Immanuel Can wrote:Me: Does it mean 'this is true about the world?' Or 'this is truly what I meant?
The former, I would say. "What I truly meant" could be right or wrong. What is true about the world would have to be objectively true.
It might or might not be objectively true, but it would be a claim that it was.
But in that case, we would have to agree what 'Christian' or 'Scotsman' meant. If I made the claim 'Socrates is X', but declined to give a meaning for 'X', then it would be neither true nor false, because it was incomplete. So, in the case of Christians or Scotsmen, we need to point to some specific meaning of those words, something we would both accept as authoritative.
Me: But on the other hand, if we say 'being Christian' is about conforming to objective criteria, then Christianity is no longer a moral matter.
The opposite, I would say, is the case. If there is no objective reality to what it means to be "Christian," then there is are no moral criteria by which such an assessment can be formed or justified.
Let us suppose the objective criteria for being a Christian is simply 'was baptised'. That would just be a fact, it would not contain any moral judgement, nothing the person concerned thought or did would unmake that fact.
Me: I would be Christian as a matter of empirical fact. For example, Christianity would be about following the rules; whatever they were, irrespective of conscience.
Non-sequitur, I would say. "Following rules" is not the only -- or even the best way -- of following a person. One follows by association with that person, by adopting his character, by modelling his attitudes and behaviours, and by responding to his teaching...not simply by following a list of rules.
I mean 'rules' in the sense of whatever objective criteria we have agreed designates a Christian; 'being baptised', having a particular set of beliefs, having a propensity to do certain things, whatever.
You say they should 'respond to his teaching'. Now either there is a fixed set of rules (i.e. objective criteria) that count as 'respond to his teaching' or it is up to us individually to determine our response. In the first case we can say 'X is a true Christian' but in the second it is for the individual to determine, in which case their idea is as good as ours.
If I were a "follower of Picasso," it would not mean only that I had a list of rules from him. It would mean that when I painted, I operated in a particular Cubist style of the previous century, employing the palette, techniques, materials and aesthetic philosophy of the master painter from whom my art was inspired. And I could be judged as a true "follower" by the objective criteria of my simulation of his methods and the extent to which I represented and extended his attitudes to art. I could be judged as an even more intense "follower of Picasso" if I also practiced his lifestyle (not recommended), and perhaps a consummate follower of Picasso if I could actually so absorb his spirit so as to make Picasso-authentic judgments in new areas of life and art.
In that case, I would ask what is the difference between being a 'follower of Picasso' and a 'Picasso impersonator'? For the second, we would say they were are 'true impersonator' in proportion to how exactly they copied the life of Picasso. Any deviation would be a fault. But in that case you are not an artist.
I think the phrase 'Picasso-authentic judgments' is self-contradictory. The only judgments that are authentic to Picasso were made by Picasso; in as far as
I make those judgments, they can't be authentic. (Indeed, we might say they would have no authenticity at all, being neither Picasso's nor mine!)
There are several problems with this conclusion. One is simply finding the right body of persons to identify as "the church" in question: many people claim things to which their right is contestable, as when boor calls himself a "lover of art," or when a tyrant calls himself, "a servant of the poor." Such things are not rare.
So one would have to have criteria beyond the mere self-identification criterion by which to differentiate between authentic and inauthentic claims to "Christianity." (That is the main point we are considering, I think.)
I agree, my point being that such criteria
But secondly, if the right way to identify a Christian is, as I suggest, by relative association with the Master, Christ Himself, then if the whole "church" (however conceived) and Christ should be at variance on an issue, then by what standard could we speak of the church itself as "Christian" any longer, at least in that particular respect? I think you can see that would be hard to justify rationally. We would have to say that the entity we were calling "church" was no longer acting in a particular way that was "Christian."
But if we are to say 'the church is wrong' then we are saying there is no longer any agreed set of objective criteria, since plainly some Christians are saying other Christians are not 'true Christians'.
At which point we would either be back with Christianity as subjective, such that no opinion is better than any other...unless we were to claim that our own opinion is objectively better than anyone else's. And that is what people do; they say
'my opinion is in the scriptures' or
'I am the anointed successor to St Peter', or '
Jesus came to me in a dream'. But since there is more than one such claim to authority, we are no better off.
Is the "Christian" moral position the position contingently taken by a "church," or is it the moral position occupied by the example of Christ? That's the key question here.
As with the 'true Scotsman', I'd say it isn't a real issue, it is just a confusion created by the ambiguity in words. If asked whether (say) Henry VIII was a 'true Christian', surely the rational response would be to ask '
How do you mean?' Yes; he was a member of a church, yes; he was baptised, yes; he thought of himself as a Christian, but no; not all Christians think like Henry VIII. It is silly to think the word 'Christian' must somehow cover our every use of the word in a completely consistent way. In one sense the word 'Christian' describes various concrete facts, in another sense it is an open ended 'work in progress'.
So, when asked about bad behaviour by Christians, I think saying they were not 'true Christians' serves to distinguish genuine differences in the meaning of 'Christian' (whereas the '
real Scotsmen don't drink ale' difference is contrived). But it should not be an alternative claim. Bad Christians are also 'real Christians' - but in a different sense of 'Christian'. That is nothing special; it comes up all the time in normal speech. I can say
'I try to act morally' and also '
Hitler had a morality' without anyone concluding I'm saying
'I try to act like Hitler', just because the same word 'morally' occurs in both sentences.