100% Proof That Gods Do Not Exist

[Harbal]

If I say God does not exist that is a truth claim so the burden of proof / disproof has to rest with me
If I say I think God does not exist that is not a truth claim so no burden of proof / disproof is needed

But couldn't you legitimately be asked to prove that you think God does not exist? I don't think that would be any easier to prove than the non existence of God. I always think it's best to just say "I can't be bothered to talk about God", then your refusal to talk about God, while not being proof of the truth of your assertion, is certainly strong evidence in support of it.

[Immanuel Can]

If I say I think God does not exist that is not a truth claim so no burden of proof / disproof is needed

Not so. If you claim your "thinking" is based on any sense at all, or if you expect the child to agree, then you owe an answer. If you are just saying, "I feel skeptical for no reason," then you don't.

[davidm]

But we can easily prove that god does not exist. All we need is a dose of Alvin Plantinga’s Modal Ontological Special Super Secret Sauce. Here we go.

Premise 1 : It is possible that God does not exist.
Premise 2 : If it is possible that God does not exist then God does not exist in some possible worlds.
Premise 3 : If God does not exist in some possible worlds then God does not exist in all possible worlds.
Premise 4 : If God does not exist in all possible worlds then God does not exist in the actual world.
Premise 5 : If God does not exist in the actual world then God does not exist.
Conclusion : Therefore God does not exist.


See how easy that was?

</thread>

[Harbal]

I disbelieve in hobgoblins. But until this moment, I have never felt the slightest need to discuss my disbelief with anyone. But if I thought there were a case to be made regarding them, perhaps I might; but my certainty level is so high as to render any such discussion boring.

That's not really a comparable situation. If there were a significant number of people on this forum asserting the existence of hobgoblins you could possibly find yourself getting drawn into an argument about it, despite your disinterest in hobgoblins per se.

[Harbal]

It is possible that God does not exist.

But what if, as is likely, some claim that it is not possible for God not to exist? That would sort of make 2,3,4 and 5 redundant, wouldn't it?

[Immanuel Can]

Theists believe that God exists. Atheists lack a belief that God exists.

That God exists is a positive claim. Generally, those who make positive claims bear the burden of proof.

Neither the Theist nor the Atheist have reason to argue the claim "A lack of belief exists." We both know the Atheist lacks belief.

But if Atheists say, "God does not exist," or "There are no reasons to believe God exists," then they have reopened themselves. They've made positive knowledge claims, and owe evidence or reasons.

I also happen to lack a belief that a teapot orbits the sun somewhere between Mars and Jupiter. Should I then be expected to support my “ateapotism” with evidence? That would be irrational.

Incorrect. The problems are not that no evidence can be adduced for whether or not a teapot orbits the Sun. The question is not irrational at all. It's just capricious and verifiably fictitious, and that's its real problem.

If some people actually believed a teapot did orbit the Sun, you could deal with them by way of evidence. You could, for example, point out that our technological means such as telescopes or space ships show us it's not there (evidence). Or you could argue that teapots don't spontaneously generate (reasons). Or that a "teapot" is, by definition, a manufactured item (analytic logic), and there are no manufacturers in space. Or you could argue that since you just made it up today, or borrowed it from Dawkins, the idea has a vanishingly small likelihood of being true (probability argument).

Science does this kind of work all the time. When people believe something is there that is actually not there (like, say, a flat world, humours or phlogiston), science gets to work on evidence to disprove it, and to prove an alternate theory. Facts, reasons, tests, logic and evidence are the things with which it has to work.

Therefore, no part of making such an argument would cause you to be behaving irrationally in doing so. In fact, I suggest that is why you chose the "teapot" analogy in the first place; because you had already come to the conclusion the both you and I have ever reason NOT to believe in teapots in space. Were it not so, you would have no reason to expect your analogy to "take."

[Harbal]

Incorrect. The problems are not that no evidence can be adduced for whether or not a teapot orbits the Sun.

Or a coffee pot.

[Immanuel Can]

But we can easily prove that god does not exist. All we need is a dose of Alvin Plantinga’s Modal Ontological Special Super Secret Sauce. Here we go.

Premise 1 : It is possible that God does not exist.
Premise 2 : If it is possible that God does not exist then God does not exist in some possible worlds.

Your first fault. It is not possible to say, "A Supreme Being" is a coherent concept, but does not exist."

If the Supreme Being does not exist, then He's not "supreme" at all, because everyone can see that an existing thing is superior to a non-existing one, if for no other reason, in regard to the metric of existence. So once you've accepted the coherence of the concept "Supreme Being," you're committed to accepting "existence" as part of the package.

Maybe you shouldn't have accepted the coherence of the concept "God" back in premise 1. But if you didn't, then you'd have to explain why.

See how easy that was?

Easy? Well, one synonym for that word is "facile".

[Immanuel Can]

Incorrect. The problems are not that no evidence can be adduced for whether or not a teapot orbits the Sun.

Or a coffee pot.

Indeed.

[davidm]

It's not Dawkins' teapot or mine. It's Russell's.

[Harbal]

It's not Dawkins' teapot or mine. It's Russell's.

So whose is the coffee pot?

[davidm]

But we can easily prove that god does not exist. All we need is a dose of Alvin Plantinga’s Modal Ontological Special Super Secret Sauce. Here we go.

Premise 1 : It is possible that God does not exist.
Premise 2 : If it is possible that God does not exist then God does not exist in some possible worlds.

Your first fault. It is not possible to say, "A Supreme Being" is a coherent concept, but does not exist."

If the Supreme Being does not exist, then He's not "supreme" at all, because everyone can see that an existing thing is superior to a non-existing one, if for no other reason, in regard to the metric of existence. So once you've accepted the coherence of the concept "Supreme Being," you're committed to accepting "existence" as part of the package.

Maybe you shouldn't have accepted the coherence of the concept "God" back in premise 1. But if you didn't, then you'd have to explain why.

See how easy that was?

Easy? Well, one synonym for that word is "facile".

So if you want to reopen this line of discussion, why don't you go back and address, specifically, the illicit move from epistemic possibility in P1 to modal possibility in P2? 'Why don't you address how I used this illicit move to "prove" Goldbach's Theorem?

[davidm]

It's not Dawkins' teapot or mine. It's Russell's.

So whose is the coffee pot?

That would be yours.

[Immanuel Can]

I disbelieve in hobgoblins. But until this moment, I have never felt the slightest need to discuss my disbelief with anyone. But if I thought there were a case to be made regarding them, perhaps I might; but my certainty level is so high as to render any such discussion boring.

That's not really a comparable situation. If there were a significant number of people on this forum asserting the existence of hobgoblins you could possibly find yourself getting drawn into an argument about it, despite your disinterest in hobgoblins per se.

My point precisely. Hobgoblins and celestial teapots...nobody believes in them.

The concept "Supreme Being," on the other hand, is a concept at least entertained by 96% of the world's population. I would say that raises the stakes considerably, wouldn't you?

But this puts the boots to davidm's argument that the skeptic doesn't have to argue with evidence and reasons. We can see that he does...even in the case of arguing against things he may regard as fictional.

[Immanuel Can]

It's not Dawkins' teapot or mine. It's Russell's.

Then it just has one more layer of tarnish on it, because it's second hand.