The Nonsense Fallacy

[surreptitious57]

I am cannot be an assumption because it requires self awareness and self awareness cannot be imaginary
Therefore even if everything else is an assumption or an illusion your existence has to be objectively real
You could be in a matrix or a brain in a vat or in a dream state but the form you take is of no importance
Some mental capability that acknowledges you exist is the one thing you can be certain of a la Descartes

[Eodnhoj7]

I am cannot be an assumption because it requires self awareness and self awareness cannot be imaginary
Therefore even if everything else is an assumption or an illusion your existence has to be objectively real
You could be in a matrix or a brain in a vat or in a dream state but the form you take is of no importance
Some mental capability that acknowledges you exist is the one thing you can be certain of a la Descartes

Self awareness begins with the creation of patterns through recursion, where I inverts from one state into another.

"I Am" can be expressed as (I --> (I --> I)).

[Skepdick]

"I Am" can be expressed as (I --> (I --> I)).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loop_unrolling

You can also apply this rule iteratively (constructively) to itself.

https://repl.it/repls/WeeEmbellishedProgramminglanguage

Iteration No. : 0
I
Iteration No. : 1
(I --> (I --> I))
Iteration No. : 2
((I --> (I --> I)) --> ((I --> (I --> I)) --> (I --> (I --> I))))
Iteration No. : 3
(((I --> (I --> I)) --> ((I --> (I --> I)) --> (I --> (I --> I)))) --> (((I --> (I --> I)) --> ((I --> (I --> I)) --> (I --> (I --> I)))) --> ((I --> (I --> I)) --> ((I --> (I --> I)) --> (I --> (I --> I))))))

[Eodnhoj7]

"I Am" can be expressed as (I --> (I --> I)).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loop_unrolling

You can also apply this rule iteratively (constructively) to itself.

https://repl.it/repls/WeeEmbellishedProgramminglanguage

Iteration No. : 0
I
Iteration No. : 1
(I --> (I --> I))
Iteration No. : 2
((I --> (I --> I)) --> ((I --> (I --> I)) --> (I --> (I --> I))))
Iteration No. : 3
(((I --> (I --> I)) --> ((I --> (I --> I)) --> (I --> (I --> I)))) --> (((I --> (I --> I)) --> ((I --> (I --> I)) --> (I --> (I --> I)))) --> ((I --> (I --> I)) --> ((I --> (I --> I)) --> (I --> (I --> I))))))

No disagreement.

[TheVisionofEr]

TheVisionofEr wrote: ↑
Sun Feb 23, 2020 5:13 pm
The common argument isn't to exclude subjectivity, but rather that observation must be subject to various strictures and to confirmation or acceptance by persons with a rigorous training.
Who gets to define the acceptance and exclusion criteria for 'rigour' and 'training'?

Regarded from the de facto, in biology and chemistry lab groups or cohorts modify their training through shared apprenticeship and experience. The theory imposed, which also in a sense creates the distinctive hard sciences in contradistinction to the more general idea of science as serious and careful study (all the fields involving the suffix “-ology” or talking about), since about 1900 is the exclusion of comments concerning good and bad from science and various forms of the exclusion of “values” or the “subjective”. It’s not so much a “who” who decided, but a general unfolding of the practice in the universities over hundreds of years. Ideas become generally cogent. If one named a who, Max Weber is very important in practical terms for spreading the current ideas of methodology from Germany where the current ideas first took concrete hold in the research universities, to America, but thousands of names could be put forward. Not all academicians.

Who ought to decide what is and is not science? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demarcation_problem

In practice nobody simply decides. Some views seem more cogent. There are sometimes powerful personalities. At other times there are warring claques which produce disciples or make, in medieval fashion, through apprenticeship, masters able to move forward in a given discipline and a particular school of thought. This happens in every discipline including the hard sciences.

This statement is difficult to parse until we agree on how we determine what is "scientific" and what is "rigorous"

Well, one can look at the details of various accounts of scientific method in the great theorists and philosophers. Or, survey the views of the great scientists. For instance, Richard Feynman said that the number of decimal places one can get on a measurement is the standard of rigour in physics (echoing the more metaphysical pronouncement of Max Plank who said that what is is what is measurable). This kind of view can be taken as the essence of matter if judged from the view that physics is the fundamental science. Otherwise one can look at some specific manner of dealing with the question of method in a biological choret or so, and one then finds great variety.

“Who gets to define/standardise the ruler?

When you are using a ruler to measure a table, you are also using the table to measure the ruler…”

So far as I understand it their is a specialization in measurement which is a discipline in its own right. The bigger question here is are we speaking of working scientists involved in particular questions seeking solutions, or are we speaking from an ontology which wants to establish if science as such is true, or in what sense it is true. All methods of making hypothesis, theory or laws can be false but productive of relatively reliable results within the bounds of specific aims.

[Skepdick]

It’s not so much a “who” who decided, but a general unfolding of the practice in the universities over hundreds of years. Ideas become generally cogent. If one named a who, Max Weber is very important in practical terms for spreading the current ideas of methodology from Germany where the current ideas first took concrete hold in the research universities, to America, but thousands of names could be put forward. Not all academicians.

So, given your perspective, would it then be a fair assessment in saying that if it's not practiced in a university or in academic setting then it's not science?

In practice nobody simply decides. Some views seem more cogent.

Who decides which views are "cogent" and which aren't?

Well, one can look at the details of various accounts of scientific method in the great theorists and philosophers. Or, survey the views of the great scientists. For instance, Richard Feynman said that the number of decimal places one can get on a measurement is the standard of rigour in physics (echoing the more metaphysical pronouncement of Max Plank who said that what is is what is measurable). This kind of view can be taken as the essence of matter if judged from the view that physics is the fundamental science. Otherwise one can look at some specific manner of dealing with the question of method in a biological choret or so, and one then finds great variety.

Indeed, one can do that. And one can also examine the views of Paul Feyerabend and observe that if we are to adhere to any strict/narrow definition of "science". If we are to discriminate between "science" and "not-science" then some of humanity's greatest inventions and discoveries are NOT science. This is the demarcation problem.

Not to mention that if "what is is what is measurable" doesn't even come close to solving the Measurement problem.

So far as I understand it their is a specialization in measurement which is a discipline in its own right.

So if one does not specialise in this discipline one cannot be a scientist? It must be a mandatory course in University then!

The bigger question here is are we speaking of working scientists involved in particular questions seeking solutions, or are we speaking from an ontology which wants to establish if science as such is true, or in what sense it is true. All methods of making hypothesis, theory or laws can be false but productive of relatively reliable results within the bounds of specific aims.

I am speaking from a human perspective of a person who is suffering a major identity crisis. The definitions are so ambiguous it's hard to determine whether one is a scientist, or a philosopher, or an expert, or a logician.

It's difficult to know which box to shove oneself into...

[Eodnhoj7]

It’s not so much a “who” who decided, but a general unfolding of the practice in the universities over hundreds of years. Ideas become generally cogent. If one named a who, Max Weber is very important in practical terms for spreading the current ideas of methodology from Germany where the current ideas first took concrete hold in the research universities, to America, but thousands of names could be put forward. Not all academicians.

So, given your perspective, would it then be a fair assessment in saying that if it's not practiced in a university or in academic setting then it's not science?

In practice nobody simply decides. Some views seem more cogent.

Who decides which views are "cogent" and which aren't?

Well, one can look at the details of various accounts of scientific method in the great theorists and philosophers. Or, survey the views of the great scientists. For instance, Richard Feynman said that the number of decimal places one can get on a measurement is the standard of rigour in physics (echoing the more metaphysical pronouncement of Max Plank who said that what is is what is measurable). This kind of view can be taken as the essence of matter if judged from the view that physics is the fundamental science. Otherwise one can look at some specific manner of dealing with the question of method in a biological choret or so, and one then finds great variety.

Indeed, one can do that. And one can also examine the views of Paul Feyerabend and observe that if we are to adhere to any strict/narrow definition of "science". If we are to discriminate between "science" and "not-science" then some of humanity's greatest inventions and discoveries are NOT science. This is the demarcation problem.

Not to mention that if "what is is what is measurable" doesn't even come close to solving the Measurement problem.

So far as I understand it their is a specialization in measurement which is a discipline in its own right.

So if one does not specialise in this discipline one cannot be a scientist? It must be a mandatory course in University then!

The bigger question here is are we speaking of working scientists involved in particular questions seeking solutions, or are we speaking from an ontology which wants to establish if science as such is true, or in what sense it is true. All methods of making hypothesis, theory or laws can be false but productive of relatively reliable results within the bounds of specific aims.

I am speaking from a human perspective of a person who is suffering a major identity crisis. The definitions are so ambiguous it's hard to determine whether one is a scientist, or a philosopher, or an expert, or a logician.

It's difficult to know which box to shove oneself into...

The sense of self is an illusion, try to box it and you are left with an infinite regress of boxes. I is self assumed and transitory as an empty context...I am learning this the hard way.

I had a few people remark how much life experience I had...I laughed and took it as a compliment then realized all my "adventures" where due to circumstances largely beyond me or were mostly trial and error.

Best just to learn how to forget the self...at least that is what I try to work on.

[commonsense]

Best just to learn how to forget the self.

That which can forget the self cannot deny memory of itself. It transforms self from subjective illusion to non-subjective memorizations of self-limiting boundaries. That which cannot forget itself is delusion for all delusion is just reality transformed to the imaginary.

[Eodnhoj7]

Best just to learn how to forget the self...at least that is what I try to work on.

That which can forget the self cannot deny memory of itself. It transforms self from subjective illusion to non-subjective memorizations of self-limiting boundaries. That which cannot forget itself is delusion for all delusion is just reality transformed to the imaginary.

No real disagreement.

[commonsense]

Best just to learn how to forget the self...at least that is what I try to work on.

That which can forget the self cannot deny memory of itself. It transforms self from subjective illusion to non-subjective memorizations of self-limiting boundaries. That which cannot forget itself is delusion for all delusion is just reality transformed to the imaginary.

No real disagreement.

Disagreement is delusion for all delusion is formed by transitioning objectivity to the unreal. That which is unreal cannot be imagined for then it would be objective. Only objectivity can separate the imaginary from the objective.

[Eodnhoj7]

That which can forget the self cannot deny memory of itself. It transforms self from subjective illusion to non-subjective memorizations of self-limiting boundaries. That which cannot forget itself is delusion for all delusion is just reality transformed to the imaginary.

No real disagreement.

Disagreement is delusion for all delusion is formed by transitioning objectivity to the unreal. That which is unreal cannot be imagined for then it would be objective. Only objectivity can separate the imaginary from the objective.

Still no real disagreement.

[TheVisionofEr]

“So, given your perspective, would it then be a fair assessment in saying that if it's not practiced in a university or in academic setting then it's not science?”

No. That would concede the meaning of science to the general usage or the usage currently most in power. A small discussion in the Socratic style is the most cogent, and a discussion can be not only with others but with ourselves. The status of the principle of the cogency, why some talk impresses one as making sense would come into question. On the whole, to ask this question, one does well to think through from the origin in the thinking of episteme with the first Greeks, but not only because of that origin in empirical terms.

The relationship between the understanding now in power, and what is most cogent to the most talented with respect to the question and its subject matter, is, in my view quite linked. So, in practice, I am almost tempted to say yes. This is at least so to the extent that while the fact / value distinction remains very powerful, it is flanked by very strong regimes of thought that threaten to overturn it (without achieving the necessary cogency, though, their failure to take over could, in theory, be explained by the violence of financial or power games as well).

“Who decides which views are "cogent" and which aren't?”

One could say empirically this is rather like the question why the works of Kafka about the year 1922 or so were considered so striking as to be worthy of translation into English though the English speaking public had not heard of him and had no demand that he be made readable for them. There seems to be an element in the cogency of works that is, so to say, independent of human beings as such, or better, of mere authority and power. The current view stems ultimately, in a large part, from Nietzsche's writing which he made when not an academic, but which were taken up by Simmel (probably the most cogent single proponent of the current regime of thought) and others, for instance.

“discoveries are NOT science.”

Science in the vernacular means experimental science. What science is as such is a philosophic (or Western) question about a law of what all things or objects or phenomena or beings are (and, in the Greek sense, always will be).

“So if one does not specialize in this discipline one cannot be a scientist? It must be a mandatory course in University then!”

It’s questionable though what the issue is here. My own view is that there are views concerning a law of things that are more cogent than others. And so the field is legitimate. In other words, on the standard that physicists build things that are part of daily life as are phones and trees, the fact / value distinction operates to separate lower and higher order questions. The total questioning of the distinction is possible, and very vigorously in existence, but as a scientist in the vernacular sense, such a discipline is useful in the sake of the limited goal of that (natural) science, which is scarcely limitable.

I am speaking from a human perspective of a person who is suffering a major identity crisis. The definitions are so ambiguous it's hard to determine whether one is a scientist, or a philosopher, or an expert, or a logician.

It's difficult to know which box to shove oneself into...

The vernacular meaning of science is co-extensive with the “hard sciences” and theoretically bounded by the idea of experiment and measurement of physical things. When one says, and this science of “facts” is the Science, one speaks dogmaticly. The dogmatism becomes clearer when one speaks of “nonsense”, and all that is not experimental science is nonsense.

From the ordinary point of view Science in the current understanding, since about 1900, is limited in this way to guild work, to handicraft, to making things. All theory is subordinated to the results and need not be true in itself. The practical result is the near worship of “facts” rather than possibilities or what should be and the discussion of why it should be.