What could make morality objective?

[Immanuel Can]

So I conclude you're content with the following logically valid argument.

P1 If morality is what God desires, then morality is objective.
P2 Morality is what God desires.
Conclusion: Therefore, morality is objective.

Heh. It's your quotation, your formulation, which you unilaterally declared valid. I didn't make it up. But in declaring it valid, you essentially gave away the game: you have yourself declared the truth of what I said: monotheism provides a rationally valid ontological basis for assessing morality as objective.

But before we go on, do you agree that the logical validity and the soundness of an argument are completely different things - so that a valid argument can be unsound?

Absolutely. That's one clear implication of the axiom, "ontology precedes ethics." If my ontology is right, one set of conclusions logically follows; if yours is right, quite a different set follows.

But now, here's your problem: IF monotheist ontology is correct, then you have unilaterally declared that morality can be validly represented. And IF monotheism is also true, then it's not merely valid, but also sound and fully rational to believe. (Now, you don't believe that my ontology is true; but that butters no parsnips here: we haven't even reached the "truth" question yet -- we're just asking if the argument can even potentially be made rational, not whether or not you suppose that you have reasons to accept it.) You have shown that monotheism is capable of rendering a valid syllogism for the existence of objective morality. And I agree. And we can see it can.

However, the same cannot be done for subjective morality. There is literally no set of premises that will render it even valid in form, let alone true and sound. For as you have pointed out earlier, and repeatedly so, subjective morality inherently makes no claims about morality. It has, as you say, no reference to any moral facts, duties or required values. It can neither rationally give us a basis to approve what we may intuitively feel is good (say, giving care to orphans) nor disapprove what we intuitively know is deeply evil (say, genocide or slavery). It's utterly morally uninformative.

In short, the idea of subjective morality isn't even valid. It cannot be made valid. And instead of informing us about morality, it essentially denies that any morality can exist, and thus inevitably issues in Nihilism.

And that's my case. There it stops.

[Necromancer]

Interesting, Immanuel Can! Absolutely.

Monotheistic ontology: I can sense God, which makes for monotheistic ontology, and as I can sense God, out of God, I can also sense what's right and wrong, both intellectually and "by feelings", emotionally, in getting to Heaven. Thus, "ontology precedes Christian/Kantian Ethics".

Earlier, I've dismissed religious ontology as "too crazy" and rather being comfortable with it inside "religious belief" or simply religion. Now, that I've compiled "the most strange list" of phenomena which suggests that God exists, almost plainly, there's no reason anymore to dismiss this monotheistic ontology!

The rest seems done! Are you being naughty, Peter Holmes? Are you hiding something from us?

[Peter Holmes]

Immanuel Can

So I conclude you're content with the following logically valid argument.

P1 If morality is what God desires, then morality is objective.
P2 Morality is what God desires.
Conclusion: Therefore, morality is objective.

Heh. It's your quotation, your formulation, which you unilaterally declared valid. I didn't make it up. But in declaring it valid, you essentially gave away the game: you have yourself declared the truth of what I said: monotheism provides a rationally valid ontological basis for assessing morality as objective.

But before we go on, do you agree that the logical validity and the soundness of an argument are completely different things - so that a valid argument can be unsound?

Absolutely. That's one clear implication of the axiom, "ontology precedes ethics." If my ontology is right, one set of conclusions logically follows; if yours is right, quite a different set follows.

I didn't unilaterally declare the syllogism to be valid. It just is valid, because the conclusion follows from the premises. But that tells us nothing about the truth of the claims it makes. You need to slow down and take this step by step.

You agree that a logically valid argument can be unsound. So the next step is to establish the soundness of this argument. And that means establishing the truth of the premises. In this case, I assume you agree there are really two separate claims, as follows.

1 Morality is what God desires.

2 If morality is what God desires, then morality is objective.

Before we go on, do you agree with this analysis of the argument?

[Skip]

P1. Morality is what God desires.
P2. God tells some human male what particulars of His desired morality He wants implemented.
P3. Those particulars are broadcast, codified and widely disobeyed.
P4. God chooses another human male to whom He will dictate His new desired morality.
P5. That, too, is broadcast, codified, interpreted and widely disobeyed.
P6-80. repeat as above
C. God is not very good at getting what He desires.

[Immanuel Can]

You need to slow down and take this step by step. You agree that a logically valid argument can be unsound.

Actually, Peter, we need to go even slower than you say. In fact, we need to park it right there for a moment, and to consider what your admission of validity really indicates:

1. A valid argument for objective morality can be made from monotheism. (You've made one, yourself; and as you say, it "just is" valid.)

2. No valid argument for morality of any kind can be made from moral subjectivism.

Of course we could go on to examine questions of premise-truthfulness and soundness -- and if I were making a comprehensive argument for monotheistic morality, maybe that's where we'd go. But we're not going that far, and it's not at all necessary to deciding the present question. What we do know is that it's already too late for moral subjectivism: it didn't even get past the first post, validity.

The conclusion: that moral subjectivism isn't even possibly or plausibly rational. It can't even be articulated in valid form...let alone address truthfulness or soundness.

Unless you've got a valid syllogism premised on moral subjectivism, I'm afraid the horse upon which you wanted to ride has already died in the gate.

[Dalek Prime]

A prime source (no, not me lol), if you believe in that. Again, I say it's a priority of living things to accept certain moral objectives, if only to survive without living in mortal fear of others.

[Necromancer]

A prime source (no, not me lol), if you believe in that. Again, I say it's a priority of living things to accept certain moral objectives, if only to survive without living in mortal fear of others.

Thus we must work for the 2nd Amendment (that includes pepper spray) for all the World! And from there, advance through to Utopia!

[Peter Holmes]

Immanuel Can

No, once again you're rushing ahead beyond what's been established. Can I ask you again. Do you agree that we're considering two claims?:

1 Morality is what God desires.

2 If morality is what God desires, then morality is objective.

Please just answer that question. A simple yes or no will suffice.

And, just to slow you down a bit: if the claim that morality can be objective is false, then God's involvement is irrelevant, and the house of cards collapses. Hence my question: why does morality being what God desires make morality objective?

But, why not let's keep at my plodding donkey pace, so that we can learn together and from each other? I suppose you want to believe things that are true, just as I do.

[Peter Holmes]

Immanuel Can

While you're considering whether we have two separate claims to justify - 'morality is what God desires' and 'if morality is what God desires, then morality is objective' - here's an argument I think you need to consider.

P1: If an assertion is a fact, its source is irrelevant. (By definition of the word 'fact': true factual assertion, independent of opinion.)
P2: If a moral assertion is a fact, its source is irrelevant. (From P1.)
P3: The source of a factual moral assertion does not determine its truth or falsehood. (From P1 and P2.)
Conclusion: God does not determine the truth or falsehood of a factual moral assertion.

I think this argument is both valid and sound. And if I'm right, the premise 'if morality is what God desires, then morality is objective' is false.

And this is not to concede that a moral assertion is or even can be factual, let alone a fact.

Before bristling and accidentally missing the point, please think about this argument carefully and see if you can refute it logically.

[Belinda]

Immanuel Can wrote:

However, the same cannot be done for subjective morality. There is literally no set of premises that will render it even valid in form, let alone true and sound. For as you have pointed out earlier, and repeatedly so, subjective morality inherently makes no claims about morality. It has, as you say, no reference to any moral facts, duties or required values. It can neither rationally give us a basis to approve what we may intuitively feel is good (say, giving care to orphans) nor disapprove what we intuitively know is deeply evil (say, genocide or slavery). It's utterly morally uninformative.

That's all true.

You say 'monotheism'. If God had wanted men to obey all the moral wisdom which men received from Him presumably God would have used His power to make men obedient.

But as a matter of fact men must choose whether or not to obey God and His moral wisdom. In a secular age of course more and more people choose to reason without benefit of God's revealed wisdom. But that's neither here nor there. The crux of the matter of God and monotheism is that one can hold to a monotheist ontology and believe that God intended men to navigate their independent ways back to Him.

True, God sent his messengers, His guiding stars, to men the most credible of whom was Christ. Christ's moral law is sometimes too vague to apply to modern ethical problems.

You project an online personality which is fundamentalist and literalist. Do you intend to do so?

[Peter Holmes]

Immanuel Can

Here's an even simpler argument to consider.

P1 If an assertion is factual, then its source has no bearing on its truth or falsehood.
P2 If a moral assertion is factual, then its source has no bearing on its truth or falsehood. (From P1.)
Conclusion: That God is the source of a factual moral assertion has no bearing on its truth or falsehood.

Again, I think this is valid and sound. And if it is, then the claims of theistic moral objectivism are false.

And again, this is not to concede that a moral assertion is or even can be factual, let alone a fact. That's a separate argument.

And if your moral nihilism duck starts quacking, consider your argument: moral subjectivism can't provide an objective justification for morality; therefore morality is objective. Do you see the fallacy yet?

[Immanuel Can]

Please just answer that question. A simple yes or no will suffice.

No, we are not yet considering those claims. Again, you are too fast there.

We are considering whether or not any valid account of subjective morality can be made. My contention is that any attempt to do so results immediately in analytic absurdity -- thus, that believing in subjectivism is rationally self-defeating. Truth and falsehood of premises are not even on the table yet; and until we can get moral subjectivism a workably valid syllogism that does not issue in analytic self-contradictions, it's not just one step behind moral objectivism; it's not even in the race as a rational possibility. We can already know that it makes no sense.

[Peter Holmes]

Immanuel Can

Once again, you don't address the argument that refutes theistic moral objectivism. I assume you can't.

Instead, as before and to deflect the embarrassing attention, your argument is: moral subjectivism can't provide an objective foundation for morality; therefore morality is objective. There's no logical connection between those two claims, so the reasoning is fallacious.

The correct conclusion is that there is no objective foundation for morality. The truth is that we have to make and repair our own collective moral foundations - and that's why it's been a long, faltering and on-going process, with many setbacks, to free ourselves from many of our ancestor's moral values.

[Immanuel Can]

...presumably God would have used His power to make men obedient.

As you say, this can only be a presumption -- it does not follow that if God had power He would be obligated to use it in this particular way.

In fact, if right was deterministically imposed on people without their choice, there would BE no such thing as "morality." We would not only not need it, but could not possibly even have a conception of it. After all, what is "right" when everything is always "right"? It's a redundant term, then, on that refers to no phenomenon in particular, because it refers to all always.

But as a matter of fact men must choose whether or not to obey God and His moral wisdom.

This would be a fair thing to say, I would say. And if true, it would account for why we have a thing called "ethics" or "morality" as a central human concern. Apparently we are not deterministically forced to do the "right" things.

In a secular age of course more and more people choose to reason without benefit of God's revealed wisdom. But that's neither here nor there. The crux of the matter of God and monotheism is that one can hold to a monotheist ontology and believe that God intended men to navigate their independent ways back to Him.

You create several difficult questions with your claim there. One might ask, what does "independent" mean, in your statement, and what does "navigate their way" mean, and in what sense does man go "back" to God. I'd need to know more about your conception of these before I'd have any possibility of knowing whether or not a person should agree, or what to say in response if he or she had any reservations.

Christ's moral law is sometimes too vague to apply to modern ethical problems.

Of which modern ethical problem were you thinking?

You project an online personality which is fundamentalist and literalist. Do you intend to do so?

I'm not projecting a personality, actually. I'm saying what I believe to be true.

However, the terms in which you phrase your question are circulated today as mere pejoratives, and both are essentially deficient in content. It's really impossible to say what they mean. For example, what is a "fundamentalist," when we use the word to include a traditional Hindu, a Mennonite, a Hassidic Jew, and a member of ISIL? Moreover, recent sociological scholarship has even spoken of "fundamentalist Atheism." No clear commonality emerges from such a loose grouping, I think, beyond perhaps the idea of a person believing some set of "fundamentals" -- the content thereof having been left to the imagination.

But fret not. I don't suppose it really matters much; after all, here we are only cyber "voices," and what we say is all we know of each other. So we can only go with that. We do want to steer clear of the ad hominem, do we not?

[Immanuel Can]

...if your moral nihilism duck starts quacking, consider your argument: moral subjectivism can't provide an objective justification for morality; therefore morality is objective. Do you see the fallacy yet?

This is not my argument, actually.

My argument runs: moral subjectivism cannot provide any coherent account of itself; therefore, the concept of subjective morality is irrational and self-contradicting.