lights come on or not is contingent on the wires being there. The wires are either there or they are not, but I may not know for sure if they are there, (perhaps it's a new house and I'm not sure the wiring has been completed, or an old house and I'm not sure if the wiring has deteriorated or not). Once I throw the switch, if the lights come on, whether or not the wiring is there is no longer in question. It must be there or the lights would not have come on. The meaning of, "contingent," in this case is only what is necessary for the fact to be so. It does not mean, "it could have been different." If the lights come on, it is not possible the wiring is not there. Three weeks from now, it will still be true, that the wiring was there when I turned on the lights. Three weeks before, it was true, that the wiring would be there when I turned on the lights. The facts of reality are what they are and cannot logically or factually be anything other than what they are.

The idea that what is could have been something different is a kind of reification of ignorance. It is true that, before in event occurs, one cannot know for certain which possible event will occur and in our ignorance we can say some future occurrence could be just anything, but once the event has occurred there can no longer be any doubt about what was going to occur. It occurred and it will be true for eternity that is what occurred and it will never be possible that it did not occur or could have been something different.

If your and Kant's notion of what contingency means were true, not only would reality itself be some kind of nebulous thing that could at any moment cease to be, but all of history (not the record but the facts) could be wiped out by whatever force or intelligence you suppose reality is contingent on and all that is would not only be different but never have been at all. It's nonsense.

If you choose to believe that, then you do, but please understand that it is not possible for me to accept the logical contradiction that what is can also not be.

Now, THERE'S an assumption! Why should we think that anything had to exist at all?

What is cannot not be. No assumption is required. It's the law of non-contradiction. [/quote]
What is, is contingent...meaning it could have not been, even if it now exists. There is no necessary reason why the universe had to exist at all.[/quote]
And that is exactly the contradiction I'm talking about. It is not possible that what is can also not be. The universe is, it cannot also not be. If the universe is, there could never have been a time when it was not going to be.

It's not a violation of the Law of Non-Contradiction. The Law of Non-Contradiction only tells us that two equal and opposite proportions cannot be true at the same time, in the same way.

Why in the world do you insert the notion of, "proportion," into the concept of non-contradiction. A logical, "law," is not a rule and does not, "tell," us anything. It is simply a principle that describes how to discover if a proposition is true or not. It is simplicity itself. Nothing can be both a thing and not that thing. A, "thing," is anything identified by any concept: an existent, an attribute, a relationship, or event, ontological or epistemological. Whatever a proposition asserts, if one propositions asserts something is so, and another asserts that same something is not so, one or both propositions is not true. If one proposition asserts, "reality exists," and another proposition asserts, "reality does not exist," if either proposition is true, the other is not true. Since, "reality exists," is true, "reality does not exist," is false. To say, "reality could not exist," means, "reality does not exist," could be true, but it cannot be true, because, "reality exists," is true.

So it tells us that if "RC is at home" is true, then "RC is not home" is not true. But it doesn't tell us that since RC is home, it could not have been the case that he was at the football grounds or the pub instead. He could have been. His being at home is true, but contingent, not necessary.

That's a good example of giving ignorance a kind of efficiency it cannot have. To say RC could have been at the football grounds or the pub only means you don't know which, it does not mean the facts could be other than what they are. It only means where I am is determined by what I chose and I might have chosen any of those things, but what I have chosen I have chosen, and it was always what I was going to choose, whether I knew it or not. Nothing made me do it, it's just the fact that's what I did.

If something has a starting point, then it's not eternal. If it's eternal, it has no starting point. So that's analytic and necessary, obviously.

That would pertain to God, but not to the universe.

Incorrect. It would necessarily pertain to anything. There is only the possibility of a starting point or eternality. There's no third option there.

Everything is either round or not-round. There is no third option. Which is true, so long as the context is shape.

In the context of existence one is either talking about the "existents," that are existence, in which case no existent is eternal; or, one is talking about the concept, "existence," meaning all that exists, which has no time component. Relative to the concept, "time," no existent is eternal and everything has a beginning and end, but relative to existence there is no time, which is only an attribute of relationships between the motion of existents. The idea of time as some kind actual existent is a kind of reification. That which only exists as a relationship does not itself have such properties as beginnings, ends, or any others. Time, like geometric points, lines, and figures, is a conceptual idealization, not an actual (ontological) existent. Things have length, width, weight, etc. but length, width and weight do not themselves have any measurable limits. Time, like all other concepts of quantification, only exists epistemologically, not ontologically.

I suspect you regard the universe to be a kind of ontological existent (very big and complex but nevertheless an entity), as I think most people regard it, including myself, in which case, as an entity it would have dimensional and temporal attributes. The problem with attempting to apply measurement to the universe is what one uses as a metric standard. What are the commensurate units of measure that can be applied to the universe? Unlike counting, which is absolute, all measurement requires some unit of measure, which is arbitrary, that is, chosen, not discovered, and no arbitrary unit of measure can measure everything absolutely, (and, in fact, almost nothing exactly).

So what unit of measure does one pick to measure the universe? Let's just consider the attribute of time. How long has there been a universe, and how would one measure that time? I know cosmologists guess the, "age of the universe," at 13.8 billion years, after the hypothesized, "big bang." If a terrestrial year is chosen as the unit of time measurement, the universe lasts 13.8 billion of those, but if a terrestrial day is chosen as the unit of time, the universe lasts 5.037 trillion days. If a terrestrial hour is used as the unit of measure, the universe lasts 241.776 quadrillion hours. There is no limit on how small a unit of time measure can be, so there is no limit on how many units of time the universe has already existed. If the unit of measure is infinitesimal, the universe has already lasted an infinite amount of time, even if it had a beginning. Beginnings, ends, and infinity (or eternity) are not mutually exclusive, just as that without a beginning or end may be finite, such as a mobius strip or even a circle, for example.

So which is it? The universe is not eternal, we know, because science tells us empirically. No serious scientist doubts that anymore. All the remaining proposals for how a universe could come to exist without a singular starting point are presently flawed mathematical projections, not empirically verifiable theories.

Oh, well, if no serious scientist doubts it, it must be true.[/quote]
Are you arguing that the science is bad? Fraudulent, maybe?[/quote]
Well, no I wasn't, but since you brought it up, a very large part of what is called science today is fraudulent. Take your example of Leonard Jane Holmes Bernstein Professor of Evolutionary Science and Director of the Institute of Cosmology at Tufts University. Neither evolution or cosmology are actual sciences. At best, they are educated guesses, but nothing they supposedly study scientifically actually exists, because it is all in the past that might or might not have left sufficient clues to what was, but there is really no way to test the conclusions experimentally and some of the worst concepts corrupting almost every field have come out of the evolutionary hypothesis. I have absolutely no confidence in any so-called science that has to throw out all its absolutely proven conclusions every few years. Frankly, I think you have been taken in by modern-day religion of science.

Purposes and values are not, "imagined," they are identified, rationally on the basis of human nature.

Human nature is an "is." It does not imply any "ought." You can't logically derive an ought from an is.

Nothing implies an ought. First of all, "ought," is misleading. When moralists use it, it implies something one is obliged to do just because they are obliged to do it. There is no such obligation. When I use the word ought, it only has meaning relative to some human chosen objective, end, or goal, and by, "ought," is meant, "what must be done to achieve that objective, end, or goal." It is reality itself, the nature of the world we live in and our own human natures, that determine what can and cannot be done. If one wants to achieve any goal, how it must be achieved is dictated by what reality makes possible, that is, what one must do to achieve it.

... That means that whatever these contingent human creatures come to "value" is also contingent. They could have chosen to "value" other things. And indeed, you see that human beings do not share most values in common. Indeed, taking the entire human race into account, you'd have to admit they don't share any values at all; for there is no value so universal that nobody nowhere has ever chosen to devalue it.

That's why the only contingent things in the universe are those determined by human choice, but even those things, once done, are no longer contingent. If anything determined what any individual human being valued they would not be volitional beings. If they were not volitional beings there could be no values. Values imply and an objective or purpose relative to which one must make choices, but if there is no volition, there is no choice, and values are pointless. So what difference does it make that, "there is no value so universal that nobody nowhere has ever chosen to devalue it." Is there some mystical principle that requires everyone to have the same values?

There is no authority, no secret short-cut, no revelation that will tell you what, "to live your life to the fullest," means. Every individual has there own mind and must use that mind to discover what living as fully human as possible means. It is not mandatory that anyone do so, however. Everyone is free to throw away the life they have (which most people do) because doing the hard work of discovering what their nature really requires and how to achieve it is hard and it is easier to accept the word of some authority or leader or expert than to think for oneself.

You contradict yourself here.

If there is no revelation that will tell you how to live your life to the fullest, then how can you possibly claim someone can "throw away" that life? Who gave you the authority or capacity to judge such a thing, since your standards only apply to yourself, you say. According to your account, it cannot possibly be "hard," since nobody can possibly fail to "live their life to the fullest." There's no "non-fullest," according to your account. And then there is no way anybody can do anything but "think for himself."

If you don't think every organism has a specific nature that determines how it must live to successfully live as the kind of organism it is, OK. Then a fish can attempt to live by eating hay like a cow and a cat can attempt to live under water like a fish and a human can attempt to live like a parasitic blood sucker. I don't believe that. I think a fish must live in the water and eat what it finds that fits the requirements of its biological nature, and that a cat must eat meat because it is a carnivore and will die if it attempts to live under water or eat hay, and that a human must live by using his mind to discover what his life requires and must work to produce all his biological and psychological requirements and then choose to do it, else he will die. Unlike any other organism he does not have an instinctive program that determines what he does, and instead has a mind with which to learn what his nature requires and how to produce it, the ability to reason and judge which are the best means to achieve those requirement, and the necessity and ability to use those attributes to choose what to do. Only human beings can choose to live in contradiction of the requirements of their nature as the kind of organisms they are. For a human being, the first choice is, "to be or not to be," and the second choice is, "to be a human or something less." All values, if there are any, follow the second choice. No one is obliged to live or live as a human being.

About our conversation, you said:

... the other thing is that both participants can become more aware, more subtle and more refined in their own thinking...achieving a greater depth of insight as to why they hold the positions they do, even if they are ultimately positions similar to those they held at the start. This is no small gain.

The issue of truth ultimately settles itself. In the meanwhile, there is value for us in refining our thinking...whichever way our personal judgment tends in the final analysis. So that is some consolation, to be sure.

Quite so, and both profitable and entertaining, in the best sense. Life consists of what you do, not what happens to you and good conversation requires one to do their best thinking, listening, and explaining.

[Immanuel Can]

Here's a quick summary of philosophy's "necessary/contingent" distinction, just to clear this up. http://faculty.washington.edu/wtalbott/ ... aepist.htm

The only contingent facts in this world are those which, before the fact, depended on some human choice, i.e. the man made. (Note, all your examples.) The rest is pure Kantian nonsense based on his bad epistemology. It is exactly the kind of equivocation I meant.

Did you read the summary, RC?

If you didn't then we've got a basic problem. You don't know what "contingent" means in philosophical terms. You think it means "man made." And you don't understand "necessary" either, apparently, as your light bulb example illustrates. Light bulbs and circuits are all contingent...there is no need for them to have existed at all, that means. And you can see that this is certainly true, because there was a time when human beings had no light bulbs.

So first, we've got to clear up "necessary" and "contingent." Because you attribute straw-man claims to me, on the basis of misunderstanding those definitions. Here's another resource.

"It is commonly accepted that there are two sorts of existent entities: those that exist but could have failed to exist, and those that could not have failed to exist. Entities of the first sort are contingent beings; entities of the second sort are necessary beings."

That's Stanford. How about University of California (Tom Wetzel, Philosophy Dept)?

"For A to exist contingently means the following:

It is possible for A to not exist.
It is possible for A to exist.
Anything which can come into or go out of existence exists contingently.

For A to exist necessarily means the following:

There is no possible situation whatsoever where A would fail to exist.

Contingency and necessity are what philosophers call modal properties. Their logic is investigated in modal logics. In this framework they would be explained as follows:

A exists contingently if and only if: there is some possible world where A exists but A does not exist in all possible worlds

A exists necessarily if and only if: A exists in all possible worlds.

Do not confuse this philosophical use of “contingent” with the ordinary sense of “something being contingent on something else”.

Necessary and contingent are perfectly ordinary expressions and they are used commonly in philosophy without any necessary reference to theology. So ignore the answer here that says they make no sense apart from religious theories.

Platonists would say that numbers exist necessarily for example."


Got it yet, RC?

Things that exist, but could have not existed...like universes and everything in them...are all contingent. There are only two candidates for "necessarily existing entities": the First Cause, and abstractions like numbers. It means that these are things that "could not not exist."

Everything else is contingent.

[Veritas Aequitas]

According to Hume, there is no such thing as causation.

No. According to Hume, we do not have the means to prove causation. That's quite different from a claim it doesn't exist.

We can't prove the size of the universe. That doesn't imply the universe doesn't have a size. We can't prove how much water is in the ocean at any given moment; that doesn't remotely imply there's no water in the ocean.

What are you talking about?

I was referring to 'there is no such thing as causation' in the ontological absolutely independent sense.

Yes, causation does exists but ultimately it is grounded in psychology.
Hume claimed the reasons for the illusory sense of causation is due to customs and habits from constant conjunctions which are obviously psychological elements.

It is the same with 'God exists' [illusory] which is also grounded in psychology.

[Belinda]

I bet Henry does not apply justice to cats and dogs.

Justice is for man; humaneness for animals

The two-legged mad dog gets one; the four-legged kind, the other.

Do you understand people once did hang animals in a spirit of retribution for their bad behaviour? And this punishment for an evil animal was considered to be justice?

If you do understand this then you will know justice depends upon what the culture says justice is.

Humaneness towards animals is comparatively new in the scope of human experience, and depends very much upon cultural values of time and place.

[Skepdick]

This is a probability claim, not a moral one. You don't mean, "The Sun is morally required to rise."

The sun ought to come up tomorrow.

This is again, a probability estimate, not a moral one. You're not saying that the Sun "owes it" to come up...just that you think it will.

The sun would come up tomorrow.

This, you would not say, unless you had reason to believe it can't, as in "The Sun would come up tomorrow if it hadn't burned out already." So that's not even something one would be inclined to say.

If morality is about requirements, then by induction it's necessarily about ontology, for there are things which are required in order for the sun to rise.

I have no idea how a moral requirement is different from an ontological one. Explain it to me.

Rationally big, as in "significant" or "substantial."

1. You don't have an objective measurement for "rationality".
2. You don't have an objective way for measuring significance or substance.

Not sure where you are going with this.

No. Even if I couldn't prove you wrong, that wouldn't suggest you were right. It would only suggest we don't know how to disprove your argument.

It's how this works with scientific theories. If your best attempt at falsification is unsuccessful the theory stands.

What approach are you using if not an evidence-based one?

But I do, in any case.

Just answer the question: if it's not power that makes your morally right, what is it that does?

I answered it - you keep confirming it. Your inability to prove me morally wrong is what makes me (probably) morally right.

Falsification is easier than proof, and you can't falsify my claim.

No. I mean simply that "tolerance" implies, very literally, the willingness to "put up with" dissent. If one isn't, then by definition, one is not "tolerant."

That's what I keep telling you.

Are you willing to put up with people who dissent by murdering and enslaving people? No, you are not.

Therefore you are intolerant. Why is that a problem for me, but not a problem for you?

There are simply things one should tolerate, and things one should not.

And I suppose you insist that there is some material difference between things that one "should not tolerate" and things that one "ought not tolerate".

Go ahead and explain the difference between "One should not tolerate murder and slavery" and "One ought not tolerate murder and slavery"

That's not at all mysterious. It means "tolerance" itself is not a universal virtue, but more of a "middle quality," or "Golden Mean" quality, of the sort Aristotle pointed out...namely, one that can be unvirtuous two ways: through too little or too much. Too little tolerance is authoritarianism. Too much is permissiveness of evil. Virtuous tolerance stands in the middle of those two extremes.

OK, so where is the middle when it comes to tolerating intolerance?

Because it is evil. It falls into the "too much" zone of toleration. Again, that's not problematic if you understand tolerance is a middle virtue.

I understand it perfectly well. Do you? You are the one who accused me of being intolerant. e.g you implied my intolerance was too intolerant.

As far as I can tell - you are saying that my intolerance of murder and slavery is too intolerant.

So you are immoral. And I am intolerant of your immorality.

I am still not sure what your point is though?

That's where the debate gets interesting. Do we "owe it" (ought) to the slave who is being abused by our neighbour to fight for his freedom? I say, "Yes." What do you say?

You seem to be saying yes and no.

You are going to. have to clarify here. Do you think my intolerance of murder and slavery is too intolerant?

That's what Hume said.

Why should we care what Hume said?

No. What I see is the COVID-19 virus, nuclear warfare, a thriving sex-slave and child-slave trade, rampant pornography, Socialism rearing its ugly head again, and 140 million dead in wars in the last "modern" century. I don't think you can make a good case that we are becoming more moral. We are, however, becoming much more powerful at producing consequences for our immorality.

Your criticism is too reductionist - you are failing to see the forest for the trees. There is an anecdotal evidence for every side to every argument.

75 to 200 million people died from the Black plague in the 14th century. That was between 25 and 55% of the world's population.

If I was a betting man (and I am) I choose war over a disease with 60% mortality. Better odds and all that.

Not an anecdote. It's a description of what science consists in. That Oppenheimer agrees merely tells you that scientists also know it.

It's not an accurate description, since ethics boards stand in the way of scientific grants.

That's only on the assumption that you are a rational person, and one who thinks he might owe other people the respect of being treated the same. If not, you don't need to explain yourself at all.

By your circular standards of "rationality" I am probably a very irrational person. Which is why I prefer my definition to yours...

Either way, rationality is not required for morality. Is it?