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DNA & The Identity Crisis
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RaymondKeogh
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Re: DNA & The Identity Crisis
Science is subject to the limitations of logic and language. But to deal with these limitations in a sensible and pragmatic way, science often decides what it means by a term. Thus, the rules of the game are established. The question that is relevant here is: Can science define identity objectively based on measurable characteristics and the satisfaction of determined criteria?
Assume that person “A” maintains his/her genome (sum of all DNA sequences) without any change throughout life (the classical view). In this case sameness is maintained at all times or in all circumstances in the genome, even though, as we know, our chemical constituents (atoms, etc) are continually changing. In other words, “sameness” does not reside in the underlying constituent blocks themselves, but in the form and function of DNA sequences.
But what happens if one base pair (of the 3 billion that exist) changes? Then, surely, person “A” is not the same. Person “A” has become person “A1”. But where has “A” gone? Is “A” incorporated into “A1”?
If, in this case, “sameness” no longer resides in the form and function of DNA, where does it reside? We may return to the suggestion that “sameness” resides in memory, thinking, consciousness, ego or "sense" of self. But the problem of sleep or other forms of “unconsciousness” arises here. So, maybe it is fruitless to continue the discussion and time to yield to the view that we cannot be definite about who we are as persons.
On the other hand, is it not possible to derive—objectively—the characteristics of “sameness” within the person? It turns out that each individual genome is viable in the sense that it is able to survive as an entity. Once it can no longer survive for whatever reason—cancer, old age, accident etc, etc—then it no longer exists as an entity; it cannot even fight for its survival if it is not persisting as an entity.
We also know that continuity, individuality and uniqueness is maintained in the individual genome. By uniqueness is meant the sense of being different to any other individual genome in structure and function.
In summary, "sameness" resides in the viability, continuity, individuality and uniqueness of the genome. In this sense we do have an unchanging entity irrespective of all other changes wrought on it or within it. We move beyond the conundrum in the example (is “A” = or ≠ “A1”?). “A” continues to be “A” with respect to its innate characteristics.
It is now possible to begin testing the hypothesis in the real world by empirical observation (measurement). The difficult cases can be brought to the fore and analysed. The first difficulty is how to measure, with precision, 3 billion base pairs in one person and compare them with someone else who has roughly the same number? It is difficult, but technology is getting better (faster and more accurate). In the absence of a total count we rely on sampling and probability.
And probability reflects differences. For example, are “identical” twins identical? One study of a monozygotic twin pair estimated that differences occurred at the rate of 0.34×10−8 for twin I and 0.04×10−8 for twin II. Another study compared the genomes of 19 sets of adult “identical” twins. The results show that differences are such that the term “identical” twin is a misnomer.
Let us move onto a more difficult case: cloning. Clones are identical. It is claimed that human clones (moral or ethical moratoriums aside) would make the donor indistinguishable from its offspring, thus violating the condition that uniqueness is maintained in either the genome of the donor or the clone. In other words, both would have the same DNA sequences while maintaining viability, continuity and individuality. However, uniqueness would be contravened thus bringing us back to the metaphysical conundrum: are they not the same person?
However, the suggestion that human cloning would make the donor indistinguishable from its offspring is false. Clones are not identical. Even in a case in which the nuclei of both donor and clone are similar, DNA reacts in conjunction with the cellular fluid (cytoplasm) in which it is embedded, and which also includes mitochondrial DNA. Therefore, to be the same or function in a similar manner the nucleus of the clone would have to be introduced into the same host as that of the donor and act in precisely the same manner. Many discrepancies would arise as a result of epigenetic changes or gene expression (i.e. different genes being “turned on” or “off” in reaction to different environmental stimuli). Probability demonstrates that ongoing mutations would also occur (these might include base substitutions, deletions and/or insertions). As a result, even a clone of one’s self would different from the donor in that its subsequent development would never replicate the original.
But what about genetic engineering? Similar reactions as found in clones would be present in genetically engineered material and these may be greater given the artificial nature of the interventions.
I refer next to some points you made:
Q. Do I appeal to authority when I say: “We are free to think about ourselves in any way we like, within the bounds of objective reality as established by science”?
A. I appeal to empirical observations; is this authority?
Q. "The individual is itself and not something else" this is incoherent mumbo jumbo.
A. The definition of identity I use is the (older) Oxford English Dictionary definition (2nd edition, 1989): “The sameness of a person … at all times or in all circumstances; the condition or fact that a person … is itself and not something else.” The first part of the definition covers “sameness”; the second part, as I understand it, is to ensure that the person cannot be confused with another, thus violating uniqueness.
I am not sure what you mean by: “The human genome is relativistic”.
Fixation index is a measure of probabilities in populations; no contradiction with the above.
Finally, why bother with attempts to derive a scientific perspective on identity?
American political scientist and author Francis Fukuyama in his book "Identity", acknowledges that "identities can be and are incredibly varied, based on nation, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or gender." In fact, "… identity has a wide number of meanings today." Unfortunately, no one has been able to tie down—in precise terms—what exactly is meant by the term. Instead, according to James D. Fearon, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, academics rely on the supposition that: "… everyone knows how to use the word properly in everyday discourse …" This explains much of the confusion surrounding the term and all related interdependent expressions.
Professor of Sociology Rogers Brubaker and historian Frederick Cooper in Beyond ‘identity’ acknowledge that the term can be understood in many ways and in many different forms, depending on "… the context of its use and the theoretical tradition from which the use in question derives." Furthermore, these usages "... are not simply heterogeneous; they point in sharply differing directions." There is no polite way to describe the outcome: we are talking chaos here.
Perhaps we should dispense with the term altogether, as suggested by Brubaker and Cooper. Alternatively, we can face the challenge of seeking an objective definition of the term that would provide linguistic precision, simplification and standardisation of meaning.
Unfortunately, rather than being confined to the world of linguistics, semantics or the halls of academia, the problems associated with how the term is used, misused and abused are causing major negative effects in contemporary society leading to anxiety, ambiguity, confusion, social divisions and even civil unrest (e.g. cases caused by extreme viewpoints of “identity” politics). In the current issue of PN (Issue 136; p.29) Peter Benson states: “The politics of identity … can only multiply conflicts and divisions.”
Michael Lind, author of Land of Promise: An Economic History of the United States echoes these sentiments and goes as far as stating that unprecedented change is clearly visible in the nature of dominant human conflicts. During the 20th century these were ideological; now, in the 21st century, they are identity-driven. Lind concludes that "… the ideological wars are over and the age of the identity wars has arrived."
In his book The Lies that Bind: Rethinking Identity Kwame Anthony Appiah suggests that getting closer to the truth may not settle political questions but states: "… it can make our discussions more productive, more reasonable, even, perhaps, a little less antagonistic … Sensible discussions about matters that profoundly engage our passions are essential if we are to live together in concord."
The main objective of the quest for a scientifically based definition of identity concurs strongly with Appiah’s sentiments and aims to improve identity dialogue by clarifying the meaning of this widely used and utterly confused word.
With reference again to the current issue of PN, Steven Campbell-Harris has some relevant comments (p. 31): “We may … choose to stay in a state of detached perplexity, not seeking any resolution.” Or “… we may find that these conflicts prompt a quest for invention and a desire for new ways of viewing the world and ourselves.”
Personally, I see apparent contradictions as positive challenges and one of the greatest stimuli for new thinking. As such, I think that the identity conundrum demands our focused attention and some fresh perspectives.
Assume that person “A” maintains his/her genome (sum of all DNA sequences) without any change throughout life (the classical view). In this case sameness is maintained at all times or in all circumstances in the genome, even though, as we know, our chemical constituents (atoms, etc) are continually changing. In other words, “sameness” does not reside in the underlying constituent blocks themselves, but in the form and function of DNA sequences.
But what happens if one base pair (of the 3 billion that exist) changes? Then, surely, person “A” is not the same. Person “A” has become person “A1”. But where has “A” gone? Is “A” incorporated into “A1”?
If, in this case, “sameness” no longer resides in the form and function of DNA, where does it reside? We may return to the suggestion that “sameness” resides in memory, thinking, consciousness, ego or "sense" of self. But the problem of sleep or other forms of “unconsciousness” arises here. So, maybe it is fruitless to continue the discussion and time to yield to the view that we cannot be definite about who we are as persons.
On the other hand, is it not possible to derive—objectively—the characteristics of “sameness” within the person? It turns out that each individual genome is viable in the sense that it is able to survive as an entity. Once it can no longer survive for whatever reason—cancer, old age, accident etc, etc—then it no longer exists as an entity; it cannot even fight for its survival if it is not persisting as an entity.
We also know that continuity, individuality and uniqueness is maintained in the individual genome. By uniqueness is meant the sense of being different to any other individual genome in structure and function.
In summary, "sameness" resides in the viability, continuity, individuality and uniqueness of the genome. In this sense we do have an unchanging entity irrespective of all other changes wrought on it or within it. We move beyond the conundrum in the example (is “A” = or ≠ “A1”?). “A” continues to be “A” with respect to its innate characteristics.
It is now possible to begin testing the hypothesis in the real world by empirical observation (measurement). The difficult cases can be brought to the fore and analysed. The first difficulty is how to measure, with precision, 3 billion base pairs in one person and compare them with someone else who has roughly the same number? It is difficult, but technology is getting better (faster and more accurate). In the absence of a total count we rely on sampling and probability.
And probability reflects differences. For example, are “identical” twins identical? One study of a monozygotic twin pair estimated that differences occurred at the rate of 0.34×10−8 for twin I and 0.04×10−8 for twin II. Another study compared the genomes of 19 sets of adult “identical” twins. The results show that differences are such that the term “identical” twin is a misnomer.
Let us move onto a more difficult case: cloning. Clones are identical. It is claimed that human clones (moral or ethical moratoriums aside) would make the donor indistinguishable from its offspring, thus violating the condition that uniqueness is maintained in either the genome of the donor or the clone. In other words, both would have the same DNA sequences while maintaining viability, continuity and individuality. However, uniqueness would be contravened thus bringing us back to the metaphysical conundrum: are they not the same person?
However, the suggestion that human cloning would make the donor indistinguishable from its offspring is false. Clones are not identical. Even in a case in which the nuclei of both donor and clone are similar, DNA reacts in conjunction with the cellular fluid (cytoplasm) in which it is embedded, and which also includes mitochondrial DNA. Therefore, to be the same or function in a similar manner the nucleus of the clone would have to be introduced into the same host as that of the donor and act in precisely the same manner. Many discrepancies would arise as a result of epigenetic changes or gene expression (i.e. different genes being “turned on” or “off” in reaction to different environmental stimuli). Probability demonstrates that ongoing mutations would also occur (these might include base substitutions, deletions and/or insertions). As a result, even a clone of one’s self would different from the donor in that its subsequent development would never replicate the original.
But what about genetic engineering? Similar reactions as found in clones would be present in genetically engineered material and these may be greater given the artificial nature of the interventions.
I refer next to some points you made:
Q. Do I appeal to authority when I say: “We are free to think about ourselves in any way we like, within the bounds of objective reality as established by science”?
A. I appeal to empirical observations; is this authority?
Q. "The individual is itself and not something else" this is incoherent mumbo jumbo.
A. The definition of identity I use is the (older) Oxford English Dictionary definition (2nd edition, 1989): “The sameness of a person … at all times or in all circumstances; the condition or fact that a person … is itself and not something else.” The first part of the definition covers “sameness”; the second part, as I understand it, is to ensure that the person cannot be confused with another, thus violating uniqueness.
I am not sure what you mean by: “The human genome is relativistic”.
Fixation index is a measure of probabilities in populations; no contradiction with the above.
Finally, why bother with attempts to derive a scientific perspective on identity?
American political scientist and author Francis Fukuyama in his book "Identity", acknowledges that "identities can be and are incredibly varied, based on nation, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or gender." In fact, "… identity has a wide number of meanings today." Unfortunately, no one has been able to tie down—in precise terms—what exactly is meant by the term. Instead, according to James D. Fearon, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, academics rely on the supposition that: "… everyone knows how to use the word properly in everyday discourse …" This explains much of the confusion surrounding the term and all related interdependent expressions.
Professor of Sociology Rogers Brubaker and historian Frederick Cooper in Beyond ‘identity’ acknowledge that the term can be understood in many ways and in many different forms, depending on "… the context of its use and the theoretical tradition from which the use in question derives." Furthermore, these usages "... are not simply heterogeneous; they point in sharply differing directions." There is no polite way to describe the outcome: we are talking chaos here.
Perhaps we should dispense with the term altogether, as suggested by Brubaker and Cooper. Alternatively, we can face the challenge of seeking an objective definition of the term that would provide linguistic precision, simplification and standardisation of meaning.
Unfortunately, rather than being confined to the world of linguistics, semantics or the halls of academia, the problems associated with how the term is used, misused and abused are causing major negative effects in contemporary society leading to anxiety, ambiguity, confusion, social divisions and even civil unrest (e.g. cases caused by extreme viewpoints of “identity” politics). In the current issue of PN (Issue 136; p.29) Peter Benson states: “The politics of identity … can only multiply conflicts and divisions.”
Michael Lind, author of Land of Promise: An Economic History of the United States echoes these sentiments and goes as far as stating that unprecedented change is clearly visible in the nature of dominant human conflicts. During the 20th century these were ideological; now, in the 21st century, they are identity-driven. Lind concludes that "… the ideological wars are over and the age of the identity wars has arrived."
In his book The Lies that Bind: Rethinking Identity Kwame Anthony Appiah suggests that getting closer to the truth may not settle political questions but states: "… it can make our discussions more productive, more reasonable, even, perhaps, a little less antagonistic … Sensible discussions about matters that profoundly engage our passions are essential if we are to live together in concord."
The main objective of the quest for a scientifically based definition of identity concurs strongly with Appiah’s sentiments and aims to improve identity dialogue by clarifying the meaning of this widely used and utterly confused word.
With reference again to the current issue of PN, Steven Campbell-Harris has some relevant comments (p. 31): “We may … choose to stay in a state of detached perplexity, not seeking any resolution.” Or “… we may find that these conflicts prompt a quest for invention and a desire for new ways of viewing the world and ourselves.”
Personally, I see apparent contradictions as positive challenges and one of the greatest stimuli for new thinking. As such, I think that the identity conundrum demands our focused attention and some fresh perspectives.
Re: DNA & The Identity Crisis
The article of the magazine talks about an entirely different issue.Skepdick wrote: ↑Wed Aug 21, 2019 12:01 am Science shits all over Raymond's idea.
https://www.quantamagazine.org/new-turm ... -20190423/
Re: DNA & The Identity Crisis
Can you not join the dots yourself?Sculptor wrote: ↑Tue Feb 11, 2020 9:46 pmThe article of the magazine talks about an entirely different issue.Skepdick wrote: ↑Wed Aug 21, 2019 12:01 am Science shits all over Raymond's idea.
https://www.quantamagazine.org/new-turm ... -20190423/
The "identity crisis" is looking for an answer to the question "who am I? What am I?".
It's about grounding and defining the human essence. It just turns out that knowing about DNA tells us a whole lot about the human body's biology.
It's incredibly useful to medical research and helping society, unfortunately it that was never the answer we were looking for. But hey? At least DNA could explain certain behaviours and pre-dispositions. Only... it can't. Not reliably anyway.
At some point everybody clicks that "define human" is a hard ask. Nobody has good answers - you either get comfortable with it, or you don't.
The answer we are looking for isn't science - the answer is not extrinsic. It's introspection and emotional intelligence. Know thyself.
In the words of Feynman: I am not afraid not knowing.
Re: DNA & The Identity Crisis
The question is about whether DNA is a valid metric of identity. The article is about the deterministic qualities of DNA.Skepdick wrote: ↑Tue Feb 11, 2020 10:14 pmCan you not join the dots yourself?Sculptor wrote: ↑Tue Feb 11, 2020 9:46 pmThe article of the magazine talks about an entirely different issue.Skepdick wrote: ↑Wed Aug 21, 2019 12:01 am Science shits all over Raymond's idea.
https://www.quantamagazine.org/new-turm ... -20190423/
Identity is an issue that predates DNA, and any understanding of evolution or the details of heredity. Identity has many strands, and the PN case has nothing to do with the article you posted.
If you want to be taken seriously and "join up some dots" you are better off avoiding the sort of absurd outburst of hyperbole where you think one disconnected article blows another out of the water despite not even addressing the same issue.
Re: DNA & The Identity Crisis
Identity is a metaphysical concern - it's abstract! DNA is not.
What kind of questions would a "valid metric of identity" be able to answer for us?
What answers are you looking for?
I understand that. What scientific models predict is phenomena - behaviours, traits, biology. Stuff about our bodies. It's all quantitative.
They tell us NOTHING about human emotion, experience, love. Why we feel, what we feel - all the qualitative things. And I am pretty sure, that in pursuing the question of identity we want qualitative answers.
Being told that I am a sophisticated biological machine built out of the fundamental particles of physics, with heritage spanning all the way back to a chimpanzee in Africa - not interesting.
You literally just said that the PN article is about the deterministic qualities of DNA.Sculptor wrote: ↑Tue Feb 11, 2020 10:33 pm Identity is an issue that predates DNA, and any understanding of evolution or the details of heredity. Identity has many strands, and the PN case has nothing to do with the article you posted. If you want to be taken seriously and "join up some dots" you are better off avoiding the sort of absurd outburst of hyperbole where you think one disconnected article blows another out of the water despite not even addressing the same issue.
And I am having to point out to you that the article I posted is about the poor predictive power (lack of determinism!!!) of DNA outside of a handful of specific domains.
Perhaps you really don't understand the issues at hand? Not as well as you think you do anyway.
If you are looking to evolution the best answer you are going to get is "who we were and where we come from". Won't tell us where we are going.
I come from the Big Bang - that answer works for me.
Re: DNA & The Identity Crisis
You have a serious problem of relevance dysphoriaSkepdick wrote: ↑Tue Feb 11, 2020 11:03 pmIdentity is a metaphysical concern - it's abstract! DNA is not.
What kind of questions would a "valid metric of identity" be able to answer for us?
What answers are you looking for?
I understand that. What scientific models predict is phenomena - behaviours, traits, biology. Stuff about our bodies. It's all quantitative.
They tell us NOTHING about human emotion, experience, love. Why we feel, what we feel - all the qualitative things. And I am pretty sure, that in pursuing the question of identity we want qualitative answers.
Being told that I am a sophisticated biological machine built out of the fundamental particles of physics, with heritage spanning all the way back to a chimpanzee in Africa - not interesting.
You literally just said that the PN article is about the deterministic qualities of DNA.Sculptor wrote: ↑Tue Feb 11, 2020 10:33 pm Identity is an issue that predates DNA, and any understanding of evolution or the details of heredity. Identity has many strands, and the PN case has nothing to do with the article you posted. If you want to be taken seriously and "join up some dots" you are better off avoiding the sort of absurd outburst of hyperbole where you think one disconnected article blows another out of the water despite not even addressing the same issue.
And I am having to point out to you that the article I posted is about the poor predictive power (lack of determinism!!!) of DNA outside of a handful of specific domains.
Perhaps you really don't understand the issues at hand? Not as well as you think you do anyway.
If you are looking to evolution the best answer you are going to get is "who we were and where we come from". Won't tell us where we are going.
I come from the Big Bang - that answer works for me.