Free Will vs Determinism

[Immanuel Can]

Pascal's wager is an interesting concept, but if it is the only reason for a person taking up a religion, I would think it is a bit insincere. In the end it only matters what you truly believe, not what you appear to believe.

True.

But Pascal never said it was the ONLY reason to be a Theist, or even that it was the BEST reason to be a Theist. All we need to see is that it is a very, very, very good reason not to be an Atheist. And that's quite fair. We need put no more weight than that on the argument here. It's enough.

And, on your side again, any Theist who thinks belief matters is going to agree with you about sincerity being key. And any Christian is going to agree with you that you can't "appear" to believe things you don't -- at least not to the eyes of God. No problem there.

But any Atheist has to know he's playing Russian Roulette with his own soul, and with six bullets in the gun. There is literally no way for the Atheist to end up in any good place -- and that by Atheism's own account. They can die and go to dust, or they can face Judgment. Neither alternative has the taste of a win in it. Both are huge losses.

So why is that not very obvious to them? Can't they reason?

[thedoc]

"Trained to think": that can be a synonym for "indoctrinated," which is a good description of anyone who imagines they can rationally sustain their Atheism. It's not a rational or evidentiary position: it's just a denial of belief. And when it comes down to the crunch, they've been "trained to think" that, maybe...but there's no rational warrant for their confidence.

And I'm sure they'd know that, if "trained to think" meant, "being self-critical," not merely gratuitously and smugly denying the existence of God.

I believe "Indoctrinated" is what most atheists accuse Christianity of doing to it's members, it would be ironic to think that is what atheists are doing to those who entertain atheism as a concept.

[Immanuel Can]

I believe "Indoctrinated" is what most atheists accuse Christianity of doing to it's members, it would be ironic to think that is what atheists are doing to those who entertain atheism as a concept.

Indeed. But that is exactly what they do.

[thedoc]

There is literally no way for the Atheist to end up in any good place -- and that by Atheism's own account.

Interesting, BTW there used to be a TV show "The Good Place", but as is typical the shows I want to watch usually get canceled, and this one didn't last a full season. Sometimes I think I'm out of step with the world, or the world is out of step with me?

[thedoc]

And, on your side again, any Theist who thinks belief matters is going to agree with you about sincerity being key. And any Christian is going to agree with you that you can't "appear" to believe things you don't -- at least not to the eyes of God. No problem there.

Someone I know used to be a deacon in a church he attended, and would help count the offering after service. One member always made a big show of putting a $20.00 bill in the offering plate, (this was many years ago), till one Sunday there was no $20.00 bill in the offering. They figured out that somehow he made a show of putting it into the offering, but then removed it unseen, and counting on someone else putting a $20.00 bill in the offering to cover the absence of his bill. That would be a definite sign of insincerity.

[davidm]

There is still some misunderstanding about "will do" and "must do", perhaps it would be more clear if it was stated that the foreknowledge of OA does not bind O's actions, but O's actions bind OA's foreknowledge. There is a subtle difference. O's actions may not be decided till the time of the action, but OA's foreknowledge can be far in advance, in fact the foreknowledge can be from the beginning of time but it still does not bind O's actions.

This is exactly right.

[davidm]

Only in your dreams.

What a profound response.

Thanks so much for your attention to this matter.

No evidence exists to support your assertion. Quite the contrary.

You were responding to my "assertion" that the fixity of the past does not imply the necessity of the past. So you think that all past, present and future contingent events are actually necessary events? That my eating eggs yesterday for breakfast has the same logical status as a triangle having three sides?

And you even say you have evidence for this astounding claim, which violates elementary logic?

[davidm]

Davidm wrote:

But the fixity of the past in no way implies the necessity of the past. They are two entirely different concepts. The past could have gone differently -- and if it had done so, then I would have different memories of the past. ...

Events must be either caused or original.

Given: event A was the case, including all its different time and space frames. Event A, including all its different relative time and space frames , was a caused event.

If event A had been uncaused by any prequel but originated by event A then event A as potential and actual originator would be a singular cause common to other events .E.g.either 1. God or 2. nature.

I'm not sure what you are objecting to here. I've already reiterated the standard view of causal determinism -- that past states of the universe, in concert with the laws of nature, entail our acts. However, this still does not make our acts necessary in the logical meaning of necessity -- that our acts are true at all possible worlds. As I stated upthread, our acts can and will go a different way just in case the past states of the universe were different, and/or the laws of nature are different. Causal determinism therefore does not preclude the contingency of our acts.

[thedoc]

There is still some misunderstanding about "will do" and "must do", perhaps it would be more clear if it was stated that the foreknowledge of OA does not bind O's actions, but O's actions bind OA's foreknowledge. There is a subtle difference. O's actions may not be decided till the time of the action, but OA's foreknowledge can be far in advance, in fact the foreknowledge can be from the beginning of time but it still does not bind O's actions.

This is exactly right.

Thankyou, I used to have a problem with this, I couldn't figure out how foreknowledge didn't mean determined. Then on another forum you explained the difference between "will do" and "must do" and after I thought about it for awhile, I finally figured it out.

BTW, I have very little schooling in logic, I'm learning most of what I know on forums like this or research on the internet.

[davidm]

There is still some misunderstanding about "will do" and "must do", perhaps it would be more clear if it was stated that the foreknowledge of OA does not bind O's actions, but O's actions bind OA's foreknowledge. There is a subtle difference. O's actions may not be decided till the time of the action, but OA's foreknowledge can be far in advance, in fact the foreknowledge can be from the beginning of time but it still does not bind O's actions.

This is exactly right.

Thankyou, I used to have a problem with this, I couldn't figure out how foreknowledge didn't mean determined. Then on another forum you explained the difference between "will do" and "must do" and after I thought about it for awhile, I finally figured it out.

Thank you; I had specifically hoped to make it clear to you and I am glad I succeeded!

[Immanuel Can]

Sometimes I think I'm out of step with the world, or the world is out of step with me?

Depends on where "the world" is going, doesn't it?

[Belinda]

Davidm wrote:

I'm not sure what you are objecting to here. I've already reiterated the standard view of causal determinism -- that past states of the universe, in concert with the laws of nature, entrai our acts. However, this still does not make our acts necessary in the logical meaning of necessity -- that our acts are true at all possible worlds. As I stated upthread, our acts can and will go a different way just in case the past states of the universe were different, and/or the laws of nature are different. Causal determinism therefore does not preclude the contingency of our acts.

To say that an event might happen in the future ('contingency') depends upon estimating a possibility for its proximation to a probability. The utterance may refer to to some law or laws of science such as a physicist might deal with. Or the context of the utterance may be a very limited train of events e.g. "It's possible that I might be pregnant, as you did not wear a condom" .I am saying that talk of possibilities i.e. contingencies is not explicit philosophical talk.

Determinism and Free Willism are not about what we can know. They are ontical. Determinism is inseparable from nature. Free Will is not natural. Any minutest sliver of Free Will is not natural.

When you say "necessary in the logical meaning of necessity" are you referring to formal logic, now a branch of mathematics? If so, I agree that our acts are not necessary in the logical meaning of necessity. But the sum total of my acts isn't a number or a logical relation, which are abstractions from nature. The totality of my acts is necessary as a mode of nature.

[Harbal]

This is exactly right.

Nonsense, thedoc has never been "exactly right" in his life, there must be some mistake.

[Harbal]

Thankyou, I used to have a problem with this, I couldn't figure out how foreknowledge didn't mean determined. Then on another forum you explained the difference between "will do" and "must do" and after I thought about it for awhile, I finally figured it out.

It looks like you've found a new Daddy, doc. IC will be ever so jealous.

BTW, I have very little schooling in logic,

What a relief, I'd hate to think anybody was teaching the kind of stuff you come out with.

[davidm]

What provocative and insightful responses from Harbal. (did you mean Herbal, or maybe you can't spell, either?)

Typical message board.

But don't let me interfere with your content-free trolling. Message boards are set up precisely so that trolls can destroy meaningful discussion.