Why Christianity May Be the Most Logical Religion.

[uwot]

What I am applying is synthesis, not a criterion. Drawing distinctions, collapsing them - information emerges.

This is gibberish. Why is applying synthesis not a criterion? How is drawing distinctions and then collapsing them different to not drawing distinctions in the first place? If doing so results in information, does that not show that drawing distinctions served a useful function?

Well call me dogmatic, but for me the distinction between what exists and how you know works so well that I see no reason to abandon it.

I am not asking you to abandon it - only to classify it.

What are you on about now? Tell ya what, if you can provide a couple of boxes, I'll see if I would chuck 'the distinction between what exists and how you know' into one of them. Probably not though, because as you sometimes intimate, philosophers who attempt to rigidly categorise things for the purpose of 'analytic philosophy' are on a hiding to nothing, and in some cases, as you say, a bit dumb.

If you had been paying attention, yer might have noticed that I have made it clear that I don't believe in ontological knowledge about spacetime.

You don't have to "believe" in it. Possession is sufficient for you to attempt to classify it.

This from the same occasional self-righteous crusader against prescriptivism. When you do that Skepdick, I agree with you and when you don't, I don't.

I get the point, I just happen to disagree with it.

Your disagreement is failing to obtain.

Well let's check it and see:

The point that I am making (and still am attempting to make)

That for any and all purpose ontology is always an epistemic activity.

Yup, I really do disagree with that. In my book ontology is usually theoretical, it is metaphysics after all. So you pluck from your head some crazy shit like a missing shade of blue, the number 5, spacetime or strings. Then you do the epistemology to find out whether any of it is useful, which is the pragmatic, instrumentalist, Feyerabendian position the on some days you have expressed support for. In some cases, that of spacetime being an example, the ontology remains theoretical because of underdetermination - a point which, like many others, you have argued both for and against, giving the impression either that you have no idea what you are talking about and are thrashing about in wikiland trying to create a coherent picture, or that you will say any old bollocks just to be contrary.

[Skepdick]

This is gibberish. Why is applying synthesis not a criterion?

Because synthesis has no elimination rules. Whatever is synthesized is synthesized.

Even if it's gibberish, there's no rule to say that "gibberish is not allowed".

If all you have is inclusion rules, then nothing is excluded.
If all you have is exclusion rules, then nothing is included.

It roughly translates into Gödel (or Anselm's) Ontological argument.

In English, this trivially translates to "Ontologically - anything and everything goes"

How is drawing distinctions and then collapsing them different to not drawing distinctions in the first place?

It's different in exactly the same way as going to a foreign country and then coming back is different to never having gone there at all.

Perspectivism.

If doing so results in information, does that not show that drawing distinctions served a useful function?

It's not useful if ALL you do is drawing distinctions. It's not useful if you have no mechanism for ranking your distinctions as less and more probable.

If you can't collapse - you can't discriminate (in the statistical sense).

What are you on about now? Tell ya what, if you can provide a couple of boxes, I'll see if I would chuck 'the distinction between what exists and how you know' into one of them.

You have everything you need. The two boxes are:

A. Epistemology
B. Ontology.

The thing I want you to chuck into one of those boxes is your ontological knowledge of spacetime.

Probably not though, because as you sometimes intimate, philosophers who attempt to rigidly categorise things for the purpose of 'analytic philosophy' are on a hiding to nothing, and in some cases, as you say, a bit dumb.

Then don't categorize it rigidly. If you insist that there is a distinction between ontology and epistemology then categorize it flexibly if you have to, but please do categorize it.

This from the same occasional self-righteous crusader against prescriptivism. When you do that Skepdick, I agree with you and when you don't, I don't.

I am not prescribing anything to you whatsoever. I am simply insisting that you self-define your own behaviour.

If there is a difference between A and A then they go in different boxes.
If there is no difference between A and A then they go into the same box.

Yup, I really do disagree with that. In my book ontology is usually theoretical, it is metaphysics after all.

And I disagree with your disagreement. Metaphysics is just logic, after all.

In so far as logic can be formalised, then so can all of Metaphysics.

Consider Peter Naur's 1985 paper "Programming as theory-building".
Also consider Floridi's 2019 book "The Logic of information - Philosophy as conceptual design"

It's logical/synthetic/metaphysical/epistemic from start to finish.

So you pluck from your head some crazy shit like a missing shade of blue, the number 5, spacetime or strings. Then you do the epistemology to find out whether any of it is useful, which is the pragmatic, instrumentalist.

OK, so what is your utility-function. Do you have one a priori? If you don't have one now, how would you determine utility at a future date?

Instruments serve a purpose. They allow you to do things that you couldn't do previously. There's different kinds of utility - all of it is quantifiable/measurable. If tool X is better than tool Y, you can tell me exactly how/why the tool is better.

And you aren't doing any of that. You stop all discussion at "it obtains". It obtains what?

Feyerabendian position the on some days you have expressed support for.

I support Feyerabend 100%. You can't define my utility function, ergo what is useful to you may not be useful to me. But you must be able to define your own utility function.

Rinse, repeat "missing shade of blue". You must be able to determine that the new thing you've synthesized is useful to you or not. Even if the utility is purely psychological/Placebo effect - that's still measurable.

In some cases, that of spacetime being an example, the ontology remains theoretical because of underdetermination

The most trivial question I can pose to you: Is usefulness underdetermined?

- a point which, like many others, you have argued both for and against, giving the impression either that you have no idea what you are talking about and are thrashing about in wikiland trying to create a coherent picture, or that you will say any old bollocks just to be contrary.

I have a coherent picture, thank you very much.

When you utter incomplete sentences such as "it obtains", it gives away the impressions that you don't. What is it that it obtained?

[Eodnhoj7]

Good for you! Welcome to philosophy.

I am challenging philosophy, I am not trying to become a member.

I refuse to join any club that would have me as a member...

I imagine it is very similar to whatever criteria you apply when you say this:

Assess and elbows are not abstract entities. Contradictions are.

What I am applying is synthesis, not a criterion. Drawing distinctions, collapsing them - information emerges.

Well call me dogmatic, but for me the distinction between what exists and how you know works so well that I see no reason to abandon it.

I am not asking you to abandon it - only to classify it.

If you had been paying attention, yer might have noticed that I have made it clear that I don't believe in ontological knowledge about spacetime.

You don't have to "believe" in it. Possession is sufficient for you to attempt to classify it.

I get the point, I just happen to disagree with it.

Your disagreement is failing to obtain.

Philosophy is the synthesis of definitions................

[uwot]

...synthesis has no elimination rules.

It depends on what you mean by 'synthesis'. In philosophy at least it means combining existing components, in which case you eliminate anything that includes novel components. That does away with a fair chunk of theoretical physics, including spacetime, because while the name suggests that it is an archetypal synthesis of space and time, in Einstein's hands it isn't.

It's different in exactly the same way as going to a foreign country and then coming back is different to never having gone there at all.

Perspectivism.

So having stumbled into this foreign land of philosophy, talked very loudly because you don't speak the language and dismissed the natives as dumb because you can't understand them, how is your perspective changing?

You have everything you need. The two boxes are:

A. Epistemology
B. Ontology.

The thing I want you to chuck into one of those boxes is your ontological knowledge of spacetime.

Once again Skepdick:

If you had been paying attention, yer might have noticed that I have made it clear that I don't believe in ontological knowledge about spacetime.

"Ontological knowledge of spacetime" is just word salad in these parts.

Metaphysics is just logic, after all.

Only if it is synthesis in the above meaning and you eliminate novelty. Logic is what you do with premises, not how you invent them.

Consider Peter Naur's 1985 paper "Programming as theory-building".
Also consider Floridi's 2019 book "The Logic of information - Philosophy as conceptual design"

Ah the missionary brings Good News!

When you utter incomplete sentences such as "it obtains", it gives away the impressions that you don't. What is it that it obtained?

Here Kemosabe; read this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_of_ ... hilosophy)

[uwot]

Philosophy is the synthesis of definitions................

That's kinda what Russell was trying to show with logical atomism. Turns out that no it isn't.

[Skepdick]

It depends on what you mean by 'synthesis'. In philosophy at least it means combining existing components, in which case you eliminate anything that includes novel components. That does away with a fair chunk of theoretical physics, including spacetime, because while the name suggests that it is an archetypal synthesis of space and time, in Einstein's hands it isn't.

What I mean by synthesis is everything that follows the symbol ∃. Existential quantification.

To Einstein a Minkowski space is a component. To Minkowski - it was synthesised.

So having stumbled into this foreign land of philosophy, talked very loudly because you don't speak the language and dismissed the natives as dumb because you can't understand them, how is your perspective changing?

I stumbled into the foreign land of philosophy, thinking the natives had something useful, only to discover that the natives haven't even navigated language synthesis and synchronisation yet; nor game theory; nor counter-factual reasoning; nor viable consensus algorithms; nor conflict-resolution strategies. Basically, philosophers knew nothing about model design/synthesis.

That's why I dismissed them as dumb.

If you had been paying attention, yer might have noticed that I have made it clear that I don't believe in ontological knowledge about spacetime."Ontological knowledge of spacetime" is just word salad in these parts.

It may have been a "word salad" 5 posts ago. It has been synthesised as a meaningful phrase since. Everything you say about spacetime is ontological knowledge. If you didn't know it - you couldn't have said it.

What is a word salad is the phrase "I don't believe in ontological knowledge" given that you demonstrated possession of ontological knowledge.

Only if it is synthesis in the above meaning and you eliminate novelty. Logic is what you do with premises, not how you invent them.

Inventing premises is trivial. Start with true conclusions then find workable premises. The entire field with reverse mathematics does this.

What Philosophers do is not novelty. It's re-description. Saying the same thing using a different vocabulary. There's no grammatical/structural novelty in any of it.

Here Kemosabe; read this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_of_ ... hilosophy)

Nothing new in the land of Philosophy. You still haven't told me what you use truth/knowledge for. Why do you even need it?

Your utility function is lacking.

P.S Did I forget to mention that the concept of "state" (should there even be such a thing as "state of affairs") is a well-studied abstraction.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_(computer_science)

[uwot]

What I mean by synthesis is everything that follows the symbol ∃.

Right, and if you'd read the link I gave you, you would understand that is what philosophers mean by obtain.

To Einstein a Minkowski space is a component.

Yup to his epistemology. Nope to his ontology.

To Minkowski - it was synthesised.

Not in the sense that philosophers use the word.

I stumbled into the foreign land of philosophy, thinking the natives had something useful, only to discover that the natives haven't even navigated language synthesis and synchronisation yet; nor game theory; nor counter-factual reasoning; nor viable consensus algorithms; nor conflict-resolution strategies. Basically, philosophers knew nothing about model design/synthesis.

Have you spoken to any philosophers of computer science? https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computer-science/ The rest of us know about that stuff and will use what we find useful, but it's a bit niche.

That's why I dismissed them as dumb.

It's a bit like going into an Italian restaurant and complaining that they don't serve fish and chips.

It may have been a "word salad" 5 posts ago. It has been synthesised as a meaningful phrase since. Everything you say about spacetime is ontological knowledge. If you didn't know it - you couldn't have said it.

Word salad.

What is a word salad is the phrase "I don't believe in ontological knowledge" given that you demonstrated possession of ontological knowledge.

No sir, I have made it clear to anyone with even average intelligence that according to the way that philosophers of science use the terms, I do not believe anyone has ontological knowledge of spacetime. It's an hypothesis. There is no direct evidence for it. Ergo no one knows if it obtains.

Inventing premises is trivial.

Tell that to Einstein.

Start with true conclusions then find workable premises. The entire field with reverse mathematics does this.

Yup, that's one way of going about it.

What Philosophers do is not novelty. It's re-description. Saying the same thing using a different vocabulary. There's no grammatical/structural novelty in any of it.

You've got it arse about tit, me old china. Philosophy has been around a lot longer than computer science, it's you chaps who are re-inventing the wheel.

Nothing new in the land of Philosophy.

True dat. We've covered pretty well everything.

You still haven't told me what you use truth/knowledge for.

Yeah I have. It is true that there are thoughts. What they are about is all theory-laden and underdetermined. Ergo no one knows if anything obtains.

Why do you even need it?
Your utility function is lacking.

I get by with hypotheses and assumptions.

P.S Did I forget to mention that the concept of "state" (should there even be such a thing as "state of affairs") is a well-studied abstraction.

Yes.

[Eodnhoj7]

Philosophy is the synthesis of definitions................

That's kinda what Russell was trying to show with logical atomism. Turns out that no it isn't.

So Russel is a Hegelian, is that what you are saying?

We see synthesis with terminology:

"Gen" grounds itself in genesis, genealogy, generator, etc,

It occurs in reproduction.

It occurs in synthetic materials created.

Etc.

[uwot]

So Russel is a Hegelian, is that what you are saying?

No Eodnhoj7; what on Earth makes you think that?

[Eodnhoj7]

So Russel is a Hegelian, is that what you are saying?

No Eodnhoj7; what on Earth makes you think that?

I must of read what you said wrongly, forget about it.

[Skepdick]

Right, and if you'd read the link I gave you, you would understand that is what philosophers mean by obtain.

I read it. And a couple others that I dug up on my own. I don't understand what it means.

Probably because I have no idea how to satisfy the yes/no question "Does X obtain?"

Yup to his epistemology. Nope to his ontology.

If Einstein was an epistemologist (and he certainly considered himself an "epistemological opportunist"), then the ontology of an epistemologist is still only an artefact of epistemic thought (which is precisely the point I am making).

Not in the sense that philosophers use the word.

If epistemologists don't use it that way, who care about philosophers? I don't.

Have you spoken to any philosophers of computer science? https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computer-science/ The rest of us know about that stuff and will use what we find useful, but it's a bit niche.

A philosophy of computer science is as useful to a computer scientist as philosophy of flying is useful to a birds.

It's not "niche" - it's essential. Your mind is (at least) a quantum computer. If you think that the very instrument you use to think with is "too niche" for philosophy, perhaps we ought to draw a distinction between "thinking" and "philosophy" ?

It's a bit like going into an Italian restaurant and complaining that they don't serve fish and chips.

Well, no. It's a bit like going to a club for "people who love wisdom" and wondering why they are so wisdumb.

Word salad.

Obscurantism.

No sir, I have made it clear to anyone with even average intelligence that according to the way that philosophers of science use the terms, I do not believe anyone has ontological knowledge of spacetime. It's an hypothesis. There is no direct evidence for it. Ergo no one knows if it obtains.

Well, you are going to have to make up your mind here. You can describe the curvature of spacetime.

If you don't know anything about spacetime, how do you know about its curvature?
What would it take for spacetime "to obtain"?

You've got it arse about tit, me old china. Philosophy has been around a lot longer than computer science, it's you chaps who are re-inventing the wheel.

No. I am pretty sure you have this backwards. Computers (humans, minds) have been around for way longer than philosophy.
Turing-completeness in linguistics has been around at least since 4BC: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P%C4%81%E1%B9%87ini

But this really isn't about "my camp is better than your camp". This is more about "natural philosophy became a science: physics. Philosophy of language became a science too: computer science". In so far as "making humans think critically" programming sure produces more critical thinkers than philosophy does.

So if the language games are now the domain of science (computer science, game theory, computational linguistics) - what's philosophy's next brain-child?

True dat. We've covered pretty well everything.

Covered everything - automated nothing. Milled over the same thing for 2000 years.

Yeah I have. It is true that there are thoughts. What they are about is all theory-laden and underdetermined. Ergo no one knows if anything obtains.

So you use truth/knowledge for "obtaining"? Obtaining what?

I get by with hypotheses and assumptions.

How do you know?

P.S Did I forget to mention that the concept of "state" (should there even be such a thing as "state of affairs") is a well-studied abstraction.

Yes.

Well. I've mentioned it now. State of affairs implies statefulness implies computation.

Those damn wikipedia articles. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_(computer_science)

[uwot]

... I have no idea how to satisfy the yes/no question "Does X obtain?"

Well, if you have some way of demonstrating ∃x, you can use precisely the same method to show x obtains.

[Skepdick]

Well, if you have some way of demonstrating ∃x, you can use precisely the same method to show x obtains.

That's hardly a problem particular to spacetime. It's a problem generic to ontology. Since you are unable to demonstrate the existence of anything you are basically conceding that ontology can never obtain.

Which is precisely why ∃x is an epistemic statement, not an ontological one. It refers to the existence of abstract object in the epistemologist's mind.

[uwot]

Well, if you have some way of demonstrating ∃x, you can use precisely the same method to show x obtains.

That's hardly a problem particular to spacetime.

It's the difference between theory and experiment. Einstein comes up with an idea about spacetime, and Arthur Eddington goes off to Principe to take pictures of an eclipse. For all that you insist that it's a distinction without a difference, I'm going to disagree.

It's a problem generic to ontology. Since you are unable to demonstrate the existence of anything you are basically conceding that ontology can never obtain.

The most recent example of me doing just that was only two posts ago:

It is true that there are thoughts. What they are about is all theory-laden and underdetermined. Ergo no one knows if anything obtains.

[Skepdick]

Well, if you have some way of demonstrating ∃x, you can use precisely the same method to show x obtains.

That's hardly a problem particular to spacetime.

It's the difference between theory and experiment. Einstein comes up with an idea about spacetime, and Arthur Eddington goes off to Principe to take pictures of an eclipse. For all that you insist that it's a distinction without a difference, I'm going to disagree.

It's a problem generic to ontology. Since you are unable to demonstrate the existence of anything you are basically conceding that ontology can never obtain.

The most recent example of me doing just that was only two posts ago:

It is true that there are thoughts. What they are about is all theory-laden and underdetermined. Ergo no one knows if anything obtains.

Now, now. You are disagreeing with yourself here way more than you are disagreeing with me.

All I am pointing out is that the English sentence "X obtains" is a determination, and it is you who insists that ALL theories are at best underdetermined.

Now you are also outright admitting that ontology and "obtainment" are not even underdetermined, they are indeterminate.

So how then does an epistemologist ever come to determine the curvature of an indeterminate ontology?