What could make morality objective?

[Immanuel Can]

A moral judgment/fact, to be objective, must be falsifiable and independent of judgment, belief or opinion.

Question: must a moral fact exist independent of man, or do you accept that some real things only exist within a context, or when certain conditions exist?

It can't mean "independent of man altogether," since moral judgments are things that, even if we assume they are objectively grounded in reality somehow, are only going to take place or be manifest within human minds.

The standard in bold is not right. A moral judgment can't be "independent of judgment, belief or opinion," because it IS a belief. So that's like saying "a painting must be independent of paint."

The medium in which the thing occurs cannot be arbitrarily excluded relevance, if what we're looking for is a feature of the medium itself. We're looking to justify a phenomenon in minds; so we can't ask that it not occur in a mind.

However, what's happened is your interlocutor has mixed up ontology with moral epistemology. The objective truths that justify the moral judgment might plausibly be independent of our minds; but the judgment that corresponds to, or reacts to, those objective truths cannot possibly be.

[henry quirk]

Please, Mannie, let Pete set and explain his standard.

[Peter Holmes]

Please, Mannie, let Pete set and explain his standard.

Okay. Again. Objectivity means independence from judgement, belief or opinion.

So, by definition, a judgement, belief or opinion can't be objective.

My argument is that all moral assertions express judgements, beliefs or opinions - so that they can't be objective, by definition.

[Skepdick]

Okay. Again. Objectivity means independence from judgement, belief or opinion.

That is an unsatisfiable definition. Even science doesn't define "objectivity" in that way.

So, by definition, a judgement, belief or opinion can't be objective.

By your definition facts don't exist. Everything humans say is an assertion.

Some assertions are deemed "accurate". Some assertions are deemed "inaccurate".

My argument is that all moral assertions express judgements, beliefs or opinions - so that they can't be objective, by definition.

The word "moral" is superfluous. If all assertions express judgements, beliefs or opinions and assertions is ALL that humans make, then It should be pertinently obvious to you that your definition of 'objectivity' is broken.

[henry quirk]

Please, Mannie, let Pete set and explain his standard.

Okay. Again. Objectivity means independence from judgement, belief or opinion.

So, by definition, a judgement, belief or opinion can't be objective.

My argument is that all moral assertions express judgements, beliefs or opinions - so that they can't be objective, by definition.

I got all that, Pete.

Can you answer my questions?

[henry quirk]

This...

what is it that moral objectivists claim about moral judgements that makes them objective - matters of fact, falsifiable and independent of judgement, belief or opinion?

...is your question, yeah?

And: embedded in the question is your standard, yeah?

A moral judgment/fact, to be objective, must be falsifiable and independent of judgment, belief or opinion.

Question: must a moral fact exist independent of man, or do you accept that some real things only exist within a context, or when certain conditions exist?

A stone, for example, exists independent of me and is independent of judgement, belief or opinion (uncertain where falsifiability fits in), but (my) hunger (an equally real biological event that occurs without judgement, belief or opinion) only exists in a certain context, that being me; or fire (another equally real event) that exists only in certain conditions, that being, colloquially, fuel, spark, and dry.

I want to pin down exactly what your measure is, what exactly you'll accept as evidence of objective morality.

Once I that, once we're both satisfied, I'll offer my argument.

[Peter Holmes]

Please, Mannie, let Pete set and explain his standard.

Okay. Again. Objectivity means independence from judgement, belief or opinion.

So, by definition, a judgement, belief or opinion can't be objective.

My argument is that all moral assertions express judgements, beliefs or opinions - so that they can't be objective, by definition.

I got all that, Pete.

Can you answer my questions?

Sorry - I missed the questions. Can you paste them here, or how far back are they in the discussion?

[henry quirk]

This...

what is it that moral objectivists claim about moral judgements that makes them objective - matters of fact, falsifiable and independent of judgement, belief or opinion?

...is your question, yeah?

And: embedded in the question is your standard, yeah?

A moral judgment/fact, to be objective, must be falsifiable and independent of judgment, belief or opinion.

Question: must a moral fact exist independent of man, or do you accept that some real things only exist within a context, or when certain conditions exist?

A stone, for example, exists independent of me and is independent of judgement, belief or opinion (uncertain where falsifiability fits in), but (my) hunger (an equally real biological event that occurs without judgement, belief or opinion) only exists in a certain context, that being me; or fire (another equally real event) that exists only in certain conditions, that being, colloquially, fuel, spark, and dry.

I want to pin down exactly what your measure is, what exactly you'll accept as evidence of objective morality.

Once I have that, once we're both satisfied, I'll offer my argument.

[henry quirk]

This...

what is it that moral objectivists claim about moral judgements that makes them objective - matters of fact, falsifiable and independent of judgement, belief or opinion?

...is your question, yeah?

And: embedded in the question is your standard, yeah?

A moral judgment/fact, to be objective, must be falsifiable and independent of judgment, belief or opinion.

Question: must a moral fact exist independent of man, or do you accept that some real things only exist within a context, or when certain conditions exist?

A stone, for example, exists independent of me and is independent of judgement, belief or opinion (uncertain where falsifiability fits in).

My hunger, however, (an equally real biological event that occurs without judgement, belief or opinion) only exists in a certain context, that being me.

And fire (another equally real event) exists only in certain conditions, that being, colloquially, fuel, spark, and dry.

I want to pin down exactly what your measure is, what exactly you'll accept as evidence of objective morality.

Once I have that, once we're both satisfied, I'll offer my argument.

[Peter Holmes]

This...

what is it that moral objectivists claim about moral judgements that makes them objective - matters of fact, falsifiable and independent of judgement, belief or opinion?

...is your question, yeah?

And: embedded in the question is your standard, yeah?

A moral judgment/fact, to be objective, must be falsifiable and independent of judgment, belief or opinion.

Question: must a moral fact exist independent of man, or do you accept that some real things only exist within a context, or when certain conditions exist?

A stone, for example, exists independent of me and is independent of judgement, belief or opinion (uncertain where falsifiability fits in), but (my) hunger (an equally real biological event that occurs without judgement, belief or opinion) only exists in a certain context, that being me; or fire (another equally real event) that exists only in certain conditions, that being, colloquially, fuel, spark, and dry.

I want to pin down exactly what your measure is, what exactly you'll accept as evidence of objective morality.

Once I that, once we're both satisfied, I'll offer my argument.

Okay. First, we use the word 'fact' in two completely different ways, to mean either a state-of-affairs, or a description of a state-of-affairs, which is typically a linguistic expression. Of those two things, only a description has a truth-value - true or false - given the way we use the signs involved.

Second, a factual assertion makes a claim about a state-of-affairs that may or may not be the case. The existence of the state-of-affairs is independent from opinion. For example, a stone or a fire may or may not exist. Believing they exist makes not the slightest difference. So the truth-value of a claim that they exist is independent from opinion. And though the case of your hunger is a little different, I think it's still a state-of-affairs that does or doesn't exist, even if only you can say which.

Our argument is about the status of moral right and wrong: are they states-of-affairs that exist independent from opinion? I think it's patently obvious that they aren't, so that moral assertions can't be objective, and so true or false, independent from opinion.

[surreptitious57]

If all assertions express judgements beliefs or opinions and assertions is ALL that humans make

They are not all that humans make as you know very well

Some assertions can be tested empirically using the scientific method
Some assertions can be tested logically using valid or sound arguments

Some assertions cannot be tested either empirically or logically at this point in time
Some assertions cannot be tested either empirically or logically at any point in time

[Immanuel Can]

So, by definition, a judgement, belief or opinion can't be objective.

My argument is that all moral assertions express judgements, beliefs or opinions - so that they can't be objective, by definition.

That's a bit of an amphiboly error there, Pete.

To say, "A judgment, by definition is made by a subject" is one thing.

To say, "That judgment is not premised on any facts or reality, and hence is dismissible" is quite different.

In the first case, a judgment may be 100% correct, and accurately correspond to the objective truth, while still being a person's judgment.

For example, I presume that in your judgment, the moon is not made of cheese. The fact that that judgment is being held in Pete's head does not argue for its being wrong, or merely gratuitous, or premised on no facts. There is something the moon is made out of, and if it's not cheese, then Pete's judgment is right.

The only question is, is there anything to "back" moral judgments? Because there is something that, objectively speaking, could back Pete's judgment about the moon. It's well-grounded, and objectively right.

What is Pete's confidence, then, that there's no possibility of such a thing as a well-grounded, objectively true moral judgment?

[henry quirk]

So: you do accept that real things can sometimes exist only in a certain context, or when certain conditions are in place, yeah?

Bear with me, Pete. Again, I want to pin down exactly what your standard is.

[Skepdick]

If all assertions express judgements beliefs or opinions and assertions is ALL that humans make

They are not all that humans make as you know very well

Some assertions can be tested empirically using the scientific method
Some assertions can be tested logically using valid or sound arguments

Some assertions cannot be tested either empirically or logically at this point in time
Some assertions cannot be tested either empirically or logically at any point in time

4 different kinds of assertions.

[Peter Holmes]

So, by definition, a judgement, belief or opinion can't be objective.

My argument is that all moral assertions express judgements, beliefs or opinions - so that they can't be objective, by definition.

That's a bit of an amphiboly error there, Pete.

To say, "A judgment, by definition is made by a subject" is one thing.

To say, "That judgment is not premised on any facts or reality, and hence is dismissible" is quite different.

In the first case, a judgment may be 100% correct, and accurately correspond to the objective truth, while still being a person's judgment.

For example, I presume that in your judgment, the moon is not made of cheese. The fact that that judgment is being held in Pete's head does not argue for its being wrong, or merely gratuitous, or premised on no facts. There is something the moon is made out of, and if it's not cheese, then Pete's judgment is right.

The only question is, is there anything to "back" moral judgments? Because there is something that, objectively speaking, could back Pete's judgment about the moon. It's well-grounded, and objectively right.

What is Pete's confidence, then, that there's no possibility of such a thing as a well-grounded, objectively true moral judgment?

To believe that the claim 'the moon is not made of cheese' is true is a matter of judgement or opinion. But the claim's truth-value is independent from judgement, because the moon, in fact, either is or is not made of cheese. That's what makes this an objective matter.

Now analyse the claim 'slavery is morally wrong' in the same way. To which fact does this refer?