There is no emergence

[Skepdick]

No, if the demonstration was based on computers as we understand them, it would be demonstrating a Chinese Room.

If the test was double-blind you wouldn't be able to tell.

Exactly like I am unable to tell whether you are a Chinese Room or a real consciousness. Right now.

It's a challenging context. I'd express it as we know consciousness is a thing, but we can't locate it.

Maybe not precisely, but at the very least I thought we are agreeing that 'consciousness' is somewhere between your ears and in your skull.

We can't think of a way of stating why others must be conscious, yet I do think its a waste of time to pretend they are not. Our own consciousness is undeniable. rather than assumed. It has to be expressed as an assumption, but that's different matter.

Undeniable to whom? If that's the game we decide to play, you can't prove to me that you aren't just a Chinese Room.

Which I think means the ontology is pointless to doubt, but the epistemology - how we say we know of its existence - is the problem.

Uhuh And epistemology brings with itself the unsolved problem of criterion. Is A = А?

I don't have much to say to that. With the current level of knowledge, its a bit like asking the Wright Brothers "how are you going to get to Alpha Centauri in that contraption?" All I'm really saying is I'm comfortable with the idea that many animals have consciousness. I think that's more to observe that, indeed, we are looking at a feature that is probably shared in a more rudimentary form by those animals - and not restricted to humans, which I believe is what Descartes contended.

No. It's nothing like that - the Wright Brothers metaphor is unnecessary. If you already believe that "many animals animals have consciousness", I am simply asking you whether you believe the earth worm is one of the animals have consciousness. It's question with a binary answer.

But as to where the boundary might be, I've no idea.

Then why would you say that "many animals have consciousness", and not "ALL animals have consciousness"?

[bahman]

Why do you ask?

This is my basic premise. So we have to see if we can agree upon.

What is the "this" of the first sentence? What premise?
You second sentence is a fragment. Agree upon what?

I use "the premise" to show that there is no emergence, the premise being "everything has an explanation". Let me know if you have a problem with the premise.

[Sculptor]

This is my basic premise. So we have to see if we can agree upon.

What is the "this" of the first sentence? What premise?
You second sentence is a fragment. Agree upon what?

I use "the premise" to show that there is no emergence, the premise being "everything has an explanation". Let me know if you have a problem with the premise.

Your premise is false as you do not understand what emergence means - as I explained to you above.
Would you like me to repeat that?
eg.
Sweetness is an emergent quality of Hydrogen, Oxygen and Carbon.
That this can be explained is not relevant, since a lack of explanation is not a criterion of emergence.

PS: my earlier post offered what you did not - a definition.

3. In philosophy, systems theory, science, and art, emergence occurs when an entity is observed to have properties its parts do not have on their own.

It does not take much imagination to supply valid examples of these versions of emergence.
The other example I used was DNA.
But Using Hydrogen, Oxygen, and Nitrogen. You can get petrol, sugar, and a massive list of other organic chemicals all with different emergent properties; explosiveness, sweetness, a range of colours, and textures, whereby NONE of the constituent molecules alone have these qualities; some explicable more or less, some not at all.

But since emergence has nothing to do with explicability your main objection is false.

[bahman]

What is the "this" of the first sentence? What premise?
You second sentence is a fragment. Agree upon what?

I use "the premise" to show that there is no emergence, the premise being "everything has an explanation". Let me know if you have a problem with the premise.

Your premise is false as you do not understand what emergence means - as I explained to you above.
Would you like me to repeat that?
eg.
Sweetness is an emergent quality of Hydrogen, Oxygen and Carbon.
That this can be explained is not relevant, since a lack of explanation is not a criterion of emergence.

So you think that there is no explanation for sweetness. If it is so then why always a part of your brain which is related to sweetness becomes active.
Color, for example, is not a property of objects we experience. That is true because sentient beings do not share the same experience of things, the snake can see infrared and we can't.

[PTH]

No, if the demonstration was based on computers as we understand them, it would be demonstrating a Chinese Room.

If the test was double-blind you wouldn't be able to tell.

But what the issue hinges on, for me, is the explanation of what's in the box. The double-blind test might tell me a Chinese Room had successfully simulated the outputs of a mind. But that's all.

I do feel a need to remind ourselves that we don't have actual machines that people have made, capable of simulating consciousness.

It's a challenging context. I'd express it as we know consciousness is a thing, but we can't locate it.

Maybe not precisely, but at the very least I thought we are agreeing that 'consciousness' is somewhere between your ears and in your skull.

Just to confirm, I strongly suspect that's the case! What I mean is no-one, that I'm aware of, can locate the mechanism.

We can't think of a way of stating why others must be conscious, yet I do think its a waste of time to pretend they are not. Our own consciousness is undeniable. rather than assumed. It has to be expressed as an assumption, but that's different matter.

Undeniable to whom? If that's the game we decide to play, you can't prove to me that you aren't just a Chinese Room.

Oh, strictly its just our own consciousness that is undeniable. But I wouldn't spend time debating these topics if I thought you were a Chinese Room. That's my proof that I accept the existence of other minds.

Which I think means the ontology is pointless to doubt, but the epistemology - how we say we know of its existence - is the problem.

Uhuh And epistemology brings with itself the unsolved problem of criterion. Is A = А?

I don't have much to say to that. With the current level of knowledge, its a bit like asking the Wright Brothers "how are you going to get to Alpha Centauri in that contraption?" All I'm really saying is I'm comfortable with the idea that many animals have consciousness. I think that's more to observe that, indeed, we are looking at a feature that is probably shared in a more rudimentary form by those animals - and not restricted to humans, which I believe is what Descartes contended.

No. It's nothing like that - the Wright Brothers metaphor is unnecessary. If you already believe that "many animals animals have consciousness", I am simply asking you whether you believe the earth worm is one of the animals have consciousness. It's question with a binary answer.

But as to where the boundary might be, I've no idea.

Then why would you say that "many animals have consciousness", and not "ALL animals have consciousness"?

Perhaps wrongly. I'm taking these points to all be around the space of establishing some feature that distinguishes consciousness, to get to that point of saying "so if we have a Chinese Room that does X, we agree its conscious". So if I say cats are in because they purr, and worms are out because they only wriggle, we can conclude that a Chinese Room that purrs in the right context is conscious.

Unfortunately, I'm still stuck with the Wright Brothers trying to get this thing to stay in the air for twelve seconds. I don't have a solid basis for drawing a line. So all I'm really saying is I don't expect consciousness is restricted to humans. In principle, that means I'm at least open to the idea that consciousness could occur in different physical contexts - maybe even artificial contexts.

Now, I do expect that for science to do its trick, we'd need to be able to point to the basic thing or feature that separates the conscious from the not-conscious. We don't yet have that.

[Sculptor]

I use "the premise" to show that there is no emergence, the premise being "everything has an explanation". Let me know if you have a problem with the premise.

Your premise is false as you do not understand what emergence means - as I explained to you above.
Would you like me to repeat that?
eg.
Sweetness is an emergent quality of Hydrogen, Oxygen and Carbon.
That this can be explained is not relevant, since a lack of explanation is not a criterion of emergence.

So you think that there is no explanation for sweetness. If it is so then why always a part of your brain which is related to sweetness becomes active.
Color, for example, is not a property of objects we experience. That is true because sentient beings do not share the same experience of things, the snake can see infrared and we can't.

You are being irrelevant. Do you even know what emergence is? Worst still you are making MY case FOR emergence, and have failed to make your own.

Explain how Carbon hydrogen and oxygen emerge as SWEET when in a specific combination

[seeds]

In other words, where’s the epiphenomenal correlation between the objectively-based “gears” of the engine and that of the subjectively-based “behavior” of a self-aware entity/agent (the “dreamer”) that seems to exist within the inner context of its own autonomous dimension of reality that we call a “mind”?

I might be responding to a different point to the one you intend, but for me I think those points raise that traditional mind-body problem.

I think the mind-body problem arises in pretty much any discussion regarding consciousness.

However, in this instance, we are discussing your suggestion that the presence and actions of consciousness should be directly relatable (dependent upon/traceable) to the movements of the “levers and gears” of the Difference Engine.

Therefore, if you can figure out how any particular lever of the Engine could be directly responsible,...

(in a purely deterministic way)

...not only for the very existence of a “conscious dreamer” to begin with, but especially for her personal landscaping and design decisions as she forms her dream substances into a tropical island paradise where she is lying on a beach, as opposed to her creating a cityscape where she is shopping for a new dress...

...then I am all ears.

To me, it would be the metaphorical equivalent of trying to figure out how something that is occurring within our universe is somehow responsible for the interior behavior of another universe that has branched-off of ours (as per Everett’s Many Worlds Theory) wherein any correlation would be utterly (and literally) impossible to establish.

Now, I do get you are suggesting that a spiritual or mental dimension might be present in every physical thing. That would be different to saying there's a mental world, and a physical world, and they link up through the pineal gland.

First of all, I really don’t have any opinion on the role of the pineal gland.

And secondly, I am an idealist, and it is idealism that asserts that all of reality (both objective and subjective) is mental in nature.

Indeed, from the perspective of my own particular brand of idealism, I view the material features of the universe as being constructed from an extremely advanced and ordered version of the same fundamental substance that forms our thoughts and dreams.

And as such, I believe that even the most inanimate structures of the universe (i.e., suns, planets, moons, asteroids, rocks, etc.) are literally alive*...

...*(note: not conscious or self-aware; just imbued with a ubiquitous and universal essence of life in the same way that our own thoughts and dreams are imbued with our own personal life essence).

And that brings us back to the topic of this thread and to why I keep suggesting that the very way in which brains are structured, somehow allows them to summon-forth the essence of life that is already present within the fabric of their being, and then trigger that essence into awakening into a new individualization of personal, self-aware consciousness.

Now, of course, I could be wrong about all of that, but to me, that whole process represents the perfect example of what the word “emergence” is all about.

It could even explain “abiogenesis.”

Because if the fabric of reality is already alive, then it is simply a tiny little step in accepting how “inanimate” (yet living) matter could become “animate” matter in the form of evolvable micro organisms.
_______

[PTH]

However, in this instance, we are discussing your suggestion that the presence and actions of consciousness should be directly relatable (dependent upon/traceable) to the movements of the “levers and gears” of the Difference Engine.

Therefore, if you can figure out how any particular lever of the Engine could be directly responsible,...

(in a purely deterministic way)

...not only for the very existence of a “conscious dreamer” to begin with, but especially for her personal landscaping and design decisions as she forms her dream substances into a tropical island paradise where she is lying on a beach, as opposed to her creating a cityscape where she is shopping for a new dress...

...then I am all ears.

To me, it would be the metaphorical equivalent of trying to figure out how something that is occurring within our universe is somehow responsible for the interior behavior of another universe that has branched-off of ours (as per Everett’s Many Worlds Theory) wherein any correlation would be utterly (and literally) impossible to establish.

I don't actually think our perspective is that different, while we might be coming at it from different directions. I am trying to avoid any dogmatic statement, which may make it look like I'm saying more than I mean!

If I was speaking plainly, I'd say that I expect a Difference Engine could not be conscious. But that would be to rule out the possibility that consciousness could exist in some other medium, which I don't feel we can be dogmatic about if we can't adequate account or explain the concept.

For me, the example of the Difference Engine helps illuminate why the computers that we have cannot be conscious. Because, absolutely, no matter what response we get from it, we can exhaustively explain by reference to the gears. No scope or ambiguity to allow for some external direction.

With the human mind, there's a slightly different situation. Someone reflects on a tropical island - whether a real or imagined experience. We might be able to point to some correlation between that persons brain activity, and thinking about a tropical island. But we can't account for it, in any real sense.

If a Difference Engine said to us "I'm thinking about a tropical island", we can exhaustively point to the sequence of gears that put those letters together, and outputted them in whatever form. And we'd notice that at no time did the Difference Engine need to reflect on a tropical island.

So, just to be clear, I'm not particularly saying I expect a Difference Engine determines mental states. I'm more saying that if someone contended that a Difference Engine was conscious they could only be contending that this was an epiphenomenal consciousness, as there's no ambiguity on the physical side of things.

Because if the fabric of reality is already alive, then it is simply a tiny little step in accepting how “inanimate” (yet living) matter could become “animate” matter in the form of evolvable micro organisms.

In one sense, who's to know. I don't think there's a particular problem in identifying the ways things could be.

The issue, for me, is more finding a way of narrowing the field. I don't go with idealism, as if thoughts and the world were the same thing I'd expect that occasionally we'd bump into invisible objects that everyone else was convinced existed, or alternatively we'd sometimes see other folk walking through objects that we were convinced are solid.

[Skepdick]

No, if the demonstration was based on computers as we understand them, it would be demonstrating a Chinese Room.

If the test was double-blind you wouldn't be able to tell.

But what the issue hinges on, for me, is the explanation of what's in the box. The double-blind test might tell me a Chinese Room had successfully simulated the outputs of a mind. But that's all.

I do feel a need to remind ourselves that we don't have actual machines that people have made, capable of simulating consciousness.

It's a challenging context. I'd express it as we know consciousness is a thing, but we can't locate it.

Maybe not precisely, but at the very least I thought we are agreeing that 'consciousness' is somewhere between your ears and in your skull.

Just to confirm, I strongly suspect that's the case! What I mean is no-one, that I'm aware of, can locate the mechanism.

We can't think of a way of stating why others must be conscious, yet I do think its a waste of time to pretend they are not. Our own consciousness is undeniable. rather than assumed. It has to be expressed as an assumption, but that's different matter.

Undeniable to whom? If that's the game we decide to play, you can't prove to me that you aren't just a Chinese Room.

Oh, strictly its just our own consciousness that is undeniable. But I wouldn't spend time debating these topics if I thought you were a Chinese Room. That's my proof that I accept the existence of other minds.

Which I think means the ontology is pointless to doubt, but the epistemology - how we say we know of its existence - is the problem.

Uhuh And epistemology brings with itself the unsolved problem of criterion. Is A = А?

I don't have much to say to that. With the current level of knowledge, its a bit like asking the Wright Brothers "how are you going to get to Alpha Centauri in that contraption?" All I'm really saying is I'm comfortable with the idea that many animals have consciousness. I think that's more to observe that, indeed, we are looking at a feature that is probably shared in a more rudimentary form by those animals - and not restricted to humans, which I believe is what Descartes contended.

No. It's nothing like that - the Wright Brothers metaphor is unnecessary. If you already believe that "many animals animals have consciousness", I am simply asking you whether you believe the earth worm is one of the animals have consciousness. It's question with a binary answer.

But as to where the boundary might be, I've no idea.

Then why would you say that "many animals have consciousness", and not "ALL animals have consciousness"?

Perhaps wrongly. I'm taking these points to all be around the space of establishing some feature that distinguishes consciousness, to get to that point of saying "so if we have a Chinese Room that does X, we agree its conscious". So if I say cats are in because they purr, and worms are out because they only wriggle, we can conclude that a Chinese Room that purrs in the right context is conscious.

Unfortunately, I'm still stuck with the Wright Brothers trying to get this thing to stay in the air for twelve seconds. I don't have a solid basis for drawing a line. So all I'm really saying is I don't expect consciousness is restricted to humans. In principle, that means I'm at least open to the idea that consciousness could occur in different physical contexts - maybe even artificial contexts.

Now, I do expect that for science to do its trick, we'd need to be able to point to the basic thing or feature that separates the conscious from the not-conscious. We don't yet have that.

I fear your misunderstanding on the issues at hand are deeply epistemic and stems from the dualistic nature of your philosophy.

Particularly of your failure to understand that the "inside the box", "outside the box" and even the box itself are just perspectives.

Ultimately - what's inside the box is the same thing that's outside the box, and is the same thing the box is made of. And it's the same thing the observer of the box is made of. Matter. Leptons. Quarks. Electrons. Energy. Information.
But I think this is where our philosophical difference lie. I subscribe to a digital philosophy. Bits are physical entities. Information is a physical thing.

A "difference engine" can be made out of any matter. A difference engine needs not be made out of gears. A difference engine can be made out of water, or silicon, or photons, proteins, or any physical substance whatsoever that can act in a semi or fully-deterministic fashion "Difference engines" (e.g computers) manipulate matter. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m5WodTppevo

Your conception of it as being "just mechanical gears" is perhaps limiting your imagination? Computers/difference engines are made out of the same building blocks you and I are made of. The distinctions between a "real consciousness" and a "mechanical consciousness" are just differences between form, function and configuration, but not composition, and so "What is inside the Chinese Room?" is far less interesting question than "How are the contents of the Chinese Room arranged?"

And if your standard rebuttal to this is the mind-body dualism, the standard rebuttal to your rebuttal is the explanatory gap itself.

You can't argue for mind-body dualism, while also demanding explanations of consciousness, while also ignoring that the mind-body dualism fails to explain mind–body interaction and mental causation.

The "explanatory gap" is self-defeating. Either we can re-create consciousness (in which case we can also "explain" it) or we can't. The only way to answer the question is to keep trying until we succeed.

Now, I do expect that for science to do its trick, we'd need to be able to point to the basic thing or feature that separates the conscious from the not-conscious. We don't yet have that.

For one, that's an extremely reductionist perspective. To expect science to point at that "basic thing" is to pre-suppose that consciousness is atomic and that it can be arrived at via reduction like quarks, leptons, photons etc.

Secondly. It's fallacious as it begs a bunch of questions. What if consciousness is not a "fundamental particle"? What if consciousness cannot be arrived at by reduction? What if consciousness is a function, not a feature of matter? What if consciousness is emergent?

To seek a "basic" feature of consciousness, is to ignore the possibility that consciousness may not be "basic" at all. Marvin Minsky called this "mistaking the complex for the simple".

[PTH]

Your conception of it as being "just mechanical gears" is perhaps limiting your imagination? Computers/difference engines are made out of the same building blocks you and I are made of. The distinctions between a "real consciousness" and a "mechanical consciousness" are just differences between form, function and configuration, but not composition, and so "What is inside the Chinese Room?" is far less interesting question than "How are the contents of the Chinese Room arranged?"

Just to be clear, I'm not especially suggesting that computers can't be made in different ways. But the example of a Babbage-style Difference Engine, where it is clear that any output is a product of a purely mechanical process, is very useful in highlighting the point that can be made about any similar apparatus.

Beyond that, you're unfortunately back to assuming what needs to be investigated. Yes, we can agree that all of physical reality must be made of the same basic stuff. But, if we cycled through a few more posts, we'd probably equally get to agreeing that reality isn't just one big blob of stuff.

I don't think that's necessary to talk meaningfully about whether particular things are conscious. Unless you are joining Seeds in contending that its all conscious - we're atoms in Teilhard de Chardin's cosmic consciousness, or such.

A constant feature of philosophical deliberation is that the subject matter disintegrates in our hands, if we want it to.

You can't argue for mind-body dualism, while also demanding explanations of consciousness, while also ignoring that the mind-body dualism fails to explain mind–body interaction and mental causation.

Well, the philosophy of mind is usually a romp around a couple of seemingly intractable problems. Dualism can't account for how mental activity influences a closed physical world. Monism can't account for the fact that things mean something.

The "explanatory gap" is self-defeating. Either we can re-create consciousness (in which case we can also "explain" it) or we can't. The only way to answer the question is to keep trying until we succeed.

Indeed, a strong part of it is noticing what consciousnesses do, and seeing if we can figure out how they do it.

What if consciousness is not a "fundamental particle"? What if consciousness cannot be arrived at by reduction? What if consciousness is a function, not a feature of matter? What if consciousness is emergent?

If I recall correctly, this is where I came in.

I think, for the idea you are expressing, "emergence" is the wrong term. Because, like the example of flight, to say consciousness is emergent should mean we can understand how its components combine to generate it. If all we mean is that consciousness could be emergent, we're just adding to the lengthy list of possibilities that can't be eliminated.

When you say "emergence", what you mean is you think it is "a mystery". I suspect "mystery" is a word you want to avoid, but I may be wrong in that suspicion.

Have you a reluctance to say that consciousness is a mystery, in a way that flight isn't?

[Skepdick]

Just to be clear, I'm not especially suggesting that computers can't be made in different ways. But the example of a Babbage-style Difference Engine, where it is clear that any output is a product of a purely mechanical process, is very useful in highlighting the point that can be made about any similar apparatus.

When you say "purely mechanical process" you are implying that there are any other kinds of processes?
What exactly is a non-mechanical process in a world of causality and interactions?

Could you perhaps offer an example of one such process?

Beyond that, you're unfortunately back to assuming what needs to be investigated. Yes, we can agree that all of physical reality must be made of the same basic stuff. But, if we cycled through a few more posts, we'd probably equally get to agreeing that reality isn't just one big blob of stuff.

Whether you view reality as "one blob" or "billions of basic parts interacting" is purely a function of scale/complexity and perspective!
Viewing reality as "many small things" is the reductionist perspective. It is very VERY complex.
Viewing reality as "one big blob" is the holistic perspective. it is very VERY simple, but it is a necessary perspective before you begin chopping up reality into chunks of time.

Consciousness is less complex than a reductionist perspective of reality.
Consciousness is more complex than a holistic view of reality.

But even more to the point of the OP.

From a holistic perspective - physics is a reductive perspective on The Universe.
From a reductionist perspective - The Universe is a holistic perspective on physics.

This is the view of all complexity theorists. Reductionism and Holism are two sides of the same coin!

I don't think that's necessary to talk meaningfully about whether particular things are conscious. Unless you are joining Seeds in contending that its all conscious - we're atoms in Teilhard de Chardin's cosmic consciousness, or such.

False dichotomy. The question is, and always will be "Who decides that PTH is conscious and how?".
I am using "who" to imply a human other than you. Whoever and however decides on your consciousness, they will still have to decide into 3 different bins:

A. PTH is certainly conscious.
B. PTH is certainly not conscious
C. It cannot be decided whether PTH is conscious or not.

I think it is obvious to everybody that the decision of whether PTH is conscious can be made at this very moment!
Even if we don't know WHAT consciousness is.
Even if we don't know HOW consciousness works.
Even if we don't know HOW we are making that decision.
Even if we are unable to explain what goes on in our heads in order to make that decision.

Man is the measure of all things! Man is the source of all judgments.

Well, the philosophy of mind is usually a romp around a couple of seemingly intractable problems. Dualism can't account for how mental activity influences a closed physical world.

Just to be sure, you and I mean the same thing by "intractable". In computational complexity theory "intractable" means that there is a theoretical solution to a problem, but not a practical one. Due to limited resources (time, money, energy, matter.) etc...

Monism can't account for the fact that things mean something.

A nihilistic view on Monism fixes that. This place, this universe - it means nothing whatsoever. It means whatever meaning or value you ascribe to it.

Indeed, a strong part of it is noticing what consciousnesses do, and seeing if we can figure out how they do it.

And to this end it's important to observe that we never really ask (or answer) the question "What is consciousness?".
We only re-create it.

I think, for the idea you are expressing, "emergence" is the wrong term. Because, like the example of flight, to say consciousness is emergent should mean we can understand how its components combine to generate it. If all we mean is that consciousness could be emergent, we're just adding to the lengthy list of possibilities that can't be eliminated.

When you say "emergence", what you mean is you think it is "a mystery". I suspect "mystery" is a word you want to avoid, but I may be wrong in that suspicion.

I am using "emergence" in exactly the same sense any complexity theorist would use it. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
The system (as a whole) can do things that any of its individual parts cannot.

Consciousness (as a whole) can do things that quarks, leptons, electrons and photons cannot do on their own.

Have you a reluctance to say that consciousness is a mystery, in a way that flight isn't?

Why do you keep defaulting to such trivial analogies? Hind-sight is always 20/20!

Pretend that we are in the 1300s.

Would you have said that "consciousness" is a mystery in exactly the same way "flight" is a mystery?

If you are going to argue for, or against a position - choose a prospective or a retrospective argument. If you are arguing both view-points you are still guilty of dualism.

And as an aside, do you know what is the most trivial dualism of all? True and False.

Which can be (broadly) defined as:
True: all the things you can say
False: all the things you shouldn't (NOT can't) say.

I shouldn't say that the Earth is flat. But I can

[PTH]

Just to be clear, I'm not especially suggesting that computers can't be made in different ways. But the example of a Babbage-style Difference Engine, where it is clear that any output is a product of a purely mechanical process, is very useful in highlighting the point that can be made about any similar apparatus.

When you say "purely mechanical process" you are implying that there are any other kinds of processes?

I’m not ascribing any technical meaning. You can replace the word process, as desired, by “thing”, “thingummy”, “whatjamacallit” or “yoke(y)”.

The point will, or course, remain. I think looking at one example – a Babbage-style Difference Engine, made of nicely engineered gears, maybe even powered by a steam engine with a healthy fire going – is really useful as a way of making things clear. Because the question is “this is one of the yokeymabobs that we’re going to make conscious?” then has some real connection to something.

You could say it’s a Really Useful Engine.

Man is the measure of all things! Man is the source of all judgments.

That’s almost a sociological point. Indeed, such discussions will involve only people and their observations and judgements.

Well, the philosophy of mind is usually a romp around a couple of seemingly intractable problems. Dualism can't account for how mental activity influences a closed physical world.

Just to be sure, you and I mean the same thing by "intractable". In computational complexity theory "intractable" means that there is a theoretical solution to a problem, but not a practical one. Due to limited resources (time, money, energy, matter.) etc...

Again, I intend no technical meaning. I’d say replace “seemingly intractable” with “unsolved”, which hopefully removes any unintended ambiguity.

Monism can't account for the fact that things mean something.

A nihilistic view on Monism fixes that. This place, this universe - it means nothing whatsoever. It means whatever meaning or value you ascribe to it.

Unfortunately, even subjective meanings and values need to be accounted for as they exist. I may or may not be Vroomfondel, but either way it means something to be (or not to be) Vroomfondel.

I am using "emergence" in exactly the same sense any complexity theorist would use it. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
The system (as a whole) can do things that any of its individual parts cannot.
Consciousness (as a whole) can do things that quarks, leptons, electrons and photons cannot do on their own.

And that’s grand so far as it goes; it’s just obvious (in an area where not much is obvious) that saying “consciousness may emerge from how subatomic particles combine” is a significantly different statement to “consciousness emerges from how subatomic particles combine”.

Have you a reluctance to say that consciousness is a mystery, in a way that flight isn't?

Why do you keep defaulting to such trivial analogies? Hind-sight is always 20/20!
Pretend that we are in the 1300s.
Would you have said that "consciousness" is a mystery in exactly the same way "flight" is a mystery?

I stick to the flight analogy because it illustrates the point I’m making. If there was a past time when flight and consciousness were equally seen as mysteries – in ways that we’d agree on - that’s consistent with the point I’m making.

If there was never a time when flight and consciousness were equally seen as mysteries, it’s also consistent with the point I’m making.

It means something to say that flight is emergent, because we can say how it emerges.

It means nothing to say that consciousness is emergent, because we have no idea what that means. We might as well say consciousness is a mystery.

Wouldn’t you agree?

[Skepdick]

I’m not ascribing any technical meaning. You can replace the word process, as desired, by “thing”, “thingummy”, “whatjamacallit” or “yoke(y)”.

But you are drawing a linguistic distinction. One which is rather difficult to trace to any empirical consequence.

It is astonishing to see how many philosophical disputes collapse into insignificance the moment you subject them to this simple test of tracing a concrete consequence. There can be no difference anywhere that doesn't make a difference elsewhere—no difference in abstract truth that doesn't express itself in a difference in concrete fact and in conduct consequent upon that fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhere and some-when. The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the true one. --William James

Because the question is “this is one of the yokeymabobs that we’re going to make conscious?” then has some real connection to something. You could say it’s a Really Useful Engine.

Which is all that I could empirically observe about you, without going as far as saying that you are conscious.

You are really useful for having pointless, yet well thought-out debates on an internet forum. If you are a Chinese Room - I am none the wiser.

That’s almost a sociological point. Indeed, such discussions will involve only people and their observations and judgements.

No, not just the discussion. The actual decision. The decree, the judgment that "PTH is not conscious." will be made by a jury of your human peers.
In 2019 that jury is called "scientists" and the verdict is usually known as "scientific consensus". It is very democratic!

Again, I intend no technical meaning. I’d say replace “seemingly intractable” with “unsolved”, which hopefully removes any unintended ambiguity.

OK, but you do intend a meaning. And I am simply pointing out that your use of "intractable" to mean "unsolved" has multiple meanings. So I am trying to clarify whether by "(in)tractable" you mean "(un)solved in theory" or "(un)solved in practice".

In theory calculating pi to infinite precision is solved. In practice it's not. Is that tractable or intractable to you?

Unfortunately, even subjective meanings and values need to be accounted for as they exist.

I have no idea what this means.

The Universe exists. Does this mean it needs to be accounted for?
Quarks, leptons and photons exist Quantum entanglement exists. Does this mean that they need to be accounted for?

How do you account for that which accounts for whatever it is that you are accounting for?

This mode of reasoning produces Turtles. All the way down. And it's the root of all epistemic arrogance in humans. The belief that the Universe is accountable to us.

And that’s grand so far as it goes; it’s just obvious (in an area where not much is obvious) that saying “consciousness may emerge from how subatomic particles combine” is a significantly different statement to “consciousness emerges from how subatomic particles combine”.

False dichotomy. Consciousness EMERGED (past tense. Fact.) from the arrangement of subatomic particles.
You exist. You are conscious (as best as you and I can tell). Are you not convinced that you are made of subatomic particles?
Are you arguing for something mystical in your own composition?

I stick to the flight analogy because it illustrates the point I’m making. If there was a past time when flight and consciousness were equally seen as mysteries – in ways that we’d agree on - that’s consistent with the point I’m making.

And if there is a future in which both "flight" and "consciousness" are seen as equivalently explained - that's consistent with the point I am making.

We have machines which fly for us == "flight is explained"
We have machines which think for us == "consciousness is explained"

If there was never a time when flight and consciousness were equally seen as mysteries, it’s also consistent with the point I’m making.

That smells of a truism. Is there a time-period that is inconsistent with the point you are making? Is it even wrong?

It means something to say that flight is emergent, because we can say how it emerges.

No! That's not what emergence means at all! Flight is emergent because none of the parts of the airplane, as seen individually, can fly.
Engines don't fly. Wings don't fly. Fuselages don't fly.

They fly only when you put them all together.

It means nothing to say that consciousness is emergent, because we have no idea what that means. We might as well say consciousness is a mystery.

It means to say exactly the same thing as "flight is emergent". Quarks and leptons aren't conscious. Atoms aren't conscious. Cells aren't conscious. Neurons aren't conscious. Frontal lobes, parietal lobes, hippocampi, thalamuses, cerebella, spinal cords, optical nerves etc. are not conscious.

They are only conscious when you put them all together.

[PTH]

And to think we were almost in agreement, just a few posts ago.

A couple of Chinese Rooms would have left it there.

Again, I intend no technical meaning. I’d say replace “seemingly intractable” with “unsolved”, which hopefully removes any unintended ambiguity.

OK, but you do intend a meaning. And I am simply pointing out that intractable is ambiguous. So I am simply trying to clarify whether by "intractable" you mean "solved in theory" or "solved in practice".

I thought the ambiguity was resolved; the philosophy of mind is usually a romp around a couple of unsolved problems. Dualism can't account for how mental activity influences a closed physical world. Monism can't account for the fact that things mean something.

Is there anything unclear in that?

And that’s grand so far as it goes; it’s just obvious (in an area where not much is obvious) that saying “consciousness may emerge from how subatomic particles combine” is a significantly different statement to “consciousness emerges from how subatomic particles combine”.

False dichotomy. Consciousness EMERGED (past tense. Fact.) from how subatomic particles are combined.
Taking you on your own word - you are conscious. You exist. Are you not convinced that you are made of subatomic particles?
Are you arguing for something mystical in your own composition?

On the plus side, I think this is getting towards the point of disagreement.

Consciousness exists. Whether it emerged from subatomic particles, or in some other way, is currently unknown.

And if there is a future in which both "flight" and "consciousness" are seen as equivalently explained - that's consistent with the point I am making.

And consistent with the point I'm making - although I suspect we'd have scope for future disagreement over whether the new explanation was equivalent!

But if we're both agreed they are not equivalently explained at present, that's progress.

It means something to say that flight is emergent, because we can say how it emerges.

No! That's not what emergence means at all! Flight is emergent because none of the parts of the airplane, as seen individually, can fly.
Engines don't fly. Wings don't fly. Fuselages don't fly.

They fly only when you put them together.

Precisely. We can say flight is emergent, because we know the elements that combine to make it so.

We know planes can still fly when we take the in-flight service trollies out, but not if we detach the wings. No mystery about it.

It means nothing to say that consciousness is emergent, because we have no idea what that means. We might as well say consciousness is a mystery.

It means to say exactly the same thing as "flight is emergent". Atoms aren't conscious. Cells aren't conscious. Neurons aren't conscious. Frontal lobes, parietal lobes, hippocampi, thalamuses, cerebella, spinal cords, optical nerves etc. are not conscious.

The entire nervous system is conscious.

It would mean the same thing, if we could explain why that combination of things produces consciousness.

But we can't.

Its the difference between is and may be.

[bahman]

Your premise is false as you do not understand what emergence means - as I explained to you above.
Would you like me to repeat that?
eg.
Sweetness is an emergent quality of Hydrogen, Oxygen and Carbon.
That this can be explained is not relevant, since a lack of explanation is not a criterion of emergence.

So you think that there is no explanation for sweetness. If it is so then why always a part of your brain which is related to sweetness becomes active.
Color, for example, is not a property of objects we experience. That is true because sentient beings do not share the same experience of things, the snake can see infrared and we can't.

You are being irrelevant. Do you even know what emergence is? Worst still you are making MY case FOR emergence, and have failed to make your own.

Explain how Carbon hydrogen and oxygen emerge as SWEET when in a specific combination

This thread is not about "how" but I give it a go. What we know and what we don't know: What we know is that sugar affects the specific receptors on our tongues through electromagnetic interaction (there is no such thing as the sweetness in sugar and sugar does not emit sweetness). Receptors then send specific signals to the brain. The brain is a collection of minds. Minds are structured within the brain. Each mind has a specific job depending on where is it in the brain. The mind then perceives the electromagnetic signal. Each signal, however, causes a specific experience depending on where it comes from and where it goes and how the brain is structured in that area. What we don't know is how a pure electromagnetic wave can have different effects on different minds.