Immanuel Did wrote: ↑Thu Dec 13, 2018 4:29 pm
The challenge presented earlier was whether or not moves in a game of chess are assumptions or value judgements.
Since this is the main premise logical positivists use to explain their philosophical perspective by analogy it needs to be coherent and without flaw to deliver an accurate notion of reality.
I pointed out that there are legal moves in chess that could not be considered moves you make during your turn. Thus overturning this assumption that language follows rules similarly to chess.
If there are moves we can make that are within the rules but outside of the boundaries of our idea of the game then the analogy is not appropriate to identify with language.
It is this reason that Wittgenstein later contradicted his own work learning the folley of it. It is this reason that post-structuralist philosophy thrived overthrowing the shortcoming of rigid linguistic relativists/determinists.
1 I agree that the logical positivist position - partly reached because they misinterpreted the Tractatus - is untenable, and that Wittgenstein came to see his earlier mistake. I am decidedly a 'later Wittgensteinian'.
2 Post-structuralism was a catastrophic development from Saussure's original blunder in bifurcating the sign into signifier and signified. And the later Wittgenstein's approach was and remains the cure.
The main reason it is incoherent is because of the normative standard of evaluation within his system known as the verification principle.
The verificatin principle dictates that only analytic statements and verifiable synthetic statements are meaninful. Thus rendering it's own standard invalid.
Your standard says metaphysics, ethics, and religion is meaningless but if this standard is followed the philosophical perspective renders itself invalid along with these other subjects.
I've never said the claims of metaphysics, ethics and religion are meaningless - and I'm wondering why you think I have.
With regard to ethics - or more precisely morality - my argument is that moral assertions aren't factual, so that the assertions 'slavery is wrong' and 'the earth orbits the sun' have completely different functions. But moral assertions can be meaningful.
With regard to religion, to the extent that religious assertions are factual, they require objective justification, as do any factual assertions. But that isn't to say religious assertions are meaningless. Again - an absurd idea.
And with regard to metaphysics, I believe it is founded on a radical misunderstanding of the function of abstract nouns: treating them as the names of supposed abstract things which, because they are supposedly things, may or may not exist, and may be describable. Such descriptions are meaningful, but tendentious and unjustified.
There are notions within your own perspective when you have to violate your own fact-value distinction/ought-is problem to make a rational or coherent statement/thought (such as Hume did).
This is a claim. Please give a clear example of such a violation to back it up.
Your philosophy doesn't allow for ethics (because of reasons mentioned earlier) however if it can be shown to be contradictory, insufficient, incoherent, and self-violating then objective morality is possible.
1 This is false. I think moral discourse and values are immensely important. You've completely misunderstood my philosophy.
2 Why would the supposed inadequacy of my philosophy mean that objective morality is possible? If there's no way to account for and justify objectivity, why do you claim morality could be objective - that there could be moral facts? This looks like a contradiction.
