Free Will vs Determinism

[Dave Mangnall]

What do you mean by free will? Free of or from what exactly?

The ability to choose between freely realisable alternatives so free from any restriction
Although only as it pertains to them so not free will in absolute terms only relative ones

And how do you choose?
If you had the time again, exactly would you choose the same thing?
If the entire universe is a process of cause and effect; what causes your choice?

I’m a determinist too, but I don’t see how the question of “If you had your time again?” advances our cause against these obdurate Free Willies. I’m guessing that you’re implying that if they’d choose the same way then there’s a reason for it, “reason” meaning compelling deterministic cause. That’s how I think of it. As you said earlier, we can act to our will, but we are not free to will our will. But in the Free Will model being able to act for a reason is actually a sign of free will, so their interpretation is that if they’re free to make a choice the first time then they’d be free to make the same choice another time. Their “reason” is explanation, rather than compelling cause.
Or am I misunderstanding you?

[henry quirk]

Kettle callin' the pot black.

[Dave Mangnall]

Kettle callin' the pot black.

Fair comment, Henry!

[Hobbes' Choice]

The ability to choose between freely realisable alternatives so free from any restriction
Although only as it pertains to them so not free will in absolute terms only relative ones

And how do you choose?
If you had the time again exactly would you choose the same thing?
If the entire universe is a process of cause and effect what causes your choice?

You choose whichever is most preferable to you at the time
I would not choose exactly the same thing again if I had the knowledge of my original choices
Your choice is determined by the logical or emotional process which selects it over all others

Thus a choice is determined.

[Hobbes' Choice]

The ability to choose between freely realisable alternatives so free from any restriction
Although only as it pertains to them so not free will in absolute terms only relative ones

And how do you choose?
If you had the time again, exactly would you choose the same thing?
If the entire universe is a process of cause and effect; what causes your choice?

I’m a determinist too, but I don’t see how the question of “If you had your time again?” advances our cause against these obdurate Free Willies. I’m guessing that you’re implying that if they’d choose the same way then there’s a reason for it, “reason” meaning compelling deterministic cause. That’s how I think of it. As you said earlier, we can act to our will, but we are not free to will our will. But in the Free Will model being able to act for a reason is actually a sign of free will, so their interpretation is that if they’re free to make a choice the first time then they’d be free to make the same choice another time. Their “reason” is explanation, rather than compelling cause.
Or am I misunderstanding you?

The point is that a choice is determined, caused. having the time again there is no freedom to choice otherwise.
I've had some free willies say they might have a different choice, which invalidates their choice to my mind, making it effectively random.
"Free" is a redundant word in this context.

[Harbal]

Kettle callin' the pot black.

My kettle is made of white plastic and would never dream of being so un PC as to call anything black.

[Immanuel Can]

obdurate Free Willies

Can't help it. We were predetermined by material causes to be obdurate.

Wish we could help you out...but we're stuck.

[Dave Mangnall]

obdurate Free Willies

Can't help it. We were predetermined by material causes to be obdurate.

Wish we could help you out...but we're stuck.

Of course you're stuck, Immanuel. I understand that better than anyone!
Don't worry about my playfully provocative adjectives. We drones are stuck with our odd sense of humour.
By the way, I've googled Nagel's Mind and Cosmos. I'm unwilling to shell out the fifteen quid for it, especially as one review I read called the book "frustrating and unconvincing". Perhaps you could summarise his account of free will for me in one or two pithy sentences! If not, I do have in my possession, within a book of essays on free will, an extract from his "The View From Nowhere". Hopefully this will give me a flavour of his thinking.

[Hobbes' Choice]

obdurate Free Willies

Can't help it. We were predetermined by material causes to be obdurate.

Wish we could help you out...but we're stuck.

But you can be caused to change. That's what determinism is all about.

[Dave Mangnall]

And how do you choose?
If you had the time again, exactly would you choose the same thing?
If the entire universe is a process of cause and effect; what causes your choice?

I’m a determinist too, but I don’t see how the question of “If you had your time again?” advances our cause against these obdurate Free Willies. I’m guessing that you’re implying that if they’d choose the same way then there’s a reason for it, “reason” meaning compelling deterministic cause. That’s how I think of it. As you said earlier, we can act to our will, but we are not free to will our will. But in the Free Will model being able to act for a reason is actually a sign of free will, so their interpretation is that if they’re free to make a choice the first time then they’d be free to make the same choice another time. Their “reason” is explanation, rather than compelling cause.
Or am I misunderstanding you?

The point is that a choice is determined, caused. having the time again there is no freedom to choice otherwise.
I've had some free willies say they might have a different choice, which invalidates their choice to my mind, making it effectively random.
"Free" is a redundant word in this context.

The key phrase here is "to my mind"; clearly the Free Willies don't agree. The mystery, for me, is this. Why, when the truth of determinism is so clear to me, do so many other people not see it? (Their answer, of course, would be "'Cause it ain't true!") To try to understand this "obduracy" is the main reason why I'm closely following this thread. (Sorry, Immanuel, if you're reading this. It's not that I'm trying to "change your mind"!)

[Immanuel Can]

We drones are stuck with our odd sense of humour.

Fair enough.

By the way, I've googled Nagel's Mind and Cosmos. I'm unwilling to shell out the fifteen quid for it, especially as one review I read called the book "frustrating and unconvincing".

You'll find his pals in the Atheist side of things are very unhappy with him. There problem with him is that he criticizes materialism and *gasp* Darwinism for their inadequacies in accounting for important parts of the world and human experience -- such as free will and human consciousness, among others.

Now, to be perfectly fair to Nagel, he's no kind of Theist. Nor does he appear, at this moment, to be interested in entertaining becoming one. His argument is basically, "C'mon, Atheists: we've got to do better than we're doing."

He is quite explicit in his two closing chapters in saying that he is NOT campaigning for Theism, but rather he sees the secular scientific and philosophical worlds has having got stuck down a sort of cut-de-sac of Materialism and Neo-Darwinian Gradualism, and he wants them to find a better paradigm with which to frame science, one that does not conceptually hack off things like perception, identity, consciousness and will, and then has to pretend they don't exist, but rather one capable of embracing these things -- the reality of which, he argues, is really beyond reasonable dispute. (You'll have to read him if you want all his reasons; I can't possibly do all that for you in this space.)

In the end, he explicitly says that he looks for remedy in Atheism, not in Theism. While admitting that Atheism is not there yet, he hopes it will come up with something better than the horse it's been backing so far; because in his view, the cost of a bad paradigm in terms of bad science is just too high to pay.

Now, that's a reasonable argument from a committedly secular perspective. But if you read the subsequent reviews -- particularly those just after the initial release of his book -- he's been pilloried in the press by his Atheist friends, simply for suggesting they've been playing without a full deck thus far. Most of the annoyance seems to come not just from the fact that he's indirectly, as a side effect, opened the door to Theism again, but that he has the temerity to say that any paradigm Atheism's been backing as hard as it can is less than ideal, and even worse, he hasn't replaced it already with something better. I suspect that's what they find most "frustrating."

They've pretty much shut down his (formerly rather promising) career. And near as I can see, the only reason is spite. His peers just don't like what he's saying. But I have to feel a little sympathy for him, even though he's not of my camp; because as nearly as I can tell, he's committed no "sins" against Atheism, he's just raised some questions they really ought to have been asking themselves years ago but were too busy desperately trying to fend of Theism to realize it.

I think he deserves a read. I wonder if you have such a thing as a "library" in your area...

[henry quirk]

Dave,

I think most of us free will-types understand cause and effect, and implications of cause and effect, as well as any one. We see the practical examples of c & e all around us, all the time.

Speaking for me only: as I've said before, while recognizing c & e, I can't deny my own real, on-going experience as a self-director, so: some aspect of cause and effect must be false, or, some aspect of 'selfness/I-ness' renders that self/I (partially) exempt from c & e.

Mebbe selfness and self-direction is a kind of nondeterministic algorithm (an on-going computational event [or error]).

*shrug*

Whatever it is, it's real...as real as I am, as you are.

So, again, the question is: How can you so easily deny your own experience of self-direction in favor of a formula which has no room in it for 'you', for self-direction?

[Immanuel Can]

Dave,

So, again, the question is: How can you so easily deny your own experience of self-direction in favor of a formula which has no room in it for 'you', for self-direction?

Dave:

What he said.

[Belinda]

Henry Quirk wrote:

Speaking for me only: as I've said before, while recognizing c & e, I can't deny my own real, on-going experience as a self-director, so: some aspect of cause and effect must be false, or, some aspect of 'selfness/I-ness' renders that self/I (partially) exempt from c & e.

Henry, your own, real, ongoing experience is a proper basis for your belief, and is better than quotations from any published philosopher. however I suggest that you look again at why you believe your self to be able to originate decisions and ideas.

If your self can originate decisions and ideas it's different from any other organ or tissue mass in your body.

If your self has nothing to do with what caused it to act then your self is something like God, which is supposed to be the only self-caused.

If you believe that something is real simply because it feels as if it's real, then you are at risk of all manner of self deceptions.

[Immanuel Can]

If you believe that something is real simply because it feels as if it's real, then you are at risk of all manner of self deceptions.

True, but incomplete. It is also true that if you insist that only that which you can verify by methods you choose to prescribe arbitrarily is true, you are also at risk of self-deception. Pick your poison.

Look at it this way: we have this very, very powerful intuition that we exist as a "self," not merely as a collocation of predetermined atoms. Everybody feels it, even those people who most ardently want to deny it. Everybody acts like this intuition reflects some important truth. Even its deniers argue -- showing thereby that they imagine they can sway the judgment of free agents. But at the same time, they will tell you that these agents are not free. That's clearly nonsense, since they cannot even stay consistent with their own philosophy. If they could, perhaps we'd have reason to believe them: but then, they would not be offering arguments. They'd just be waiting for predetermined outcomes to play out as they inevitably must, and they wouldn't bother to argue.

So people are of two types: those (like Henry) who know they believe in some measure of free will, and those (like the Determinists) who claim not to but actually act like they do believe in it anyway. And there are no other types, apparently. There are only those who affirm free will by ideology, and those who affirm it by their practices.

So we need to ask what we can make of this powerful, universal intuition. Is it wrong? What is our theory for the reason it's wrong; that we think all intuitions are automatically wrong? That's clearly untrue; some intuitions turn out to be right...everybody recognizes that. So it begs the question of what this inuition really means.

I think it means we know we're all morally-responsible agents, ultimately.

Let me show you a simple illustration of why we have that sort of intuition.

Take an optical illusion...say this one: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7f1G6Nx5VDw. But don't start the video just yet -- pause it right at the starting image. Just look at the still image, and ask yourself what it is.

Can you see both images? Most people can, after a few seconds. If you can't, then click on the video, and you'll see it. They'll morph it for you.

Go back to the starting image, and pause the video.

Now, before the video started morphing to the old woman, when you had just arrived at the site and seen the still picture, which one did you see first? Which one did you see second?

Now play around with this. Can you now focus your mind so as just to perceive one and not the other, and hold that for a second or two? Now can you focus your mind to see the other one, and not the first one?

Almost everyone can do that. But notice this: THE PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF THE STILL VERSION OF THE ILLUSION DO NOT CHANGE. Nor did I tell you which of the two images you had to perceive first, and which you had to perceive second. Moreover, when I asked you to hold onto one, I didn't specify which one. Then, when I told you to revert to the other, again, I didn't tell you which one that one had to be. I left all that to you.

So let me ask you this: who is doing the manipulating of the image? Of course, you can imagine it was some sort of physical causality, but that gets less plausible because no physical property is being manipulated as you move from the one image to the other, and back again, as often as you may happen to please. Only your own individual perception is changing. And I am not making you change it, because I was non-directive in my instructions as to which you would choose to see.

I suggest to you that you are feeling the sensation of your own free will. And that powerful feeling you've just had is exactly what the Determinists want to tell you means nothing.

Having done the experiment, and having felt yourself make the decision to go back and forth on the image, are you still with them on that?