What is Truth?

[RCSaunders]

You are apparently begging that whatever is is, without adding anything more meaningful.

WHAT more does there need to be. "Existence," is an attribute. Everything that is, has the attribute, "existing." What more do you want it to mean?

[Skepdick]

I'll assume you are making a joke, because a, "variable," is simply a concept for a symbol used in mathematics or logic, both human inventions which have no existence independently of human minds. Before there can be variables there must be human beings.

Then you must be making a joke too. Because "existence" is simply a concept too. It's also a human invention, which has no existence independent of the human mind.

Before there can be "existence" there was everything else.

[RCSaunders]

I'll assume you are making a joke, because a, "variable," is simply a concept for a symbol used in mathematics or logic, both human inventions which have no existence independently of human minds. Before there can be variables there must be human beings.

Then you must be making a joke too. Because "existence" is simply a concept too. It's also a human invention, which has no existence independent of the human mind.

No, I'm not joking, because you are exactly right. A concept only has psychological (epistemological) existence, but a concept's meaning is what ever existent or existents it identifies. Before there can be any concept, there must be that which exists which the concept identifies.

Before there can be "existence" there was everything else.

If you mean before there can be the concept, "existence," there had to be everything else, that is correct.

I'm not sure what your disagreement is here. A symbol in mathematics or logic identifies nothing until an actual concept is assigned to that symbol. To say, "to be is to be the value of a bound variable," would mean before a thing could, "be," there would have to be a concept for that thing, and before the concept could identify that thing there would have to be a variable of which that concept was the, "value." I know what Quine intended, but it's just backwards, isn't it?

[Skepdick]

No, I'm not joking, because you are exactly right. A concept only has psychological (epistemological) existence, but a concept's meaning is what ever existent or existents it identifies. Before there can be any concept, there must be that which exists which the concept identifies.

I'm not sure what your disagreement is here.

So what existent the does the concept of "existence" identify?

To say, "to be is to be the value of a bound variable," would mean before a thing could, "be," there would have to be a concept for that thing, and before the concept could identify that thing there would have to be a variable of which that concept was the, "value." I know what Quine intended, but it's just backwards, isn't it?

Not really. "Existence" (what there is) is an ontological concern and Quine was no ontologist. He simply pointed out a way of identifying how one goas about committing to an ontology.

The moment you utter "to be" you have committed yourself to the ontology of "being".

[RCSaunders]

No, I'm not joking, because you are exactly right. A concept only has psychological (epistemological) existence, but a concept's meaning is what ever existent or existents it identifies. Before there can be any concept, there must be that which exists which the concept identifies.

I'm not sure what your disagreement is here.

So what existent the does the concept of "existence" identify?

To say, "to be is to be the value of a bound variable," would mean before a thing could, "be," there would have to be a concept for that thing, and before the concept could identify that thing there would have to be a variable of which that concept was the, "value." I know what Quine intended, but it's just backwards, isn't it?

Not really. "Existence" (what there is) is an ontological concern and Quine was no ontologist. He simply pointed out a way of identifying how one goas about committing to an ontology.

The moment you utter "to be" you have committed yourself to the ontology of "being".

If I'm missing something you can clear it up, but at this point I don't think we disagree. I think our difference is mostly semantic.

[Skepdick]

I think our difference is mostly semantic.

Every philosophical disagreement ever is about semantics.

It's the fundamental concern of constructivism: Meaning and meaning-making.

It still begs a question: What does "meaning" mean?

[RCSaunders]

It still begs a question: What does "meaning" mean?

1. Please explain what premise I used that assumes the conclusion. (That's what begging a question means in philosophy.)

2. A concept, "means," whatever existent or class of existents it identifies. The concept, "worm," means any existent defined or described as a worm, not the definition or description, but the actual worm. The concept, "gerund," means a verbal, a verb used as a noun in a sentence; it does no mean the description of a gerund or definition or a gerund, but any actual gerund, like, "jumping, listening, or learning."

[Skepdick]

1. Please explain what premise I used that assumes the conclusion. (That's what begging a question means in philosophy.)

Every single axiom in your conceptual scheme meets that criterion.

Is this sentence a premise or a conclusion: "That's what begging a question means in philosophy." ?

In order for you to premise OR conclude that, then it necessitates that you know what meaning is.

2. A concept, "means," whatever existent or class of existents it identifies.

Perfect! I can work with that.

What existent or class of existents does the concept of "concept" identify?
What existent or class of existents do the concepts of "philosophy" and "meaning" identify?

The following three questions are ontological:
1.What is a concept?
2.What is meaning?
3.What is philosophy?

You can't escape self-reference. Every attempt in doing so doesn't simply defeat your argument - it defeats you.

[RCSaunders]

1. Please explain what premise I used that assumes the conclusion. (That's what begging a question means in philosophy.)

Every single axiom in your conceptual scheme meets that criterion.

Is this sentence a premise or a conclusion: "That's what begging a question means in philosophy." ?

In order for you to premise OR conclude that, then it necessitates that you know what meaning is.

2. A concept, "means," whatever existent or class of existents it identifies.

Perfect! I can work with that.

What existent or class of existents does the concept of "concept" identify?
What existent or class of existents do the concepts of "philosophy" and "meaning" identify?

You don't know what the concept, "concept," identifies, but you use the word. You are saying, "I have no idea what the word, "analex," is, but what is the analex of analex? Your question is gibberish. If you don't identify anything by the word, "concept," how can the question, "what existent or class of existents do the predabits of "philosophy" and "meaning" identify?" be anything other than nonsense?

The following three questions are ontological:
1.What is a concept?
2.What is meaning?
3.What is philosophy?

I have no idea how a question can be, "ontological?" The ontological is all that exists independently of anyone's consciousness or knowledge of it, that is, whether or not anyone is conscious of it or has any knowledge of it. Questions do not exist independently of the conscious minds that ask them.

The words, "concept," "meaning," and, "philosophy," are symbols for concepts. The words (when written or spoken) have ontological existence, but the concepts they represent only exist as conscious identifications of what those concepts identify, that is, "other concepts," "what concepts identify (their meaning)," and, "the intellectual discipline addressing fundamental ideas." Concepts exist epistemologically (psychologically), but not ontologically.

You can't escape self-reference.

I'm sorry if you can't. I have no problem with it at all.

[Skepdick]

You don't know what the concept, "concept," identifies, but you use the word.
You are saying, "I have no idea what the word, "analex," is, but what is the analex of analex? Your question is gibberish.
If you don't identify anything by the word, "concept," how can the question, "what existent or class of existents do the predabits of "philosophy" and "meaning" identify?" be anything other than nonsense?

My use of those words is simply mirroring your use of those words. And if your very question above is genuine, then it necessarily implies that you can identify the existents for "concept", "philosophy" and "meaning".

And if you can identify the existents for "concept", "philosophy" and "meaning", then that would be an ontological statement.

And so I am asking you to describe the ontology (nature?) of a "concept", "philosophy" and "meaning".

I have no idea how a question can be, "ontological?" The ontological is all that exists independently of anyone's consciousness or knowledge of it, that is, whether or not anyone is conscious of it or has any knowledge of it.

Your "concepts", "philosophy" and "meaning" exist independently of me. They are ontological.

Unless you are insisting that your "philosophy", "concepts" and "meaning" don't exist.

Questions do not exist independently of the conscious minds that ask them.

But your questions exist independently of my mind. Your questions are ontological to me.

The words, "concept," "meaning," and, "philosophy," are symbols for concepts.

Sure. Now explain to me the ontological nature of a concept.

Not the word "concept" the existent itself.

The words (when written or spoken) have ontological existence, but the concepts they represent only exist as conscious identifications of what those concepts identify, that is, "other concepts," "what concepts identify (their meaning)," and, "the intellectual discipline addressing fundamental ideas." Concepts exist epistemologically (psychologically), but not ontologically.

So now you are equivocating "existence". To ask "What exists?" is to ask an ontological question.

To argue that epistemological existence is different to ontological existence is to insist that I should believe that your concepts, philosophy and meaning don't exist.

I'm sorry if you can't. I have no problem with it at all.

You don't have a problem. I have a problem.

Do you exist? You keep arguing against your own existence.

If you insist that your concepts, philosophy and meaning don't exist, I have no problem believing you.

[RCSaunders]

Questions do not exist independently of the conscious minds that ask them.

But your questions exist independently of my mind. Your questions are ontological to me.

The words you see exist ontologically, but the words are not the question. The words are only symbols for the concepts that are the question and they only exist in your mind when you interpret the words as the concepts they represent. The question never exists ontologically.

The words, "concept," "meaning," and, "philosophy," are symbols for concepts.

Sure. Now explain to me the ontological nature of a concept.

A concept does not have an ontological nature, only an epistemological nature, and cannot exist independently of a human conscious mind.

The words (when written or spoken) have ontological existence, but the concepts they represent only exist as conscious identifications of what those concepts identify, that is, "other concepts," "what concepts identify (their meaning)," and, "the intellectual discipline addressing fundamental ideas." Concepts exist epistemologically (psychologically), but not ontologically.

So now you are equivocating "existence". To ask "What exists?" is to ask an ontological question.

You equate the "ontological," and, "existence?" Do you classify fictions, imaginary characters, illusions, and wishes, as ontological or non-existent?

To argue that epistemological existence is different to ontological existence is to insist that I should believe that your concepts, philosophy and meaning don't exist.

Your disagreement with the argument does not make it incorrect. You don't have to agree with it.

[Veritas Aequitas]

A concept does not have an ontological nature, only an epistemological nature, and cannot exist independently of a human conscious mind.

The words (when written or spoken) have ontological existence, but the concepts they represent only exist as conscious identifications of what those concepts identify, that is, "other concepts," "what concepts identify (their meaning)," and, "the intellectual discipline addressing fundamental ideas." Concepts exist epistemologically (psychologically), but not ontologically.

I believe you are trying to dominate the definition of 'what is ontology' to your own personal views and those of your likes.

Ontology refer to 4 philosophical perspectives - SEP; i.e.

• 1. (O1)the study of ontological commitment, i.e. what we or others are committed to,
  
  2. (O2)the study of what there is,
  
  3. (O3)the study of the most general features of what there is, and how the things there are relate to each other in the metaphysically most general ways,
  
  4. (O4)the study of meta-ontology, i.e. saying what task it is that the discipline of ontology should aim to accomplish, if any, how the questions it aims to answer should be understood, and with what methodology they can be answered.

You are only focusing on ontology as 'what there is' [2] and confined 'what-there-is' to things that are claimed to be absolutely independent of the mind.
This is why you are insisting 'a concept do not have an ontological nature'.

However by the general definition of what is ontology, a concept does have an ontological nature, i.e. that is has interactive elements within the mind [btw not as in dualism].

Your ontological [what is] view of things are existing ultimately & absolutely independent of the mind is illusory and delusional.
Yes, that things exist external to the mind is merely one perspective of ontology which is evidently [without doubt] based on common sense.

However, there is no way one can prove things exist absolutely independent of the mind, note Meta-Ontology, Meno's paradox and and the views Philosophical anti-realism [Kantian].

[Skepdick]

The words you see exist ontologically, but the words are not the question. The words are only symbols for the concepts that are the question and they only exist in your mind when you interpret the words as the concepts they represent. The question never exists ontologically.

No. You are confused. The questions YOU ask exist in YOUR mind. YOUR mind is ontological to me. There is no other existence except ontological existence.

Directly from Wikipedia: Ontology studies concepts that directly relate to being, in particular becoming, existence, reality.

If you are talking about existence, you are talking about ontology, but for some peculiar reason you keep insisting that you don't exist.

A concept does not have an ontological nature, only an epistemological nature, and cannot exist independently of a human conscious mind.

Look! You are talking about "existence" again - ontology.

You equate the "ontological," and, "existence?"

It's not just me! It's all of philosophy.

Do you classify fictions, imaginary characters, illusions, and wishes, as ontological or non-existent?

The concepts of "fictions", "imaginary characters", "illusions and wishes" exist. Which is why I keep asking you the hard question:

What is the ontological nature of a concept?

Your disagreement with the argument does not make it incorrect. You don't have to agree with it.

Like I keep pointing out... I am not agreeing or disagreeing with anything, but if you insist that you don't exist - then I don't have to.

[RCSaunders]

I believe you are trying to dominate the definition of 'what is ontology' to your own personal views and those of your likes.

I confess. You are right. The views I present are my own and I like them because they are true. Does that make them wrong?

Whose views are you expressing when you write a comment? Are they not your own? Do you dislike them?

Ontology refer to 4 philosophical perspectives - SEP; i.e.

• 1. (O1)the study of ontological commitment, i.e. what we or others are committed to,
  
  2. (O2)the study of what there is,
  
  3. (O3)the study of the most general features of what there is, and how the things there are relate to each other in the metaphysically most general ways,
  
  4. (O4)the study of meta-ontology, i.e. saying what task it is that the discipline of ontology should aim to accomplish, if any, how the questions it aims to answer should be understood, and with what methodology they can be answered.

You are only focusing on ontology as 'what there is' [2] and confined 'what-there-is' to things that are claimed to be absolutely independent of the mind.
This is why you are insisting 'a concept do not have an ontological nature'.

That's right. All the rest is academic nonsense, typical of the self-induced psychosis "philosophers," have turned the field of philosophy into. Do you ever think for yourself?

However by the general definition of what is ontology, a concept does have an ontological nature, i.e. that is has interactive elements within the mind [btw not as in dualism].

Isn't that a lovely piece of academic garbledegook. "... a concept does have an ontological nature, i.e. that is has interactive elements within the mind ..." What color are those elements? How much do they weigh? Have you ever seen any of them? What do they look like? How do you know this?

Your ontological [what is] view of things are existing ultimately & absolutely independent of the mind is illusory and delusional.

I was unaware of your ability to read minds and be aware of what is in other's consciousness. Perhaps your consciousness is illusion and delusion, I can't read your mind. Why should I doubt what I am conscious of in favor some absurd nonsense you or any other so-called philosopher assure me is more real than what I actually see, hear, feel, smell, and taste and the fact that I am conscious of them?

Yes, that things exist external to the mind is merely one perspective of ontology which is evidently [without doubt] based on common sense.

However, there is no way one can prove things exist absolutely independent of the mind, note Meta-Ontology, Meno's paradox and and the views Philosophical anti-realism [Kantian].

Prove to whom? Anyone who chooses to know whether anything exists independent of the mind can certainly know it. It is not necessary to prove it to all those whose minds are demented or corrupted by what passes for philosophy. If you are in a room with your friend while using your computer, if the computer does not exist independently of your friend's mind, if he should die, your computer would disappear. So much for Meno and Kant.

It is quite obvious your ideas are not your own and that most are derived from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, subtitled, "A Manual for Promoting Schizophrenia in Oneself and Others." In your case, the program has been totally successful.

[RCSaunders]

The words you see exist ontologically, but the words are not the question. The words are only symbols for the concepts that are the question and they only exist in your mind when you interpret the words as the concepts they represent. The question never exists ontologically.

No. You are confused. The questions YOU ask exist in YOUR mind. YOUR mind is ontological to me. There is no other existence except ontological existence.

Directly from Wikipedia: Ontology studies concepts that directly relate to being, in particular becoming, existence, reality.

If you are talking about existence, you are talking about ontology, but for some peculiar reason you keep insisting that you don't exist.

A concept does not have an ontological nature, only an epistemological nature, and cannot exist independently of a human conscious mind.

Look! You are talking about "existence" again - ontology.

You equate the "ontological," and, "existence?"

It's not just me! It's all of philosophy.

Do you classify fictions, imaginary characters, illusions, and wishes, as ontological or non-existent?

The concepts of "fictions", "imaginary characters", "illusions and wishes" exist. Which is why I keep asking you the hard question:

What is the ontological nature of a concept?

Your disagreement with the argument does not make it incorrect. You don't have to agree with it.

Like I keep pointing out... I am not agreeing or disagreeing with anything, but if you insist that you don't exist - then I don't have to.

The whole discussion seems semantic. You are using the concept, "ontological," to mean whatever exists, in whatever manner it exists. I have no objection to your defining ontological that way. The problem is, everything that exists does not exist in the same way. Santa Claus exists, but does not exist as an actual person living at the corner of Maple and Tremont Street. Santa Claus does exist as a common fiction for the entertainment of Children at the Christmas season.

If you choose to define concepts as ontological because they exist, fine. I certainly agree they exist. So, if you define, "ontological," as whatever exists, concepts are ontological. But I think it is important to distinguish those things that exist, whether anyone is conscious of or knows they exist or not from those things which only exist if someone is conscious of them, like your own thoughts, and all those other things that would no longer exist if humanity became extinct, like Santa Claus, language, mathematics, logic, the sciences, and all knowledge.

They all exist, so you would call them ontological, but they obviously do not exist in the same way the earth, sun, stars, rocks, rivers, and all other organisms exist. How would you differentiate them?