Do you believe or do you epoché?

[Gary Childress]

(2) is definition God so we cannot exclude it. So Your only problem could be with (1). Am I right?

Both premises are suspect. How do you define God at all? Do you look at something with your eyes and say, "ah. Yep. That's what God is?" Even to say God is absolute, what is meant by that? Absolute what?

Suppose a burning bush materialized in front of you and said, "I'm God." By what means would you extrapolate anything from that other than you saw a burning bush which spoke and said, "I'm God". Is the burning bush God? How would you go about verifying it? And what is "God"?

By Absolute I mean the best.

Best at what? Everything? Best checker player? Best at being God?

[bahman]

Best at everything.

[Justintruth]

When it comes to things that seem to be beyond all reasonable ability to know or verify--for example such as whether or not there is a God or whether or not there are "dimensions" to the world and our existences which transcend our average, every day experiences--do you have a belief one way or the other on such matters or do you find yourself like me, unable to decide one way or the other and therefore generally in a perpetual state of suspended judgement or "epoché" with respect to those things?

Your examples are atrocious, or at best naïve, and I will totally ignore them except to say you don't have a clue about what people are talking about when you write: "--for example such as whether or not there is a God or whether or not there are "dimensions" to the world and our existences which transcend our average, every day experiences--" You just have demonstrated a lack of understanding of the nature of those questions.

So I will respond instead to: "When it comes to things that seem to be beyond all reasonable ability to know or verify, do you have a belief one way or the other on such matters, or do you find yourself like me, unable to decide one way or the other and therefore generally in a perpetual state of suspended judgement or "epoché" with respect to those things?

It seems to me that you have answered the question. In other words, if you really are talking about: "...things that seem to be beyond all reasonable ability to know or verify.." then what choice have you, the knowledge that they are beyond all ability to know necessitates the epoche. Now actually, if by epoche, you are referring to Husserl, then you are wrong for his meaning of the term is very different. It is a setting aside of a question, in order to focus on another and has nothing to do with whether the former is "knowable". By Sartre, that knowledge had been lost and he believed that there was some claim that philosophy had transcended the idea of what he called "worlds behind the scenes" and were not focused on the reality of phenomena. For Husserl it was just a temporary suspension not a judgement.

There is wiggle room because you say "seem" which implies that potentially there is an "illusion" - something that "seems" one way but "isn't". But if you get rid of that and you have something that *is* "beyond all reasonable ability to verify" then you are saying that you can't make a judgement and how do you at that point decide to do what you just said you can't do?

But there is still wiggle room in that case that goes like this. It is in fact impossible to verify almost anything. How do you know that there isn't a grand illusion operating. Occam's razor does away with a lot of that. But in addition to that principle, you find that there are differences in "not knowing". You might not now whether any physical reality exists. Someone else may have done your laundry and put the clothes away and so you don't know which drawer they put the socks in. Those "not-knowings" are not the same. It is necessary to use some term to designate the fact that you do know which drawer they are in because you didn't do the laundry, from the case where you do know which drawer they are in because you did the laundry yourself. This is even though, in fact, is impossible to verify which drawer they are in because they may have quantum tunneled into another drawer or something, or because the universe may be such that there is an exception to the laws of physics that we don't know about and so they move etc.

So in many contexts it is still correct to say things like "I know that my socks are in the top drawer" and not just because you need to get them - not for operational reasons but just because there is a real distinction in the situation that needs expression. (Someday a neurologist will be able to tell the whether you know by looking at your brain. There is a reality of a fact as to whether you do or not)

Even if you are talking about socks you will never ever use you need to distinguish between the state of not knowing which drawer they are in from knowing which drawer they are in even given the physical and epistemic realizations that you don't know ultimately.

Just saying "I don't know" because of the physical and or epistemic realizations does not capture the further distinctions in possible states of knowing. You need to express those and the ordinary language definitions allow you to do that using something like "Yea, I know my socks are in the top drawer because I just put them there" vs "No, I don't know which drawer they are in because the new maid put them away and she is forgetful of where I want them."

So no, I don't stay in the epoche when I am talking about knowledge in a sense in which there are facts that need expression even though philosophical or physical doubt is also there. Perhaps, technically, I should say "very probably" but that has its own problems.

[roydop]

When it comes to things that seem to be beyond all reasonable ability to know or verify--for example such as whether or not there is a God or whether or not there are "dimensions" to the world and our existences which transcend our average, every day experiences--do you have a belief one way or the other on such matters or do you find yourself like me, unable to decide one way or the other and therefore generally in a perpetual state of suspended judgement or "epoché" with respect to those things?

Why judge? There's another option: non-conceptualization. Just observe.

Truth is self evident, and therefore impossible to believe in.

[Age]

When it comes to things that seem to be beyond all reasonable ability to know or verify--for example such as whether or not there is a God or whether or not there are "dimensions" to the world and our existences which transcend our average, every day experiences--do you have a belief one way or the other on such matters or do you find yourself like me, unable to decide one way or the other and therefore generally in a perpetual state of suspended judgement or "epoché" with respect to those things?

But NONE of those thing are beyond all reasonable ability to know or verify.

In FACT they have all already be resolved, and thus are already KNOWN.

I'll take that as "no", you don't epoché.

As long as you also 'know', that I neither believe, nor disbelieve?

[Gary Childress]

When it comes to things that seem to be beyond all reasonable ability to know or verify--for example such as whether or not there is a God or whether or not there are "dimensions" to the world and our existences which transcend our average, every day experiences--do you have a belief one way or the other on such matters or do you find yourself like me, unable to decide one way or the other and therefore generally in a perpetual state of suspended judgement or "epoché" with respect to those things?

Your examples are atrocious, or at best naïve, and I will totally ignore them except to say you don't have a clue about what people are talking about when you write: "--for example such as whether or not there is a God or whether or not there are "dimensions" to the world and our existences which transcend our average, every day experiences--" You just have demonstrated a lack of understanding of the nature of those questions.

So I will respond instead to: "When it comes to things that seem to be beyond all reasonable ability to know or verify, do you have a belief one way or the other on such matters, or do you find yourself like me, unable to decide one way or the other and therefore generally in a perpetual state of suspended judgement or "epoché" with respect to those things?

It seems to me that you have answered the question. In other words, if you really are talking about: "...things that seem to be beyond all reasonable ability to know or verify.." then what choice have you, the knowledge that they are beyond all ability to know necessitates the epoche. Now actually, if by epoche, you are referring to Husserl, then you are wrong for his meaning of the term is very different. It is a setting aside of a question, in order to focus on another and has nothing to do with whether the former is "knowable". By Sartre, that knowledge had been lost and he believed that there was some claim that philosophy had transcended the idea of what he called "worlds behind the scenes" and were not focused on the reality of phenomena. For Husserl it was just a temporary suspension not a judgement.

There is wiggle room because you say "seem" which implies that potentially there is an "illusion" - something that "seems" one way but "isn't". But if you get rid of that and you have something that *is* "beyond all reasonable ability to verify" then you are saying that you can't make a judgement and how do you at that point decide to do what you just said you can't do?

But there is still wiggle room in that case that goes like this. It is in fact impossible to verify almost anything. How do you know that there isn't a grand illusion operating. Occam's razor does away with a lot of that. But in addition to that principle, you find that there are differences in "not knowing". You might not now whether any physical reality exists. Someone else may have done your laundry and put the clothes away and so you don't know which drawer they put the socks in. Those "not-knowings" are not the same. It is necessary to use some term to designate the fact that you do know which drawer they are in because you didn't do the laundry, from the case where you do know which drawer they are in because you did the laundry yourself. This is even though, in fact, is impossible to verify which drawer they are in because they may have quantum tunneled into another drawer or something, or because the universe may be such that there is an exception to the laws of physics that we don't know about and so they move etc.

So in many contexts it is still correct to say things like "I know that my socks are in the top drawer" and not just because you need to get them - not for operational reasons but just because there is a real distinction in the situation that needs expression. (Someday a neurologist will be able to tell the whether you know by looking at your brain. There is a reality of a fact as to whether you do or not)

Even if you are talking about socks you will never ever use you need to distinguish between the state of not knowing which drawer they are in from knowing which drawer they are in even given the physical and epistemic realizations that you don't know ultimately.

Just saying "I don't know" because of the physical and or epistemic realizations does not capture the further distinctions in possible states of knowing. You need to express those and the ordinary language definitions allow you to do that using something like "Yea, I know my socks are in the top drawer because I just put them there" vs "No, I don't know which drawer they are in because the new maid put them away and she is forgetful of where I want them."

So no, I don't stay in the epoche when I am talking about knowledge in a sense in which there are facts that need expression even though philosophical or physical doubt is also there. Perhaps, technically, I should say "very probably" but that has its own problems.

So if someone asked you whether or not there is a God, how would you respond? Is there a God, is there not a God or do you consider the question unknowable--at least from your place in the world? I'm very familiar with Husserl's use of the word "epoche" BTW. It's not the only way the word can be used.

[Gary Childress]

But NONE of those thing are beyond all reasonable ability to know or verify.

In FACT they have all already be resolved, and thus are already KNOWN.

I'll take that as "no", you don't epoché.

As long as you also 'know', that I neither believe, nor disbelieve?

You neither believe nor disbelieve in things that have "already been resolved" and "thus are already known?" Sounds rather counter intuitive. Can you explain?

[Immanuel Can]

When it comes to things that seem to be beyond all reasonable ability to know or verify--for example such as whether or not there is a God or whether or not there are "dimensions" to the world and our existences which transcend our average, every day experiences--do you have a belief one way or the other on such matters or do you find yourself like me, unable to decide one way or the other and therefore generally in a perpetual state of suspended judgement or "epoché" with respect to those things?

Well, to back up one step, Gary, how would we decide it was "beyond all reasonable ability" to know a thing (such as whether or not there is a God or dimensions)? Is that, in itself, a knowledge claim or a belief of some kind? What is the precise justification of the "seeming" to which you refer?

If it's not decided on a knowledge basis, are you, in all consistency, therefore irremediably epoché about your own question? Or have you instead decided that it is so, but without recourse to evidence?

[Gary Childress]

When it comes to things that seem to be beyond all reasonable ability to know or verify--for example such as whether or not there is a God or whether or not there are "dimensions" to the world and our existences which transcend our average, every day experiences--do you have a belief one way or the other on such matters or do you find yourself like me, unable to decide one way or the other and therefore generally in a perpetual state of suspended judgement or "epoché" with respect to those things?

Well, to back up one step, Gary, how would we decide it was "beyond all reasonable ability" to know a thing (such as whether or not there is a God or dimensions)? Is that, in itself, a knowledge claim or a belief of some kind? What is the precise justification of the "seeming" to which you refer?

If it's not decided on a knowledge basis, are you, in all consistency, therefore irremediably epoché about your own question? Or have you instead decided that it is so, but without recourse to evidence?

I can't imagine a scenario in this world that would demonstrate beyond doubt that there is a God or not a God. Note the words "seem to be beyond all reasonable ability to know" as opposed to saying "are beyond all reasonable ability to know". I can only speak for myself and I don't rule out the possibility that such a scenario could transpire as such that it would, by some as yet inconceivable way, be made manifest that there either is or is not a God. However, I have no idea what such a scenario would be. Therefore I exercise caution and use of the word "seem".

[Gary Childress]

When it comes to things that seem to be beyond all reasonable ability to know or verify--for example such as whether or not there is a God or whether or not there are "dimensions" to the world and our existences which transcend our average, every day experiences--do you have a belief one way or the other on such matters or do you find yourself like me, unable to decide one way or the other and therefore generally in a perpetual state of suspended judgement or "epoché" with respect to those things?

Why judge? There's another option: non-conceptualization. Just observe.

Truth is self evident, and therefore impossible to believe in.

I'm not judging. I'm saying, I don't know the answer. That's what I mean by saying "suspended judgement". I'm not judging. I'm suspending it.

[Immanuel Can]

I can't imagine a scenario in this world that would demonstrate beyond doubt that there is a God or not a God.

Well, Gary, who set the standard as "beyond doubt"? Everything we say we "know," we actually know with far less certainty than that, except perhaps (as per Descartes) one's own existence, but even then as no more than disembodied consciousness. If we can't "know" without having established that a thing is actually "beyond doubt," we actually know nothing. Is that not so?

But if so, then on what basis are you something other than epoché about the question itself?

Note the words "seem to be beyond all reasonable ability to know" as opposed to saying "are beyond all reasonable ability to know".

Well, yes, of course. I trust you'll note I did give you credit for saying "seeming," but then I also asked you about the justification of the "seeming." For surely we're not saying that if something merely "seems" so then we have a strong premise from which to launch the question...are we? So you must be saying, "seems with significant strength" of some kind. But what would that significant strength, that justification be? So I would ask again, on what basis, then, do you affirm that it "seems" so? How strong is that basis?

I can only speak for myself and I don't rule out the possibility that such a scenario could transpire as such that it would, by some as yet inconceivable way, be made manifest that there either is or is not a God. However, I have no idea what such a scenario would be. Therefore I exercise caution and use of the word "seem".

Fair enough; caution is always a good idea, and we can't take issue with intellectual humility, of course. However, if, as you assert, you're "only speaking for yourself," and yet "don't rule out the contrary possibility," then how do you evaluate the relative strength of the first in comparison to the second? Again, you must have some warrant, surely, for asserting the premise of your question, no? And surely your supposition cannot be one of the following:

1. That what Gary doesn't happen to know at this moment, he can't come to know.

2. That what Gary doesn't happen to know, nobody else can possibly know either.

or

3. That a thing that admittedly only "seems", and only to Gary (since, as you note, you aren't proposing to speak for others), forms a sound basis for further premises strong enough to form the basis of an argument -- and that such an argument is sufficiently strong that rational others should be inclined to respond (since you're putting this argument on a forum, obviously).

Something's not adding up there, Gary. Or is this "seeming" to which you refer stronger in some way than you have yet said?

[Gary Childress]

I can't imagine a scenario in this world that would demonstrate beyond doubt that there is a God or not a God.

Well, Gary, who set the standard as "beyond doubt"? Everything we say we "know," we actually know with far less certainty than that, except perhaps (as per Descartes) one's own existence, but even then as no more than disembodied consciousness. If we can't "know" without having established that a thing is actually "beyond doubt," we actually know nothing. Is that not so?

But if so, then on what basis are you something other than epoché about the question itself?

Note the words "seem to be beyond all reasonable ability to know" as opposed to saying "are beyond all reasonable ability to know".

Well, yes, of course. I trust you'll note I did give you credit for saying "seeming," but then I also asked you about the justification of the "seeming." For surely we're not saying that if something merely "seems" so then we have a strong premise from which to launch the question...are we? So you must be saying, "seems with significant strength" of some kind. But what would that significant strength, that justification be? So I would ask again, on what basis, then, do you affirm that it "seems" so? How strong is that basis?

I can only speak for myself and I don't rule out the possibility that such a scenario could transpire as such that it would, by some as yet inconceivable way, be made manifest that there either is or is not a God. However, I have no idea what such a scenario would be. Therefore I exercise caution and use of the word "seem".

Fair enough; caution is always a good idea, and we can't take issue with intellectual humility, of course. However, if, as you assert, you're "only speaking for yourself," and yet "don't rule out the contrary possibility," then how do you evaluate the relative strength of the first in comparison to the second? Again, you must have some warrant, surely, for asserting the premise of your question, no? And surely your supposition cannot be one of the following:

1. That what Gary doesn't happen to know at this moment, he can't come to know.

2. That what Gary doesn't happen to know, nobody else can possibly know either.

or

3. That a thing that admittedly only "seems", and only to Gary (since, as you note, you aren't proposing to speak for others), forms a sound basis for further premises strong enough to form the basis of an argument -- and that such an argument is sufficiently strong that rational others should be inclined to respond (since you're putting this argument on a forum, obviously).

Something's not adding up there, Gary. Or is this "seeming" to which you refer stronger in some way than you have yet said?

We're humans living among other humans. We have language with which to share ideas and experiences. In putting the statement on a forum I invite others to share any scenario in which they know there is a God or not a God. And if they explain it to me and it indeed seems indubitable that there is a God or not a God, then I will agree. So far that hasn't happened.

[Immanuel Can]

We're humans living among other humans. We have language with which to share ideas and experiences. In putting the statement on a forum I invite others to share any scenario in which they know there is a God or not a God.

Okay, but you did phrase the "God" question as one of two examples of something that it "seems" we are indefinitely unable to "know." You didn't ask if we thought there is a God, or what evidence anybody had for a God, but rather instantly defaulted to the supposition it was an example of the "unknowable," as it "seems." Or was that not actually the question you were trying to pose? Would you prefer to reword, if so?

I've also noted you're a reasonably pleasant and thoughtful person, so I would imagine you have some idea of what you meant by "knowing." And, as I suggested in the last message, that you wouldn't believe that "beyond doubt" was a good description of what human beings can possibly mean by "knowing."

But if so, how is it that the God question, or the dimensions question (your own examples) are presumed to be beyond "knowing"?

And if they explain it to me and it indeed seems indubitable that there is a God or not a God, then I will agree. So far that hasn't happened.

I don't doubt that all this is true. And likely, nobody has explained to you what the capital city of Eritrea is. But I don't suppose you're epoché about there being an Eritrea, even though you've probably never been there, most likely wouldn't know where to find it on a map, and haven't ever heard of the city of Asmara.

So none of that provides justification for the question. Is it not so that there might well be people who DO know about God (or about dimensions of the universe, even)? In fact, while the latter would be uncommon, about 96% of the world's population are not atheists. So how do the atheists become so certain that what "seems" to them is rational to attribute also to others, absent sufficient evidence to warrant such an example?

But if the God/dimensions are as problematic and limited as you are now suggesting, then can you give a better example of some things that "are beyond all reasonable ability to know or verify," to use your precise terms? And when you get them, why would anybody "believe" in something for which no evidence, knowledge or rational inducement to "believe" exists? And if the inducements to believe a thing are known not to be rational, as your question seems to require, then in what sense can we accuse a person of actually "believing" in them? (For your question requires that they must "know," no matter what they may say, that the "believed" things are "beyond all reasonable ability to know or verify.")

I'm not trying to be obtuse, Gary: I'm trying to hold up a mirror to the question. It seems to me to be premised on suppositions in need of careful second thought.

[Gary Childress]

We're humans living among other humans. We have language with which to share ideas and experiences. In putting the statement on a forum I invite others to share any scenario in which they know there is a God or not a God.

Okay, but you did phrase the "God" question as one of two examples of something that it "seems" we are indefinitely unable to "know." You didn't ask if we thought there is a God, or what evidence anybody had for a God, but rather instantly defaulted to the supposition it was an example of the "unknowable," as it "seems." Or was that not actually the question you were trying to pose? Would you prefer to reword, if so?

I've also noted you're a reasonably pleasant and thoughtful person, so I would imagine you have some idea of what you meant by "knowing." And, as I suggested in the last message, that you wouldn't believe that "beyond doubt" was a good description of what human beings can possibly mean by "knowing."

But if so, how is it that the God question, or the dimensions question (your own examples) are presumed to be beyond "knowing"?

And if they explain it to me and it indeed seems indubitable that there is a God or not a God, then I will agree. So far that hasn't happened.

I don't doubt that all this is true. And likely, nobody has explained to you what the capital city of Eritrea is. But I don't suppose you're epoché about there being an Eritrea, even though you've probably never been there, most likely wouldn't know where to find it on a map, and haven't ever heard of the city of Asmara.

So none of that provides justification for the question. Is it not so that there might well be people who DO know about God (or about dimensions of the universe, even)? In fact, while the latter would be uncommon, about 96% of the world's population are not atheists. So how do the atheists become so certain that what "seems" to them is rational to attribute also to others, absent sufficient evidence to warrant such an example?

But if the God/dimensions are as problematic and limited as you are now suggesting, then can you give a better example of some things that "are beyond all reasonable ability to know or verify," to use your precise terms? And when you get them, why would anybody "believe" in something for which no evidence, knowledge or rational inducement to "believe" exists? And if the inducements to believe a thing are known not to be rational, as your question seems to require, then in what sense can we accuse a person of actually "believing" in them? (For your question requires that they must "know," no matter what they may say, that the "believed" things are "beyond all reasonable ability to know or verify.")

I'm not trying to be obtuse, Gary: I'm trying to hold up a mirror to the question. It seems to me to be premised on suppositions in need of careful second thought.

What suppositions need careful second thought? I'm not following your line of thought here.

[Age]

I'll take that as "no", you don't epoché.

As long as you also 'know', that I neither believe, nor disbelieve?

You neither believe nor disbelieve in things that have "already been resolved" and "thus are already known?"

I neither believe nor disbelieve in ANY thing.

Sounds rather counter intuitive. Can you explain?

Yes easy.

It is very easy to KNOW some thing but NOT having to believe it.

For example I KNOW the thoughts within this body have a VIEW that human beings NEED relatively clean air, that is; if they want to keep on existing. But I do NOT believe this because some one might come along and SHOW otherwise. Someone might SHOW with evidence that human beings can keep polluting the air on earth and still can keep living. From what I have observed and seen/understood, up to now, is that human beings need clean air if they do want to keep on living. This is the VIEW that I have now, but if I BELIEVED that this is true, right, and/or correct, then I would NOT be open to any other VIEWS that come along.

By definition one only believes 'that' what IS IS true, right, and/or correct, to them. If one believed some thing was true, then obviously they could NOT be open to any thing showing otherwise. While one is BELIEVING, then they can NOT, literally, be OPEN.

So, what may seem rather counter intuitive, at first glance, is not always the case.