Free Will vs Determinism

[Immanuel Can]

Free Will vs Determinism seems to yield a perspective based on whether your looking from the inside out or the outside in.

That's a good thought. And I think it's true.

At the same time, obviously that doesn't mean that one or the other isn't true in an absolute sense, regardless of our "insider" view. That's not because I say so, but because the two key propositions...the future is predetermined / the future is open to actions of will...are mutually-exclusive claims.

IF the future is Deterministically set, then by definition "will" or the "insider feeling of will" doesn't really matter, because it's not an independent causal factor. But IF will IS a genuine force of causality, then Determinism is not absolute, and we have some degree of a free-will position in hand, not a Determinist one.

[Immanuel Can]

=And even if [paths] appear to "change," that's not really a change, because the (apparent) change itself was determined.

How do you define change??? Example of change (a deterministic one of sorts): Tall lit candle, and a short lit candle later on. That's change: a different in the state of a thing over time. You're denying that the candle thus changes because deterministic physics are involved? Probably not, but then I don't know how you're using the word 'change'.

A fair question. The word "change" is ambiguous, of course. But as you intuit, I'm not speaking merely of a change of condition. Nor am I doubting that candles can be one way today and a different one tomorrow. Rather, I'm wanting to speak of a "change" that is induced out of the will or volition of some person, not out of his or her function purely as a cog in the Determinist machine, but rather as a somewhat-independent agent of change.

Determinists can "see" changes of the candle sort. They know things start out one way, and end up another all the time. But they think that all of them are just inevitable changes. In fact, they think that even human volition-induced changes are of the candle sort...just a result of a Determined process.

[Immanuel Can]

If you deny you're own experience of choosing and self-direction, nuthin' I'm gonna post will change your mind. In effect, you deny fire burns, even as your hand cooks in the flame. What can I offer in the face of such wrong-headedness?

Good ol' Henry. There with the common sense when we need it.

[Noax]

You seem to have a begging definition of personhood: one externally controlled.

No. Quite the contrary. That's no definition of personhood I've ever accepted. I have no idea how you came up with it.

But Determinists think that "control" of a certain kind is a comprehensive explanation for everything. Therefore, a "person" in their worldview, is not a cause-capable agent, but rather a dumb-terminal in a Materialist chain.

There you go. You deny the definition, then use it. Determinists think no such thing. You really need to stop representing a view that is not your own.

Oh? You're not a Determinist? Good. Nobody should be.

But these two of your statements are mutually contradictory.

Under hard determination, there is one future of a given state, and dualism just doesn't fit in.

A human is a person with his own volition, free from causes initiated by an external entity.

The second statement is not Determinism.

It includes determinism, but is not limited to it. I know, you define freedom as a body possessed, not as being free from it.

They personhood, and assert their personal rights. They deny morality, and then claim they are also moral people. They deny will, and then they argue to change people's minds...and so on.

Again, don't tell us what we deny. There is will, morality, and causality. I'm also not in this to change your mind. How often does that happen on these forums? I'm in this for other reasons.

I'm not asking you to accept incredulity as evidence. But when all people, including Determinists, find themselves obliged to live as if Determinism is not true, I think we're justified in holding off unthinking belief in Determinism until we know why that happens.

You mean as if fate were true, a sort of monist epiphenomenalism: The will disjoint from causality, leaving the person a mere spectator. Sorry, no, that's not determinism. Your whole argument seems to revolve around misrepresenting the view. Perhaps expressing understanding would threaten your weak position?

I don't decline. But its' absurd to ask, "Where are the material causes of non-material phenomena?" to someone who does not accept that "materials" is a sufficient explanation for everything, or to suppose suppose that there's virtue in dismissing such phenomena as consciousness, identity, rationality and morality by reducing them -- without reason -- to nothing more than arrangements of materials.

Where did I ask the bolded question? You change my wording significantly. Very impolite.
Again I'm asking: In your view, where is will, memory and cognition? I presume the immaterial mind/soul, but you won't say it.
Do non-human creatures do it that way? If so, what might distinguish the ones that do from the ones that don't?

I'm not prepared to take Physicalism on faith, and it does not appear more than reductional in the case of dealing with the (epi?-)phenomena you mention.

When did I ever ask you to do that?
Your way of framing the question seemed to presuppose that. But if you're not a Materialist Determinist, then maybe you didn't mean that.

I'm not either, but I am a monist at least, and my goal either way was never to change your faith.

You're not entirely wrong here. You seem to realize that if "physics" were the right answer to the question, "What is calculation?" we'd be forgetting that Materials don't "calculate" anything. It would indeed by "just moving electrons," then, for no rational agent would be present to interpret what those electrons in their various combinations meant.

More insults. Rational agents are present. More quotes around things you know are nonsense. Determinists very much do calculate things despite your condescending tone.

Physical entities can't actually want things.
...
It's the metaphors that confuse, in that case. We need to stop allowing Physicalists to speak of wants.

This is not a biased view?

No. It's merely telling people to say what they really mean, instead of confusing their own minds with metaphors. We're doing them a favour, actually. If they are held to literal terms, then they are far more likely to be able to detect the strengths and weaknesses of their own ideas.

Doing them a favor now. Last heard that sort of bigoted talk describing doing the women a favor by keeping them out of the voting booths that dealt with matters their weak minds could not possibly comprehend. Are you going out of your way in this post to be as offensive as possible?

Had enough. Stopped reading after that.

[Noax]

=And even if [paths] appear to "change," that's not really a change, because the (apparent) change itself was determined.

How do you define change??? Example of change (a deterministic one of sorts): Tall lit candle, and a short lit candle later on. That's change: a different in the state of a thing over time. You're denying that the candle thus changes because deterministic physics are involved? Probably not, but then I don't know how you're using the word 'change'.

A fair question. The word "change" is ambiguous, of course. But as you intuit, I'm not speaking merely of a change of condition. Nor am I doubting that candles can be one way today and a different one tomorrow. Rather, I'm wanting to speak of a "change" that is induced out of the will or volition of some person, not out of his or her function purely as a cog in the Determinist machine, but rather as a somewhat-independent agent of change.

Determinists can "see" changes of the candle sort. They know things start out one way, and end up another all the time. But they think that all of them are just inevitable changes. In fact, they think that even human volition-induced changes are of the candle sort...just a result of a Determined process.

Change is not the difference between what isn't and what is. For it to be change, the what=isn't had to be IS at some point, which it never was. Don't see how your "independent agent" model makes any difference on that front.

[Immanuel Can]

There you go. You deny the definition, then use it. Determinists think no such thing. You really need to stop representing a view that is not your own.

Incorrect. We're just using two different definitions of "Determinist."

Mine is, "One who actually believes what the premises of Determinism require of him/her."

In contrast, the definition you seem to be relying on is, "Determinism is whatever a person who calls himself/herself a 'Determinist' says he/she believes."

In other words, I'm using an objective measure, based on the definition of "Determinism," and you're using the self-identification criterion (i.e. that anyone who calls himself/herself a "Determinist" cannot be challenged). Now, maybe you think you're not; but if you're not, then your objection has no teeth anymore. For it would not matter that it was "not my own": I, and anyone else, would have perfect right to tell that person that they were mistaken about what they thought they believed. After all, if the person does not conform to the objective referent of "Determinist," then it's no insult to call him/her "not-a-Determinist." It's just a statement of fact.

A human is a person with his own volition, free from causes initiated by an external entity.

The second statement is not Determinism.

It includes determinism, but is not limited to it. I know, you define freedom as a body possessed, not as being free from it.

No, Determinism is defined as that. Here's the IEP on that question: "Causal determinism (hereafter, simply "determinism") is the thesis that the course of the future is entirely determined by the conjunction of the past and the laws of nature."

There you go. I didn't say it: a peer-reviewed dictionary did.

I point of fact, though you describe yourself as a Determinist, you seem like a kind of Compatibilist to me; you're certainly no Determinist if you think "free" is a descriptor of human will. And that's a definitional, not personal claim.

I'm in this for other reasons.

Like what?

[Noax]

There you go. You deny the definition, then use it. Determinists think no such thing. You really need to stop representing a view that is not your own.

Incorrect. We're just using two different definitions of "Determinist."

Mine is, "One who actually believes what the premises of Determinism require of him/her."

Translation: "One who actually believes what I say determinism requires", which apparently includes not being a person. Nobody is a determinist by that definition, so there is no point in refuting the stance. Your quoted definition below is much better, and none of what you are claiming follows from that one.

In contrast, the definition you seem to be relying on is, "Determinism is whatever a person who calls himself/herself a 'Determinist' says he/she believes."

Nope, but you can at least let them speak for themselves instead of putting straw words in their mouths.

No, Determinism is defined as that. Here's the IEP on that question: "Causal determinism (hereafter, simply "determinism") is the thesis that the course of the future is entirely determined by the conjunction of the past and the laws of nature."
There you go. I didn't say it: a peer-reviewed dictionary did.

No mention of any implication of non-personhood from that, or that one's will is not involved in choices.

I point of fact, though you describe yourself as a Determinist, you seem like a kind of Compatibilist to me; you're certainly no Determinist if you think "free" is a descriptor of human will. And that's a definitional, not personal claim.

I'm protesting your denial of choice and personhood, not the definition of what might make it free or not.

A person may be an automaton under determinism, but only under a biased concept of 'want' does that imply a person cannot 'want' under determinism.

I'm in this for other reasons.

Like what?

Answer the questions I asked.

[thedoc]

There with the common sense when we need it.

IC, it seems like Noax is just here to pick a fight rather than pursue the topic, just say'in.

[Harbal]

IC, it seems like Noax is just here to pick a fight rather than pursue the topic, just say'in.

Surely not, doc, surely not.

[Hobbes' Choice]

Mine is, "One who actually believes what the premises of Determinism require of him/her."

In contrast, the definition you seem to be relying on is, "Determinism is whatever a person who calls himself/herself a 'Determinist' says he/she believes.".

But since you don't understand determinism, your definition is useless.

[Immanuel Can]

There with the common sense when we need it.

IC, it seems like Noax is just here to pick a fight rather than pursue the topic, just say'in.

Yeah, I see that. I don't think he's actually possibly so clued out that he can't recognize something like the IEP gives us a better definition than his. He's likely just being ornery, to borrow a Southern idiom. So I'm going to pas on responding to him. He's had his day.

[Belinda]

Hobbes Choice responded to Immanuel Can:

But since you don't understand determinism, your definition is useless.

I agree. But what I want Hobbes Choice to tell me is less about determinism than about freedom. I believe in causal determinism and I believe some people are a lot more free than others. What does Hobbes think, in the absence of freedom to originate, are the requisites for relative human freedom?

[Hobbes' Choice]

Hobbes Choice responded to Immanuel Can:

But since you don't understand determinism, your definition is useless.

I agree. But what I want Hobbes Choice to tell me is less about determinism than about freedom. I believe in causal determinism and I believe some people are a lot more free than others. What does Hobbes think, in the absence of freedom to originate, are the requisites for relative human freedom?

None of us are really free, since we all live by a system of obligation, duty and compulsion. We are urged to act by those we love and prevented to act by law-makers.
But compulsion is not evenly distributed through all polities and cultures. We can talk about relative freedom, but one man's freedom is another woman's compulsion.
In terms of determinism, there is no contradiction as we are causal agents, and act to the limits of our will, giving us the feeling of free action. But isn the same way that pain is not "real", but a feeling, a freely made act is also a feeling though fully determined by all antecedent conditions.
Does that start to approach your question?

[Belinda]

Hobbes Choice wrote:

We can talk about relative freedom, but one man's freedom is another woman's compulsion.

If you were to write "We can talk about relative freedom, and one man's freedom is another woman's compulsion." I'd agree with you.

The rest of your reply(for which i thank you) is voluntarism as a sort of freedom. I don't think that voluntarism gets to the heart of the matter. I don't think that wanting something makes me more free. Sometimes I want a chocolate. I may be the captive of my want. I am however succeeding quite well in freeing myself from love for sugar. What frees me is not my desire it's the working of reason upon my desire.

[Hobbes' Choice]

Hobbes Choice wrote:

We can talk about relative freedom, but one man's freedom is another woman's compulsion.

If you were to write "We can talk about relative freedom, and one man's freedom is another woman's compulsion." I'd agree with you.

The rest of your reply(for which i thank you) is voluntarism as a sort of freedom. I don't think that voluntarism gets to the heart of the matter. I don't think that wanting something makes me more free. Sometimes I want a chocolate. I may be the captive of my want. I am however succeeding quite well in freeing myself from love for sugar. What frees me is not my desire it's the working of reason upon my desire.

This changes nothing, since your reason is also determined.