Secularism versus the Demonization of Atheists

[Londoner]

Me: OK, then if they have a relationship they must be two seperate things.
Okay, so what?

Then 'what is right' cannot be the same as our feelings. So in the phrase 'we feel its the right thing' our judgement 'it is right' cannot be derived from 'our feelings'. It must come from somewhere else.

Your feelings about something can change over time, consequently, what you feel is the right thing may also change. I didn't say our feelings were the only thing that determined if something was right.

Then we are in agreement.

I suppose you could say that your conscience informs your feelings. I'm not particularly interested in untangling the conscience from the feelings we have about things or what we intuitively seem to know as right and wrong. The only point I want to make is that our sense of morality, whether you be atheist, theist or whatever, is instilled in us through the same process, the source is irrelevant to that.

If we literally intuitively knew what was right or wrong, then moral questions would never arise. We would simply act and not be aware that a choice was involved at all. But we do not know intuitively; we can tell this since we disagree with others about what is moral. And as you say, we change our own minds.

I don't know if we are born with any specific moral precepts, I tend to think probably not. For the most part we assimilate our morality from the culture we are from, if that's what you mean by external. I have already said this.

I think that runs into the same problem as saying morality is intuitive. If we are conscious that are morality is assimilated from our culture, why would we feel bound by it? If, say, I became aware that my views on sex had been unthinkingly absorbed from society, then once I became aware then surely I would realise they they were not binding on me?

I don't think I've said conscience is just a feeling, although it may be, I don't know. What are you trying to make it sound like I'm saying?

I'm putting forward my own view, which is that I do not think it makes sense to say that we 'feel it's the right thing' can make sense as a description of how we make moral judgments. From what you write above, you seem to agree.

The act has moral implications, if that's what you're asking.

No, I was pointing out that if our 'feelings' were what made an act 'right', then two people could have different feelings, so two quite contradictory acts could both be 'right'. But as I say, I gather have moved on from that idea.

Me: So which is it? Either morality is simply conforming to the society we are in, or morality is us each responding spontaneously to our own feelings. It can't be both.

Can't it? And there was me thinking it could.

Not if I want to assert certain things are right and others are wrong, as in 'eating people is wrong'. If we are to say that, then we must be claiming one moral system is more valid than another; that if some other person's moral system says they can eat people, then their moral system is defective.

If we think contrasting moral codes, which would result in contrasting moral decisions, are equally valid, then we would be in the position of saying that an act was bad and good at the same time. I think that would make the descriptions 'bad' and 'good' meaningless.

Of course, as a skeptic, we might accept that, and argue no moral judgement is meaningful. That would be a coherent position. But saying two contradictory moral codes were both true would not be coherent.

I don't think I've explained myself badly enough to justify you interpreting it in such a silly way.

I don't know what your general position is. As I have said, I responded to one remark saying I did not think it made sense as an explanation of morality, and you seem to agree with me.

[Harbal]

Then 'what is right' cannot be the same as our feelings.

Our feelings are primed by something else, yes, but, ultimately, how it feels is what actually motivates our action, isn't it?

But we do not know intuitively; we can tell this since we disagree with others about what is moral. And as you say, we change our own minds.

My intuition tells me lots of things and it is probably wrong as often as it is right. Besides, intuition can only tell me what is morally right or wrong in relation to my moral programming or conditioning, morality is purely subjective. Or maybe you think it isn't subjective, which would account for us not seeming to be on the same page regarding one or two things. Just to be clear: I do not see how there can be such a thing as objective morality.

If we are conscious that are morality is assimilated from our culture, why would we feel bound by it?

Morality is not a matter of logic. At least on an individual level, it's not, although I suppose it must be in an evolutionary sense. I can't explain the nuts and bolts of why I feel bound to walk around dressed in modern, western style clothing, as opposed to that of say a Roman Centurion, but I most certainly do feel a strong inclination to do so. I can't help but think it has something to do with the conventions of my own culture.

I'm putting forward my own view, which is that I do not think it makes sense to say that we 'feel it's the right thing' can make sense as a description of how we make moral judgments.

I think many moral decisions are based on our feelings, but even when we try to apply rational thinking to a moral problem in order to establish what does and doesn't conform to our moral position I think the final arbiter is probably how we feel about the conclusion our logic has led us to.

so two quite contradictory acts could both be 'right'.

Yes, one could be right to me and the other to you. As I said before, morality is subjective.

I think that would make the descriptions 'bad' and 'good' meaningless.

They are meaningless from anything other than a subjective point of view.

I don't know what your general position is.

And I don't know what yours is. If you believe there is some kind of objective reality to morality then there is no way for us to reconcile our differing opinions on the subject, as the difference would be too fundamental to get round. This would be the case if you believed, for example, that morality comes from God.

[Londoner]

Our feelings are primed by something else, yes, but, ultimately, how it feels is what actually motivates our action, isn't it?

Isn't the problem that we often are unclear about what it is we do feel? We have feelings in the sense of an impulse, an emotion, but at the same time we second-guess ourselves. A bit like the ego and super-ego, except that we are conscious of the conflict. Yes; I am angry, but sometimes I am aware of my anger, such that I can think I should not simply give-in to it. Either at the time, or later, I judge my own feelings, thinking 'you could have chosen to do something different'.

My judgement of my own feelings could also be called a feeling, in that it also comes from inside my head. But equally it must be different in some way.

My intuition tells me lots of things and it is probably wrong as often as it is right. Besides, intuition can only tell me what is morally right or wrong in relation to my moral programming or conditioning, morality is purely subjective. Or maybe you think it isn't subjective, which would account for us not seeming to be on the same page regarding one or two things. Just to be clear: I do not see how there can be such a thing as objective morality.

I agree there does not exist such a thing as objective morality, in the sense of some object (like a stone listing God's commandments), that everyone can see and must accept. But I think that when we make moral judgments we speak as if there was such a thing. If I say 'eating people is wrong' I say it as if it was an objective fact, such that anyone who disagrees is mistaken - or not seeing clearly.

Maybe you could say it is about intuition, but if we do then we would be saying that some intuitions are better than others. If I assert something is bad, then I'm saying that you should agree with me - if you don't then your moral intuition is defective.

We can take the logical positivist view that all moral statements are just expressions of personal feeling. That if I say 'X is bad' I only mean 'I don't like X', with no implication that anyone else should agree. Thus if you said 'eating people is wrong' and I said 'eating people is right' we would not be having a disagreement, since we are both describing ourselves.

Later in your post you make a couple of comments that suggest you might take that view yourself. It makes a lot of sense, but I do not think many people think that way; the way they actually use the word 'good' does not seem to reflect that understanding. MY argument is not about whether 'good' ultimately makes sense, but what is implied by people's use of the word. (Rather like you can have an argument about what is implied by God being 'omnipotent' without admitting that God exists.)

So my position is that morality is applied as if it is objective. We refer it to systems that give it some degree of objectivity (religion, utilitarianism, ideas of human nature, beneficial outcomes etc.), but are aware that such things cannot be objective in the sense that physical facts are objective.

I think many moral decisions are based on our feelings, but even when we try to apply rational thinking to a moral problem in order to establish what does and doesn't conform to our moral position I think the final arbiter is probably how we feel about the conclusion our logic has led us to.

Or perhaps moral problems are ones where we never get to the final arbiter? After all, those things we call moral problems are those where we don't have agreement, where we can't find a totally convincing argument one way or another. We cannot disregard our feelings - but at the same time we cannot simply accept feelings as providing an answer. Feelings do not seem quite good enough, we also want reasons...objective reasons...to justify our position - and to persuade others to agree with us.

And I don't know what yours is. If you believe there is some kind of objective reality to morality then there is no way for us to reconcile our differing opinions on the subject, as the difference would be too fundamental to get round. This would be the case if you believed, for example, that morality comes from God.

As I wrote above, I think moral claims are made as if they are objective.

But I would not take that as simply an irrational choice, a perverse decision to assert as true something we have no reason to believe is true. I also have no reason to believe that minds other than my own exist, or that the external world exists. My own mind is something that in one sense is a fact, yet it does not meet the criteria for facts in the normal sense. Ultimately, everything I think only rests on assumptions; on my taking as if it was an objective fact something I am aware I cannot prove to be the case. Yet I have to do this, I have to assume a certainty that isn't there, otherwise I could not live.

Similarly, sometimes we are not clear in our own minds what we want, what we feel is the right thing to do. But we still have to make the decision. So we are obliged to try to take on some set of rules to help us decide, and treat them as if they were rules.

[Immanuel Can]

So it's a bit like being able to borrow a book from the library without being a member. Cool!

I quite like that analogy. Yes, it's like that.

But in this case, the book is "Everything We Know About Morality and Truth," and the reader has neither justification nor incentive to believe any of it, because her own most fundamental suppositions about the world are utterly incompatible with everything the book says. And that's surely got to create a strange "reading" experience for the borrower, I would say.

In fact, it does create a strange "read." For the Atheist would have to say, "Murder (or rape, or suppression of women's rights, or embezzlement) is wrong, but I have no idea why it's really wrong -- my society happens to say it is, but the one next door says it's not, and some say it's absolutely virtuous in certain cases." So that cognitive dissonance has got to conduce to a bit of moral schizophrenia.

Some Christians used to think they were doing good by burning heretics to death, the agony from the flames would remind them how they would spend eternity if they didn't repent at the last minute.

They seem to have taken a different book out of the library, I would say.

And given that, I think we have every reason to deny them their claim to being "Christians" at all. After all, the Founder said quite adamantly, that "by their fruits (or actions) you will know them." So we can know quite confidently that if they went against Him, they weren't any of His.

We're all just people. But some believe things that can make sense of what is moral and what is not, and others have denied any such thing exists.

Believing there is a moral code from above does not necessarily mean you make sense of it.

Yes, that's quite true. Hence my comment about the borrowed book above. Someone can have the book, and even in practice tend to go along with what it says, yet not have any reason to believe it.

How is being kind to your neighbour because you've been instructed to do so more creditable than being kind to him because you just feel it's the right thing to do?

Well, from a perspective that only looks at actions, it's not, of course. But absent any rational motivation, actions tend to be limited to those things that we happen to be "feeling" at a given moment.

Unfortunately, much of what the human race "feels" isn't as moral as you and I (who, after all, will have to live with the consequences of the limitations of what other people just "feel" is right) probably wish it were. A better world might well be the one in which "feelings" were bolstered by a knowledge of the moral facts. I wish we could trust the feelings of others to keep them doing good things; but I just don't think we really can, can we?

Given history, I imagine that's a pretty uncontroversial statement. But if you think about that, it's really interesting -- essentially, ethics are what we need when we don't want to do something (or do want to do something we feel we shouldn't).

Why I say that is that so long as our feelings line up with a particularly good action, we have no need of an ethical or moral precept to tell us what to do -- we just do what we feel. When ethics really appear is when these two are different: when I want to steal from my boss, but know I shouldn't, or when I have every incentive to be drawn to cheating on my wife. Barring the situation where there's a division between "want" and "right," I don't think we'd need ethics or morals at all, would we?

[Immanuel Can]

How could morality in atheism also be intentional when you specifically claimed: "...the other, i.e., atheists, has in it not even a conception of the good

Oh, that's plain. I don't have to have a conception of what it means to be a...say an American, in order to be an American, or to act like an American. For example, one could have no concept of the right to free speech, but still just happen to allow people to speak freely as a matter of preference. This would make me a "free speech" advocate, in one sense: but I still might not have the faintest notion of why I happen to advocate free speech -- I might have no conception at all of the right of free speech itself, or why anyone would believe in such a right...far less that it had anything to do with America per se.

And the problem with that is that, lacking any reason for believing free speech is sacred, I will only be committed to free speech as long as I happen to feel I want to be.

...if morality in atheism has no rational grounds within its own worldview, then how can morality among atheists exist at all since all moralities are both based upon and supervised by an edifice built on rationality and their corresponding laws.

For several reasons. Firstly, you can borrow laws from other people. Or you can enact laws the reasons for which you yourself don't understand. Or you can enact laws to serve some temporary, pragmatic social end, without ever considering them more. Or, as I would suggest, you could have an innate conscience (a fallible one, perhaps) that gives you hints about what kinds of laws are right to enact, but not even believe in the conscience itself while you're acting on its leading.

But you can test the facts easily on this. If it's possible to do right thing without having rational grounds for doing it, there should probably be cases in which people are known to do this. And I'll give you an easy one: explain to me, given an Atheist-Materialist worldview, why rape and/or slavery are actually wrong. But do Atheists run around raping and enslaving people? If they don't but they can't explain rational grounds for why they can't, then I think we have a pretty clear case, don't you?

What you are claiming outright is that ONLY theistic morality is rational since atheists have NO rational grounds for being moral. In short, it negates all the logic of why atheists should be moral.

Yes. If I'm wrong, then it's very easy to prove it's wrong. Just give me one moral precept that an Atheist, because of his Atheism, must follow. Give me anything -- murder, rape, slavery (the easy cases of "wrong," I would think) all the way down to lying, cheating and stealing (perhaps a little harder to show).

One counter-case will defeat my claim.

That should be easy, shouldn't it? At least, it should, if what I'm saying just isn't true.

[Immanuel Can]

More squirming. Your red herring label is inappropriately applied

Not at all. Whether or not you believe in an impersonal or a personal force behind the adjective "evil" changes nothing. We agree that some things are '"evil". I imagine, for example, we agree that rape or child abuse fit that label.

So since we are agree that evil exists, to cavil over what portion of it is deliberate and what part is merely a sort of impersonal "force" is of no moment. if we don't believe in demons, we certainly believe in the existence of "demonic" people and "demonic" actions -- take it literally or metaphorically, and we're at the same point.

[Immanuel Can]

Atheists' criteria for goodness are

1. It's reasonable i.e. thoughtful and well informed and also

2. It is kind.

Explain, using only Atheist suppositions (such as Materialism), why "kindness" is "good." In other words, give me those "reasons" of which you speak. If they exist, this ought not to be hard. Show me the "thoughts," and "information" about Atheist morality, so I too may be "well-informed," just as you say.

...ordinary human kindness and reason are both felt and empirically justified, and is all that sceptics can trust in.

Well, "felt" is not terribly helpful. A Neo-Nazi doubtless has lots of "feelings" about Jews and persons of colour...I'm going to suggest that's not a good thing. But the "empirical justification," now, that's interesting.

Show me the "empirical justification" for morality.

Perhaps Immanuel Can would say how he evaluates scepticism as a strategy to further goodness.

When people are clinging to falsehood, the first step toward the truth is to show them that what they are trusting is just not good enough. It's only then that anyone goes looking for truth. So skepticism can be the first step to a better belief.

[Harbal]

For the Atheist would have to say, "Murder (or rape, or suppression of women's rights, or embezzlement) is wrong, but I have no idea why it's really wrong --

But I'm an atheist and I know why I think these things are wrong. Perhaps it would be helpful if you explained why you think they are wrong.

Some Christians used to think they were doing good by burning heretics to death, the agony from the flames would remind them how they would spend eternity if they didn't repent at the last minute.

They seem to have taken a different book out of the library, I would say. And given that, I think we have every reason to deny them their claim to being "Christians" at all.

For some reason the words "no true Scotsman" and "fallacy" have popped into my mind.

[Immanuel Can]

But I'm an atheist and I know why I think these things are wrong. Perhaps it would be helpful if you explained why you think they are wrong.

For me, they're wrong because they are against the nature and will of God. That they are also destructive to humanity is probably a further stroke against them, but primarily by way of the potential victims being dignified persons by dint of being created and loved by God. However, I cannot imagine an Atheist explanation of why it would be wrong even to destroy a fellow human being in these ways, though I am eager to know how one would go.

They seem to have taken a different book out of the library, I would say. And given that, I think we have every reason to deny them their claim to being "Christians" at all.

For some reason the words "no true Scotsman" and "fallacy" have popped into my mind.

Perhaps wrongly: that fallacy is reserved for situations in which no criteria are relevant.

For example, if I say, "No true Christian wears blue," then that would be right: it's a fallacy of the NTS type, because the criterion "wears blue" has no justifiable impact on the term "Christian." But if I said, "No true Christian does not believe in Christ," then there is no fallacy at all. In fact, it's definitionally true, and probably beyond debate even among those who think Christians as such aren't a good thing.

I suppose, then, that whether or not you consider my claim a fallacy would depend on your readiness to believe that a man could live like a complete hellion and, in direct contradiction of Christ Himself, still believe that such a one could be genuinely a "Christian."

I do say not. That I admit. I say Christ has the right to say what a "Christian" really is, and that deeds appropriate to being a Christian must accompany faith, as Christ and the Apostle Paul also said.

Do you think you have reason to insist the opposite?

[davidm]

For me, they're wrong because they are against the nature and will of God. That they are also destructive to humanity is probably a further stroke against them, but primarily by way of the potential victims being dignified persons by dint of being created and loved by God.

Created and "loved" by God. You mean the Sky Monster who is going to throw you into a lake of fire for eternity just because you did not believe in its existence? That loving God?

However, I cannot imagine an Atheist explanation of why it would be wrong even to destroy a fellow human being in these ways, though I am eager to know how one would go.

I've already addressed this on a number of occasions. You ignore it. But we both know (and everyone knows) how dishonest you are. That's what it means to be a Liar for Jesus. I'll say again: It is strange how your one true God requires a bodyguard of liars.

[Immanuel Can]

I've already addressed this on a number of occasions. You ignore it.

Not once, and not ever. I have never received a plausible answer to that question from any Atheist, especially you. And if I'm wrong, you can quote yourself to show I'm wrong.

Go ahead.

[Harbal]

For me, they're wrong because they are against the nature and will of God. That they are also destructive to humanity is probably a further stroke against them, but primarily by way of the potential victims being dignified persons by dint of being created and loved by God. However, I cannot imagine an Atheist explanation of why it would be wrong even to destroy a fellow human being in these ways, though I am eager to know how one would go.

I suppose, for me, these things are wrong because they are against my nature and will. Also, like you, I have an interest in the well being of humanity, although my interest is more to do with empathy. I suppose there is also a rational element to it: if such and such a misfortune could happen to so and so then it could also happen to me, which would make me inclined to disapprove of it. The thing is, though, matters of morality provoke an emotional response, which can't be accounted for by your view that, without God, morality is just a perfunctory process.

I suppose, then, that whether or not you consider my claim a fallacy would depend on your readiness to believe that a man could live like a complete hellion and, in direct contradiction of Christ Himself, still believe that such a one could be genuinely a "Christian."

Some men, be they Christians, atheists or whatever, have an impressive ability to rationalise when the failure to do so would be particularly inconvenient.

Do you think you have reason to insist the opposite?

The only thing I am insisting is that atheism has no bearing on my morality and I am not convinced that being a Christian has got all that much to do with yours, although, if you say it has, I must accept that. Neither do I expect that I have said anything that will cause you to modify your opinion, but, regardless, I am satisfied that my sense of morality is no less valid than anyone else's merely because I don't happen to believe there is a God.

[Immanuel Can]

I suppose, for me, these things are wrong because they are against my nature and will.

Perhaps you are just a particularly kind-hearted person. But I'm not sure we'll be content to let people of a different "nature and will" (to use your phrase) do as they also please. The results for us are likely to be bad.

Also, like you, I have an interest in the well being of humanity, although my interest is more to do with empathy.

Well, "empathy" too is a tricky quality. Maybe your is informed and well-directed; but many people's is not. There's a new book by Paul Bloom, "Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion," which outlines many of the pitfalls of empathy as a moral guide. It's a good read, and covers many -- but not all -- of the problems with empathy.

I suppose there is also a rational element to it: if such and such a misfortune could happen to so and so then it could also happen to me, which would make me inclined to disapprove of it.

Well, perhaps. But the lack of the rational element is one of the chief problems with empathy. It can so easily be misdirected or short-sighted.

The thing is, though, matters of morality provoke an emotional response, which can't be accounted for by your view that, without God, morality is just a perfunctory process.

Actually, the faculty of conscience seems to me to cover that nicely. As I said earlier, I don't allege that Atheists have no moral emotions; only that they cannot have any justification from their worldview of the moral emotions they have. They must suppose they are merely emotions, untied to any rational conception of the good, or to any objective good.

I suppose, then, that whether or not you consider my claim a fallacy would depend on your readiness to believe that a man could live like a complete hellion and, in direct contradiction of Christ Himself, still believe that such a one could be genuinely a "Christian."

Some men, be they Christians, atheists or whatever, have an impressive ability to rationalise when the failure to do so would be particularly inconvenient.

Yes. That's what I would say too.

So how do we know they're "guilty" of inappropriate or dishonest "rationalizing," without some larger objective facts or framework from which to launch such a critique?

Do you think you have reason to insist the opposite?

The only thing I am insisting is that atheism has no bearing on my morality and I am not convinced that being a Christian has got all that much to do with yours, although, if you say it has, I must accept that.

Anecdotally, I can tell you that it does.

I have spent a great deal of time living and travelling in what are called "developing" countries. And I note that wherever I go, I find Christian agencies helping the poor -- food, medicine, shelter, business aid, schooling, and so on. But I have yet to find any such agency spreading the good news of Atheism, or sharing food medicine and other aid in the name of No-God. There needs to be some reasonable explanation found for that fact.

Moreover, I have personally met people freed from all sort of things -- addictions, sexual exploitation, enslavement, crime -- by becoming Christians. However, I have yet to meet the man who says, "I beat my wife and drank, until I discovered Atheism: and now, praise Nobody, I'm free."

I am satisfied that my sense of morality is no less valid than anyone else's merely because I don't happen to believe there is a God.

Well, I'd agree that you could still have a correct understanding of morality. That's fair.

But knowing is not doing, is it? I might know how to be a professional football player, but Tottenham Hotspur are not calling me to try out. Just so, a man may know what is right; but whether or not he does what is right is quite a different question. Only you and God can say if you actually manage to do what you know. I wouldn't know whether or not you did. And you wouldn't know about me either, would you?

[Harbal]

So my position is that morality is applied as if it is objective. We refer it to systems that give it some degree of objectivity (religion, utilitarianism, ideas of human nature, beneficial outcomes etc.), but are aware that such things cannot be objective in the sense that physical facts are objective.

It feels objective and yes, I agree, we treat it as if it is objective, I don't suppose it could be otherwise. The problem with going the whole hog and believing it actually is objective is that we would be more resistant to modifying it as we become more enlightened about the validity of some of our prejudices.

[Harbal]

"nature and will" (to use your phrase)

It's not my phrase, I borrowed it from you.

There's a new book by Paul Bloom, "Against Empathy:

When Paul Bloom shows an interest in my opinions on empathy I'll return the compliment and read what he has to say.

But knowing is not doing, is it? I might know how to be a professional football player, but Tottenham Hotspur are not calling me to try out.

Neither have you been called to go and collect your Nobel Peace Prize, at least I assume you haven't, maybe you are more modest than I give you credit for.