What could make morality objective?

[Immanuel Can]

I'll assume it's a mistake. You are mistaking "reason," with the, "ability to reason."

Nope.

And that's what turns reason to the service of the autocrat. If there's only one thing "reason" can lead someone to, then everybody who does not arrive there is simply "unreasonable." So they can be dismissed without being understood.

Unfortunately for the autocrat, it's just not true that "reason is on his side." His reasons are on his side...but the process of reason makes him no favourite.

To help you through your confusion: from now on, I'll say, "correct reason,"

That's the worst misunderstanding.

Reason can be perfectly "correct" but still not arrive at the same conclusions as another "correct reasoner." That's because reason favours no content. All reason does is to make sure that whatever content we are plugging into it, we are treating that content with integrity...but "reason" never dictates the content.

But of course, that's not so. They're reasoning, alright; but they're reasoning from different premises than you are.

No they are not, "reasoning, alright," they are reasoning all wrong.

It is not their reasoning that is faulty: it's their content.

Starting with an incorrect premise is wrong,

Of course. But it's not an indication of "unreason." Unreason would only be implicated if the person failed to act rationally consistently with his premise.

Nobody believes that. They all believe that they ARE reasoning. They're just reasoning from different premises, again.

There was a time when I believed it was possible for people to simply be mistaken in their use of reason [/quote]
It's a belief you should have kept. It's true.

To reason correctly one must examine their premises, as well as all their conclusions to insure there are no contradictions.

Of course. But there are non-contradictory premises that lead to faulty conclusions. Such as,

The moon is made of vapour.
Vapour is a gas, and cannot support weight.
Therefore, the moon will not support our weight.

Reasoning perfect: first premise factually faulty, but second correct. Conclusion following rationally, but still wrong.

Rationality can only tell us that this syllogism works. It cannot tell us whether or not the moon is made of vapour, if we have no empirical tests to make us think otherwise. Empirical tests warrant premises. Reason does not. Reason only tells us whether what we do with the premises we have is logical.

[Immanuel Can]

What is a "Supreme Being?"

It's an expression one cannot make simpler, unless one writes it as "God."

If moral principles were objective, God would have to abide by those objective moral principles.

False dichotomy. The old Euthyphro Dilemma, which has been asked and answered up the strand.

It is only a dilemma for those who believe in a gods, like Socrates...

You really need to read my answer to Pete, back on the top of page 134. It handles this.

The Euthyprho Dilemma is a false dichotomy, and an error in reasoning. I showed why there.

[Peter Holmes]

IC

Sorry I didn't respond to your supposed refutation of Euthyphro. I didn't give it a second thought, because it's laughable.

The problem is as relevant for monotheism as it is for polytheism: what bearing does divine opinion have on 'the pious' or the good? Is something good because 'the god' loves it, or does 'the god' love it because it's good? That different gods love different things is irrelevant to the point of the dilemma.

[Immanuel Can]

The problem is as relevant for monotheism as it is for polytheism: what bearing does divine opinion have on 'the pious' or the good?

It's very simple. Under polytheism, "the will of the gods" and "the good" cannot be the same thing, because as Socrates notes, "the gods" disagree about what "the good is."

If you ever read The Odyssey, for example, you would know that the gods have three different opinions about Odysseus: Athena loves him, Poseidon hates him, and Zeus doesn't care. Which one is "the right" attitude to take to a man like Odysseus? Nobody can say, based on what the gods do. They aren't in touch with whatever that is.

But in monotheism, "the nature of the good" and "the nature of God" are identical. There is no difference. They're simply two terms for exactly the same thing, like "Peter Holmes" and "Mr. Holmes."

Consequently, just as Socrates himself says, Euthyprho's Dilemma is a problem for polytheists. But it's not at all for monotheists.

[Peter Holmes]

The problem is as relevant for monotheism as it is for polytheism: what bearing does divine opinion have on 'the pious' or the good?

It's very simple. Under polytheism, "the will of the gods" and "the good" cannot be the same thing, because as Socrates notes, "the gods" disagree about what "the good is."

If you ever read The Odyssey, for example, you would know that the gods have three different opinions about Odysseus: Athena loves him, Poseidon hates him, and Zeus doesn't care. Which one is "the right" attitude to take to a man like Odysseus? Nobody can say, based on what the gods do. They aren't in touch with whatever that is.

But in monotheism, "the nature of the good" and "the nature of God" are identical. There is no difference. They're simply two terms for exactly the same thing, like "Peter Holmes" and "Mr. Holmes."

Consequently, just as Socrates himself says, Euthyprho's Dilemma is a problem for polytheists. But it's not at all for monotheists.

Yes it is. The question is as I posed it, and for some reason you didn't quote it: is something good because it's loved by 'the god', or is it loved by 'the god' because it's good? As you can see, it doesn't matter if another god doesn't love it, so the polytheism is irrelevant.

The issue is: why is something good? And defining your god as good doesn't answer that question - that has absolutely no bearing on the question posed in Euthyphro. Why is your god good? Well, it just is. - Your 'solution' is useless.

[Immanuel Can]

... is something good because it's loved by 'the god', or is it loved by 'the god' because it's good?

The answer is "Yes." It is both good, and God approves of it."

See Genesis 1.

Your mistake is to think that "good" and "God" have to refer to different entities. But God is good, and the only true good is that which is consonant with the character of God.

Your assumption is just wrong there.

[Peter Holmes]

... is something good because it's loved by 'the god', or is it loved by 'the god' because it's good?

The answer is "Yes." It is both good, and God approves of it."

See Genesis 1.

Your mistake is to think that "good" and "God" have to refer to different entities. But God is good, and the only true good is that which is consonant with the character of God.

Your assumption is just wrong there.

That you italicise each 'is' revealing. Is this the 'is' of identity or predication, or both?

Q: What is the good or goodness? A1: God is good. A2: The only true good is that which is consonant with the character of God.

These answers don't explain what the good or goodness is. They don't explain what about a thing or action makes it good. And they don't explain why morality is objective - independent from opinion.

[RCSaunders]

I'll assume it's a mistake. You are mistaking "reason," with the, "ability to reason."

Nope.

I was giving you the benefit of the doubt, but since you insist otherwise, I have to conclude you are intentionally obfuscating the nature of reason.

To help you through your confusion: from now on, I'll say, "correct reason,"

That's the worst misunderstanding.

Reason can be perfectly "correct" but still not arrive at the same conclusions as another "correct reasoner." That's because reason favours no content. All reason does is to make sure that whatever content we are plugging into it, we are treating that content with integrity...but "reason" never dictates the content.

"Festus said with a loud voice, 'Paul, thou art beside thyself! Much learning doth make thee mad!'" [Acts 26:24 ] You've swallowed all that Kantian nonsense and it has made you unable to reason. I'm sorry to say, Kant and all his disciples are a bit insane.

But of course, that's not so. They're reasoning, alright; but they're reasoning from different premises than you are.

No they are not, "reasoning, alright," they are reasoning all wrong.

It is not their reasoning that is faulty: it's their content.

Perhaps you think reasoning that contains superstitious nonsense is correct reasoning. It's not, it's a kind of mental disfunction.

Starting with an incorrect premise is wrong,

Of course. But it's not an indication of "unreason." Unreason would only be implicated if the person failed to act rationally consistently with his premise.

Here's the crux of you inability to understand what correct reason is (along with the stupid Kantian nonsense that reason is the manipulation of symbols). A premise is subject to the same non-contradictory requirements as all other thinking. A premise that is not rationally identified as non-contradictory is an invalid premise, and no reasoning that is based on it is valid, no matter how consistent it is.

Nobody believes that. They all believe that they ARE reasoning. They're just reasoning from different premises, again.

There was a time when I believed it was possible for people to simply be mistaken in their use of reason [/quote]
It's a belief you should have kept.[/quote]
Well I do believe people make innocent mistakes in their reasoning, but you know that is not what I was talking about. I was talking about those who, as I said, "believe absurd things," because, as I also said, "deep down, they are evading the truth. They know the premises they have accepted are only so they can maintain beliefs that, honestly examined, could not be rationally sustained." In plain English, they are lying to themselves. Mistakes in reasoning of such magnitude are not possible.

To reason correctly one must examine their premises, as well as all their conclusions to insure there are no contradictions.

Of course. But there are non-contradictory premises that lead to faulty conclusions. Such as,

The moon is made of vapour.
Vapour is a gas, and cannot support weight.
Therefore, the moon will not support our weight.

Reasoning perfect: first premise factually faulty, but second correct. Conclusion following rationally, but still wrong.

"first premise factually faulty?" What do you think a contradiction is? If reality is one thing and your proposition declares it is something else, THAT IS A CONTRADICTION! No syllogism that begins with a false premise is correct reason.

Rationality can only tell us that this syllogism works.

You, and Kant, and the logical positivist have all fallen for one of the worst lies in philosophy. Rationality is not determined, or even described by any logic method. Logic is only a method, a formalized form of some essential principles of correct reason. All knowledge methods: language, mathematics, geometry, and logic are all only valid if what they are applied to are actual existents as they actually exist.

It cannot tell us whether or not the moon is made of vapour, if we have no empirical tests to make us think otherwise. Empirical tests warrant premises. Reason does not. Reason only tells us whether what we do with the premises we have is logical.

How can you sleep at night? Exactly what do you think one uses to make an, "empirical test," if it is not reason. What a nightmare your world must be. What must it be like to believe no certain knowledge is possible, that no matter how well one reasons they can never learn the truth, and the world you live in is never certain or stable because it is contingent and subject to totally inexplicable events. I wouldn't worry about hell if I were you, you've already turned this world into one.

Here's a question. If you consider any kind of mental operation that conforms to some rules of logic, "reason," no matter whether the premises are correct or not, what would you call a method that is only valid if the premises are correct? The latter method is what I mean by, "correct reason."

[Immanuel Can]

I have to conclude you are intentionally obfuscating the nature of reason.

You don't have to. But I can't stop you, if that's what you prefer to think.

You've swallowed all that Kantian nonsense and it has made you unable to reason. I'm sorry to say, Kant and all his disciples are a bit insane.

I'm no Kantian. You're mistaking the implication of my pseudonym. It's not Kant.

Perhaps you think reasoning that contains superstitious nonsense is correct reasoning.

It can be correct reasoning. But it's erroneous content.

I'm surprised you don't know that a person can reason correctly, but have a false premise. It's so ordinary that when it happens that we often call it "learning."

The hardest "learning" comes from the situation in which one's reasoning has been valid, but one's premises have been untrue... this, philosophers call, "unsound" reasoning, because the logic part is just fine but the content is messed up.

I was talking about those who, as I said, "believe absurd things,"

If so, you were talking about people who reason formally correctly, but whose content is wrong.

"deep down, they are evading the truth.

Yep. Some people do that, too.

"first premise factually faulty?" What do you think a contradiction is?

Ah, you're using "contradiction" to refer to things that "fail to conform to empirical reality," and I'm using it only to refer to things that "fail to follow the formal demands of reason, by actually conflicting with other premises required by the argument."

That's why we were missing each other about that.

Exactly what do you think one uses to make an, "empirical test," if it is not reason.

Again, you're not using the word "reason" in the precise way. What one does in an empirical test, is perform enough trials to convince one that one ought to believe that the rest of the possible tests will yield the same results. And this allows one to estimate the probability of what appears to be a "law." It's from the law that you are able to reason...but if the law turns out to be wrong, despite the tests, then the reasoning will yield incorrect conclusions.

Again, this has happened so many times in the history of science that I can't imagine you're unaware of the phenomenon. At one time, it was thought that the smallest particles in the world were called "atoms." And science reasoned based on that assumption. Then this assumption was found to be false...there are smaller particles. Science had to revise. And so on.

This is so obvious, and so routine, I'm surprised to have to point it out.

Here's a question. If you consider any kind of mental operation that conforms to some rules of logic, "reason," no matter whether the premises are correct or not, what would you call a method that is only valid if the premises are correct? The latter method is what I mean by, "correct reason."

The terms in philosophy are as follows: "validity" refers to the form of the argument only..it's "reasoning," if you will. "Truth" refers to the conformability of its premises to objective facts..it's "content," if you will. And "soundness" is the term used for an argument that has both the form of its reasoning correct, and the content truthful. And a "sound" argument is one that should be believed: because if the form is correct AND the premises are true, then the resulting conclusion is inevitably warranted.

Here's where that's laid out: https://www.iep.utm.edu/val-snd/

[henry quirk]

I'm surprised you don't know that a person can reason correctly, but have a false premise.

It is possible to commit no mistakes and still lose. That is not a weakness. That is life. -John Luck Pickerd

A false premise, a lack of information, a slavish devotion to a legit, but inadequate, philo-method can lead one right into hell (where there are no goods or evils, where there's only opinion).

[Immanuel Can]

These answers don't explain what the good or goodness is. They don't explain what about a thing or action makes it good. And they don't explain why morality is objective - independent from opinion.

Your premise is faulty again, in the way you frame the objection. The premise assumes that "good" is an adjectival quality that exists independent and prior to any ascription of it to God.

Now, it's true that good exists prior to the mundane objects or human beings of whom we sometimes predicate it. But God, being eternal, cannot be assigned any predicate that pre-exists Him. There are no such prior-existing things, including "goodness." It exists eternally too, as an attribute of the character of God. So there's no way to explain the ultimate meaning of "goodness" without reference to God.

As for human actions, they are good or bad depending on their harmony or disharmony with the character and intentions of God. And the reason morality is objective is that it is grounded in the character of God, which is always right and does not change. Moreover, no Authority less total would be capable of grounding an objective morality. But God is.

Human "opinion" is only as good as the extent to which it reflects the Divine assessment of an action or thing.

[RCSaunders]

I'm no Kantian. You're mistaking the implication of my pseudonym. It's not Kant.

I'm not going by your pseudonym, I'm going by the Kantian epistemology you've accepted and promote:

"A bachelor is a single male," is a proposition, but it is not knowledge unless it is true, that the actual existents identified by the concept are what the definition describes. That cannot be known unless the concepts, "single," and, "male," are known. ("Single male" is two concepts.) If a, "male," were a "turnip," and, "single," meant, "red," according to you and Kant, the proposition, "a bachelor is a red turnip," would be true knowledge, by definition.

Ironically, you're absolutely right. Because linguistic signifiers are social constructs, we could have constructed them to mean different things than they do. ...

I just noticed this bit of post-modernist nonsense you slipped in as well, in typical, "academic-speak:" "linguistic signifiers are social constructs." You couldn't write, "words?" I know, it's more impressive to use two words, "linguitstic signifiers," in the place of one. In any case, words are not some social product, they are the creations of individual minds developing concepts to identify existents.

The terms in philosophy are as follows: "validity" refers to the form of the argument only..it's "reasoning," if you will. "Truth" refers to the conformability of its premises to objective facts..it's "content," if you will. And "soundness" is the term used for an argument that has both the form of its reasoning correct, and the content truthful. And a "sound" argument is one that should be believed: because if the form is correct AND the premises are true, then the resulting conclusion is inevitably warranted.

Here's where that's laid out: https://www.iep.utm.edu/val-snd/

I'm sorry I do not accept any authority, especially in philosophy, and espeically some online site with an academic slant like the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

The idea that a proposition can be true simply on the basis of it's structure, whether the concepts are legitimate concepts or not is Kantian. If a syllogism is comprised of such propositions and is declared, "valid," by implication it some kind of, "truth." Just because Kant and some online reference repeat that nonsense does not make it correct. There is no, "Bible," of philosophy.

The object of reason is Truth, not following some set of rules that establish nothing but confusion. But I'll give you this, you are a master at evasion, and I have definitely learned something from you.

[Immanuel Can]

"A bachelor is a single male," is a proposition, but it is not knowledge unless it is true, that the actual existents identified by the concept are what the definition describes. That cannot be known unless the concepts, "single," and, "male," are known. ("Single male" is two concepts.) If a, "male," were a "turnip," and, "single," meant, "red," according to you and Kant, the proposition, "a bachelor is a red turnip," would be true knowledge, by definition.

Ironically, you're absolutely right. Because linguistic signifiers are social constructs, we could have constructed them to mean different things than they do. ...

I just noticed this bit of post-modernist nonsense you slipped in as well, in typical, "academic-speak:" "linguistic signifiers are social constructs." You couldn't write, "words?"

Of course not. That would not have pointed out what was important there...namely, that words are invented things, things particular to linguistic groups, not universals. They are both social and constructed.

You can't tell the difference, RC?

In any case, words are not some social product,

Actually, that's exactly what they are. They are agreed upon by groups of people, and used for communication among them. Communication always has two ends to it; sender, and recipient (or, more often, recipients).

English is the same. It's a group words agreed upon by English-speaking people, for the purpose of communicating with other English-speaking people. The whole language means nothing at all to a speaker of Swahili or Urdu. So it's a social construct...made by English speakers (many more than one), and for English speakers to speak to English speakers.

Who else?

Man, you're digging up this stuff on linguistics now? Seems off topic for the present moment...

The terms in philosophy are as follows: "validity" refers to the form of the argument only..it's "reasoning," if you will. "Truth" refers to the conformability of its premises to objective facts..it's "content," if you will. And "soundness" is the term used for an argument that has both the form of its reasoning correct, and the content truthful. And a "sound" argument is one that should be believed: because if the form is correct AND the premises are true, then the resulting conclusion is inevitably warranted.

Here's where that's laid out: https://www.iep.utm.edu/val-snd/

I'm sorry I do not accept any authority, especially in philosophy, and espeically some online site with an academic slant like the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

It's a peer-reviewed site, compiled by people with the relevant qualifications and checked by the same. And while no source can ever be perfect, you won't find a better one for this sort of thing.

So yeah, you can ignore it. Maybe academia doesn't impress you much. Okay.

Everybody has the right to be wrong, if they are determined to be. On this, it seems you're determined.

[Veritas Aequitas]

A fascist has to insist that his moral opinions are facts, in order to justify oppression. That's why moral objectivism is an evil that has to be fought at each and every turn.

How come you are so ignorant?

I am a moral realist but I have always insists whatever the absolute moral law as moral facts [not empirical facts] are not to be enforced by only to be used a guide to improve human moral behaviors.
I repeat, the absolute moral laws are to be used as a GUIDE only.
This is more like a feature of an effective problem solving technique.

Where is the oppression in my case.
Show me the proof of your claim.

I agree when absolute moral laws in the theological setting are enforced by God via the threat of hell.
I don't think this is fascism either.

[Veritas Aequitas]

So - no sign of any justification for the claim that morality is objective - that there are moral facts - moral features of reality. Just a repetition of the claim, as though saying something is so makes it so.

And the fascism implicit in the claim - there are moral facts, and, of course, I know what they are - shows its ugliness. Moral objectivism is moral fascism with a civilised veneer. When inquisitors tighten the rack, or homosexuals are thrown off tall buildings, or planes are flown into them, or women are forced to continue unwanted pregnancies to term - the nasty truth is out. Such crimes are unlikely to be committed by moral subjectivists. It's the swivel-eyed nutters convinced of the truth of their moral opinions who are comfortable with persecuting and murdering others.

You are babbling with groundless opinions and straw-man[s].

Btw, who in the world can stop a moral subjectivist from committing all the crimes you stated above because to him it is pleasing [highest happiness] and of great benefits to his subjective self?