The logical error of the Liar Paradox

[Logik]

You just contradicted yourself, for indeed knowing anything at all
does constitute knowledge.

No, I didn't and no it doesn't.

1. It only appears to be a symbolic contradiction, but it is not a semantic contradiction. I am just being inconsistent and I overloaded "knowing" ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantic_overload ).

But I didn't have to tell you that. You know that contradictions don't exist in reality, correct? Therefore an existing contradiction would be self-contradictory.

Q.E.D https://repl.it/repls/SourSelfishProblems

Code: Select all

$toggle = false

def a
  $toggle = ( not $toggle )
end

a and ( not a )
=> true

Contradictions only exist in the realm of metaphysics (logic/language). There are no contradictions in the real, temporal-spatial universe.

2. Knowing anything/something may be a member of the Knowledge-set, but it does not constitute the set in its entirety/completeness. Some knowledge is worthless.

Example:I know that tomorrow I may or may not die.

It has no undistributed middle. It's true and it's justified, because all men are mortal.
If that's knowledge - I prefer toilet paper.

Knowing truisms is worthless knowledge. Truisms do not contain any useful information.
If you were to say to me "Black is not white" what you are giving me is information about your own mind. You can draw two distinctions. Black and white. Your mind can measure up to 1 bit of precision.

Until you provide an ostensive definition for "black" and "white" and we agree to the meaning of those terms we are not on the same page.

[PeteOlcott]

You just contradicted yourself, for indeed knowing anything at all
does constitute knowledge.

No, I didn't and no it doesn't.

1. It only appears to be a symbolic contradiction, but it is not a semantic contradiction. I am just being inconsistent and I overloaded "knowing" ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantic_overload ).

I consider that a form of (possibly unintentional) deception.
My system would use GUIDs** so that there is only one unique integer per semantic meaning.

Knowledge would then be only a set of interlocking mutually self-defining tautologies,
anything less than this would be presumption.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/
The problem of induction proves that all conclusions based on inductive inference
(including all of science) are less than 100% reliable.

**Cycorp thought of this first.

[Logik]

I consider that a form of (possibly unintentional) deception.

I already gave you the true hypothesis yet you continue to speculate. Why?

It wasn't unintentional deception.
It was intentional semantic overloading.

My system would use GUIDs** so that there is only one unique integer per semantic meaning.

1. How many bits would you use for your GUID representation?
2. That's a problem. If you are going to use integers to represent meaning, what are you going to use to represent integers themselves?

Knowledge would then be only a set of interlocking mutually self-defining tautologies,
anything less than this would be presumption.

It's called an expert system. It doesn't work.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/
The problem of induction proves that all conclusions based on inductive inference
(including all of science) are less than 100% reliable.

All the axioms you use for deduction are derived via induction.

If your axioms are probabilistic so are your conclusions.

[PeteOlcott]

I consider that a form of (possibly unintentional) deception.

I already gave you the true hypothesis yet you continue to speculate. Why?

It wasn't unintentional deception.
It was intentional semantic overloading.

When you don't expressly specify the semantic overloading then it becomes deception.

It is like when your wife asks you did you just have sex with another woman (and you did)
but decide to reinterpret her question as asking: "Did you just go see a Batman movie?"
and you answer no only because of your intentionally deceptive and uncommunicated
reinterpretation.

Unless semantic overloading of the conventional meaning of a term is communicated in advance
this "semantic overloading" is merely a euphemism for a liar lying.

[wtf]

Unless semantic overloading of the conventional meaning of a term is communicated in advance
this "semantic overloading" is merely a euphemism for a liar lying.

Like when you use "truth" in two different ways: one, as what's true in the world; and two, as what's colloquially called "true" in a formal system.

[PeteOlcott]

Unless semantic overloading of the conventional meaning of a term is communicated in advance
this "semantic overloading" is merely a euphemism for a liar lying.

Like when you use "truth" in two different ways: one, as what's true in the world; and two, as what's colloquially called "true" in a formal system.

Not quite, it is two different ways, but you did not quite anchor them correctly. What is known to be true with justifiable 100% complete certainty on the basis of sound deductive inference and what is estimated to be true on the basis of inductive inference.

[wtf]

Not quite, it is two different ways, but you did not quite anchor them correctly. What is known to be true with justifiable 100% complete certainty on the basis of sound deductive inference and what is estimated to be true on the basis of inductive inference.

Doesn't that make you a liar by your own criterion? Using the same word two different ways within the same argument? Aristotle called that equivocation but I'll go with your term. Liar.

[PeteOlcott]

Not quite, it is two different ways, but you did not quite anchor them correctly. What is known to be true with justifiable 100% complete certainty on the basis of sound deductive inference and what is estimated to be true on the basis of inductive inference.

Doesn't that make you a liar by your own criterion? Using the same word two different ways within the same argument? Aristotle called that equivocation but I'll go with your term. Liar.

Not at all. There is a huge difference between justified certainty and seemingly
probable these are two entirely different things. I did not even equivocate at all.

Although both are referred to in conventional usage as truth, more literally all
inductive inference because of the problem of induction
https://stanford.library.sydney.edu.au/ ... n-problem/
only derives speculation.

To most people it seems far too unbelievable to refer to scientific speculation instead
of the more conventional scientific truth, none-the-less because science is based on
induction and induction has the problem of induction all scientific "truth" is really
only speculation. This part is almost always far too much to grasp.

[wtf]

Not at all. There is a huge difference between justified certainty and seemingly
probable these are two entirely different things. I did not even equivocate at all.

There you go again. Lying.

You have repeatedly equivocated "truth" as

a) A premise in a formal system; and

b) Truth in the world.

That is actually the source of all of your other errors. You quoted some completely out-of-context remark from Haskell Curry that "Premises are SAID to be true," my emphasis; and then immediately claimed that premises are true IN THE WORLD.

I think you honestly don't see the mistake you've made. After 22 years, no wonder. But it's an obvious mistake.

[Logik]

a) A premise in a formal system; and

b) Truth in the world.

You left out one of his lies.

Truth: the end product of deduction.

What is known to be true with justifiable 100% complete certainty on the basis of sound deductive inference.

[PeteOlcott]

Not at all. There is a huge difference between justified certainty and seemingly
probable these are two entirely different things. I did not even equivocate at all.

There you go again. Lying.

You have repeatedly equivocated "truth" as

a) A premise in a formal system; and

b) Truth in the world.

That is actually the source of all of your other errors. You quoted some completely out-of-context remark from Haskell Curry that "Premises are SAID to be true," my emphasis; and then immediately claimed that premises are true IN THE WORLD.

I think you honestly don't see the mistake you've made. After 22 years, no wonder. But it's an obvious mistake.

I don't divide it up that way. I divide truth up into two different kinds:
(1) Memories of physical sensations from the sense organs.
(2) Mathematical relations between finite strings of characters representing connections between ideas.

Truth in the world is a sort of hybrid mixture between these two and thus has
the two different aspects of its representation listed above.

[Logik]

I divide truth up into two different kinds

My system would use GUIDs** so that there is only one unique integer per semantic meaning.

You contradict yourself. You said you are going to use GUID to ensure semantic uniqueness, and yet you equivocate "truth".

[wtf]

You left out one of his lies.

LOL I lost count!

[PeteOlcott]

I divide truth up into two different kinds

My system would use GUIDs** so that there is only one unique integer per semantic meaning.

You contradict yourself. You said you are going to use GUID to ensure semantic uniqueness, and yet you equivocate "truth".

I "equivocate" truth essentially the same way that Kant does in his Critique of Pure Reason.

[Logik]

I "equivocate" truth essentially the same way that Kant does in his Critique of Pure Reason.

Leave Kant out of this. I am holding you accountable to the standards you've proposed and insist on.

They are your own criteria, not mine. Live up to them!

1 symbol - 1 meaning!

A globally-unique identifier for every semantic.