What could make morality objective?

[Veritas Aequitas]

You've swallowed all that Kantian nonsense and it has made you unable to reason. I'm sorry to say, Kant and all his disciples are a bit insane.

I am an ardent fan of Kant.

I don't believe you have understood [not necessary agree] Kant's philosophy because to understand [not necessary agree with] one has to spent at least 3 years full time to research into Kant's philosophy. I have done that and I have understood and agree [with some exceptions] Kant's philosophy.

I understand Rand was crazily anti-Kant but from what I have known of Rand, she had not even understood Kant's full philosophy.
Whilst you have stated you are not a fan of Rand, seemingly you have blindly echoed her views on Kant.

Here is where Kant warned of Cherry-Pickers like Rand and yourself;

A philosophical work cannot be armed at all points, like a Mathematical treatise, and may therefore be open to objection in this or that respect, while yet the Structure of the System, taken in its Unity, is not in the least endangered.
Few have the versatility of mind to familiarise themselves with a new System; and owing to the general distaste for all innovation, still fewer have the inclination to do so.

If we take single passages, torn from their contexts, and compare them with one another, apparent contradictions are not likely to be lacking, especially in a work that is written with any freedom of expression.

In the eyes of those who rely on the judgment of others, such contradictions have the effect of placing the work in an unfavourable light; but they are easily resolved by those who have mastered the idea of the Whole.
-BxLiv CPR

The prerequisite is the master the idea of the Whole of Kant's Critique of Reason and his other books before one is qualified to critique Kant. It is the same for criticism of all philosophers.

Prior to his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant was a fanatical rationalist, i.e. very dogmatic on the use of reason as a basis of knowledge. However, after being awoke from his dogmatic slumber by Hume, Kant walked the middle path between rationalism and empiricism.

In what manner was Kant insane?
Since you made such a serious claim, where is your proof?

On the topic of morality, Kant was a moral objectivist but whatever the objective moral law, it can only be used as a guide and should never be enforced [as I had proposed herein].

[Peter Holmes]

These answers don't explain what the good or goodness is. They don't explain what about a thing or action makes it good. And they don't explain why morality is objective - independent from opinion.

Your premise is faulty again, in the way you frame the objection. The premise assumes that "good" is an adjectival quality that exists independent and prior to any ascription of it to God.

Now, it's true that good exists prior to the mundane objects or human beings of whom we sometimes predicate it. But God, being eternal, cannot be assigned any predicate that pre-exists Him. There are no such prior-existing things, including "goodness." It exists eternally too, as an attribute of the character of God. So there's no way to explain the ultimate meaning of "goodness" without reference to God.

As for human actions, they are good or bad depending on their harmony or disharmony with the character and intentions of God. And the reason morality is objective is that it is grounded in the character of God, which is always right and does not change. Moreover, no Authority less total would be capable of grounding an objective morality. But God is.

Human "opinion" is only as good as the extent to which it reflects the Divine assessment of an action or thing.

And here, in a nutshell, is the poverty of this aspect of theological 'reasoning'.

If 'good' isn't a predicate - a property ascribed to this god - then the 'is' in 'this god is good' seems to be the is of identity, so that 'good' is an abstract noun - the name of something: the good or goodness. And you say 'God' and 'good' are names for the same entity: this god and 'goodness' are the same thing. And this has two consequences.

1 An abstract noun is not the name of any thing of any kind anywhere. (Or are we still Platonists?) So if this god is goodness, then this god is not a thing of any kind anywhere.

2 Substitute any other fictional abstract thing for 'goodness', and the illogicality of deriving objectivity from it is obvious. 'This god is beauty, so beauty is objective - the beautiful is that which is consonant with the beauty of this god - and this is independent from opinion.' (Why?)

[Skepdick]

And here, in a nutshell, is the poverty of this aspect of theological 'reasoning'.

Special pleading. It's the poverty of your own reasoning, Peter.

1 An abstract noun is not the name of any thing of any kind anywhere. (Or are we still Platonists?) So if this god is goodness, then this god is not a thing of any kind anywhere.

Holy smokes! You don't even know the difference between nouns and adjectives! Strictly speaking, there are no such things as nouns. Nouns are artefacts of language and reasoning, not artefacts of reality. Nouns are static. Nothing in reality is (refer to Heraclitus).

The words "blue", "oblate" and "wrong" are all adjectives.

Why is it OK to assign the adjective "blue" to the sky.
Why is it OK to assign the adjective "oblate" to the Earth.
Why is it suddenly not OK to assign the adjective "wrong" to murder?

[Veritas Aequitas]

These answers don't explain what the good or goodness is. They don't explain what about a thing or action makes it good. And they don't explain why morality is objective - independent from opinion.

Your premise is faulty again, in the way you frame the objection. The premise assumes that "good" is an adjectival quality that exists independent and prior to any ascription of it to God.

Now, it's true that good exists prior to the mundane objects or human beings of whom we sometimes predicate it. But God, being eternal, cannot be assigned any predicate that pre-exists Him. There are no such prior-existing things, including "goodness." It exists eternally too, as an attribute of the character of God. So there's no way to explain the ultimate meaning of "goodness" without reference to God.

As for human actions, they are good or bad depending on their harmony or disharmony with the character and intentions of God. And the reason morality is objective is that it is grounded in the character of God, which is always right and does not change. Moreover, no Authority less total would be capable of grounding an objective morality. But God is.

Human "opinion" is only as good as the extent to which it reflects the Divine assessment of an action or thing.

And here, in a nutshell, is the poverty of this aspect of theological 'reasoning'.

If 'good' isn't a predicate - a property ascribed to this god - then the 'is' in 'this god is good' seems to be the is of identity, so that 'good' is an abstract noun - the name of something: the good or goodness. And you say 'God' and 'good' are names for the same entity: this god and 'goodness' are the same thing. And this has two consequences.

1 An abstract noun is not the name of any thing of any kind anywhere. (Or are we still Platonists?) So if this god is goodness, then this god is not a thing of any kind anywhere.

2 Substitute any other fictional abstract thing for 'goodness', and the illogicality of deriving objectivity from it is obvious. 'This god is beauty, so beauty is objective - the beautiful is that which is consonant with the beauty of this god - and this is independent from opinion.' (Why?)

Note the difference,
in theology and theism, the objective moral laws are imposed by God because God commanded it to be so as stated in some whatever holy texts which is accepted based on faith [belief without proof and justified reason].

How can God's commanded 'highest good' be 'good' when God's commands condoned slavery and even killing of non-believers under vague conditions of threats as in Islam plus a whole loads of other evil laden sanctions.
In addition, God's commanded objective moral laws is enforced with a threat of hell for non-compliance.

The final nail to the theists' moral coffin is God is an illusion and it impossible to exists as a real entity.

• God is an Impossibility
  viewtopic.php?f=11&t=24704

In my case, I claim absolute moral laws [or moral facts] are necessary to ensure the efficient workings of a Framework and System of Morality and Work.
This absolute moral laws as I had repeated many times are only be used a GUIDE and never be enforced in any way at all.
The approach to ensure the Framework and System of Morality and Work is working efficient is to develop the moral faculty and function within the brain of the individuals naturally and in a fool proof manner.
What is so wrong with this approach?

[Peter Holmes]

Your premise is faulty again, in the way you frame the objection. The premise assumes that "good" is an adjectival quality that exists independent and prior to any ascription of it to God.

Now, it's true that good exists prior to the mundane objects or human beings of whom we sometimes predicate it. But God, being eternal, cannot be assigned any predicate that pre-exists Him. There are no such prior-existing things, including "goodness." It exists eternally too, as an attribute of the character of God. So there's no way to explain the ultimate meaning of "goodness" without reference to God.

As for human actions, they are good or bad depending on their harmony or disharmony with the character and intentions of God. And the reason morality is objective is that it is grounded in the character of God, which is always right and does not change. Moreover, no Authority less total would be capable of grounding an objective morality. But God is.

Human "opinion" is only as good as the extent to which it reflects the Divine assessment of an action or thing.

And here, in a nutshell, is the poverty of this aspect of theological 'reasoning'.

If 'good' isn't a predicate - a property ascribed to this god - then the 'is' in 'this god is good' seems to be the is of identity, so that 'good' is an abstract noun - the name of something: the good or goodness. And you say 'God' and 'good' are names for the same entity: this god and 'goodness' are the same thing. And this has two consequences.

1 An abstract noun is not the name of any thing of any kind anywhere. (Or are we still Platonists?) So if this god is goodness, then this god is not a thing of any kind anywhere.

2 Substitute any other fictional abstract thing for 'goodness', and the illogicality of deriving objectivity from it is obvious. 'This god is beauty, so beauty is objective - the beautiful is that which is consonant with the beauty of this god - and this is independent from opinion.' (Why?)

Note the difference,
in theology and theism, the objective moral laws are imposed by God because God commanded it to be so as stated in some whatever holy texts which is accepted based on faith [belief without proof and justified reason].

How can God's commanded 'highest good' be 'good' when God's commands condoned slavery and even killing of non-believers under vague conditions of threats as in Islam plus a whole loads of other evil laden sanctions.
In addition, God's commanded objective moral laws is enforced with a threat of hell for non-compliance.

The final nail to the theists' moral coffin is God is an illusion and it impossible to exists as a real entity.

• God is an Impossibility
  viewtopic.php?f=11&t=24704

In my case, I claim absolute moral laws [or moral facts] are necessary to ensure the efficient workings of a Framework and System of Morality and Work.
This absolute moral laws as I had repeated many times are only be used a GUIDE and never be enforced in any way at all.
The approach to ensure the Framework and System of Morality and Work is working efficient is to develop the moral faculty and function within the brain of the individuals naturally and in a fool proof manner.
What is so wrong with this approach?

What's wrong with what you say is the expression 'absolute moral laws'.

There are only moral rules that a community or society may adopt - and that all human communities have adopted - because there are good reasons to do so. Those rules can change, and sometimes have changed, through our history; attitudes towards slavery and homosexuality are examples. So the word 'absolute' is inappropriate. It means fixed and unchanging.

The fact that we do have moral rules, some of them embodied in laws, does not mean the moral judgements they express are facts. That claim is a fundamental and elementary logical mistake, based on a category error.

That's why your approach is wrong.

[Sculptor]

The fact that we do have moral rules, some of them embodied in laws, does not mean the moral judgements they express are facts. That claim is a fundamental and elementary logical mistake, based on a category error.

That's why your approach is wrong.

I really find this error puzzling.
It is quite common and can be found in another Philosophy Forum I frequent.
It is more than puzzling but shocking how anyone could fail to notice the problems here.

What sort of reality do these people live in? And it is not as if people proposing such an idea have the slightest argument in its favour. They seem to bluster on as if it is a simple undeniable fact; but this ignores human diversity, anthropology and history.

[Peter Holmes]

The fact that we do have moral rules, some of them embodied in laws, does not mean the moral judgements they express are facts. That claim is a fundamental and elementary logical mistake, based on a category error.

That's why your approach is wrong.

I really find this error puzzling.
It is quite common and can be found in another Philosophy Forum I frequent.
It is more than puzzling but shocking how anyone could fail to notice the problems here.

What sort of reality do these people live in? And it is not as if people proposing such an idea have the slightest argument in its favour. They seem to bluster on as if it is a simple undeniable fact; but this ignores human diversity, anthropology and history.

Agreed. I reckon there are two reasons why people are convinced morality is objective - that there are moral facts.

First, our moral judgements matter to most of us, so that to say they're simply subjective moral judgements seems to trivialise them.

And second, it's the nature of moral judgements that we make them universally. So if we think slavery is morally wrong, we think it always was and will be morally wrong everywhere. It would be morally inconsistent to think otherwise.

[Skepdick]

There are only moral rules that a community or society may adopt - and that all human communities have adopted - because there are good reasons to do so.

There are only linguistic expressions that a community or society may adopt - and that all human communities have adopted - because there are good reasons to do so.

Those rules can change, and sometimes have changed, through our history; attitudes towards slavery and homosexuality are examples. So the word 'absolute' is inappropriate. It means fixed and unchanging.

Those linguistic expressions can change, and sometimes have changed, through our history; attitude towards geocentrism and physics are examples. The word 'absolute' is meaningless. There is nothing fixed and unchanging. Such things are relegated to the imaginary realm of Mathematics.

No man can cross the same river twice, for it is not the same man and it is not the same river. --Heraclitus

The fact that we do have moral rules, some of them embodied in laws, does not mean the moral judgements they express are facts.

The fact that we have linguistic expressions, some of them embodied in dictionaries, does not mean those linguistic expressions are facts.

That claim is a fundamental and elementary logical mistake, based on a category error.

That claim is fundamental and elementary logical mistakes, based on bandwagon fallacy.

That's why your approach is wrong.

Performative contradiction. If the 'wrongness' of my approach is just your subjective opinion - then why should I give a damn about your opinion?

Next step in Peter's repertoire: special pleading. He will proceed to admit that he has been equivocating the word 'wrong' all along by attempting to draw a distinction between the moral use of 'wrong' and his actual use of 'wrong'.

People in glass houses shouldn't throw stones.

[Immanuel Can]

If 'good' isn't a predicate...

But, of course, "good" is a predicate...yet not merely a predicate, in the unique case of God. It is a predication, but it is also an attribute.

Jesus said exactly the same thing: "There is none good but God alone," He said. In other words, for all other entities, "good" is a MERE predication. But in relation to God, it is not MERElY a predication, but an inherent attribute as well.

God is not merely "one among other good things," He is the prototype of goodness, in association with which all other goods are merely derivative.

[Peter Holmes]

If 'good' isn't a predicate...

But, of course, "good" is a predicate...yet not merely a predicate, in the unique case of God. It is a predication, but it is also an attribute.

Jesus said exactly the same thing: "There is none good but God alone," He said. In other words, for all other entities, "good" is a MERE predication. But in relation to God, it is not MERElY a predication, but an inherent attribute as well.

God is not merely "one among other good things," He is the prototype of goodness, in association with which all other goods are merely derivative.

To predicate something of something else is to describe it. So to say 'this god is good' is to describe the god, just as to say 'this action is good' is to describe the action. And this is not the 'is' of identity in these expressions. They claim something about the god and the action. And our disagreement is about what it is that they claim.

You say goodness can be a property - something that belongs to the god or the action - that exists regardless of what anyone thinks. I say that to claim something is morally good - or just good - can only be to express a value-judgment about that thing - and can never be to make a factual claim about it. And a value-judgement can't be objective.

You can define your god as the prototype of goodness, but until you demonstrate that the word 'goodness' is the name of a real thing, your claim is meaningless or circular.

[Immanuel Can]

You say goodness can be a property - something that belongs to the god or the action - that exists regardless of what anyone thinks. I say that to claim something is morally good - or just good - can only be to express a value-judgment about that thing - and can never be to make a factual claim about it. And a value-judgement can't be objective.

You're presuming, not proving your conclusion there, Pete. You say there are no moral facts...but on what basis? That you don't know them? How does that serve the turn?

You go on to insist, "A value judgment cannot be objective." How do we know that? Only if we presume that there is, and can be, no prototype for any moral quality. But how do we know that? We don't, in fact.

The only answer as to whether there can be comes to us from ontology, prior to our ethical pronouncement. If our ontology holds that there is no God, then all moral claims are exactly what you say they are -- merely human, merely arbitrary, merely conventional, and devoid of reference to any objective reality. But then, if one is fully honest with oneself, one would have to say that moral claims are falsehoods...they predicate something of objects and actions that are simply incapable of bearing such predications.

And that's what Hume thought, too.

But if our ontology tells us that this world is not accidental, but is the deliberate creation of God, who has an intrinsic moral nature, then the items and actions in this created world are teleological in nature...they have a purpose, a role, and a designed outcome in being placed as they are. To fulfill that creatorially-assigned role is "good." To fail to fulfil that creatorially-intended role is "evil." And there are objective facts about those relations, derived from their proximity or distance to the Divine intention...whether we always know them or not.

In other words, if human moral epistemology is flawed, fallible, imperfect, then correcting it means bringing it back into line with reality. And the reality with which it needs to be brought back into line is the intention and purposes of the Creator. Human moral epistemology is not determinative of the truth about morality, and morality remains objective.

[Peter Holmes]

You say goodness can be a property - something that belongs to the god or the action - that exists regardless of what anyone thinks. I say that to claim something is morally good - or just good - can only be to express a value-judgment about that thing - and can never be to make a factual claim about it. And a value-judgement can't be objective.

You're presuming, not proving your conclusion there, Pete. You say there are no moral facts...but on what basis? That you don't know them? How does that serve the turn?

You go on to insist, "A value judgment cannot be objective." How do we know that? Only if we presume that there is, and can be, no prototype for any moral quality. But how do we know that? We don't, in fact.

The only answer as to whether there can be comes to us from ontology, prior to our ethical pronouncement. If our ontology holds that there is no God, then all moral claims are exactly what you say they are -- merely human, merely arbitrary, merely conventional, and devoid of reference to any objective reality. But then, if one is fully honest with oneself, one would have to say that moral claims are falsehoods...they predicate something of objects and actions that are simply incapable of bearing such predications.

And that's what Hume thought, too.

But if our ontology tells us that this world is not accidental, but is the deliberate creation of God, who has an intrinsic moral nature, then the items and actions in this created world are teleological in nature...they have a purpose, a role, and a designed outcome in being placed as they are. To fulfill that creatorially-assigned role is "good." To fail to fulfil that creatorially-intended role is "evil." And there are objective facts about those relations, derived from their proximity or distance to the Divine intention...whether we always know them or not.

In other words, if human moral epistemology is flawed, fallible, imperfect, then correcting it means bringing it back into line with reality. And the reality with which it needs to be brought back into line is the intention and purposes of the Creator. Human moral epistemology is not determinative of the truth about morality, and morality remains objective.

We've done this to death. I've explained countless times, upside down and back to front, why your argument is fallacious, and you're impervious to reason. That's the intellectual damage that theism does. You have to justify one or both of these claims, taking 'objective' to mean 'independent from opinion':

1 If morality is objective, then there is a god (defined any way you like).

2 If there is a god (defined any way you like), then morality is objective.

Forget ontology - that's irrelevant for these claims.

[Skepdick]

We've done this to death.

And you still haven't admitted your error. I guess we have to flog the horse till you actually die; or till you rectify yourself.

I've explained countless times, upside down and back to front, why your argument is fallacious, and you're impervious to reason.

And I've explained and demonstrated countless times why your epistemic criteria for "fallaciousness" and "reasonableness" are duplicit!

Your epistemic double-standard keeps imploding all your arguments.

You want to do Philosophy, while quietly pretending that the Munchhausen Trilemma only applies to others, but not to you.

Either there are objective standards for {reason, logic, epistemology, factuality and morality} or there aren't objective standards for any of those things because they are ALL founded upon human judgment.

If you only want objective standards for some of those things, then go ahead and tell us HOW to cherry-pick them and WHY?

[Immanuel Can]

We've done this to death. I've explained countless times, upside down and back to front, why your argument is fallacious,

Actually, you haven't. But you can try now, if you like.

Interestingly, notice how ontology gets into your two articulations here. The copula "is" means "exists as." So it's quite impossible for ontology to be irrelevant. In fact, in your two claims, you have yourself made it fundamental.

[Sculptor]

The fact that we do have moral rules, some of them embodied in laws, does not mean the moral judgements they express are facts. That claim is a fundamental and elementary logical mistake, based on a category error.

That's why your approach is wrong.

I really find this error puzzling.
It is quite common and can be found in another Philosophy Forum I frequent.
It is more than puzzling but shocking how anyone could fail to notice the problems here.

What sort of reality do these people live in? And it is not as if people proposing such an idea have the slightest argument in its favour. They seem to bluster on as if it is a simple undeniable fact; but this ignores human diversity, anthropology and history.

Agreed. I reckon there are two reasons why people are convinced morality is objective - that there are moral facts.

First, our moral judgements matter to most of us, so that to say they're simply subjective moral judgements seems to trivialise them.

And second, it's the nature of moral judgements that we make them universally. So if we think slavery is morally wrong, we think it always was and will be morally wrong everywhere. It would be morally inconsistent to think otherwise.

Yes, but this is a pure example of totalitarianism.

Even with something as obvious as slavery the lines are blurred, since most people are slaves or one kind or another. Circumstances force us to enter into undesirable contracts with employers, and unless we are rigorously and frugally monkishly to avoid products that are the result of slave labour - we all participate in supporting slavery all over the world.