What could make morality objective?

[surreptitious57]

You asked the Yes / No question : Does the universe exist ? You answered : Yes

Reality is mind independent and does not require minds in order for it to exist
Logically and empirically therefore the Universe cannot be a mental construct

[TimeSeeker]

Reality is mind independent and does not require minds in order for it to exist

Yeah, but I've never heard reality say out loud "I am mind independent!" or "I exist!". Humans do that.

And so while reality may be mind-independent the WORDS and CONCEPTS for 'reality' are not!
And let me assure you, what is in your head is not reality, it is a MODEL-MAP OF reality. Reality itself is faaaar to big to fit in our tiny heads

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Map–territory_relation

[TimeSeeker]

The Universe existed long before human beings and formal systems of logic ever did.

Indeed. But the utterance "The Universe" didn't exist right until HUMANS invented it.
Linguistic OR Mathematical DESCRIPTIONS OF the universe did not exist until HUMANS invented them.

And so while you area speaking a LANGUAGE you are using LOGIC.

Logic (from the Ancient Greek: λογική, translit. logikḗ[1]), originally meaning "the word" or "what is spoken".

Before you can learn to think, first you must learn to speak So choose your LOGIC carefully.

[Peter Holmes]

Just a sidebar on the consequence of rejecting moral objectivism.

My argument is that morality isn’t objective – that there are no moral facts, but only moral judgements.

One conclusion is that, if there are no moral facts, we have to be resigned to moral relativism or moral nihilism – or abandon morality altogether.

Of course, that these seem unpalatable alternatives provides no justification for objectivism. To claim that it does is to argue fallaciously from undesirable consequences.

But I suggest both meta-ethical moral relativism and moral nihilism are in themselves flawed theories, haunted by the objectivism they reject.

If there are no moral facts, it follows that moral judgements are not objectively right or wrong, and that nothing is intrinsically or inherently right or wrong. So meta-ethical relativism and nihilism are trivially true and inconsequential.

The correct conclusion is not that we can’t make moral judgements, or have confidence in them. On the contrary, it means we can make them, precisely because there are no moral facts – but that there can and always will be moral debate and development. That is our predicament.

[TimeSeeker]

Just a sidebar on the consequence of rejecting moral objectivism.

My argument is that morality isn’t objective – that there are no moral facts, but only moral judgements.

One conclusion is that, if there are no moral facts, we have to be resigned to moral relativism or moral nihilism – or abandon morality altogether.

Note that throughout our discussion you failed to address the temporal dimension.
And so I have a particular example: If you turn on the kettle the water will boil in 10 minutes.

According to your taxonomy: Is this a fact or a judgment?
To me it's a fact. It is possible to speak of probabilistic future events as factual.

In general: "If X then Y is highly likely" is ALWAYS a claim about the FUTURE EXPECTATIONS.

And so: If SOMETHING will result in 15% decrease in murders across society in 5 years then this SOMETHING is a moral fact today!

This SOMETHING is a law which decrees murder as "illegal" and punishes murderers. It's not about revenge, or punishing the murderer. It's about the 15% decrease in murders in 5 years.

[creativesoul]

The objective/subjective distinction is fraught...

Morality is best put in terms and thus thought about as a human condition. Morality, as currently defined by convention, is a code of conduct. All codes of conduct are influenced by individual particulars(subject to familial, cultural, and/or historical circumstances). So all morality is 'subjective' in that way.

All morality has things in common. Look to the common denominators, remove the individual particulars, and you'll discover what is universal to all codes of conduct.

[creativesoul]

If I promise to plant you a rose garden, then I am voluntarily entering into an agreement to make the world match my words. Making a promise is a moral state of affairs. It is a moral fact that I promised to make the world match my words. Here, it is true that I ought plant a rose garden, for it is only by virtue of my doing that that I can satisfy my obligation(to make the world match my words).

[TimeSeeker]

If I promise to plant you a rose garden, then I am voluntarily entering into an agreement to make the world match my words. Making a promise is a moral state of affairs.

All promises are best effort until fulfilled.Shit happens - you could become paralyzed tomorrow.

It is a moral fact that I promised to make the world match my words.

This equivocates to personal goal for you, and an expectation for me.

Here, it is true that I ought plant a rose garden, for it is only by virtue of my doing that that I can satisfy my obligation(to make the world match my words).

You can hire a gardener to do it for you. HOW you achieve the goal and HOW you meet the expectation which you have created is implementation detail.

It suffices to say "I will do my very best to have a rose garden planted for you.". Failing to achieve this goal and meeting your obligation through things outside of your control is not a moral failure on your part.

[Peter Holmes]

Just a sidebar on the consequence of rejecting moral objectivism.

My argument is that morality isn’t objective – that there are no moral facts, but only moral judgements.

One conclusion is that, if there are no moral facts, we have to be resigned to moral relativism or moral nihilism – or abandon morality altogether.

Note that throughout our discussion you failed to address the temporal dimension.
And so I have a particular example: If you turn on the kettle the water will boil in 10 minutes.

According to your taxonomy: Is this a fact or a judgment?
To me it's a fact. It is possible to speak of probabilistic future events as factual.

In general: "If X then Y is highly likely" is ALWAYS a claim about the FUTURE EXPECTATIONS.

And so: If SOMETHING will result in 15% decrease in murders across society in 5 years then this SOMETHING is a moral fact today!

This SOMETHING is a law which decrees murder as "illegal" and punishes murderers. It's not about revenge, or punishing the murderer. It's about the 15% decrease in murders in 5 years.

Thanks again, TimeSeeker.

I haven't addressed what you call the temporal dimension, because it has no bearing on the distinction between facts and value-judgements.

That the kettle will boil in 10 minutes is a prediction about a state of affairs that will obtain given certain conditions. To say 'the kettle will boil in ten minutes' is to make a factual assertion with a truth value about a feature of reality. In the same way, to say 'this law will reduce murders by 15% in 5 years' is to make a factual assertion with a truth-value.

But the claim 'we should try to reduce murders' is a completely different kind of assertion - one with no truth-value. And adding in a temporal dimension doesn't add truth-value: 'we should try to reduce murders by 15% in 5 years' remains a moral value-judgement. It's not a falsifiable factual assertion. Time is irrelevant in this context.

[TimeSeeker]

Thanks again, TimeSeeker.

I haven't addressed what you call the temporal dimension, because it has no bearing on the distinction between facts and value-judgements.

That the kettle will boil in 10 minutes is a prediction about a state of affairs that will obtain given certain conditions. To say 'the kettle will boil in ten minutes' is to make a factual assertion with a truth value about a feature of reality. In the same way, to say 'this law will reduce murders by 15% in 5 years' is to make a factual assertion with a truth-value.

But the claim 'we should try to reduce murders' is a completely different kind of assertion - one with no truth-value. And adding in a temporal dimension doesn't add truth-value: 'we should try to reduce murders by 15% in 5 years' remains a moral value-judgement. It's not a falsifiable factual assertion. Time is irrelevant in this context.

But I am not claiming that "we ought to reduce murders by 15%".
I am claiming that "doing X will reduce harm to humans by 15% in 5 years". This is a factual statement. It has truth value.
THEREFORE by the "no-harm" principle doing X is objectively moral.

You are hung up on the is-ought gap.

I mean, I can demonstrate (again) how "moral values" are a red herring, because ANY values are subject to the is-ought gap.
I can further demonstrate that without values you cannot make ANY choices ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buridan's_ass ).
But you are probably going to ignore those arguments again.

Yet - here you are. Philosophising. A product of many LIFE choices.

[Peter Holmes]

Thanks again, TimeSeeker.

I haven't addressed what you call the temporal dimension, because it has no bearing on the distinction between facts and value-judgements.

That the kettle will boil in 10 minutes is a prediction about a state of affairs that will obtain given certain conditions. To say 'the kettle will boil in ten minutes' is to make a factual assertion with a truth value about a feature of reality. In the same way, to say 'this law will reduce murders by 15% in 5 years' is to make a factual assertion with a truth-value.

But the claim 'we should try to reduce murders' is a completely different kind of assertion - one with no truth-value. And adding in a temporal dimension doesn't add truth-value: 'we should try to reduce murders by 15% in 5 years' remains a moral value-judgement. It's not a falsifiable factual assertion. Time is irrelevant in this context.

But I am not claiming that "we ought to reduce murders by 15%".
I am claiming that "doing X will reduce harm to humans by 15% in 5 years". This is a factual statement. It has truth value.
THEREFORE by the "no-harm" principle doing X is objectively moral.

You are hung up on the is-ought gap.

I mean, I can demonstrate (again) how "moral values" are a red herring, because ANY values are subject to the is-ought gap.
I can further demonstrate that without values you cannot make ANY choices ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buridan's_ass ).
But you are probably going to ignore those arguments again.

Yet - here you are. Philosophising. A product of many LIFE choices.

You're right, no point in going over your argument again.

I simply disagree with what you say here:

'And so: If SOMETHING will result in 15% decrease in murders across society in 5 years then this SOMETHING is a moral fact today!'

My point is: you assume that reducing the murder rate at any time is (factually) a morally good thing, without justifying that claim. Just saying that to reduce the murder rate, now or in the future, is a moral fact is patent nonsense. And appealing to the 'no harm principle' just begs the question. That we should do no harm isn't a fact - it's a judgement. Ignoring the is-ought barrier doesn't make it go away.

[TimeSeeker]

My point is: you assume that reducing the murder rate at any time is (factually) a morally good thing.

No I am not. I am assuming that X causes Y% reduction in harm is a FACT.

Subjectively - this reduces MY risk of future harm by Y%! Subjectively, making sure that we do X is a pragmatically beneficial TO ME!
I don't give a rat's ass whether we label it 'moral' or 'immoral' - it's rational! I wish to reduce the risk of harm upon myself therefore it is consistent with decision theory - I am simply maximising my own utility function. Your insistence to define things smells of Newcomb's paradox in decision theory ( https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/6ddcsdA ... ationality ).

I think the same can be said for most humans? Through intersubjective consensus the 'no harm' principle emerges which makes it objective.
Much like the principle of parsimony confers 'objective factuality' to simple theories.

My point is: you assume that reducing the murder rate at any time is (factually) a morally good thing, without justifying that claim. Just saying that to reduce the murder rate, now or in the future, is a moral fact is patent nonsense. And appealing the 'no harm principle' just begs the question. That we should do no harm isn't a fact - it's a judgement. Ignoring the is-ought barrier doesn't make it go away.

That barrier doesn't exist. For many an OUGHTS have become IS without prior justification. For example we OUGHT to have laws and axioms of logic...
The axioms of logic are there by pragmatic consensus. Judgments of their own right.

If we were as concerned with the is-ought gap as you seem to be - we wouldn't have logic to begin with.

And since I no more have to justify my principles than you have to justify your logical pre-disposition. I evoke the 'no harm' principle.

You are free to reject it like I am free to reject all the principles of classical logic and the principles by which you assert 'factuality'.

I am playing to win. You are playing to define the ritual for winning.

[Peter Holmes]

My point is: you assume that reducing the murder rate at any time is (factually) a morally good thing.

No I am not. I am assuming that X causes Y% reduction in harm is a FACT.

And there's your confusion: 'harm' isn't a property. It expresses a judgement on an alteration. An alteration from being alive to being dead may not be to suffer what we call harm. You just assume that it is, without justification. You smuggle in a value-judgement and pretend it's a fact.

Subjectively - this reduces MY risk of future harm by Y%! Subjectively, making sure that we do X is a pragmatically beneficial TO ME!
I don't give a rat's ass whether it's 'right' or 'wrong' - it's pragmatic! I wish to reduce the risk of harm upon myself.

Same mistake. And 'subjective' means 'relying on judgement, belief or opinion' - unless, of course, you're using the word in a different way which you haven't specified. Absent that clarification, what you say is nonsense. A reduction in your chance of being murdered has nothing to do with subjectivity. It's a matter of fact, as you've agreed. Whether harm and benefit are involved are moral value-judgements which, again, you pretend not to be making.

I think the same can be said for most humans? Through intersubjective consensus the 'no harm' principle emerges which makes it objective.
Much like the principle of parsimony confers 'objective factuality' to simple theories.

Same mistake: 'most humans think that murder is harmful, therefore it's a fact that murder is harmful'. You claim not to care about right and wrong, but then use the words 'harm' and 'harmful' perfectly normally. And to say intersubjective consensus produces objectivity is to ignore the ordinary uses of those words. No good bleating that you can use words any way you like, or that they don't or can't mean what we ordinarily use them to mean. Either clarify the non-standard way you're using them, or don't use them at all.

The claim that the principle of parsimony confers factuality on simple theories is so full of misconceptions that it's hard to know where to begin. As usual, you disgorge these deepities as though they're indisputable facts.

My point is: you assume that reducing the murder rate at any time is (factually) a morally good thing, without justifying that claim. Just saying that to reduce the murder rate, now or in the future, is a moral fact is patent nonsense. And appealing the 'no harm principle' just begs the question. That we should do no harm isn't a fact - it's a judgement. Ignoring the is-ought barrier doesn't make it go away.

That barrier doesn't exist. For many an OUGHTS have become IS without prior justification. For example we OUGHT to have laws and axioms of logic...
The axioms of logic are there by pragmatic consensus. Judgments of their own right.

No, you really don't understand the issue with logic. Having settled on a set of rules by which we play the game of using language to talk about things - and your favoured constructivist logic is just one such set of rules - we can then follow those rules to make true factual assertions (true given the way we use the signs) or express value-judgements, such as moral judgements. But there's no 'ought' involved in the adoption of a logic. And what you say next demonstrates your misunderstanding.

If we were as concerned with the is-ought gap as you seem to be - we wouldn't have logic to begin with.

And since I no more have to justify my principles than you have to justify your logical pre-disposition. I evoke the 'no harm' principle.

You are free to reject it like I am free to reject all the principles of classical logic and the principles by which you assert 'factuality'.

Before firing back in a rage in order to show that you're absolutely right and can't have made a mistake, and that I'm a hopelessly stupid idiot not to see how brilliant you are and confess that I've been wrong all along - please could you think on it a bit longer and reason it out more coherently.

[TimeSeeker]

And there's your confusion: 'harm' isn't a property.

Yes it is. As any physician would attest to the physical nature of trauma or clinical death.

It expresses a judgement on an alteration.

Yes. A physical alteration - and therefore a fact.

An alteration from being alive to being dead may not be to suffer what we call harm. You just assume that it is, without justification. You smuggle in a value-judgement and pretend it's a fact.

Value judgments are facts. The entire field of experimental psychology deals with it - decision theory! FACTUALLY like vanilla icecream. I FACTUALLY like living and avoiding harm. It is empirically demonstrable to be the case!

My values are facts of reality! Are you saying that's not true? And if so - by what special pleading/artificial taxonomy have you excluded humans from being part of reality?

Same mistake. And 'subjective' means 'relying on judgement, belief or opinion'

Sure. Can you think of any facts that don't rely on conscious measurement, empiricism, assertion and therefore judgment?

Same mistake: 'most humans think that murder is harmful, therefore it's a fact that murder is harmful'. You claim not to care about right and wrong, but then use the words 'harm' and 'harmful' perfectly normally. And to say intersubjective consensus produces objectivity is to ignore the ordinary uses of those words.

And you agreed on numerous occasions that any and all forms of "objectivity" are the product of inter-subjective consensus. So trying to exonerate "objectivity" to some higher status that excludes the inter-subjective (human) element is just special pleading.

No good bleating that you can use words any way you like, or that they don't or can't mean what we ordinarily use them to mean. Either clarify the non-standard way you're using them, or don't use them at all.

I use words how I use words. I use words - like I use any tool. In service of my utility-function. What is it that you don't understand that requires clarity?

The claim that the principle of parsimony confers factuality on simple theories is so full of misconceptions that it's hard to know where to begin. As usual, you disgorge these deepities as though they're indisputable facts.

Show me an "indisputable" fact and I will show you how to dispute it. All "facts" are probabilistic in nature and only subject to "factuality" within a framework of interpretation. None of "scientific facts" are factual if you reject the SI units. Can you convince me WHY I should accept the SI units?
After all - the Kilogram is made up. So is the second.

No, you really don't understand the issue with logic. Having settled on a set of rules by which we play the game of using language to talk about things - and your favoured constructivist logic is just one such set of rules - we can then follow those rules to make true factual assertions (true given the way we use the signs) or express value-judgements, such as moral judgements. But there's no 'ought' involved in the adoption of a logic. And what you say next demonstrates your misunderstanding.

Ad hominem. I am a rationalist first, logician second. Rules are tools also. We USE rules towards achieving our goals. When the rules fail to get me close to my goal - I update my rules so they work in my favour (except the laws of physics - those are hard to bend). You treat man-made rules like authorities - inflexible and unchangeable.

I care about winning. You care about following rules: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/6ddcsdA ... ationality

[surreptitious57]

Value judgments are facts. The entire field of experimental psychology deals with it - decision theory! FACTUALLY
I like vanilla icecream. I FACTUALLY like living and avoiding harm. It is empirically demonstrable to be the case!

No it is not empirically demonstrable because states of mind cannot be subject to the scientific method
Science only deals with observable phenomena so what anyone thinks cannot be independently verified
Psychology is a science but is not as rigorous as other disciples because of the subject matter it deals in