100% Proof That Gods Do Not Exist

[davidm]

Possible Worlds: an Introduction to Logic and Its Philosophy

[surreptitious57]

Premise 1 : It is possible that God exists
Premise 2 : If it is possible that God exists then God exists in some possible worlds
Premise 3 : If God exists in some possible worlds then God exists in all possible worlds
Premise 4 : If God exists in all possible worlds then God exists in the actual world
Premise 5 : If God exists in the actual world then God exists
Conclusion : Therefore God exists

The basic flaw in the argument is in Premise 4 because the terms possible and actual are not synonymous but are treated as if they were
Things that are actual are only a subset of things that are possible not a totality of them because not everything that is possible is actual
Therefore if it is true that God exists in all possible worlds it does not automatically follow that he must exist in the actual world as well

I immediately saw the error after posting this. The flaw is in Premise 2 not in Premise 4. Just because something is hypothetically
possible does not mean it is actually possible. To assume it is is a non sequitur since the second part is not a logical consequence
of the first part. For if it is possible that God exists then it is equally possible that he does not actually exist in any possible world

[Immanuel Can]

Properly the argument would go:

P1 Possibly (in the natural language sense; i.e., a measure of our epistemic ignorance) God exists.
P2 If God exists, he exists at all possible worlds (Necessarily exists).
P3 If God does not exist, he fails to exist at all possible worlds (Necessarily fails to exist)
Conclusion: We don’t know if God exists or not.

This isn't a correct reflection of the OA argument, or a right response to it. Right at the start, you need to consider what it means to say that the OA argument is analytic, not synthetic. For your version treats Premise 1 as a synthetic claim, not as an analytic claim. And the reason that you allege for its insufficiency shows that that is, in fact, your assumption, so I'm not just guessing there.

Again, we come back to this question: "Do we have any reason to think the concept 'Supreme Being' is not a coherent one?" In other words, do we have any reason to think the concept itself is not possible. There is no burden put on us by this question to speak of our access at the moment to empirical evidence; and by the same token, there is in P1 no relevance to our "epistemic ignorance." There are empirical arguments for the existence of God, it's true; but to think of the OA as one is incorrect. That is not its intention.

P1 is analytic, a statement of conceptual analysis. Since the coherence of concepts pur laine does not depend on or call for empirical data, any deficiency in that regard is also not relevant to the question. You've simply missed Plantinga's point, and it seems to me you're accusing him therefore of a "dishonesty" of which he is not guilty.

So ultimately, you're quite right to say that he's probably too smart a man to make the mistake you're attributing to him -- of jumping to synthetic or even an empirical claim at P1. But perhaps that's because he's not the one who's actually making the mistake in judging the OA argument.

[Immanuel Can]

I immediately saw the error after posting this. The flaw is in Premise 2 not in Premise 4. Just because something is hypothetically
possible does not mean it is actually possible.

That is not the claim Plantinga's making. He is not telling you that the SB already exists in a sort of parallel world or other-optional empirical world. He is analyzing the meaning of the expression "possible." His premise is definitional, not empirical. If you say X is possible, you are admitting there is a set of conditions under which you would concede that such an entity could exist.

If you were not conceding that, then there is no possible meaning for your use of the word "possible," so I would say that Plantinga's step here is so modest and definitional as to be unobjectionable, if rightly understood.

[surreptitious57]

That is not the claim Plantingas making. He is not telling you that the SB already exists in a sort of parallel world or other
optional empirical world. He is analyzing the meaning of the expression possible. His premise is definitional not empirical

A definitional non empirical God would not actually exist and so even if Plantingas argument is valid it would not be sound
It is strange as to why there are no evidence based arguments for the existence of God given how he is supposed to be real

[Reflex]

That is not the claim Plantingas making. He is not telling you that the SB already exists in a sort of parallel world or other
optional empirical world. He is analyzing the meaning of the expression possible. His premise is definitional not empirical

A definitional non empirical God would not actually exist and so even if Plantingas argument is valid it would not be sound
It is strange as to why there are no evidence based arguments for the existence of God given how he is supposed to be real

Plantinga in a theistic personalist, which is very different than classical theism.

[Londoner]

Me: Except that if it was purely analytic it would not amount to a proof; it would be a tautology.
Yes and no. All definitions are, in a sense, tautological; on one side of the explanation is a word, and on the other a phrase that is the equivalent of that word. To say one is, in a definition, to imply the other. That's tautological, but it's profound and useful as well.

But in another sense, it's not tautological. To make sure you have the right-hand side of the definition correct when you have the left-hand word is far from a trivial activity. It's necessary to understanding properly what you're talking about, and it's essential to achieving the recognition of agreement (or disagreement) with other people.

It would be agreement in the sense of understanding what the other person means. And for perfect understanding you would be giving a synonym; for example 'bachelors' means 'unmarried men', the two terms are completely interchangeable. But one could do that with any word; 'unicorn' etc.

The fundamental question, again, is, "Is it even possible that the Supreme Being could exist?" And I still don't have your answer to that question. If I did, I could walk you the next step, and we'd be able to talk about it and see if you thought it was tautological or not. Until I have your position, I don't know how to point you in the right direction.

To understand that question I would have to know what you meant by 'exist'. For example, it is certainly the case that 'Supreme Being' exists as a phrase, and a concept.

But other meanings of 'exist' involve physical evidence, and having attributes like location. If the 'Supreme Being' exists in that sense, as an object in the universe, then he might exist somewhere. But then we would need to know whether the word 'Supreme' was meant to be descriptive, and how, if the Being was an object in the universe, in what sense would they be Supreme?

So we might argue that the 'Supreme Being' cannot possibly 'exist' because they would be entirely unlike any of the things we use that word 'exist' about. We could argue that the same word should also apply to the 'Supreme Being', but if we did then its meaning in that case would be quite distinct.

So a proof of the 'Supreme Being' based on using that same word 'exist' about him that we use about other things - things completely unlike him - would contradict our wish for definitional clarity. We should really invent a special word, say 'Xist' But then the meaning of the word Xist would be defined in terms of the only thing it applied to, i.e. the 'Supreme Being'. So we have achieved clarity, but at the cost of being being back with a tautology, or circularity. Then the answer to 'does the 'Supreme Being' Xist' would be 'Yes, because 'Xist' means 'whatever the 'Supreme Being' is'.

I am going through possibilities, to make the point that I cannot answer questions until I know what they mean. And I cannot just assume the normal meaning, since the 'Supreme Being' is unlike anything else.

Nobody was questioning that. But what we need to know is whether or not you regard the concept of a Supreme Being as coherent...Am I understanding you correctly if I say you do not disagree that the concept of a Supreme Being is coherent to you?

As I say, I cannot know because I do not know what it means, but it could be.

Me: The idea of a Pixie or Unicorn can be coherent.
This is the classic mental mistake that detractors of the OA make. There are no identifiable inherent "great making" properties to unicorns or pixies. So there is no more to be said about them than that. They are contingent, non-supreme entities.

They are certainly different concepts to 'Supreme Being' (as far as I understand what that is), but the point is that they can be coherent. I am saying that just having coherent concepts about Pixies or Jehovah or Euclidean geometry or Marxism is not a sign that our concept is valid in any other sense.

Me: If I claimed Unicorns exist-like-normal-animals, rather than exist-like-concepts, but cannot provide the sort of empirical evidence for Unicorns that goes with exist-like-normal-animals, then my claim would no longer be coherent.

Here you've mixed up analytic and synthetic. Synthetic proofs (empirical ones) are not necessary for analytic ones, and do not presuppose synthetic demonstrations either.

OK. So the sense in which the 'Supreme Being' exists is not in the sense that objects exist, so it does not require a synthetic proof in that sense. It only requires an analytic proof. In that case, what is an 'analytic proof' apart from a tautology?

You don't need to see a physical, empirical "1" to understand the concept of "1". It is not also necessary for you to demonstrate the physical existence of a "1" in order to know what it means to speak coherently or use the concept of "1"-ness.

Absolutely. And number is (almost!) coherent as a concept. But as I keep saying, so are lots of things.

Me: 'Existence' purely as a concept? Or in some wider sense? That is where the problem arises, the Ontological Argument is usually understood to want to move beyond God as existing purely as a concept.

Yes, it does: but it does not do that until the conclusion. To jump ahead to the conclusion and then just to declare it impossible by fiat would require proof on your part, or skeptics would have reason to call you for bluffing.

Yet again, if the 'Supreme Being' remains simply a concept then you are pushing at an open door. Everyone in the world agrees that the concept is a concept.

Here we are talking only about potential existence, and not (yet) about nature. That's important to keep in mind....So what proof for the non-existence of God would justify your move, if you were to rule out you accepting the possibility that the OA is right, even before tracking the logical demonstration?

And again, if you mean 'existence as a concept' then no need to call it 'potential'. 'Supreme Being' is definitely a concept. God exists as a concept.

We haven't got to the Ontological Argument yet.

Me: But the OA wants to move beyond that, to argue God is 'greater than a being that exists only as an idea in the mind'.

The OA does, but don't let that sway you. It doesn't ask you to do it unilaterally or without reason. It offers a logical line of reasoning instead.

Which is?

[Londoner]

If you say X is possible, you are admitting there is a set of conditions under which you would concede that such an entity could exist.

But you are not admitting that those conditions do exist.

In one sense, it was possible that Clinton might be President - but it is impossible that Clinton is the President.

By using the peculiar phrase 'possible worlds' Plantinga misleads us. A 'world' is normally understood as a state of affairs that exists. There is only one of those. The only President in that world is Trump.

'Possible worlds' are counterfactual. They exist only as ideas. President Hillary Clinton exists only as an idea. And God can exist as an idea. We're fine with that.

[uwot]

What we know is that the evidence believers present is only sufficient to persuade those who wish to believe.

..ok, so why would one not wish to believe?

I don't wish not to believe; I simply don't believe, because the evidence does not persuade me. That is not because of bad faith, irrationality or dumbness, as Mr Can insists (fuck him and the horse he came in on), rather the fact that men in skirts tell me that the character in their book really existed, is a piss poor reason for believing it.

It is no more compelling than the Christmas presents under the tree is evidence that Santa Claus put them there.

Really. You are still compelled to compare belief in our reality having an intelligent backbone, to that of someone believing in presents that they have written and wished for from some dude flying reindeer across the sky and delivering presents to billions of people in a single night?

You are mixing up the concept of some god like thing, which is a tenable hypothesis, but not what we are talking about, with the story of some dude that walked on water and turned a picnic into a feast for 5000.

Is that really an intelligent comparison?

Yes.

[uwot]

If you say X is possible, you are admitting there is a set of conditions under which you would concede that such an entity could exist.

Indeed, Mr Can, god could exist, but anyone, with even a passing knowledge of the history of science, knows that logic can only provide the hypothesis, it cannot prove the existence of anything; that requires empirical evidence. Your hypothetical god is not a special case.

[Immanuel Can]

It is strange as to why there are no evidence based arguments for the existence of God given how he is supposed to be real

Of course there are. Have you never heard of the various empirical arguments for the existence of God?

But the OA is a conceptual argument, one that depends on strict logic and definitional meanings, not per se on empirical observation. It's not at all bad if ONE of the arguments for God takes that form. In fact, it would be odd if NO such argument could be raised.

But why would you assume it was the only available argument? Among Theists, it's not even regarded as the primary one.

[Immanuel Can]

Plantinga in a theistic personalist, which is very different than classical theism.

That depends. If by "Theism" one understands a proposition that a Supreme Being exists, but one does not further evaluate the nature of said Being, then you'd be right. But if by "Theism" one understands that one actually has to be arguing for a particular nature of God, then Plantinga's as "classical" as can be.

Most of the available arguments are essentially Judeo-Christian. Plantinga's in the classical current of that tradition.

[Immanuel Can]

To understand that question I would have to know what you meant by 'exist'. For example, it is certainly the case that 'Supreme Being' exists as a phrase, and a concept.

No. It just means, "Do you have any reason to think that, given the right set of conditions (or "possible world") the Supreme Being could not exist, or do you regard His existence as a possibility, even if you don't consider it an actuality." I don't know if I know how to spell it out more clearly.

But other meanings of 'exist' involve physical evidence, and having attributes like location. If the 'Supreme Being' exists in that sense, as an object in the universe, then he might exist somewhere.

Indeed.

But then we would need to know whether the word 'Supreme' was meant to be descriptive, and how, if the Being was an object in the universe, in what sense would they be Supreme?

Plantinga does a great deal with explaining these "great-making" properties. But I'll have to refer you to him on that.

I cannot answer questions until I know what they mean.

Indeed. Nor can one find reason to be an Atheist until one knows what one is being.

They are certainly different concepts to 'Supreme Being' (as far as I understand what that is), but the point is that they can be coherent. I am saying that just having coherent concepts about Pixies or Jehovah or Euclidean geometry or Marxism is not a sign that our concept is valid in any other sense.

We know that. That is not the OA's claim.

OK. So the sense in which the 'Supreme Being' exists is not in the sense that objects exist, so it does not require a synthetic proof in that sense. It only requires an analytic proof. In that case, what is an 'analytic proof' apart from a tautology?

Analytic proofs come on line when we examine the implications of the conceptions we have. If we have an incoherent conception, say, like "married bachelor," we discover its incoherence and reject it. If we discover a concept to be coherent, then we go on to its implications.

Absolutely. And number is (almost!) coherent as a concept. But as I keep saying, so are lots of things.

But notice that there is no empirical argument for the reality of 1-ness. One cannot find 1-ness apart from its adjectival attribution to some kind of noun. 1-ness, as a pure "existence" itself forever escapes us; and yet we believe in it and use it routinely for empirical things.

Yet again, if the 'Supreme Being' remains simply a concept then you are pushing at an open door. Everyone in the world agrees that the concept is a concept.

The question is, "Is it a possible concept?" or "Can it be regarded as essentially coherent?"

[Immanuel Can]

If you say X is possible, you are admitting there is a set of conditions under which you would concede that such an entity could exist.

But you are not admitting that those conditions do exist.

No, you are not being asked to do that...yet.

In one sense, it was possible that Clinton might be President - but it is impossible that Clinton is the President.

Right. So far, so good.

But what you've forgotten again is the adjective "Supreme." If there were such a thing as a "supreme Clinton," he would have to be president not just in one possible world, but in all possible worlds.

That's put lightly ...but it points you in the right OA direction.

[davidm]

OK, let’s use Plantinga’s abracadabra to “prove” that Goldbach’s Conjecture is true!

The conjecture is a good stand-in for god because just as god necessarily exists or necessarily fails to exist (which we get from standard and correct modal ontological arguments) the conjecture is either necessarily true (true at all possible worlds) or necessarily false (false at all possible worlds).

Here we go! Whee, what fun!

Premise 1: It is possible that GC is true.
Premise 2: If it is possible that GC is true, then GC is true in some possible worlds.
Premise 3: If GC is true in some possible worlds, then GC is true in all possible worlds.
Premise 4: If GC is true in all possible worlds, then GC is true in the actual world.
Premise 5: If GC is true in the actual world, then GC is true,
Conclusion: Therefore, Goldbach’s Conjecture is true.

Yay, look what I just did using Plantinga’s “reasoning.” I did what generations of mathematicians have failed to do— I proved that GC is true!

If anyone really believes I just proved CG to be true, show this nonsense to a mathematician and watch him burst out laughing.