Secularism versus the Demonization of Atheists

[Immanuel Can]

neither of those can rationally reconcile their moral condition with their professed ideology.

Does that matter? Is there less value in a good action if you only do it because it feels right?

Not in the action, which is the same. But in the belief that led to the action...or failed to do so. For I think it's pretty manifest that whereas the one can sponsor and encourage the good, the other has in it not even a conception of the good.

And you needn't trust me for that. Even Atheists will tell you that their perspective has no precepts to do with "the good," whatever it is.

[Londoner]

The Gospels were written seventy years after the death of Jesus and there are inconsistencies in the four separate accounts. And there were also other accounts which were not validated such as for example the Gospel of Mary Magdalene simply because she was a woman [ The entire Bible is in actual fact written exclusively by men ] All of this is sufficient reason to question the validity of every single known account of the Resurrection

There are always inconsistencies between accounts and alternative versions, no source is ever without bias. (If we think it is, it is because we are blind to their bias...because it matches our own!)

There is an anecdote about Sir Walter Raleigh, imprisoned in the Tower of London. To pass the time he decided to write a history of the world. But while he is doing so there is an incident that takes place right outside his room. Raleigh tries to find out what happened, but nobody tells him quite the same story. Raleigh concludes that if he cannot discover the truth about something that happened so close to him, what hope is there of writing an accurate history of anything, let alone the world?

And most of us are not as open minded as Raleigh. Consider conspiracy theorists, or Holocaust deniers; we can always find reasons to make the evidence say what we want it to. For example, if all the stories exactly agreed we would say this was because the authors must have colluded. Yet, if they don't agree, we complain they are inconsistent.

I think that if the Gospels were an account of some normal historic event we would think that they were pretty good as source material - not to be entirely relied on, but as good as anything else that is likely to be available from those times.

If we are inclined to pick holes in them as history it is because we start from a position of not believing in the supernatural claims. I do not think we can expect the Gospels to convince a skeptic of those supernatural claims - it is impossible to produce proof of the supernatural; it would be a contradiction in terms.

[Dubious]

neither of those can rationally reconcile their moral condition with their professed ideology.

Does that matter? Is there less value in a good action if you only do it because it feels right?

Not in the action, which is the same. But in the belief that led to the action...or failed to do so. For I think it's pretty manifest that whereas the one can sponsor and encourage the good, the other has in it not even a conception of the good.

And you needn't trust me for that. Even Atheists will tell you that their perspective has no precepts to do with "the good," whatever it is.

..which would imply that whereas theists are intentionally moral atheists are so only accidentally.

If there is a god - and I don't mean Jesus - I wonder if we are as entertaining to IT as IT is to us!

[Harbal]

Not in the action, which is the same.

My guess is that that is all that matters to the beneficiary of a good deed.

For I think it's pretty manifest that whereas the one can sponsor and encourage the good, the other has in it not even a conception of the good.

So you don't think that people are capable of conceptualising "good" and that pleasing God is all that counts? In that case I have to agree with you, it really is a puzzle why atheists can sometimes perform morally good acts.

And you needn't trust me for that. Even Atheists will tell you that their perspective has no precepts to do with "the good," whatever it is

As it happens, I don't need an atheist to tell me anything as I am in the fortunate position of being one myself so I actually am the horses mouth, so to speak.

[Immanuel Can]

..which would imply that whereas theists are intentionally moral atheists are so only accidentally.

Not at all. It would not "imply," because I stated, not implied. And it would not be "intentionally-unintentionally," because both would be being intentional: but it would be a case of one being rationally consistent, and one behaving in a way that finds no rational grounds within its own worldview.

[Immanuel Can]

My guess is that that is all that matters to the beneficiary of a good deed.

True, no doubt.

But I'll borrow an illustration from Dennis Prager's debate with Richard Shermer. Prager asked Shermer this question:

"It's dark. It's late. It's raining. Suppose you find yourself driving through the bad side of a crime-ridden town -- say, Chicago. And the tire of your car goes flat. As you're kneeling to repair it, you look up to see a group of youths descending upon you.

Now, does it make a difference to you whether or not you know that they were just coming back from a Bible study?"

Shermer thought, then chuckled, and said, "Yes, I suppose it would."

For I think it's pretty manifest that whereas the one can sponsor and encourage the good, the other has in it not even a conception of the good.

So you don't think that people are capable of conceptualising "good" and that pleasing God is all that counts?

Not quite what I said. I said that Atheism is without any concept of "the good." I did not say that Atheists were. They borrow the morality that they cannot deduce from their own worldview; and they can get it from many places. The problem is that there is nothing in Atheism to tell them whether they should get it from the residue of Christianity, Buddhism, or ISIL, or the Red Communists -- or whether, really, they have to take it from anywhere at all. Atheism has no guidance for them on that point.

In that case I have to agree with you, it really is a puzzle why atheists can sometimes perform morally good acts.

Oh, I don't find that perplexing. Even Atheists are, after all, originally "made in the image of God," meaning endowed with a conscience that reminds them (however imperfectly) of their moral duties. We all have access to that.

As I say, Atheists are not a new species of particularly wicked sinners. They're not "demons." They're ordinary people who have chosen to believe something that, if followed consistently, would deny the existence of objective good. But they still may choose to be good or bad -- just as a Theist may choose to live out his or her belief; or by being hypocritical about it, to deny with his actions what his words profess.

We're all just people. But some believe things that can make sense of what is moral and what is not, and others have denied any such thing exists.

[Harbal]

But I'll borrow an illustration from Dennis Prager's debate with Richard Shermer. Prager asked Shermer this question:

"It's dark. It's late. It's raining. Suppose you find yourself driving through the bad side of a crime-ridden town -- say, Chicago. And the tire of your car goes flat. As you're kneeling to repair it, you look up to see a group of youths descending upon you.

Now, does it make a difference to you whether or not you know that they were just coming back from a Bible study?"

In this hypothetical scenario, assuming that I'm not black and that the Bible students aren't members of the KKK, then yes, it would make a difference. Although it would also make a difference if I knew they were coming back from a stamp collecting club meeting or from tap dancing practice.

The problem is that there is nothing in Atheism to tell them...

Of course not, atheism doesn't say anything beyond there being no God in the picture.

Even Atheists are, after all, originally "made in the image of God," meaning endowed with a conscience that reminds them (however imperfectly) of their moral duties. We all have access to that.

So it's a bit like being able to borrow a book from the library without being a member. Cool!

They're ordinary people who have chosen to believe something that, if followed consistently, would deny the existence of objective good.

You've got me there, I don't believe in "objective good". How can good be objective when the criteria for it change over time? Some Christians used to think they were doing good by burning heretics to death, the agony from the flames would remind them how they would spend eternity if they didn't repent at the last minute.

We're all just people. But some believe things that can make sense of what is moral and what is not, and others have denied any such thing exists.

Believing there is a moral code from above does not necessarily mean you make sense of it. How is being kind to your neighbour because you've been instructed to do so more creditable than being kind to him because you just feel it's the right thing to do?

[Dubious]

..which would imply that whereas theists are intentionally moral atheists are so only accidentally.

Not at all. It would not "imply," because I stated, not implied. And it would not be "intentionally-unintentionally," because both would be being intentional: but it would be a case of one being rationally consistent, and one behaving in a way that finds no rational grounds within its own worldview.

How could morality in atheism also be intentional when you specifically claimed:

...the other, i.e., atheists, has in it not even a conception of the good

If there is no "conception" of something no intention can follow. That's another classic contradiction. What would it be based on? Could you give an example? To repeat any "moral tendencies" among atheists could by this logic only happen by accident or by instinct. Also, if morality in atheism has no rational grounds within its own worldview, then how can morality among atheists exist at all since all moralities are both based upon and supervised by an edifice built on rationality and their corresponding laws. How many societies from ancient to modern would you require to prove that?

What you are claiming outright is that ONLY theistic morality is rational since atheists have NO rational grounds for being moral. In short, it negates all the logic of why atheists should be moral.

If believed, as presented by you, it strikes one as simply absurd requiring no further consideration. If, conversely, you attempt to rationalize both scenarios into some kind of logical grid you'll manage it only by employing a whole legion of oxymorons.

[Greta]

More squirming. Your red herring label is inappropriately applied since, if your beliefs are false - and you seem determined not to have them tested - then your demonisation of atheists is false.

Another red herring. This isn't important to anyone.

If demons don't exist, one can't "demonize" Atheists. There is no referent for the noun-as-verb. It's like the word "unicorning." One cannot be bad for "unicorning" Atheists, because there are no unicorns. And anyway, there is no objectivity (in an Atheist world) to the value judgment "bad" you are associating with "demonizing."

Moreover, nothing is "false" in a world wherein nothing is objectively "true." And "falsity" itself isn't "bad" according to the Materialism necessary to ground Atheism.

In other words, you're talking nonsense -- nonsense by the light of the logic of your own professed worldview.

More squirming. You seem to lack the courage to have your beliefs challenged.

This comes down to the crux of the thread - if you beliefs in demons is are unfounded, then your attempts to http://www.thesaurus.com/browse/demonize secular thinkers is completely invalidated.

Now we have specific to test - your belief in demons. Let's test. So, can you justify your belief?

[uwot]

...I'll borrow an illustration from Dennis Prager's debate with Richard Shermer. Prager asked Shermer this question:

"It's dark. It's late. It's raining. Suppose you find yourself driving through the bad side of a crime-ridden town -- say, Chicago. And the tire of your car goes flat. As you're kneeling to repair it, you look up to see a group of youths descending upon you.

Now, does it make a difference to you whether or not you know that they were just coming back from a Bible study?"

Shermer thought, then chuckled, and said, "Yes, I suppose it would."

Christopher Hitchens was asked the same question: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sLtNvYibK2c

For I think it's pretty manifest that whereas the one can sponsor and encourage the good, the other has in it not even a conception of the good.

So you don't think that people are capable of conceptualising "good" and that pleasing God is all that counts?

Not quite what I said.

That's exactly what you said, because...

I said that Atheism is without any concept of "the good."

...good, in your opinion, is whatever god says it is.

I did not say that Atheists were. They borrow the morality that they cannot deduce from their own worldview; and they can get it from many places. The problem is that there is nothing in Atheism to tell them whether they should get it from the residue of Christianity, Buddhism, or ISIL, or the Red Communists -- or whether, really, they have to take it from anywhere at all. Atheism has no guidance for them on that point.

On the contrary. Rather than being told how to interpret some old book or other, in order to please a god and the grubby political interests of the particular church, we are free to act in the interest of our fellow human beings.

[Londoner]

Believing there is a moral code from above does not necessarily mean you make sense of it. How is being kind to your neighbour because you've been instructed to do so more creditable than being kind to him because you just feel it's the right thing to do?

Isn't to 'feel it's the right thing' self-contradictory? My feelings are my feelings, they are a fact about me. But to call an action 'the right thing' is to assert something, not about me, but about the act.

Suppose my feelings change; does the 'right thing' change too? If it does change with my feelings, then it would be impossible not to always do the right thing. The 'right thing' would be a synonym for 'what I want'.

If we are to base a moral code on our feelings, then we would have to say that some feelings are superior to others. If we are to do that, then we cannot do it by self-reference, by consulting our own feelings at any particular moment. We need some sort of external moral code. And it must be 'from above' in the sense that we agree to subject ourselves to it.

For example, like many philosophers we might simply argue that acts that are 'reasonable' are better than acts that are 'irrational'. But we do not determine what counts as 'reasonable' individually, as we feel at that moment. To be reasonable is to follow rules, public rules in that other people can deny or agree that we are 'being reasonable'.

But that does not answer the question; 'Why should I be reasonable?' Any code may be have its own logic, but it cannot self-justify.

So, I think that to talk of 'doing the right thing' must mean we are following some moral code. We are treating our moral code as if it were a fact about the world that should direct our behaviour. But why do we do that? Moral codes are not facts in the normal sense. They cannot compel us to believe in them, as the rock I stub my toe on compels me to believe in its reality. So why not simply conclude that all talk of morality is simply nonsense? Yet few take that view.

That is why I am less inclined to be critical of religion than many others. I think that most of the ways we think about the world involve assumptions we cannot justify - we have no choice about that. If we are all making unjustified assumptions, I do not see why religion should be singled out as unjustified!

[Belinda]

Immanuel Can, there are several criteria which demarcate the concept of goodness.

Theists' criteria for goodness are

1. It is Biblical i.e. the word of God and/or


2. Jesus said so and/or


3. The Angel Gabriel dictated it.

Atheists' criteria for goodness are

1. It's reasonable i.e. thoughtful and well informed and also

2. It is kind.

Where theists are reasonable and kind people their specifically theistic criteria are viewed by atheists as redundant, as ordinary human kindness and reason are both felt and empirically justified, and is all that sceptics can trust in.

Perhaps Immanuel Can would say how he evaluates scepticism as a strategy to further goodness.

[Harbal]

Isn't to 'feel it's the right thing' self-contradictory?

I don't see why.

My feelings are my feelings, they are a fact about me. But to call an action 'the right thing' is to assert something, not about me, but about the act.

I would say it asserts something about the relationship between the act an my feelings.

Suppose my feelings change; does the 'right thing' change too?

Very often it does, yes.

If it does change with my feelings, then it would be impossible not to always do the right thing. The 'right thing' would be a synonym for 'what I want'.

You must be one of those rare people who never do anything that runs contrary to their conscience.

If we are to base a moral code on our feelings,......

If a frail old woman stumbled and ended up sprawled on the pavement in front of you, would you go to her assistance instinctively or would you consult your moral handbook before you decided whether to help her or not?

We need some sort of external moral code. And it must be 'from above' in the sense that we agree to subject ourselves to it.

In a general sense our moral code comes from the society we are part of and we adapt it as individuals. It seems to me that most moral acts are prompted by how we feel about a situation rather than by referencing a set of rules.

[Londoner]

I would say it ('feel it's the right thing' ) asserts something about the relationship between the act an my feelings.

OK, then if they have a relationship they must be two seperate things.

Me: Suppose my feelings change; does the 'right thing' change too?

Very often it does, yes.

If our feelings were the only thing that determined if something was 'the right thing', then it would be 'always'. If it is only 'very often', that means there must be some occasions when that isn't the case, so if we say 'very often' we must think there is some criteria apart from our feelings.

You must be one of those rare people who never do anything that runs contrary to their conscience.

So how do we distinguish 'conscience' from 'feelings'? I can only act contrary to my conscience if I think my conscience represents a set of values that may conflict with my feelings at any particular moment i.e. to talk of 'conscience' is to apply a standard.

And it must be an external standard otherwise it would be like Wittgenstein's 'private language' argument. If conscience was just a feeling, I could not use that feeling to judge my other feelings, since my conscience would change along with those feelings. If I was acting out of anger I would have a conscience that was OK with acting out of anger, and so on.

Me: If we are to base a moral code on our feelings,......
If a frail old woman stumbled and ended up sprawled on the pavement in front of you, would you go to her assistance instinctively or would you consult your moral handbook before you decided whether to help her or not?

Suppose instead I take the opportunity to steal her handbag. It is an instinctive act on my part, so is that OK? Would you agree it was therefore just as moral as your going to her assistance?

Remember, if you are to judge me you must be saying that there is something apart from our instinct that determines what is right and wrong. You must be applying a set of non-instinctual criteria that enables you to say 'my instinct is better than your instinct'

In a general sense our moral code comes from the society we are part of and we adapt it as individuals. It seems to me that most moral acts are prompted by how we feel about a situation rather than by referencing a set of rules.

So which is it? Either morality is simply conforming to the society we are in, or morality is us each responding spontaneously to our own feelings. It can't be both.

We could go for either. I could adopt a moral code of conformism. Or I could try to be true to my feelings. Either would then be the basis of a moral code. If I think morality is meaningful I will have to choose something, but I cannot put up any reasons to say why one choice is better than the other.

[Harbal]

OK, then if they have a relationship they must be two seperate things.

Okay, so what?

Me: Suppose my feelings change; does the 'right thing' change too?

Very often it does, yes.

If our feelings were the only thing that determined if something was 'the right thing', then it would be 'always'. If it is only 'very often', that means there must be some occasions when that isn't the case, so if we say 'very often' we must think there is some criteria apart from our feelings.

Your feelings about something can change over time, consequently, what you feel is the right thing may also change. I didn't say our feelings were the only thing that determined if something was right.

I can only act contrary to my conscience if I think my conscience represents a set of values that may conflict with my feelings at any particular moment i.e. to talk of 'conscience' is to apply a standard.

I suppose you could say that your conscience informs your feelings. I'm not particularly interested in untangling the conscience from the feelings we have about things or what we intuitively seem to know as right and wrong. The only point I want to make is that our sense of morality, whether you be atheist, theist or whatever, is instilled in us through the same process, the source is irrelevant to that.

And it must be an external standard

I don't know if we are born with any specific moral precepts, I tend to think probably not. For the most part we assimilate our morality from the culture we are from, if that's what you mean by external. I have already said this.

otherwise it would be like Wittgenstein's 'private language' argument. If conscience was just a feeling, I could not use that feeling to judge my other feelings, since my conscience would change along with those feelings. If I was acting out of anger I would have a conscience that was OK with acting out of anger, and so on.

I don't think I've said conscience is just a feeling, although it may be, I don't know. What are you trying to make it sound like I'm saying?

Suppose instead I take the opportunity to steal her handbag. It is an instinctive act on my part, so is that OK?

It's not okay with me but I'm not the one nicking her handbag so I don't have to justify it. I assume it is okay with you, or you wouldn't do it.

Would you agree it was therefore just as moral as your going to her assistance?

The act has moral implications, if that's what you're asking.

So which is it? Either morality is simply conforming to the society we are in, or morality is us each responding spontaneously to our own feelings. It can't be both.

Can't it? And there was me thinking it could.

We could go for either. I could adopt a moral code of conformism. Or I could try to be true to my feelings. Either would then be the basis of a moral code. If I think morality is meaningful I will have to choose something, but I cannot put up any reasons to say why one choice is better than the other.

I don't think I've explained myself badly enough to justify you interpreting it in such a silly way.