Ronald Beiner and his book "Dangerous Minds"

[Immanuel Can]

3) The notion of 'beyond good & evil'. What does this mean? I have taken it to mean that when you dismantle Christian metaphysics and metaphysical god-given or inspired moral metaphysics, that you only have left over pure natural mechanics.

Pure mechanics are, of course, amoral. A machine doesn't do good or evil...it just does whatever the machine does.

I say: there is absolutely nothing Christian in any sense, in any possible sense, when one examines the biological world of Nature.

I say it depends on how you look at it. Some people look at nature and claim to see only random chance, or "nature red in tooth and claw." I find this astonishing, as my empirical observation is that there is tremendous coordination and design in nature, despite the flaws. So it's a "glass half empty" versus a "glass half full" perspective, at the very least: except I would say the "glass" is really 9/10 full.

A higher Christian will is not one that comes through nature. It comes nearly completely from 'beyond nature'. It interposes itself as-against nature!

Yet if man is a mere product of nature, then so is his "will" -- and so would be "the Christian will." It's only if human will is some reflection of the divine will that it could possibly transcend the natural.

True, Nietzsche has no alternative, as he dismantles Christian ethics and those imperatives, to reduce man to just another organism seeking life. But this is not Nietzsche doing this! Nietzsche notices that it happened.

No, that's how it seems to him, perhaps, if we believe him. But it is not the case that Nietzsche's perspective is automatically the right one, the true and objective one, or that he merely dispassionately records the facts of what he could not help but see because it was all there was to see. He writes as an Atheist, with Atheist suppositions and Atheist observations -- and that is no small fact in the shaping of his conclusions.

4) The Übermench is a logical necessity from the predicates that had been established through the recognition that there is 'no metaphysical dimension'.

It wasn't a "recognition." It was a "proposition."

Nietzsche wasn't dispassionately recording neutral facts from a "nowhere" perspective. He had decided to dismiss the metaphysics a priori, not from observation or even rational argument. And ironically, in saying "God is dead," Nietzsche used his own intelligence, identity, "voice" and perspective -- all metaphysical entities.

He stood on metaphysics in order to deny metaphysics. But that, of course, is a logical failure, a self-contradiction on his part.

6) Leftism and 'will-to-power'. I think that the Left and 'progressives' are heavily involved (if I can put it like this) in 'will-to-power'. But 'will-to-power' within the larger, industrial, mechanized, and automated 'world' needs to be brought out as a topic. In brief: these systems mirror natural systems. They are not 'Christian' and cannot be 'Christian'. Just as a mining company is like a mechanism that is set in motion and 'mercilessly' extracts ores, so our modern economic mechanisms function similarly. And we live within these 'systems'. The leftist-progressive 'agenda' so-called shows itself as a servant of these forces in some, not all, but in some ways. That is why, today, people are concerned about left totalitarianism as it takes shape.

I'm not sure why you think "natural" and "mechanical" are the same thing. Nature isn't a machine, obviously; and in many ways, the "mechanical" is directly contrastable to the "natural." The former is dead, the latter is living. The former is artificial, the latter is organic. The former is man-created, and bears the image of his autocratic will; the latter is God-created, with intimations of the divine nature in it. In a few ways, the analogy might loosely hold -- for example, both mechanization and the natural world seem to run "on their own," so to speak -- but to see nature as if it were a mere "machine" in all regards, one has to squint hard to exclude a lot.

7) Europeanism...I do desire -- we do desire -- to create a solidarity and a recognition of common interests for purposes of 'self-protection'.

I understand. And I think Nietzsche would approve of that impulse. However, while I recognize that "whiteness" has become a racist target of the Left, I do not wish to organize resistance around the same concept they created. I think real resistance needs to be organized along non-racist, lines, lines like rational versus irrational, human rights advocates versus sectarian privileges, narratives of human potential and hope versus narratives of phony "oppression," or narratives of ethics versus narratives of amorality. I do not think any principled resistance is benefitted by being attached to the "whiteness" construct of the left. I don't even agree that "whiteness" is a thing: it's a minor characteristic of some persons, but one which is being artificially inflated for the purposes of stoking racist envy on the Left.

in other words, "whiteness" is a constructed artifact of the ideology known as "Identity Politics." And since it is that, why would we allow the Left to construct the terms of our own position for us? They're not doing a great job with their own.

8.) Christianity requires new definitions. What is it we are speaking about when we say "I am a Christian"? What does this mean? You may have worked out all your definitions. You may have no problems here. We have not, and we have some problems.

That may be. But I think we can begin with analytics.

To be "Christian" is, par excellence, to be a follower of the teaching and attitudes of the Jewish carpenter from Galilee. It is to be a "Christ one." Everything else is secondary to that.

If we are Christians we still have obligations to Christendom.

I think not. I believe that you will look in vain for the term "Christendom" in the Bible, and will not find anything to justify that concept in the teaching of the One who said most clearly, "My kingdom is not of this world." In fact, I would suggest, the setting up of worldly kingdoms and the creating of putatively "Christian" cultures is not at all the project He commanded of His followers.

So I would bow out on that score. What has been called "Christian" or "European" culture must fend for itself, if it can; we Christians have no mandate to try to preserve it, just as we had no mandate to create it in the first place. The goods it brought to humankind were always a byproduct of those elements that were obedient to the real Christian mandate; and its excesses and failures were a result of departure from that same mandate. I'd just advocate us getting back on track.

[Alizia]

1) If you have 'left the world', then the affairs of the world should no longer concern you, in my view. If to be a Christian is to 'leave the world' and if it is about Kingdoms not of this world, then at that point one must leave the world to its worlding. I do recognize that people do do this. In my way of seeing things I would allow for various options.

2) Beyond Good & Evil = amoral = same in effect.

3) True, man is a product of nature. And man's mind arises in nature and out of nature. And if the Christian value-set and the Christian choices are ones that operate contrarily to 'the world' then, I suppose, you would see that as a manifestation of the kindgom that is not of this world. Thus you have, I think argued an aspect of my point. But there is another point here: in my view all religious systems, in one sense or another, have metaphysical aspects that are similar to Christian radicalism. But when one studies them one notices that they, too, have their corresponding -dom-ness (as in Christen-dom). There is an ideal conception, and an ideally lived life in accord with it, and then there is everyone else.

3) I did not say that Nietzsche's views were either correct or true nor good or bad. I say that his views are expressions of the results of specific strains of ideas. I think this is a sound statement.

4) The idea of a 'Christian will' needs to be thoroughly discussed.

5) It is true that Nietzsche stood on metaphysics to disassemble a metaphysics.

6) Again, if your view of Christianity, and if the way you live your life, and what you recommend, does not concern itself with culture, law, social organization and all the rest, I would honestly not know what t say to you. I do not mean that I could not understand this choice. But I would say that it does not intersect with any of my own notions. But I would not wish to argue over the point.

6a) And I will say that, as I understand it, this may be why I say that Christianity, the Christian attitude, and the Christian ethics, need to be re-visisted, re-conversed, reexamined. In fact -- as I say! -- this is what interests me.

You express yourself clearly here:

So I would bow out on that score. What has been called "Christian" or "European" culture must fend for itself, if it can; we Christians have no mandate to try to preserve it, just as we had no mandate to create it in the first place. The goods it brought to humankind were always a byproduct of those elements that were obedient to the real Christian mandate; and its excesses and failures were a result of departure from that same mandate. I'd just advocate us getting back on track.

7) I would say that it was not exclusively Christianity that brought unique goods, but that Christianity did bring its own specific goods. Part of 'the problem' is that aspects of Christian idealism seem to attack or undermine what I might call 'necessary aspects of being'. It tends to establish itself absolutely. In my own research I discover things of great value, and power and meaning, in the pre-Christians and in their world. But, I do understand that Christianity has defined *all this* as 'demonic'. But those are, as you indicate, aspects of radical Christian metaphysics and 'impositions'.

7a) I think that we are likely arriving at, shall I say, a core of difference between our views. It may also explain why I can value someone like Nietzsche or Heidegger and by extension many many other people who are concerned for 'the world'. Maybe that is my error? Maybe I am 'not really a Christian' because I see the world as the field (on of the fields) where values must be decided, honed and lived. But I do accept imperfection. I do accept not quite making the mark.

8.) At the very least I think my views (if Catholic social teaching is considered) are more linked to Catholic praxes than yours seem to be. (Obviously, you are not a Catholic!) But, my point is (also) that I have certain questions about Catholic social teachings or, put another way, the ramifications of Catholic social policy for the West at this specific juncture.

[Immanuel Can]

1) If you have 'left the world', then the affairs of the world should no longer concern you, in my view. If to be a Christian is to 'leave the world' and if it is about Kingdoms not of this world, then at that point one must leave the world to its worlding. I do recognize that people do do this.

No, that does not follow.

The Biblical instruction is that Christians are to be "IN the world, but not OF it." That is, they are to live in the real world, participate in society, pull their weight and do good, but not to run their lives by the same values and objectives that others do. And ironically, that's exactly the best thing they can do for this world.

3) True, man is a product of nature.

Well, I didn't say that. You did, perhaps. I said man is created by God, in His image.

And man's mind arises in nature and out of nature. And if the Christian value-set and the Christian choices are ones that operate contrarily to 'the world' then, I suppose, you would see that as a manifestation of the kindgom that is not of this world.

Now you're closer to it. It's not a matter of abandoning the present world; it's a matter of setting one's perspective on it by relativizing its value by recognition of coming of the Kingdom, and of getting to work to do the right thing in this world, in view of that one.

That's one area where Marx was verifiable wrong -- and badly so. He thought "religion" was an "opium of the masses." The truth is, it can be (depending on which religion, and how people process it). But it isn't necessarily so: there are other possible outcomes, again depending on the actual nature of the "religion" in question.

What turned out to happen instead, was that Christians became leaders in social reform -- in prisons, in poor houses, in education, in welfare, in socialized medicine, in hospitals, in labour law, and so on -- and so were hugely influential in alleviating the oppressive conditions of the Industrial Revolution. Instead of being quiescent and indifferent to their state (which the "opium" myth presupposes), they became activists, sacrificially giving and serving the poor, and thus they radically improved the social situation Marx deplored. And this is a large reason why his revolution never appeared in England, where Marx thought it was most certain to break out.

He badly misread that.

4) The idea of a 'Christian will' needs to be thoroughly discussed.

There isn't the mention of such a thing in the Biblical text. At least, it's not framed in those terms. There is talk of "a renewed mind," however.

5) It is true that Nietzsche stood on metaphysics to disassemble a metaphysics.

Then he was like a man sitting on a branch, and sawing it off between where he is sitting and the tree. If he succeeded, he failed: for he had cut off from himself the foundation upon which his claims were based in the first place.

But I do accept imperfection. I do accept not quite making the mark.

Is it yours to accept, though? Is it against yourself that your "imperfection" offends, and is it you who has set yourself the task of "hitting the mark"? Or is humans often call their "imperfection" actually a thing that concerns God? And is the "mark" set by God?

If I have stolen from somebody, and I am caught, does it solve the problem if I say, "Well, I've accepted that I'm imperfect, and I accept that I wasn't quite honest," and then do no more about it? Or do I owe to stop excusing my action as mere "imperfection," take responsibility, repent, ask forgiveness and make restitution according to the terms set down by the law -- or else to serve the sentence I have earned for myself?

At the very least I think my views (if Catholic social teaching is considered) are more linked to Catholic praxes than yours seem to be. But, my point is (also) that I have certain questions about Catholic social teachings or, put another way, the ramifications of Catholic social policy for the West at this specific juncture.

Well, fair enough. And I don't want to be hard on the Catholic church here. But let me ask you this, if I can do so with your understanding that I'm not intending to be impolite: if we were to evaluate what the Catholic church was doing (in regard to its praxes, policies, teachings or whichever), just as you suggest, then to what standard would we refer in order to perform our evaluation?

If the RC church is, itself, the only standard we will accept, then we will not be able to "have questions" or "ask about the ramifications" of what it does. It would then be the highest standard to which we can refer, and thus it would be above all critiques. We would have no justification at all for our concerns, then.

We will need some higher source to go to find the moral precepts that tell us where the RC church has done the right thing, and where it has perhaps missed the mark a bit. We will need something other than the RC church to tell us. (The same would follow if we were critiquing any religious organization, by the way, so I'm not trying to be partisan when I ask this.)

Now, where would we get the higher moral standard we need, so we can reflect critically on the activities of the RC church? (Assuming, of course, that our purpose is to make our assessment of it fair and right, and maybe even to find a basis to encourage improvement in it, not merely to be arbitrarily cynical.)

[Alizia]

You said:

Well, I didn't say that. You did, perhaps. I said man is created by God, in His image.

Yet if man is a mere product of nature, then so is his "will" -- and so would be "the Christian will." It's only if human will is some reflection of the divine will that it could possibly transcend the natural.

Ah, I see. Because I cannot take a great deal of 'the Christian story' as literal -- though I sometimes wish this were possible (for me) -- the only option open to me is to consider 'metaphor'. To say 'God created man in his image' has metaphorical elements (since it could hardly be literally so), but the assertion must also connect with a further range of ideas.

It is likely that I create, as it were, a bridge between one view (the natural view) and the Christian or Jewish view. I do not have any doubt that man arose within the natural context, and for this reasons shares his 'animalness' with all of creation. Put even more forcefully, it would at this point be impossible for me to conceive things differently. So, we have another reason why I am likely able to entertain or to appreciate aspects of what M. Nietzsche is getting at: I share some of his predicates.

Therefore, if I were to say 'God created man in His image', I would have to interpret that statement. You might gather that I take this to mean (image) the conscious, thinking, rational and intelligent aspect of man. This does not mean his body -- his flesh and blood, nor even necessarily his body as having evolved from 'the slime'. It would mean something of his inner nature.

And I interpret Christianity as having identified the essence of that. That: the similitude with God's nature. (Something to that effect, but since there are metaphors and similes they can be expressed in many different ways). By identifying it, it also allows for man to 'work on it' or to further work toward it. In this there is reciprocal efforts.

But man in many different senses is obviously a 'creature of the Earth' and also a 'biological creature'. And he arises in and lives in Nature. And as I understand things to be a Christian is to hold Christ within one's conception. It is also to discover that there (within).

This is the best I can do.

The Biblical instruction is that Christians are to be "IN the world, but not OF it." That is, they are to live in the real world, participate in society, pull their weight and do good, but not to run their lives by the same values and objectives that others do. And ironically, that's exactly the best thing they can do for this world.

Yes, and doing that, one creates, essentially, Christian society. Otherwise known as Christendom. (Unless there is something I have not understood about the term Christendom).

It's not a matter of abandoning the present world; it's a matter of setting one's perspective on it by relativizing its value by recognition of coming of the Kingdom, and of getting to work to do the right thing in this world, in view of that one.

I believe that I would say something similar. Where I might differ is when 'Kingdom' was defined. It is likely that I would also be forced to see 'Kingdom' as a metaphor. I do not mean an 'unreal thing' necessarily, but perhaps a misunderstood thing. Just as the Bible stories are imperfect visualizations of truths seen through metaphors (and the metaphor is not the thing), so too the notion of Kingdom and also Heaven are things that I cannot visualize.

And I am not completely sure about what 'getting to work to do the right thing in this world' entails. I have a general sense though and certainly Catholicism (if we were to exclude other Christian forms) has fairly clearly defined ideas about this 'work'.

But it is right there that I have many many questions.

What turned out to happen instead, was that Christians became leaders in social reform -- in prisons, in poor houses, in education, in welfare, in socialized medicine, in hospitals, in labour law, and so on -- and so were hugely influential in alleviating the oppressive conditions of the Industrial Revolution. Instead of being quiescent and indifferent to their state (which the "opium" myth presupposes), they became activists, sacrificially giving and serving the poor, and thus they radically improved the social situation Marx deplored. And this is a large reason why his revolution never appeared in England, where Marx thought it was most certain to break out.

And all the same problems -- the entire problem of the organization of society -- still stand, very much, right in front of us. And this brings me back to my 'larger concerns': the proper means to oppose aspects of what is going on in our present. And this is why I would speak of 'the preservation of Europe'. All this I can talk about. It does take time though.

There isn't the mention of such a thing in the Biblical text. At least, it's not framed in those terms. There is talk of "a renewed mind," however.

Yet I would certainly say that there is a Christian will. If 'Gods will be done' then a Christian aligns her and his will with the same, no?

Fiat volúntas Tua. Do you happen to know what the corresponding word for 'will' in Greek is? Is it 'thelema'?

Well, fair enough. And I don't want to be hard on the Catholic church here. But let me ask you this, if I can do so with your understanding that I'm not intending to be impolite: if we were to evaluate what the Catholic church was doing (in regard to its praxes, policies, teachings or whichever), just as you suggest, then to what standard would we refer in order to perform our evaluation?

You don't have to worry about offending me. I am sort of 'positioned' within the Catholic tradition -- for various reasons -- but as I said I am a very poor Christian (Catholic). I even go so far as to have extended conversations with heretics! (A joke of course).

Answering my own question I found this:

One well-known example is in the "Lord's Prayer" (Matthew 6:10), "Thy kingdom come. Thy will (Θελημα) be done, On earth as it is in heaven." It is used later in the same gospel (26:42), "He went away again a second time and prayed, saying, "My Father, if this cannot pass away unless I drink it, Thy will be done." In his 5th-century Sermon on 1 John 4:4–12, Augustine of Hippo gave a similar instruction: "Love, and what thou wilt, do." (Dilige et quod vis fac).

[Immanuel Can]

Put even more forcefully, it would at this point be impossible for me to conceive things differently. So, we have another reason why I am likely able to entertain or to appreciate aspects of what M. Nietzsche is getting at: I share some of his predicates.

I understand. One would have to share his predicates to believe what he says. The problem with him is not merely logical -- its presuppositional, primarily.

It would mean something of his inner nature.

This is what it is usually taken to entail. There's nothing irregular about that.

And I interpret Christianity as having identified the essence of that. That: the similitude with God's nature.

But that just won't add up, logically.

If "to be made in the image of God" means "to be made in the image of that which does not exist ( or "is dead," as Nietzsche would insist), then the whole idea is that man is "made in the image of the non-existent." Or maybe, man is "made in the image of a dead concept."

Make sense of that, if you can. But I think you see that you need to choose one or the other: either there is some sense in which mankind is "made in the image of God," and Nietzsche is wrong, or Nietzsche is right, and mankind is not "made" in any "image" at all.

The Biblical instruction is that Christians are to be "IN the world, but not OF it." That is, they are to live in the real world, participate in society, pull their weight and do good, but not to run their lives by the same values and objectives that others do. And ironically, that's exactly the best thing they can do for this world.

Yes, and doing that, one creates, essentially, Christian society. Otherwise known as Christendom. (Unless there is something I have not understood about the term Christendom).

Right. You've missed the "-dom" part. It' the end of "king-dom," and indicates that the user of the term expects Christians to institute an earthly, political kingdom (presumably on behalf of a god incapable of arranging his own). In other words, it turns Christianity into a political enterprise -- a thing which the Biblical record never does, and which, as I noted earlier, Christ himself explicitly said it was not to be.

What turned out to happen instead, was that Christians became leaders in social reform -- in prisons, in poor houses, in education, in welfare, in socialized medicine, in hospitals, in labour law, and so on -- and so were hugely influential in alleviating the oppressive conditions of the Industrial Revolution. Instead of being quiescent and indifferent to their state (which the "opium" myth presupposes), they became activists, sacrificially giving and serving the poor, and thus they radically improved the social situation Marx deplored. And this is a large reason why his revolution never appeared in England, where Marx thought it was most certain to break out.

And all the same problems -- the entire problem of the organization of society -- still stand, very much, right in front of us.

Well, not the same problems...we've fixed up prisons considerably, eliminated poorhouses, instituted public education, established various welfare programs, and so on. Things are better. But problems, we will always have. This is, after all, earth...not utopia, and not heaven.

Yet I would certainly say that there is a Christian will. If 'Gods will be done' then a Christian aligns her and his will with the same, no?

Oh yes, of course. If you put it that way.

Fiat volúntas Tua. Do you happen to know what the corresponding word for 'will' in Greek is? Is it 'thelema'?

Yes, it is.

Well, fair enough. And I don't want to be hard on the Catholic church here. But let me ask you this, if I can do so with your understanding that I'm not intending to be impolite: if we were to evaluate what the Catholic church was doing (in regard to its praxes, policies, teachings or whichever), just as you suggest, then to what standard would we refer in order to perform our evaluation?

You don't have to worry about offending me. I am sort of 'positioned' within the Catholic tradition -- for various reasons -- but as I said I am a very poor Christian (Catholic). I even go so far as to have extended conversations with heretics! (A joke of course).

Did you find an answer to the problem? What standard of evaluation would you use, when you evaluate the successes and shortcomings of the RC church? (Again, let us assume a good goal of such critical reflection is perhaps to help, improve, reform, advance or refine Catholic practice, not merely to criticize so as to destroy; fair enough?)

[Alizia]

I understand. One would have to share his predicates to believe what he says. The problem with him is not merely logical -- its presuppositional, primarily.

But I would be forced to counter with the following: from Nietzsche's perspective, and that of natural science, and much that went on in the intellectual world, the Christian worldview is, in fact, illogical: alogical. Outside of logic. Irrational.

And were one to remain a believer in the strict and shall I say 'historical sense' one would be perceived by everyone in that world as being not the 'logical one' but the illogical one.

To the degree that one absorbs the 'predicates' of modernity -- the predicates of this world -- one necessarily moves away from being capable, as an honest intellect, in believing in many of the tenets upon which Christian belief has been built.

And thus we define the 'problem of modernity'.

I choose -- irrationally, according to the logic of the world and even (in some sense) as against Aristotelian logic -- to continue to 'believe in' or hold to overarching Christian belief. And to do this I have to peer through 'the darkened glass'.

It would likely be necessary to state, unequivocally, just what in Nietzsche (since you keed returning to him!) I do 'believe'.

These are complex conversations and they take time. Nothing here can be easily resolved.

[Immanuel Can]

I understand. One would have to share his predicates to believe what he says. The problem with him is not merely logical -- its presuppositional, primarily.

But I would be forced to counter with the following: from Nietzsche's perspective, and that of natural science, and much that went on in the intellectual world, the Christian worldview is, in fact, illogical: alogical. Outside of logic. Irrational.

Yes, that is their contention. However, there is no reason we should believe it.

Nietzsche himself did not even bother to give a disproof of God...he just dismissed the concept by calling it "dead." But he did not establish that a) God is only a concept, not a reality, and b) no actual God exists. Those are two huge burdens-of-proof his own claim puts upon him; but he just did not shoulder them at all.

There is a world of difference between saying "God is transcendent" and "God is irrational." To say "God is irrational" is to say that He cannot be known by reason," a thing which the Bible denies is so. "Come, let us reason together, says the Lord..." To say that He is "transcendent" is to say that He cannot be subdued by mere reason...that aspects of Him can be known by reason, but that in totality, He inevitably is going to be "bigger than" and more profound than human reason can possibly unpack.

Faith is necessary because God is transcendent, not because He is irrational. But faith is not all that is necessary: sound reason also serves the Divine turn. Science, in revealing the design of God's universe, speaks of the Creator's power and nature. However, these will never exhaust The Transcendent One. God is always more than that. So faith remains necessary -- not faith against facts, but faith founded upon the facts, and faith ready to take us forward beyond the facts -- to take us where the simple and limited facts of our own limited, human knowledge simply will not equip us to go.

For example, science can tell us when we live, and when we die (approximately). It cannot tell us why we live, and where we go when we die. Science can tell us how to reach the moon. But apparently it cannot teach us how to reach ethical integrity. Science can map the brain. But it cannot locate the consciousness that 'indwells' the brain. Science can tell us when we're looking at a painting, and what elements it contains. It cannot tell us whether it's a good painting, or why it ought to be aesthetically valued. Science tells us what we can do; it can't tell us a thing about what we ought to do. And science can tell us there's a world: but it cannot tell us anything about what the world is for.

All the important considerations of life transcend our present knowledge, it seems. And perhaps they always will. But so long as they do, it will take more than mere modernist scientism, more than materialism to get us through life and enable us to make it mean anything.

To the degree that one absorbs the 'predicates' of modernity -- the predicates of this world -- one necessarily moves away from being capable, as an honest intellect, in believing in many of the tenets upon which Christian belief has been built.

Ironically, "modernity" is the very thing that Postmodern thought has now deconstructed. The foundation upon which Nietzsche depended has been cut from under him, in a sense. He has been exposed as just another meta-narrative, in an age when meta-narratives are all in doubt.

So clearly, "modern" and "predicates of this world" do not refer to identical entities. The "predicates" of postmodernity have undercut many of the "predicates" of modernity.

But these are all games, really: both "modernity" and "postmodernity." Modernity was really mankind's delusion of self-sufficiency, of moral progress, of material mastery of the universe. This hubris has been blown away in two World Wars, the Nuclear and Environmental Crises, and the Linguistic Turn in academia. In fact, many commentators think postmodernity is really a form of "late" modernity...a sort of demented "coming home of the modern chickens to roost."

We thought we were God...or were becoming God...and now we find we are not. Rather, we now face the dark side of Nietzsche's tale: "Is it not colder?"

[Dubious]

Back to Ronald Beiner and his book "Dangerous Minds".

It's strange that those Nazis who actually read Nietzsche in its original, unmodified version were aware that he was not on their side and instead would have been revolted by the Nazi ideology. This is already well-known. The point is don't make Nietzsche unjustly responsible in how the far-right interprets him. Had he or Heidegger never existed it wouldn't have prevented the far-right from existing. Also, why isn't the original Nietzschean, Plato included in a triumvirate of infamy, in spite of N often disagreeing with Plato?

It would be interesting to know what Nietzsche himself would have had to say about it compared to what others have said about him. These dichotomies would certainly be immune to any reconciliation.

[Immanuel Can]

The point is don't make Nietzsche unjustly responsible in how the far-right interprets him. Had he or Heidegger never existed it wouldn't have prevented the far-right from existing.

No: but it cleared the decks nicely so that Fascism could exist. Heidegger is, of course directly implicated in this, but so is Nietzsche, more negatively. For there is no aspect of Nietzschean "ethics" that allows for any alternative to be really wrong. And National Socialism is much closer to the übermensch ideals than practically any other ideology one can name.

But Hitler was not on "the right." He was a fascist, a national socialist, and thus rather far to the Left, closer to Red Communism...not on the right, beside the Libertarians, or in the centre with classical liberalism.

[Dubious]

The point is don't make Nietzsche unjustly responsible in how the far-right interprets him. Had he or Heidegger never existed it wouldn't have prevented the far-right from existing.

No: but it cleared the decks nicely so that Fascism could exist. Heidegger is, of course directly implicated in this, but so is Nietzsche, more negatively. For there is no aspect of Nietzschean "ethics" that allows for any alternative to be really wrong. And National Socialism is much closer to the übermensch ideals than practically any other ideology one can name.

But Hitler was not on "the right." He was a fascist, a national socialist, and thus rather far to the Left, closer to Red Communism...not on the right, beside the Libertarians, or in the centre with classical liberalism.

What you're saying is N is guilty simply by virtue of how he was used. This makes him guilty by default. Not very Christian of you or logical or fair. But of course, you've always had an agenda, a hatred of Nietzsche even though you'll deny it. We've had this conversation before many times.

BTW is was Mussolini who created the first Fascist state and he didn't need Nietzsche to do it.

[Immanuel Can]

What you're saying is N is guilty simply by virtue of how he was used.

No. I'm saying he's guilty of counselling amorality, which opens the door to evil. And I'm suggesting that his philosophy of the Superman, his hatred of Jews, and his removal of moral restraints proved very useful to the Nazi cause. That's all.

BTW is was Mussolini who created the first Fascist state and he didn't need Nietzsche to do it.

Actually, the fasces was an ancient Roman motif. Both Mussolini and Hitler later made use of the ideology it represented.

[Alizia]

Nietzsche himself did not even bother to give a disproof of God...he just dismissed the concept by calling it "dead." But he did not establish that a) God is only a concept, not a reality, and b) no actual God exists. Those are two huge burdens-of-proof his own claim puts upon him; but he just did not shoulder them at all.

Having read you now for a little while, I think I might understand you better. One of your main points is this one. It doesn't quite sound right to say 'your problem is here' and yet, to be truthful to this discussion, your problem in understanding M. Nietzsche, and hence many other similar thinkers, is in this area.

It is not their responsibility to demonstrate nor to prove that the Christian concept of God is problematic and, of course (as they might say) doubtful. In fact, there is no way to 'prove' God's existence, nor the existence of Jesus Christ, nor any part of the Story nor any aspect of what a Christian generally asserts as 'truth'. The world of science, and the world of biological mechanics (the material, biological world) can get along -- can absolutely get along -- without any part of it. The proof is really quite simple: entire civilizations that have no relationship to Christian forms that exist and carry on.

Obviously, Nietzsche could never have disproven that God existed, but there is no one who can 'prove' that God exists. What that means, in my view, is that Christianity -- let us say the conversion of a person to Christianity -- is an internal affair. It is a series of choices based on coming into contact, on an interior plane, with what you named 'the transcendent'. There is though an exterior dimension too: one who lives 'in the shadow' of the Christian world. For example, should one know and have interaction with a 'genuine Christian' one may only touch Christianity in the sense of receiving (or perceiving) 'reflected light'. One could live in a Christian culture and be only a sort-of Christian, even if one called oneself that.

It is, rather obviously, not an affair that has to do with the existent, created and visible world. That is, the orb of the Earth and the living entities that exist on it. Christianity is not found 'in the Earth'. It is not a material discovery. There is, in this sense, no Christ within the chaos of the world. And in an absolute and strict sense 'the world' is not Christian, and left to itself could never be Christian. Life -- biological life -- is brutal, unthinkingly cruel and direct, and simply absorbs death which simultaneously producing life. It doesn't care about death, nor does it care above 'evil'. In fact, in the natural world there is (obviously) no such thing as 'evil'. Death is not evil. The destruction of another life is not evil. These things are just a part of life.

I gather from reading what you write that you (IMO) do not seem to have grasped these aspects, thus you cannot (again IMO) understand Nietzsche nor the age and circumstance that produced him. Therefore, you cannot (IMO) really understand him, nor can you understand the problem that he outlines.

Nietzsche suggested that God Had Died . . . And We Killed Him because, in effect, this is what happened. And for this reason -- for those outside of the faith-leap, outside of that choice, outside of that desire and also that will -- God is not seen, not understood. God in this sense 'goes invisible'. What remains in view is the entire world. But the world as natural process.

You place all your apologetic effort in asserting that he merely declared God 'dead' but did not nor could not prove Him dead. But you miss the point.

I would suggest that you have no ways and no means to 'prove' God's existence to anyone. Because there are no proofs. There might be strong arguments in favor. One might become convinced. And one might then choose to align one's thelema with God as one meets God on an inner plane. But these are 100% issues of faith. Not of 'proof'.

Will you continue to argue against 'this' as if I am making this argument to you? As if I am Nietzsche? I am only trying to explain what happened within culture at a certain time.

If there is a 'cure' for this, well, that is another level of conversation: an extended and difficult conversation.

[Alizia]

I'm saying he's guilty of counselling amorality, which opens the door to evil.

I would put it differently. At least this accords with my understanding. What he noticed is that 'the world' is amoral, through and through. Morality does not exist, naturally, in the world. Or if something like morality exists in the biological world, it is a horrifying moral system. Nietzsche, I would say (I speculate) came face-to-face with what his age was discovering and felt to be 'true'.

It is true though that he opened up the possibility of making choices that could be said to be amoral. But, Machiavelli had really opened up that 'reality' of the function of power long before.

I would say that it seems to me that Nietzsche stared into that glass, as it were. And in this sense he saw man as just another part of that 'world'.

In my view, the Christians (and perhaps the Platonists) realized that that world is evil and amoral. So, when the Christians say that this is 'the Devil's Kingdom and the devil has free rein here and is ever-present here, this is what they 'saw'. What they saw horrified them, as it does any of us who really look into Nature. The Christian Vision is, again in my view, both the recognition that this world cannot ever correspond to an Ideal World that is pure and 'good'. Therefore, such a world can only be one that is imagined, or conceived as an after-world', a next-world, a world-to-come.

And man is a unique and strange entity. We have a 'conceptual world'. We have an 'idea world'. And we have a world (and a self) that can visualize and understand the transcendent. That is where Christianity resides (as it were).

I see Christianity as a unique internal choice that cannot be supported from outside. The world does not support it.

[Immanuel Can]

It is not their responsibility to demonstrate nor to prove that the Christian concept of God is problematic...

Well, of course it is. And it is on the basis of logic, not merely because I say it is.

Who is the declarer of the statement, "God is dead"? That is a positive knowledge claim -- whether one means only "God-the-concept" or "God Himself." One who declares his knowledge of such a thing owes us his premises. That's very clear. It's on Nietzsche to justify what he wants us to believe.

In fact, there is no way to 'prove' God's existence, nor the existence of Jesus Christ, nor any part of the Story nor any aspect of what a Christian generally asserts as 'truth'.

This is also a factual claim. It requires justification as well. But more importantly, perhaps, it is also not sufficiently attentive to how "proof" works. Proof is always indicative, never absolute. So would we really want to advance the premise that not even any indicative evidence for these things exists? That's unsustainable. The arguments are well-recognized and widely circulated; that they don't constitute some sort of mythical "absolute proof" is no stroke against them at all: none of science itself provides "absolute proof."

The question is always and ever, not "Is there any evidence," but rather "How strong is the available evidence?"

The world of science, and the world of biological mechanics (the material, biological world) can get along -- can absolutely get along -- without any part of it. The proof is really quite simple: entire civilizations that have no relationship to Christian forms that exist and carry on.

Ah, this is Nietzsche's logical mistake --or perhaps his deliberate strategy; I can't say which.

The statement "We can get along without God" does not entail the necessary premises. We can get along without a lot of things that also happen to exist. It further begs the question (one which Nietzsche himself actually raises) should we try to get along without God, even if we think we can? (This is a question which I see you are also struggling with: for were it not so, why retain any of the existential vestiges of Christianity that you are wanting to retain? I am not so inattentive as to be unable to notice your ambivalence about giving that up entirely: fair enough?)

In other words, is the early modern world a better place if it were severed from belief in God? That's by no means an easy question to answer, even for Nietzsche. This is why his madman convulses with such spasms of agony when he contemplates the universe without access to the God concept anymore.

Indeed, this is what has made him "mad," one might say. For he is not Nietzsche's calm, rational wise man. He is Nietzsche's raving lunatic prophet. And that was Nietzsche's own dramatic choice.

Obviously, Nietzsche could never have disproven that God existed,

"Obviously"?

Well let's see just how "obvious" that is. What are you supposing Nietzsche's premises for his claim would have been, if he'd ever stated them? Can you guess? Would he even have dared to try?

One could live in a Christian culture and be only a sort-of Christian, even if one called oneself that.

But why would one? If God is dead, and all that is merely a delusion, then who would be so foolish as to pretend it wasn't? How would that be a good "evolutionary" move, to lose contact with reality and begin to depend on things that simply are not so...even just for existential consolation?

Nietzsche enjoins us not to do that. We are to face the coldness and misery of a universe without God, and to seize that anyway, he thinks. But he would not at all admire those who might say, "Well, we could keep the concept of God around to do some work for us (sustain morality, impart meaning, give consolation, organize society, keep up our traditions, etc.) He would regard that as a signal failure to grasp that "the will to power" is all there is. No "übermensch" would ever talk like that.

Life -- biological life -- is brutal, unthinkingly cruel and direct, and simply absorbs death which simultaneously producing life. It doesn't care about death, nor does it care above 'evil'. In fact, in the natural world there is (obviously) no such thing as 'evil'. Death is not evil. The destruction of another life is not evil. These things are just a part of life

.
Nietzsche would agree. But in saying so, look at what he missed.

Look at the complexity and delicacy with which this world is created. True, it does not any longer bear the image of perfection; but that's just what Christianity freely says is the case. But while you are considering, say, how savage it is for a lion to kill a warthog or wildebeest (a thing which I have seen first hand, several times, and close up: believe me, brutal does not begin to describe it), why not consider everything?

Consider the majestic complexity of the design of the lion itself -- it's magnificent bone-structure, the rippling power of its muscles beneath the skin, it's rhythmic stalking of its prey, its extreme cunning and coordination with the pride. And consider the complexity of the wildebeest, too. Consider also the complexity of the savannah in which it all takes place, the sky above it, the universe beyond it. Or drill down into the minute details biology and genetics, with all the astronomical improbabilities of molecular and chemical balance. Consider all the minute and precise balances that make that brutal killing possible...it takes your breath away.

You see, it's a matter of perspective. You can notice the killing, or you can notice the miracle that there is anything at all alive to kill anything else, rather than a chaotic and empty universe -- which is statistically exactly what we should expect to exist.

And people say there's no evidence for God? I say they have no eyes in their head.

I gather from reading what you write that you (IMO) do not seem to have grasped these aspects,

I have grasped them. But I have also seen beyond them. Nietzsche is giving us a very slanted story, and inviting us to squint through his dark lens. His honesty, if such he has, is limited to his own chosen perspective -- chosen, manifestly, without the premises to support it.

Nietzsche suggested that God Had Died

No, no...he stated it as fact. He was not equivocal like that. This was no "suggestion." It was a challenge.

God is not seen, not understood.

...by Nietzsche. Yes. And we have no reason to doubt that.

But what basis has Nietzsche for thinking he knows what others can or cannot know, what they do or do not know, or what it is possible to know? Again, no premises from Nietzsche actually support that. Really, he's more of a poet than a philosopher. He sweeps people along with the rhythm of his rhetoric, at least as much as he persuades by any logical sequences.

You place all your apologetic effort in asserting that he merely declared God 'dead' but did not nor could not prove Him dead. But you miss the point.

Funny. For Nietzsche it WAS the point...the only point that mattered, really. For it was on this supposition alone that all the rest of what he wanted to say could be said at all.

If God is not actually "dead" (in any sense, metaphorical or literal), then we are not "beyond good and evil." We are not alone in a colder and darkening universe. We have done no "great deed," and have no need of the counsel of the madman. There is no übermensch. The will to power is not the deep truth of things. And the whole edifice of his philosophy -- everything for which modern and postmodern people have proclaimed him valuable -- collapses into dust.

There might be strong arguments in favor. One might become convinced. And one might then choose to align one's thelema with God as one meets God on an inner plane. But these are 100% issues of faith. Not of 'proof'.

As I said before, this would only be a criticism if "faith" and "proof" were opposites, and the existence of the one made the other irrelevant. But they are not: they are co-ordinated aspects of human knowing.

But again, if you mean "absolute proof," you'll have to look to pure mathematics: for outside of a closed system of symbols, with its terms already predefined for analytical reference, you will find no "proof" at all...least of all in empirical science, but certainly not in the existential world of human beings.

I am only trying to explain what happened within culture at a certain time.

I do understand. You are spinning out a history. I'm just suggesting that, though you don't know it, Nietzsche's sense of "history," which you are attempting to expound, is merely suppositional, merely revisionist. It's not true.

Look at it this way: after 1900, when Nietzsche died, did the madman's prophecy come true? Did the modern world swallow up God, so that nobody can possibly believe in Him now? Look at it objectively: is that how it is, when you look at society, or when you consider this conversation, even.

Now, you might say, "Well, all those people are hopelessly naive, hopelessly stupid, or badly indoctrinated." That is what you seem to be implying at the end of your last message, I think. However, since about 96% of the planet holds it at least possible that there is a God, and that about 92% think there probably is, there is some remarkable level of self-confidence necessary for saying so. You must be very, very "modern" indeed; and everybody else must be very, very primitive.

I do see that you have come to regard Nietzsche as some sort of overwhelming success. You believe what he has told you, pretty much, but want to reserve some little existential space to subvert his rejection of religion...keeping it around as a sort of "helpful existential phenomenon," in some vague way. In other words, you're too moral a person to be an actual Nietzschean. You are drawn to his position, and perhaps for that reason want to put up the strongest case you can for him: but you don't really like the full implications of what he said...and I don't blame you. However, that, in itself, would not be sufficient bulwark against having to believe him: once we buy into his fundamental premise, much of the rest follows by force of logical consequence.

Nietzsche might have been pleased to think you were so convinced by his rhetoric; but I doubt he'd have been pleased at all about your reservations and your personal strategy for trying to 'save' something from the corrosive implications of his Nihilism.

In fact, I know exactly what he would have said, for he did actually say this: "Swallow your poison; for you need it badly."

Meanwhile, I'm not at all sure it doesn't disturb you more than a little bit that a Christian can read Nietzsche and not find him a substantial threat. I realize that for any Nietzsche-believer, that is not supposed to happen. So some sort of ad hominem explanation is always required, if only to subdue the cognitive dissonance it occasions, something like, ""This person must not really get it."

Maybe I do.

[Alizia]

Me: It is not their responsibility to demonstrate nor to prove that the Christian concept of God is problematic...
You: Well, of course it is. And it is on the basis of logic, not merely because I say it is.

This is your area-of-error. God's existence cannot be known within the system of knowledge in which you desire to place it (to force it really). It is not comparable to many other different epistemological tenets that could be amenable to your proof.

You are mixing categories. The very solid idea of 'positive knowledge' runs through all science. Our world can be known and described through 'positive knowledge claims'. There, proof can be said to exist.

But this does not apply in the same way to the being of God, nor even of God and His effects.

It is another -- and a radically different -- epistemological domain.

This seems to me so simple. Yet I gather that you will not be able to agree.

That puzzles me.

Your other declarations about the majesty and genius of the world (as proof of a designer) move me to understand such. But at the same time (and this is important) if I based my comprehension of God on the material, physical and biological world I would define a very different sort of God!

And I suggest that Nietzsche was moved by a similar stance. Not the same, similar. And those who encounter Nietzsche and who 'resonate' with him do so because, they too, understand the ramifications of the contrast between a god-of-nature and the Christian God.