Free Will vs Determinism

[Immanuel Can]

human causality

If "humans" are included in the causal chain, that is still Determinism or, if you wish, "Fatalism" (poor word choice on your part: "fate" has nothing to do with it -- "fate" is a polytheist term, really), unless by including them you include their wills as not-exclusively-causally-determined agencies. If you just treat human beings as a mere step in the chain of material causes, then it matters not at all that they are human...they're just another impersonal causal factor, really, another "dumb terminal" in the linkage of material causes.

You need to pick a horse and ride it: if humans can initiate causes, you're not a Determinist. If you believe they are only pawns of prior causes, you are.

[Dave Mangnall]

I agree with Dave Mangnall about his recommendation of 'How Free Are You?' by Ted Honderich. I especially like T.H.'s analysis of causes: causal chains, causal circumstances, nomic connections. I was surprised that he didn't speculate like Spinoza that all is eventually nomic connection, one big absolute nomic connection i.e. necessity, cause of itself.

Hi, Belinda.

It’s nice to meet someone who agrees with me about something, even if it’s only the merit of a book!
I thought Honderich made rather heavy weather of explaining his causational circumstances model. In the absence of any contrary coherent explanation of free will, I’m happy to attribute all our thoughts and actions to the Causal Nexus, and have done with it.
And I thought his idea that dismay and intransigence were the natural responses to determinism indicated that he was actually less than fully convinced himself. Dismay seems to be linked to a sense of having lost something, not just free will but the right to pat oneself on the back when things go well. For a fully convinced determinist, there was never any free will to be lost. And speaking for myself, when things go well, and when things go badly, I’m happy to attribute these events to luck, good or bad, in the way that these events inevitably unfolded.

[Hobbes' Choice]

human causality

If "humans" are included in the causal chain, that is still Determinism or, if you wish, "Fatalism" (poor word choice on your part: "fate" has nothing to do with it -- "fate" is a polytheist term, really), unless by including them you include their wills as not-exclusively-causally-determined agencies. If you just treat human beings as a mere step in the chain of material causes, then it matters not at all that they are human...they're just another impersonal causal factor, really, another "dumb terminal" in the linkage of material causes.

You need to pick a horse and ride it: if humans can initiate causes, you're not a Determinist. If you believe they are only pawns of prior causes, you are.

As usual you miss the point.

[Belinda]

I agree with Dave Mangnall about his recommendation of 'How Free Are You?' by Ted Honderich. I especially like T.H.'s analysis of causes: causal chains, causal circumstances, nomic connections. I was surprised that he didn't speculate like Spinoza that all is eventually nomic connection, one big absolute nomic connection i.e. necessity, cause of itself.

Hi, Belinda.

It’s nice to meet someone who agrees with me about something, even if it’s only the merit of a book!
I thought Honderich made rather heavy weather of explaining his causational circumstances model. In the absence of any contrary coherent explanation of free will, I’m happy to attribute all our thoughts and actions to the Causal Nexus, and have done with it.
And I thought his idea that dismay and intransigence were the natural responses to determinism indicated that he was actually less than fully convinced himself. Dismay seems to be linked to a sense of having lost something, not just free will but the right to pat oneself on the back when things go well. For a fully convinced determinist, there was never any free will to be lost. And speaking for myself, when things go well, and when things go badly, I’m happy to attribute these events to luck, good or bad, in the way that these events inevitably unfolded.

The causal nexus is not without problems, see Hume and the absence of any event that may be called "cause". I too am a determinist and believe that there was never any Free Will to be lost and in the light of Spinoza's rationalist speculations I see no need for dismay, because Spinoza shows how men can be more free .

I agree that was an odd part of Honderich's book where he talks about dismay and its opposite pole when joy is legitimately ours. I admit that Spinoza's version of freedom implies some emotional flatness, although there is really no practical problem with emotional flatness unless we are all dosed with barbiturates.

[SpheresOfBalance]

But some choices are random. Random is not free.

Random just means unpredictable, not indeterminate.
There is no such thing as random.
From the moment a dice leaves your hand, the number that will fall is determined. As we cannot measure the speed the rotation, the bounce as it hits the table we cannot easily predict the fall of the dice, yet all these factors are given by immutable laws of nature to make the dice fall where is must.

But even if there was such a thing as a random event; what use is this to 'free will"?

You are right Hobbes Choice.I did wonder if I should use 'random' in the sense of unpredictable. I am aware that true randomness does not exist for a determinist.

I'd better have said that for each of Spheres of Balance's examples, if Spheres felt no preference either way then Sphere's choice was a guess.

You people are quite confused as to the difference between determinism and free will. You all seem to believe that free will can't be informed or else it's deterministic in nature. Not true! You people take things for granted that are illogical. You confuse the meanings of words and concepts.

If you put a gun to my head and say, "tell me the code or I'll blow your brains out," I can either succumb to the fear of death that most of you would see as deterministic in nature and tell you, so as not to die, or I could succumb to the pressure of the honor and duty that I was trained to uphold, that many could also see as deterministic in nature and not tell you, therefore dying for the cause . Either choice is only deterministic if I allow either choice of habitual reasoning to dictate my choice in acting. If on the other hand, in an instant, I see an opportunity to disarm you I could chose that instead. You could say that all three choices are deterministic, but that's untrue because any number of people in the same situation would choose different decisions with different outcomes. Some would try any of the choices and die while others would live, while others would not try any and die while others would live. Nothing is determined in any of those instances. The various possible outcomes are all about choosing in that instant in which they are chosen, i.e., too soon, too slow, too obvious, too much bravado and not enough observation/calculation or the control of emotions versus logic. Based upon each micro second of evaluation of the situation can cause it to go any way. That one of these scenarios, actually many more than I have mentioned, shall indeed play out as if determined, is true, but ones calculated choices do in fact make a difference, as humans are not trajectories of asteroids set in motion by random uncontrollable explosions; we can in fact change our own trajectories. Even though the amount of knowledge/education which allows our choices to be informed is ever variable, and determines our assessment, other human entities have the same constraints, so in my example above the free choice of if/when to act determines the outcome as do many other outside variables too numerous to mention, but choice is among them. In fact, as to animals, choice (free will) is a determined quality.

This is why I say that Free Will exists in the framework of Determinism. Much Determinism allows for small amounts of Free Will to be a Deterministic factor in any outcome.

And no, the physics of how the brain works has nothing to do with choice, even though choice can be seen as affected by the framework of determinism in which it resides.

Like the false dichotomy of the "the chicken or the egg" dilemma, so is "the determinism or free will" dilemma; not so much a dilemma after all. That people can't see this and argue about it is amusing!

determinism [dih-tur-muh-niz-uh m]
noun
1. the doctrine that all facts and events exemplify natural laws.
2. the doctrine that all events, including human choices and decisions, have sufficient causes.

free will
noun
1. free and independent choice; voluntary decision: You took on the responsibility of your own free will.
2. Philosophy. the doctrine that the conduct of human beings expresses personal choice and is not simply determined by physical or divine forces.

--complements dictionary.com--

[Belinda]

Spheres of Balance, what is this entity within you which can originate your reactive response to fear of immediate and violent death?

[Dave Mangnall]

I agree with Dave Mangnall about his recommendation of 'How Free Are You?' by Ted Honderich. I especially like T.H.'s analysis of causes: causal chains, causal circumstances, nomic connections. I was surprised that he didn't speculate like Spinoza that all is eventually nomic connection, one big absolute nomic connection i.e. necessity, cause of itself.

Hi, Belinda.

It’s nice to meet someone who agrees with me about something, even if it’s only the merit of a book!
I thought Honderich made rather heavy weather of explaining his causational circumstances model. In the absence of any contrary coherent explanation of free will, I’m happy to attribute all our thoughts and actions to the Causal Nexus, and have done with it.
And I thought his idea that dismay and intransigence were the natural responses to determinism indicated that he was actually less than fully convinced himself. Dismay seems to be linked to a sense of having lost something, not just free will but the right to pat oneself on the back when things go well. For a fully convinced determinist, there was never any free will to be lost. And speaking for myself, when things go well, and when things go badly, I’m happy to attribute these events to luck, good or bad, in the way that these events inevitably unfolded.

The causal nexus is not without problems, see Hume and the absence of any event that may be called "cause". I too am a determinist and believe that there was never any Free Will to be lost and in the light of Spinoza's rationalist speculations I see no need for dismay, because Spinoza shows how men can be more free .

I agree that was an odd part of Honderich's book where he talks about dismay and its opposite pole when joy is legitimately ours. I admit that Spinoza's version of freedom implies some emotional flatness, although there is really no practical problem with emotional flatness unless we are all dosed with barbiturates.

I can see I'm going to have to hunt down Spinoza and learn more of him. Thanks for the pointer.

Hume's thoughts on causation puzzle me. Was he saying that there was no such thing, or just that we could never see the causal forces at work? Why do constant conjunctions come about? (Presumably we can't ask what causes them!) How, without cause and effect, can one ever explain anything? So many questions!

[Hobbes' Choice]

Hi, Belinda.

It’s nice to meet someone who agrees with me about something, even if it’s only the merit of a book!
I thought Honderich made rather heavy weather of explaining his causational circumstances model. In the absence of any contrary coherent explanation of free will, I’m happy to attribute all our thoughts and actions to the Causal Nexus, and have done with it.
And I thought his idea that dismay and intransigence were the natural responses to determinism indicated that he was actually less than fully convinced himself. Dismay seems to be linked to a sense of having lost something, not just free will but the right to pat oneself on the back when things go well. For a fully convinced determinist, there was never any free will to be lost. And speaking for myself, when things go well, and when things go badly, I’m happy to attribute these events to luck, good or bad, in the way that these events inevitably unfolded.

The causal nexus is not without problems, see Hume and the absence of any event that may be called "cause". I too am a determinist and believe that there was never any Free Will to be lost and in the light of Spinoza's rationalist speculations I see no need for dismay, because Spinoza shows how men can be more free .

I agree that was an odd part of Honderich's book where he talks about dismay and its opposite pole when joy is legitimately ours. I admit that Spinoza's version of freedom implies some emotional flatness, although there is really no practical problem with emotional flatness unless we are all dosed with barbiturates.

I can see I'm going to have to hunt down Spinoza and learn more of him. Thanks for the pointer.

Hume's thoughts on causation puzzle me. Was he saying that there was no such thing, or just that we could never see the causal forces at work? Why do constant conjunctions come about? (Presumably we can't ask what causes them!) How, without cause and effect, can one ever explain anything? So many questions!

I think for Hume there is always a deeper level.
Switch on a light. Are you causing the light to appear, or are there ever more deeper levels of causality? The conditions and material of the bulb, the electricity right back to the generator and the nuclear reaction or coal burning that causes the heat - maybe you'd like to include the rays of the sun which nourished the trees that made the coal?

But however deep you go there is no a priori reason why, say, a billiard ball transfers its energy to another ball. He made much of billiard balls. A priori one ball hitting another could just as well cause a bunch of flowers to appear; make the ball return; break another ball; ..... Causality derived from the habitual observation and one has to accept, observe and record. deeper reasons for specific causes are unpredictable and thoroughly dependant on a posteriori.

[thedoc]

You people are quite confused as to the difference between determinism and free will. You all seem to believe that free will can't be informed or else it's deterministic in nature. Not true! You people take things for granted that are illogical. You confuse the meanings of words and concepts.

Actually there is little confusion as each person has their own idea of what the different words mean and they are not confused about that. The apparent confusion arises when one person expects everyone else to accept their definitions as correct and are confused that no-one else accepts their definition as correct. When everyone is talking past each other because of different definitions, there is little chance for real conversation.

[Belinda]

Dave Mangnall wrote:

Hume's thoughts on causation puzzle me. Was he saying that there was no such thing, or just that we could never see the causal forces at work? Why do constant conjunctions come about? (Presumably we can't ask what causes them!) How, without cause and effect, can one ever explain anything? So many questions!

Hobbes Choice wrote:

think for Hume there is always a deeper level.
Switch on a light. Are you causing the light to appear, or are there ever more deeper levels of causality? The conditions and material of the bulb, the electricity right back to the generator and the nuclear reaction or coal burning that causes the heat - maybe you'd like to include the rays of the sun which nourished the trees that made the coal?

But however deep you go there is no a priori reason why, say, a billiard ball transfers its energy to another ball. He made much of billiard balls. A priori one ball hitting another could just as well cause a bunch of flowers to appear; make the ball return; break another ball; ..... Causality derived from the habitual observation and one has to accept, observe and record. deeper reasons for specific causes are unpredictable and thoroughly dependant on a posteriori.

Dave, I think Hume was saying that we cannot ever see the interaction between event A and event B and therefore we cannot presume that there was an interaction, only that we have learned that event A and event B tend to follow one upon the other. Hobbes Choice calls this conclusion a posteriori. I don't think that Hume would say there was no such thing; I have tried and failed to look up the actual text on constant conjunction verbatim. There is also Hume's thought on the problem of induction, which is related to the problem about causality. Induction is probabilistic as to how we go about predicting, as Hobbes Choice describes with those illustrations of why there is no a priori.


This is a problem for a determinist whose belief is that what happened in the past cannot have happened otherwise than it did. I.e. there was invariably a necessary connection. My conclusion is that my stance on determinism is unprovable and is thus a matter of faith. Hobbes Choice's first paragraph, above describes how I think of causality and how it makes complete sense only in that holistic way. I suppose that too is a matter of faith which verges on the religious faith on order in the universe.

I doubt if one can explain anything without cause and effect. I gather that science is dependent on causality for its predictions.

[Hobbes' Choice]

Dave Mangnall wrote:

Hume's thoughts on causation puzzle me. Was he saying that there was no such thing, or just that we could never see the causal forces at work? Why do constant conjunctions come about? (Presumably we can't ask what causes them!) How, without cause and effect, can one ever explain anything? So many questions!

Hobbes Choice wrote:

think for Hume there is always a deeper level.
Switch on a light. Are you causing the light to appear, or are there ever more deeper levels of causality? The conditions and material of the bulb, the electricity right back to the generator and the nuclear reaction or coal burning that causes the heat - maybe you'd like to include the rays of the sun which nourished the trees that made the coal?

But however deep you go there is no a priori reason why, say, a billiard ball transfers its energy to another ball. He made much of billiard balls. A priori one ball hitting another could just as well cause a bunch of flowers to appear; make the ball return; break another ball; ..... Causality derived from the habitual observation and one has to accept, observe and record. deeper reasons for specific causes are unpredictable and thoroughly dependant on a posteriori.

Dave, I think Hume was saying that we cannot ever see the interaction between event A and event B and therefore we cannot presume that there was an interaction, only that we have learned that event A and event B tend to follow one upon the other. Hobbes Choice calls this conclusion a posteriori. I don't think that Hume would say there was no such thing; I have tried and failed to look up the actual text on constant conjunction verbatim. There is also Hume's thought on the problem of induction, which is related to the problem about causality. Induction is probabilistic as to how we go about predicting, as Hobbes Choice describes with those illustrations of why there is no a priori.


This is a problem for a determinist whose belief is that what happened in the past cannot have happened otherwise than it did. I.e. there was invariably a necessary connection. My conclusion is that my stance on determinism is unprovable and is thus a matter of faith. Hobbes Choice's first paragraph, above describes how I think of causality and how it makes complete sense only in that holistic way. I suppose that too is a matter of faith which verges on the religious faith on order in the universe.

I doubt if one can explain anything without cause and effect. I gather that science is dependent on causality for its predictions.

Science is built by formulating laws from exactly those constant conjunctions. What Hume offers here is that those laws are always subject to revision when more detailed and accurate observations are made, but most importantly when theories are offered that better 'save the appearances'.
Yes the sun comes up everyday - but you have to ask, what would it look like if instead of the sun coming up, that the world was turning and the sun stayed still. Science makes that leap, until a better leap comes along.
Faith plays NO part in this, but is the death of science.

[Noax]

You need to pick a horse and ride it: if humans can initiate causes, you're not a Determinist. If you believe they are only pawns of prior causes, you are.

While I don't consider myself a hard determinist, the pawn description describes me well enough. The argument seems to be one from emotion. Pick my view, else I'll tell you you're a pawn.
But the pawn can do anything he wants within reason. Can't pass through the jail bars, etc, but he's quite free to reject the inconsistent Jesus story. Lay out for me something only you can do besides the empty description of 'initiate cause'. You've not demonstrated any such ability.

For instance, I could pick the strawman example of the guy in the cinama yelling at the hero to not go into the haunted house, to no avail. It seems the hero has a different pilot and is not open to your will. But you can of course exercise your will and move to the same show in the next room where the guy aborts his entrance into the house. Somehow I don't think you view yourself as the ineffectual guy sitting in a cinema epiphenomenally watching a fixed program. You claim you can initiate changes in the movie, yet you demonstrate (to the other characters in the movie) no such ability.

Free will, in your case, seems to be the ability of your willful soul to initiate cause in the physical world. Did I get that right? Not the general definition since another might not use the word soul, but whatever you call the thing that scores the afterlife points. To a physical monist determinist, the will is completely free in that one is intimately part of causal physics and can do what one wants. You can label this condition a 'pawn' in that a person does not initiate cause, but what need would such a one have in initiating cause???

[thedoc]

For instance, I could pick the strawman example of the guy in the cinama yelling at the hero to not go into the haunted house, to no avail. It seems the hero has a different pilot and is not open to your will. But you can of course exercise your will and move to the same show in the next room where the guy aborts his entrance into the house. Somehow I don't think you view yourself as the ineffectual guy sitting in a cinema epiphenomenally watching a fixed program. You claim you can initiate changes in the movie, yet you demonstrate (to the other characters in the movie) no such ability.

My brother is 4 years older than I, and before I was born my parents took him to see the movie "Call of the Wild". Near the end of the movie, at one particular scene, he stood up on the seat and called out "Buck, you come back here" of course the Buck in the movie didn't listen.

I used to watch "Dark Shadows" on TV, and during one ending of the show, I kept thinking to the girl in the show, "Don't go up the dark path", she always did, with bad results.

[Immanuel Can]

The argument seems to be one from emotion. Pick my view, else I'll tell you you're a pawn.

It's not intended that way, so I trust you won't take it that way. Rather, a "pawn," by definition, is a chess piece. Chess pieces have no volition or personhood. They don't even have an emotional view of what happens to them. Rather, forces outside of them determine everything that happens to them. And in at least that respect, that's actually a pretty good analogy of the implications of Determinism.

Now, do I think it's a bad thing? Sure. But the language is not intended as an insult. Rather, it's supposed to alert you to precisely what's at stake in believing in Determinism. Essentially, I don't have to say, "You're a pawn." All that has to happen is that you realize that essentially, that's what you are saying of yourself. If you're a Determinist, you deny that "will" is a description of anything but the inevitable playing out of material forces on material persons.

But the pawn can do anything he wants within reason.

Not strictly literally true. Pawns can't "want." Their "volition," i.e. their motion, is caused by prior material factors outside of themselves. Pawns have no emotions or awareness at all...and certainly, no choices. But on this point the analogy isn't apt: that a pawn has an advantage of sorts over every Determinist. For at least in the case of a pawn, an intelligent agent is manipulating it. That's got to be much better than simply being the pawn of material forces, which can have no purpose in what they impose on one. Material forces, if they control what you do, don't "care" about you, and don't have any "goal" or "purpose" in mind when they do. They just move you around without reason.

But you can of course exercise your will and move to the same show in the next room where the guy aborts his entrance into the house.

Not under Determinism, you can't. There is no "will," at least, none capable of being a causal factor in your behaviour.

Somehow I don't think you view yourself as the ineffectual guy sitting in a cinema epiphenomenally watching a fixed program. You claim you can initiate changes in the movie, yet you demonstrate (to the other characters in the movie) no such ability.

Why? Because I find your argument implausible? Funny idea, that. And ironic. I would say that hardly demonstrates an inability to think independently. Rather, it's far more likely that mindlessly agreeing with what I was being told would indicate that.

However, ad hominem...not legit, in this case. A straightforward fallacy. My attitude, even if wholly "programmed by my biases," might still be correct. You need to show the truth or falsehood of the statement, not your like or dislike of the person who offers it.

To a physical monist determinist, the will is completely free in that one is intimately part of causal physics and can do what one wants.

Incorrect. Again you seem to mix Determinism ("causal physics") and Voluntarism ("can do what one wants") without realizing you're being inconsistent there. According to strict Determinism, your will is also predetermined, and so doesn't authentically "cause" anything at all. You have no "wants" that are not mere products of the material forces. "You" don't "want" anything -- the material forces "want" it (so to speak) on your behalf.

[Noax]

My brother is 4 years older than I, and before I was born my parents took him to see the movie "Call of the Wild". Near the end of the movie, at one particular scene, he stood up on the seat and called out "Buck, you come back here" of course the Buck in the movie didn't listen.

I used to watch "Dark Shadows" on TV, and during one ending of the show, I kept thinking to the girl in the show, "Don't go up the dark path", she always did, with bad results.

I jumped on the Dark Shadows bandwagon too late to watch any of them when they were new, but I know what you mean.

Similar is the guy alone watch some sports game and shouting at his team members to do something he thinks would be more sensible. Some of the shouting is at the ref, but that is more venting than seeming attempt at control.