What could make morality objective?

[Logik]

The problem seems to be terminological.

Obviously. In our linguistic practices we use terms to speak about reality, so we disagree about terminology.

I define a factual assertion as one that makes a falsifiable claim about a feature of reality. The term distinguishes factual from non-factual assertions.

So a factual assertion may be true or false. And we call the true ones: facts. (I've defined a fact as a true factual assertion. Obviously, if 'factual assertion' means 'fact', the modifier 'true' in 'true factual assertion' would be redundant - tautological.)

You have failed to address my direct concerns.

If a "true factual assertion" is "true regardless of what anyone believes or claims to know" then it cannot possibly be false or falsifiable!

You cannot falsify features of reality. You can only falsify erroneous beliefs about features of reality.

[Peter Holmes]

The problem seems to be terminological.

Obviously. In our linguistic practices we use terms to speak about reality, so we disagree about terminology.

I define a factual assertion as one that makes a falsifiable claim about a feature of reality. The term distinguishes factual from non-factual assertions.

So a factual assertion may be true or false. And we call the true ones: facts. (I've defined a fact as a true factual assertion. Obviously, if 'factual assertion' means 'fact', the modifier 'true' in 'true factual assertion' would be redundant - tautological.)

You have failed to address my direct concerns.

If a "true factual assertion" is "true regardless of what anyone believes or claims to know" then it cannot possibly be false or falsifiable!

You cannot falsify features of reality. You can only falsify erroneous beliefs about features of reality.

Sorry, but you're misreading the explanation I've just given. Not sure how else I can explain it. Your last sentence is true, of course.

You're identifying 'factual assertion' with 'fact'. And I've explained the difference between them.

[Logik]

The problem seems to be terminological.

Obviously. In our linguistic practices we use terms to speak about reality, so we disagree about terminology.

I define a factual assertion as one that makes a falsifiable claim about a feature of reality. The term distinguishes factual from non-factual assertions.

So a factual assertion may be true or false. And we call the true ones: facts. (I've defined a fact as a true factual assertion. Obviously, if 'factual assertion' means 'fact', the modifier 'true' in 'true factual assertion' would be redundant - tautological.)

You have failed to address my direct concerns.

If a "true factual assertion" is "true regardless of what anyone believes or claims to know" then it cannot possibly be false or falsifiable!

You cannot falsify features of reality. You can only falsify erroneous beliefs about features of reality.

Sorry, but you're misreading the explanation I've just given. Not sure how else I can explain it. Your last sentence is true, of course.

You're identifying 'factual assertion' with 'fact'. And I've explained the difference between them.

Ah indeed, that distinction you draw was lost on me.

So is the claim “There are 9 planets in the Solar system” a factual assertion or a fact?

[Peter Holmes]

It's a factual assertion, because it makes a falsifiable claim about a feature of reality that may not be the case.

If there are indeed 9 planets in our solar system, then it's a true factual assertion, which we call a fact. If the number of planets is not 9, then it's a false factual assertion.

Whether we believe or know it's true or false is irrelevant. That has no bearing whatsoever on its truth-value. Just as the fact that we used to think the earth is flat had no bearing whatsoever on the truth-value of the factual assertion 'the earth is flat'.

A factual assertion is true or false regardless of what anyone believes or claims to know.

[Logik]

It's a factual assertion, because it makes a falsifiable claim about a feature of reality that may not be the case.

If there are indeed 9 planets in our solar system, then it's a true factual assertion, which we call a fact. If the number of planets is not 9, then it's a false factual assertion.

Whether we believe or know it's true or false is irrelevant. That has no bearing whatsoever on its truth-value. Just as the fact that we used to think the earth is flat had no bearing whatsoever on the truth-value of the factual assertion 'the earth is flat'.

A factual assertion is true or false regardless of what anyone believes or claims to know.

Ok. I give up.

You keep mixing up your definitions of “fact” and “factual assertion” and using one instead of the other contradicting your own definitions.

Something being “falsifiable” contradicts the notion of “true or false regardless of what anyone believes”.

Falsifiability is about beliefs, not facts.

Either you insist on obscurantism or you are unable to see your own inconsistency. It seems your position is contingent on brushing this inconsistency under the carpet.

[Immanuel Did]

Re: Peter Holmes

I'm appealing to analytical philosophy to justify what I can know and not know.

Since I believe you are arguing from a Positivist position as extended from Humean notions I'm going to posit that your assumption of knowledge rests upon the verification principle.

Logical positivism asserts that only positive statements (statements based upon empirical evidence) are meaningful. So, if the verification principle is normative (an evaluative standard), then it is not meaningful. In the same way statements about ethics, religion, or aesthetics are.

The issue is: logical positivists say that analytic statements are meaningful, that verifiable synthetic statements are meaningful and crucially, that nothing else is meaningful (which would entail the verification principle itself).

[Logik]

Re: Peter Holmes

I'm appealing to analytical philosophy to justify what I can know and not know.

Since I believe you are arguing from a Positivist position as extended from Humean notions I'm going to posit that your assumption of knowledge rests upon the verification principle.

Logical positivism asserts that only positive statements (statements based upon empirical evidence) are meaningful. So, if the verification principle is normative (an evaluative standard), then it is not meaningful. In the same way statements about ethics, religion, or aesthetics are.

The issue is: logical positivists say that analytic statements are meaningful, that verifiable synthetic statements are meaningful and crucially, that nothing else is meaningful (which would entail the verification principle itself).

The positivist forgot to address who the statement is meaningful to.

Objectively meaningful statements independent from a subject with shared knowledge are a misnomer.

They pre-suppose too much. Shared language. Shared meaning. Shared experience. Shared thought process.

Symbol/term interpretation is key.

[Peter Holmes]

It's a factual assertion, because it makes a falsifiable claim about a feature of reality that may not be the case.

If there are indeed 9 planets in our solar system, then it's a true factual assertion, which we call a fact. If the number of planets is not 9, then it's a false factual assertion.

Whether we believe or know it's true or false is irrelevant. That has no bearing whatsoever on its truth-value. Just as the fact that we used to think the earth is flat had no bearing whatsoever on the truth-value of the factual assertion 'the earth is flat'.

A factual assertion is true or false regardless of what anyone believes or claims to know.

Ok. I give up.

You keep mixing up your definitions of “fact” and “factual assertion” and using one instead of the other contradicting your own definitions.

Something being “falsifiable” contradicts the notion of “true or false regardless of what anyone believes”.

Falsifiability is about beliefs, not facts.

Either you insist on obscurantism or you are unable to see your own inconsistency. It seems your position is contingent on brushing this inconsistency under the carpet.

Oh, I thought you had it. I haven't mixed up my definitions of 'factual assertion' and 'fact' (true factual assertion). It's a factual assertion that's falsifiable. But a true factual assertion is obviously not falsifiable, because it's true - it's a fact. I don't understand why this is so hard. But I'm happy to leave it there. Thanks.

[Logik]

Oh, I thought you had it. I haven't mixed up my definitions of 'factual assertion' and 'fact' (true factual assertion). It's a factual assertion that's falsifiable. But a true factual assertion is obviously not falsifiable, because it's true - it's a fact. I don't understand why this is so hard. But I'm happy to leave it there. Thanks.

It is hard because your use of the words 'fact' and 'factual' seems very disconnected and causes confusion.

You have repeatedly said "I define a fact as a true factual assertion". Which is clearly an indication that you recognise both "true factual assertions" and "false factual assertions". And it is clear that a "false factual assertion" is NOT a fact, whereas a "true factual assertion" is a fact.

This is as far as I have gotten linguistically. Now, in order to understand your meaning I am asking you to give me an example of a 'true factual assertion' and an example of a 'false factual assertion', because ultimately what I want to understand is whether my claim (There are 9 planets in the Solar system) is a "true factual assertion" or a "false factual assertion" ?

And, I anticipate that you are probably going to say something like "If there are 9 planets in the solar system then it's a fact. If there are 10 planets in the Solar system then it's not a fact". Which would be beating around the bush.

I am asking you for a "true factual assertion" on the number of planets in the Solar system!

[Peter Holmes]

Oh, I thought you had it. I haven't mixed up my definitions of 'factual assertion' and 'fact' (true factual assertion). It's a factual assertion that's falsifiable. But a true factual assertion is obviously not falsifiable, because it's true - it's a fact. I don't understand why this is so hard. But I'm happy to leave it there. Thanks.

It is hard because your use of the words 'fact' and 'factual' seems very disconnected and causes confusion.

You have repeatedly said "I define a fact as a true factual assertion". Which is clearly an indication that you recognise both "true factual assertions" and "false factual assertions". And it is clear that a "false factual assertion" is NOT a fact, whereas a "true factual assertion" is a fact.

The word 'indication' puzzles me. I've stated very clearly that factual assertions may be true or false. I use the word 'factual' to characterise assertions that make factual claims, and to distinguish them from assertions that don't make factual claims, which I call non-factual assertions.

So 'assertions' is the set containing two kinds of assertion: factual assertions and non-factual assertions. And 'factual assertions' is the set containing true and false factual assertions. (And the word we use to name a true factual assertion is 'fact'.)

And so I am particularly curious about your use of the word "factual" in the sentence "false factual assertion".

I hope the above clears this up.

This is as far as I have gotten linguistically. Now, in order to understand your meaning I am asking you to give me an example of a 'true factual assertion' and an example of a 'false factual assertion'.

True factual assertion: the earth orbits the sun. (This is a fact.)
False factual assertion: the sun orbits the earth. (This a factual assertion, because it claims something about a feature of reality. But it's false.)

And I am still no closer to understanding whether my claim (There are 9 planets in the Solar system) a "true factual assertion" or a "false factual assertion" ?

I explained this in one of my recent comments. By all means quote my explanation and show why it's unclear - in which case I'll humbly apologise.

[Logik]

True factual assertion: the earth orbits the sun. (This is a fact.)

So no amount of new evidence can falsify this fact?

I am simply gauging your dogmatism here...

[Peter Holmes]

True factual assertion: the earth orbits the sun. (This is a fact.)

So no amount of new evidence can falsify this fact?

I am simply gauging your dogmatism here...

I'm using the words 'fact' and 'truth' in the way we ordinarily use them. What sort of metaphysical perfection are you after?

If it turns out that the earth doesn't orbit the sun, then 'the earth orbits the sun' was never a fact in the first place. And we would have been mistaken to think it was.

If your point is that what we understand about features of reality must always be provisional, so that what we call facts (true factual assertions about features of reality) may turn out not to be facts - then so what? That has no bearing whatsoever on the truth-value of those assertions.

Do you think 'the earth is flat' used to be a fact - a true factual assertion?

There's a difference between the truth-value of factual assertions and our knowledge of the features of reality we describe by means of factual assertions. But again - so what?

[Logik]

I'm using the words 'fact' and 'truth' in the way we ordinarily use them. What sort of metaphysical perfection are you after?

I am not pursuing metaphysics. I am pursuing consistency in your taxonomy. "Facts are unfalsifiable" is your claim.

If it turns out that the earth doesn't orbit the sun, then 'the earth orbits the sun' was never a fact in the first place. And we would have been mistaken to think it was.

And you don't see that as problematic? "The Earth Orbits around the sun" is either a fact or it's not (according to your definition).

You can't tell which one it is.

If your point is that what we understand about features of reality must always be provisional, so that what we call facts (true factual assertions about features of reality) may turn out not to be facts - then so what? That has no bearing whatsoever on the truth-value of those assertions.

Of course it does! Confusing falsify for truth will have a bearing on the truth-value of your assertions!

Do you think 'the earth is flat' used to be a fact - a true factual assertion?

False equivalence! You are asking this question a posteriori of all the knowledge at your disposal.

You can no more ask me "do you think the Earth used to be a flat" in 1100 A.D, then I can ask you "do you think the Earth will still be round" in year 5000?

[Immanuel Did]

The issue with Peter's epistemological perspective (I'm assuming because he hasn't really clarified much for me).

The is-ought problem utilizes a mechanism of inference that you cannot develop an ought from an is. This mechanism of inference can be turned upon itself from the fact that Hume is telling us what ought is and is not.

Fact-value distinction (what is true vs. what is right). Hume in his problem of induction freely explains how the concept of science doesn't translate into scientific fact. It's odd to see the originator of this work come to two seemingly different outcomes when faced with two seemingly different issues.

Logical positive reinforcement of what constitutes meaningful statements. Once again, according to positivists only positive, analytic, and verifiable synthetic statements are meaningful. Using their own (normative) verification principle the standard for discernment has now been rendered invalidated by their own worldview.

Since the is-ought problem is about normative (what it ought to be) and positive (what it is) statements I'm curious how you cross your own gap to present any positive or meaningful statements or conclusions within this framework.

If faced with a Munchausen Trillema I find that the only way out will be a circular or regressive argument.

[Logik]

If faced with a Munchausen Trillema I find that the only way out will be a circular or regressive argument.

That is a value-judgment. There is no way out of the Trillema.