Walker:
Kids can teach themselves.
I would like to talk about the major premise or paradigm of the talk - self-organizing systems. While I do think there is some truth to the claim that learning is a self-organizing system, it leaves open the question of the system or systems that emerge. This is related to a) the question of values and whether those values that emerge from “outdoctrination” will be beneficial to those who come to hold them, and b) the extent to which what is learned will be useful in promoting the way of life that is valued.
In other words, we are not freed from but led to the problem of society, the great beast, which is itself a self-organizing system. If we tie this to “remoteness” then hypothetically, we may over time find in geographically remote areas something like peaceful tribes, but we may also find something closer to “Lord of the Flies”. More generally, whether we are dealing with remote societies or nations, we cannot simply escape social structures or systems. They confer both benefit and harm. It is human beings who structure these systems and in turn are structured by them.
To the extent that we free ourselves from prevailing social norms we do so within society. We live in times where it is quite easy to see that social structures and values can and do change, and that such change is brought about within the system by those who rejected certain norms in favor of others. As with all change there will be some who will condemn it and long for a mythological golden age.
An ill-informed appeal to Plato is particularly ironic in this regard. Those who condemned Socrates did so because he threatened the status quo, which many thought had already deteriorated from a golden age they longed to return to. Let’s take a look at the passage from Plato from which all this talk of a great beast derives:
"Well, then," I said, "besides that one, be of this opinion too."
"What?"
"That each of the private wage earners whom these men call sophists and believe to be their rivals in art, educates in nothing other than these convictions" of the many, which they opine when they are gathered together, and he calls this wisdom. It is just like the case of a man who learns by heart the angers and desires of a great, strong beast he is rearing, how it should be approached and how taken hold of, when—and as a result of what—it becomes most difficult or most gentle, and, particularly, under what conditions it is accustomed to utter its several sounds, and, in turn, what sort of sounds uttered by another make it tame and angry. When he has learned all this from associating and spending time with the beast, he calls it wisdom and, organizing it as an art, turns to teaching. Knowing nothing in truth about which of these convictions and desires is noble, or base, or good, or evil, or just, or unjust, he applies all these names following the great animal's opinions—calling what delights it good and what vexes it bad. He has no other argument about them but calls the necessary just and noble, neither having seen nor being able to show someone else how much the nature of the necessary and the good really differ. Now, in your opinion, wouldn't such a man, in the name of Zeus, be out of place as an educator?"
"Yes," he said, "in my opinion, he would indeed." (Republic 493a-c)
What Plato is talking about is a kind of knowledge used by the sophist to manipulate opinion. The problem is not that they manipulate opinion (note this passage begins by Socrates telling Adeimantus to “be of the opinion”) but rather that the sophist does not know:
...which of these convictions and desires is noble, or base, or good, or evil, or just, or unjust, he applies all these names following the great animal's opinions—calling what delights it good and what vexes it bad.
There is in this no condemnation of the great beast, but rather a condemnation of those who attempt to set themselves up as teachers of wisdom who are not wise. To the extent that Socrates is wise it is with regard to "whatever I do not know, I do not even suppose I know" (Apology 21d). To the extent he teaches wisdom it is with regard to self-knowledge which includes knowledge of the limits of what we know. As humans we possess at best this human wisdom not the divine wisdom of the gods.
Weil, however, sees society itself, that is, a “collective”, whether it be a church or a state, as the great beast:
Society is the cave. The way out is solitude.
This does not necessarily mean physical isolation:
Meditation on the social mechanism is in this respect a purification of the first importance. To contemplate the social is as good a way of detachment as to retire from the world. That is why I have not been wrong to rub shoulders with politics or society.
Contemplation of the social is not wholesale condemnation of or opposition to society or "secular society". It is a call to individualism in thought and action. It is to find one’s own way. It is not only “secular society” that imprisons us. One can build his own prison out of such things as a perverse preoccupation with the very thing that he claims imprisons us, seeing everything as a Manichean struggle between good and evil instantiated the evil of secularism versus an ideal of consciousness not yet attained.
Finding one’s own way does not mean worshiping in the cult of Simone Weil wherein one’s every thought and statement is shaped by hers. Nor is it a matter of taking Plato’s image of the cave as if having read about it and what is supposed to exist outside of it gives one authority to speak about things he does not know. One should not mistake the “sounds uttered by another [that] make [him] tame and angry” for truth. To do so is to be a slave to Weil’s great beast, an enslavement that is the result of a failure to properly identify it. As she says:
In order to be exercised, the intelligence requires to be free to express itself without control by any authority.
This applies equally to the authority of Weil or Plato or anyone else. And for this reason one may question her next statement:
There must therefore be a domain of pure intellectual research, separate but accessible to all, where no authority intervenes.
There is no ‘therefore’ that must follow from the call for the intelligence to express itself freely. Such a domain may not exist. There is a difference between influence and control. We can free ourselves of control but no one, not even, Simone Weil is without influence.