A Challenge to Richard Dawkins and the Atheists

[thedoc]

If you think that logic applies to everything, then explain the logic of a Bumble Bee being able to fly, when the scientists claim the a Bumble Bee shouldn't be able to fly.

More nonsense from godbothering creationists. No scientist would have said a bumble-bee shouldn't be able to fly as they patently do. An engineer might have calculated that using a mathematical model they had at the time they couldn't account for its flight but all this shows is that mathematical models are not always up to the job. What this has to do with Logic I have no idea but if there is anything then Logic applies to it and that includes your 'God'.

So engineers and scientists are somehow different? that's good to know.

[thedoc]

I understand that God exists, beyond that I'll wait till God explains it to me. I don't need to have all the answers right now.

And yet you admit that your 'God' could be any number of the 'Gods' that have been about? As such 'it' may well just be one of many.

Good for you, you've pretty much nailed it.

[Arising_uk]

So engineers and scientists are somehow different? that's good to know.

I'm surprised you didn't?

[Arising_uk]

Good for you, you've pretty much nailed it.

Strange theist you are as I've never heard of one who admits their 'God' is just one amongst many?

[Londoner]

I have a pretty old-fashioned and out-of-date view on this, Logic arises because there are things and states of affairs, no things or states of affairs no Logic. As such, even if there are no perceiving creatures but things and states of affairs then I think Logic holds, you can't be a thing or state of affairs and not a thing or state of affairs at the same time, if you are a thing or state of affairs then there is a thing or state of affairs, etc. Now it's true that Logic also applies to language and reasoning but I think it arises because there are things or states of affairs.

Are there things and states of affairs? I'm questioning the use of the plural.

To say that something is, or is not, requires us first to distinguish that something from everything else. So its existence is not a feature of how the world is, but of how we see the world.

To put it another way, any description of the world is not just a neutral report of a sensation, but also incorporates a logical relationship. To say 'X is red' is not only to say what colour we perceive, it is also to say 'X is not green', i.e. to divide the world up in terms of colour. But that is our choice. We could equally describe X in terms of another attribute, in which case all those logical relationships would be different.

So I would argue that the logic arises from our descriptions of states of affairs, not the states of affairs themselves.

[Immanuel Can]

[Of course if we assume various axioms then things will follow from those axioms. But we can do that for anything.

In fact, that's all we ever do.

In maths and logic, we at least have a closed, self-referential, internally-coherent system of symbols with which to work. But not so in real life. In real life, all knowledge is merely empirical, and hence is only probabilistic. And that's true of everything from the most raw superstition to the most rigorous science...it's all just a question of probabilities, and these probabilities are only known and once an original axiom has already been taken for granted.

To illustrate: the scientist working in his lab can never perform the complete set of possible experiments for an one phenomenon. That would be infinite. So he does only a set of, say, 10...but then he takes for granted that the next 100 or 1,000 or 1,000,000 tests would show the same results, and so says, "I have proved..." But he has not. Not if by "proved" we understand "shown to be beyond all possibility of error." Rather, he has merely created a very high probability estimation, one very, very likely to turn out to be consistent, but not certain to do so.

Moreover -- and here is the key point -- from where does he get the knowledge that science will "work" for him, or the knowledge that 10 tests will be confirmed by the next 10? He does not really have proof of either at all: rather, he takes them assumptively, as foundational axioms, and presumes such things as that reality operates according to laws, that a controlled experiment can be reproduced, or that lab experiments will transfer to the larger world. And we consider him quite rational to do so.

The upshot, then, is this: it makes no sense if we indict symbolic logic for being "unreliable" since it is quite as predictable as maths; and it makes no sense to indict propositional logic for failing to be absolutely certain. For both have met the standard of trustworthiness that an accurate view of them warrants -- rational consistency for the first, and probabilistic certainty for the second. They've done what they should, in other words; and to demand more of them does not make them unreliable per se -- it would simply indicate that the objector would have an unrealistic view of what both do.

[thedoc]

Good for you, you've pretty much nailed it.

Strange theist you are as I've never heard of one who admits their 'God' is just one amongst many?

You are confusing God with the names of God. There is one God but God may go by many names. I would think that whatever name God wants to go by is God's choice, not mine.

[thedoc]

[Of course if we assume various axioms then things will follow from those axioms. But we can do that for anything.

In fact, that's all we ever do.

In maths and logic, we at least have a closed, self-referential, internally-coherent system of symbols with which to work. But not so in real life. In real life, all knowledge is merely empirical, and hence is only probabilistic. And that's true of everything from the most raw superstition to the most rigorous science...it's all just a question of probabilities, and these probabilities are only known and once an original axiom has already been taken for granted.

To illustrate: the scientist working in his lab can never perform the complete set of possible experiments for an one phenomenon. That would be infinite. So he does only a set of, say, 10...but then he takes for granted that the next 100 or 1,000 or 1,000,000 tests would show the same results, and so says, "I have proved..." But he has not. Not if by "proved" we understand "shown to be beyond all possibility of error." Rather, he has merely created a very high probability estimation, one very, very likely to turn out to be consistent, but not certain to do so.

Moreover -- and here is the key point -- from where does he get the knowledge that science will "work" for him, or the knowledge that 10 tests will be confirmed by the next 10? He does not really have proof of either at all: rather, he takes them assumptively, as foundational axioms, and presumes such things as that reality operates according to laws, that a controlled experiment can be reproduced, or that lab experiments will transfer to the larger world. And we consider him quite rational to do so.

The upshot, then, is this: it makes no sense if we indict symbolic logic for being "unreliable" since it is quite as predictable as maths; and it makes no sense to indict propositional logic for failing to be absolutely certain. For both have met the standard of trustworthiness that an accurate view of them warrants -- rational consistency for the first, and probabilistic certainty for the second. They've done what they should, in other words; and to demand more of them does not make them unreliable per se -- it would simply indicate that the objector would have an unrealistic view of what both do.

What he said.

[Arising_uk]

You are confusing God with the names of God. There is one God but God may go by many names. ...

Quite the schizophrenic then your 'one God'? As if this 'God' is Odin(as you say 'it' is) then 'it' is the ruler of the 'Gods' and this is the same for pretty much all the 'God's' that have been claimed so far. So what are all these other 'God's'?

I would think that whatever name God wants to go by is God's choice, not mine.

How do you know 'it' wants to be named "God"?

[Arising_uk]

Are there things and states of affairs? I'm questioning the use of the plural. ...

Yes I think so, the cat is on the mat, the cat is not on the mat, etc. But I'm not sure what you are asking.

To say that something is, or is not, requires us first to distinguish that something from everything else. So its existence is not a feature of how the world is, but of how we see the world.

We disagree here as I think that unless everything else is just made up of lots of things or discrete entities there'd be no distinguishing in the first place, that this body represents the thing as it does to us does not mean that a thing does not exist is my way of thinking, both me and the squirrel see a different tree but we both run up it when the wolf is about.

To put it another way, any description of the world is not just a neutral report of a sensation, but also incorporates a logical relationship. To say 'X is red' is not only to say what colour we perceive, it is also to say 'X is not green', i.e. to divide the world up in terms of colour. But that is our choice. We could equally describe X in terms of another attribute, in which case all those logical relationships would be different. ...

Again I think we think differently here as whilst its true that we could relabel the colours I don't think the logical relationship would change, they'd still be colours and different from each other.

So I would argue that the logic arises from our descriptions of states of affairs, not the states of affairs themselves.

I agree that there are lots of attributes that rely upon us and not the thing but think that there has to be a thing existing for Logic to arise else there'd be nothing for Logic to be logical about. Just my opinion mind.

[thedoc]

You are confusing God with the names of God. There is one God but God may go by many names. ...

Quite the schizophrenic then your 'one God'? As if this 'God' is Odin(as you say 'it' is) then 'it' is the ruler of the 'Gods' and this is the same for pretty much all the 'God's' that have been claimed so far. So what are all these other 'God's'?

I would think that whatever name God wants to go by is God's choice, not mine.

How do you know 'it' wants to be named "God"?

God is not a name, God is a title. You really don't know much about the English language, do you?

[Arising_uk]

Is it? Thanks for the info.

So how long you been a paganist?

[Londoner]

[Of course if we assume various axioms then things will follow from those axioms. But we can do that for anything.

In fact, that's all we ever do.

In maths and logic, we at least have a closed, self-referential, internally-coherent system of symbols with which to work. But not so in real life. In real life, all knowledge is merely empirical, and hence is only probabilistic. And that's true of everything from the most raw superstition to the most rigorous science...it's all just a question of probabilities, and these probabilities are only known and once an original axiom has already been taken for granted.

To illustrate: the scientist working in his lab can never perform the complete set of possible experiments for an one phenomenon. That would be infinite. So he does only a set of, say, 10...but then he takes for granted that the next 100 or 1,000 or 1,000,000 tests would show the same results, and so says, "I have proved..." But he has not. Not if by "proved" we understand "shown to be beyond all possibility of error." Rather, he has merely created a very high probability estimation, one very, very likely to turn out to be consistent, but not certain to do so.

Moreover -- and here is the key point -- from where does he get the knowledge that science will "work" for him, or the knowledge that 10 tests will be confirmed by the next 10? He does not really have proof of either at all: rather, he takes them assumptively, as foundational axioms, and presumes such things as that reality operates according to laws, that a controlled experiment can be reproduced, or that lab experiments will transfer to the larger world. And we consider him quite rational to do so.

The upshot, then, is this: it makes no sense if we indict symbolic logic for being "unreliable" since it is quite as predictable as maths; and it makes no sense to indict propositional logic for failing to be absolutely certain. For both have met the standard of trustworthiness that an accurate view of them warrants -- rational consistency for the first, and probabilistic certainty for the second. They've done what they should, in other words; and to demand more of them does not make them unreliable per se -- it would simply indicate that the objector would have an unrealistic view of what both do.

I would put it that the scientist assumes the validity of inductive reasoning. As you say, we do not consider them irrational to do so, but it is nevertheless an assumption. And, in the case of the occasional 'black swan', sometimes a mistaken assumption.

I'm also not sure that repeating an experiment adds to the probability that the scientist is right. If the scientist knew for a fact how many white swans there were in the universe, and how many black ones, then they could work out the probability that the next swan they see would be white, but without that knowledge however many times they guessed right it would not affect the existence (or otherwise) of black swans. Probability is only about guessing outcomes when we know all the possibilities. I might see a million white swans, then on the next occasion see a black one, and from then on see nothing but black ones. There is no rule that says this is less likely than any other pattern.

I do not think there is any connection between this and logic. Logic doesn't predict anything, it doesn't assert anything. Truth and falsity are just values; they do not assert a fact any more than the plus and minus signs in maths. Unlike induction, logic is reliable because it is tautological. There is no 'black swan' that can falsify '1 + 1 = 2' because it is the equivalent, not of saying 'all swans are white', but only that 'white swans are white'.

[Londoner]

Me: Are there things and states of affairs? I'm questioning the use of the plural. ..To say that something is, or is not, requires us first to distinguish that something from everything else. So its existence is not a feature of how the world is, but of how we see the world..
We disagree here as I think that unless everything else is just made up of lots of things or discrete entities there'd be no distinguishing in the first place, that this body represents the thing as it does to us does not mean that a thing does not exist is my way of thinking, both me and the squirrel see a different tree but we both run up it when the wolf is about.

Are they discrete entities? If they were, then you couldn't do what you do, and refer to 'a tree' since each individual tree would be distinct. Also perhaps there would be no individual tree but only 'this leaf', 'that twig', 'that sensation of green-ness'.... So certainly you can divide the world into entities, then having done so the entities will have a logical relationship to each other (the leaf has the property 'green') but choose to divide it up in a different way (the class of all green objects) and there are different logical relationships. And since there is no single way of dividing up the world, there is no single set of logical relationships.

Me: To put it another way, any description of the world is not just a neutral report of a sensation, but also incorporates a logical relationship. To say 'X is red' is not only to say what colour we perceive, it is also to say 'X is not green', i.e. to divide the world up in terms of colour. But that is our choice. We could equally describe X in terms of another attribute, in which case all those logical relationships would be different. ..

Again I think we think differently here as whilst its true that we could relabel the colours I don't think the logical relationship would change, they'd still be colours and different from each other.

The point I was getting at is more that just applying the label always involves that logical relationship.

Whereas, if we are doing formal logic, then we can keep the label and the logic bits separate; there is the label represented by 'X' or whatever, and then separately the various signs that stand for the logical relationship between those labels, the '&' and 'v' etc.

So, although that 'X' can be thought of as standing for any label in symbolic logic, as soon as we translate it from a symbol into a particular label then it is no longer neutral, the labels and the logical relationships have become tangled before we can start.

(It is a bit like 2 + 3 = 5. As long as the numbers remain just numbers, we can do the sum without any problem. But if we start thinking of the '2' as 'two apples' and the '3' as 'three unicorns' it stops being a sum and '5' no longer works as an answer)

Just my opinion mind.

And mine. Or rather, this is stuff I have picked up from Russell and Wittgenstein and that lot.

[Immanuel Can]

I might see a million white swans, then on the next occasion see a black one, and from then on see nothing but black ones. There is no rule that says this is less likely than any other pattern.

This is partly true.

You're right to say that it would not be true for us to think that probability ever eliminates the outliers. There are always possibilities, no matter how slim, that a hypothesis will turn out to be falsified by the next case. A black swan might exist, even if all we'd ever seen is white ones, that's true. But given that the world is a system of limited size, it would be more likely to find white swans than black ones, and even more unlikely to find a pink one, or a plaid one. So the induction is still probabilistically useful, even if not airtight. "Plaid" is a very, very unlikely pattern for a swan. Not impossible, perhaps; but very, very unlikely indeed.

I do not think there is any connection between this and logic. Logic doesn't predict anything, it doesn't assert anything.

"Logic" the mechanism has no particular content but its own formal requirements. But propositional logic, logic as applied to the empirical world, does.

Truth and falsity are just values; they do not assert a fact any more than the plus and minus signs in maths.

Actually, they are not just values. They're empirical facts.

Whether you are talking to a male or female right now is not a matter of how I "value" myself, far less of how you do. It's a physical fact, one you may be able to inductively estimate from my manner of discourse or the content thereof, but either way will remain true or false in spite of whatever guess you make.