Why things evolve?

[Terrapin Station]

If his behaviors (including reports of sentience) all reduce to outcomes of cause-effect chains of interacting particles, then it no longer makes sense to interpret his behaviors as autonomous actions which result from subjective experiences.

You'd be assuming that his subjective experiences and autonomous actions are not physical cause-effect chains of interacting particles, for one. If they're the same thing in this case--because that's what those particular materials (that comprise brains) are like when certain processes obtain, then it makes sense to interpret his behavior in both ways.

[OuterLimits]

If his behaviors (including reports of sentience) all reduce to outcomes of cause-effect chains of interacting particles, then it no longer makes sense to interpret his behaviors as autonomous actions which result from subjective experiences.

You'd be assuming that his subjective experiences and autonomous actions are not physical cause-effect chains of interacting particles, for one. If they're the same thing in this case--because that's what those particular materials (that comprise brains) are like when certain processes obtain, then it makes sense to interpret his behavior in both ways.

The "both ways" approach is illogical.

Perhaps you favor the "both ways" approach to lightning - that it is both the result of laws of physics and also, at the same time, the result of an autonomous subjective process going on in the cloud.

The "autonomous" part suggests a source of causation - something that is more than the mere chains of causation acting on a thing and through a thing.

Otherwise, what could autonomous mean?

Either the person, or the cloud, is the sum of blind mathematical forces moving its dumb constituent particles - or else it isn't. It can't be both.

[Terrapin Station]

The "both ways" approach is illogical.

You're using "logical/illogical" in some colloquial way that is pretty vague. So the comment that it's "illogical" doesn't mean much to me.

Perhaps you favor the "both ways" approach to lightning - that it is both the result of laws of physics and also, at the same time, the result of an autonomous subjective process going on in the cloud.

If there were some reasons other than possibility to believe that the physical materials/structures/processes of lightning amounted to consciousness, then that would be the thing to believe. What would those reasons be in your view?

The "autonomous" part suggests a source of causation - something that is more than the mere chains of causation acting on a thing and through a thing.

You could use "autonomous" to refer to "causing, but not caused." Insofar as that goes, there's not really any good reason to buy Laplacean strong, causal determinism, by the way. Laplace's demon was seen as an untenable view a long time ago now.

Otherwise, what could autonomous mean?

It could simply refer to causes originating in a particular domain (such as a person).

Either the person, or the cloud, is the sum of blind mathematical forces moving its dumb constituent particles - or else it isn't. It can't be both.

What's the logical argument for why physical stuff is necessarily "blind" and "dumb"?

[OuterLimits]

You're using "logical/illogical" in some colloquial way that is pretty vague. So the comment that it's "illogical" doesn't mean much to me.

Seeking causes. If you found one cause that accounts for all effects, it doesn't make simple logical sense to seek others - except to possibly find a single better explanation.

Again, you stubbornly favor what you have concluded before as being "true" and any alternative explanation provided to you as a mere "possibility".

In one era, God causes everything and the world is flat. Everything else is a mere "possibility".

In another era, God doesn't exist and the world is round. Anything else would be treated skeptical as a possibility requiring further reasons to believe.

I'm all tuckered out.

[Terrapin Station]

Again, you stubbornly favor what you have concluded before as being "true" and any alternative explanation provided to you as a mere "possibility".

This is not at all the case. It depends on whether there are reasons for believing something other than just possibility or not. If there are, we know them or someone who knows the reasons states them--hence why I asked, "What would those reasons be in your view? " I'm expecting an answer to that if you know of one.

I'm all tuckered out.

We're just getting started. I'll learn ya something yet.

[OuterLimits]

Again, you stubbornly favor what you have concluded before as being "true" and any alternative explanation provided to you as a mere "possibility".

This is not at all the case. It depends on whether there are reasons for believing something other than just possibility or not.

You haven't given any - only insisted that they exist and that you have them.

That's called just going with your gut. Very understandable, but you'd better just admit it.

[Terrapin Station]

Again, you stubbornly favor what you have concluded before as being "true" and any alternative explanation provided to you as a mere "possibility".

This is not at all the case. It depends on whether there are reasons for believing something other than just possibility or not.

You haven't given any . . .

For?

[OuterLimits]

This is not at all the case. It depends on whether there are reasons for believing something other than just possibility or not.

You haven't given any . . .

For?

Oh, I get it. You're napping. That makes a lot of sense all of the sudden.

I was referring to "reasons for believing something other than just possibility".

[Terrapin Station]

You haven't given any . . .

For?

Oh, I get it. You're napping. That makes a lot of sense all of the sudden.

I was referring to "reasons for believing something other than just possibility".

So a meta-level justification of this. Okay. I had no idea that's what you meant.

I actually explained this earlier, although maybe I did so a bit sketchily. I'll explain it more systemically here. Take the brain in a vat scenario:

It's possible that we're just brains in vats.

It's also possible that we're not just brains in vats.

That's the case for the vast majority of claims that are possible--it's possible that P, and it's possible that not-P.

So, if we take possibility to be sufficient to warrant belief, for the vast majority of claims, we'd be required (by our adopted principle that possibility is sufficient to warrant belief) to believe both P and not-P.

Obviously, most folks are not going to be comfortable with a requirement to believe both P and not-P--that is, to believe contradictions--for the vast majority of claims. (And this is assuming that it's even really possible to believe contradictions.)

So we need something else to warrant belief in a claim. What else? Reasons for believing a claim that support the claim more than mere possibility does. Or in other words, additional supports. Those sorts of reasons include empirical evidence that supports a claim, and logical argumentation that would support a claim. Those are two of the major epistemic justification avenues, after all--empirical evidence and logical argumentation. Those two factors wouldn't exhaust the reasons, but we do not need to exhaust reasons for a meta-level justification of needing something more than possibility to warrant belief in claims. The problem that if possibility is sufficient, we'd be required to mostly believe contradictions is enough of a justification.

Another way to look at the problem, by the way, is that logical possibility is typically defined by "not being or entailing a contradiction." So if possibility were taken as sufficient to warrant belief, we'd be required to believe mostly things that are not possible, because we'd be required to mostly believe sets of propositions that are contradictory when taken together, and contradictoriness is logical impossibility. (At least outside of paraconsistent logic.)

[OuterLimits]

For?

Oh, I get it. You're napping. That makes a lot of sense all of the sudden.

I was referring to "reasons for believing something other than just possibility".

So we need something else to warrant belief in a claim. What else? Reasons for believing a claim that support the claim more than mere possibility does. Or in other words, additional supports. Those sorts of reasons include empirical evidence that supports a claim, and logical argumentation that would support a claim.

I read and reread that a few times. I must conclude that you agree with me then that there is not a greater number or potency of "additional supports" to the vat possibility or the sensory world possibility? You certainly didn't give any. You are arguing in circles to justify the greater potency of the prior belief in your gut.

[Terrapin Station]

I read and reread that a few times. I must conclude that you agree with me then that there is not a greater number or potency of "additional supports" to the vat possibility or the sensory world possibility? You certainly didn't give any. You are arguing in circles to justify the greater potency of the prior belief in your gut.

If you were looking for reasons to buy the claim that "we are not brains in vats," then when you say, "You didn't give any reasons," and I say, "For?" you should answer, "For not being brains in vats." And then that's what I'd give you reasons for.

So, an additional reason (additional to possibility) for not being a brain in a vat: we have empirical evidence, which you can interpret as phenomenal data, that we are brains inside bodies moving about in worlds that consist of homes and streets and parks and so on.

As I noted, I think you're still interpreting this in the context of certainty. I'm not saying anything about that. I think that concern with certainty is silly. And empirical claims are not provable. So we don't have proof or certainty that we're really brains in human bodies living in houses and so on. That's not at all what I'm talking about. I'm not talking about proof of those things. (And in fact that's my whole point in this laboriously protracted tangent--that proof/certainty are silly to worry about/are missing the point; that we should instead be focusing on reasons we have for believing versus not believing particular things.) All I'm saying is that we have empirical evidence of being brains in human bodies and houses and so on, whether that empirical evidence is just phenomenal data or not. We do have that at least. And that's more than just possibility.

[OuterLimits]

All I'm saying is that we have empirical evidence of being brains in human bodies and houses and so on, whether that empirical evidence is just phenomenal data or not. We do have that at least. And that's more than just possibility.

I have the subjective experience of things, people, and houses.

I just have no "empirical evidence" of what causes me to have those experiences experience (real objects out in the world vs computer code somewhere).

I think we agree that the subjective experience doesn't amount to "empirical evidence". The main error so many people make is in the use of the word "we". If you ask yourself, instead, what do "I" experience and what does that tell "me" about the nature of reality, you might get into the spirit of this.

It seems you are taking the subjective experience and labeling it "empirical evidence". If you would stop doing that (or alternately explain why you are doing it) then things might move along.

[sthitapragya]

Volcanoes and storms turned out to be "zombies" - why not (other) people? I say other people because I have undeniable subjective knowledge of my own experiences.

The other way to ask the question would be "why am I equating people with volcanoes and storms?" Just because you see a similarity does not make something identical.

You might have subjective knowledge of your own experiences but you don't seem to have understood how significantly those experiences have shaped you. Otherwise you would realize that this argument of yours is ridiculous.

going back to your robot analogy. A robot might be programmed to answer like a human but two robots with the same programming will give identical answers. Two humans produced by the same parents will not. The difference is experiences.

[OuterLimits]

Volcanoes and storms turned out to be "zombies" - why not (other) people? I say other people because I have undeniable subjective knowledge of my own experiences.

The other way to ask the question would be "why am I equating people with volcanoes and storms?" Just because you see a similarity does not make something identical.

You might have subjective knowledge of your own experiences but you don't seem to have understood how significantly those experiences have shaped you. Otherwise you would realize that this argument of yours is ridiculous.

going back to your robot analogy. A robot might be programmed to answer like a human but two robots with the same programming will give identical answers. Two humans produced by the same parents will not. The difference is experiences.

I seem to have jumped to a few conclusions. How much scientific education have you had?

[sthitapragya]

Volcanoes and storms turned out to be "zombies" - why not (other) people? I say other people because I have undeniable subjective knowledge of my own experiences.

The other way to ask the question would be "why am I equating people with volcanoes and storms?" Just because you see a similarity does not make something identical.

You might have subjective knowledge of your own experiences but you don't seem to have understood how significantly those experiences have shaped you. Otherwise you would realize that this argument of yours is ridiculous.

going back to your robot analogy. A robot might be programmed to answer like a human but two robots with the same programming will give identical answers. Two humans produced by the same parents will not. The difference is experiences.

I seem to have jumped to a few conclusions. How much scientific education have you had?

By the look of things, a lot more than you, which isn't much to speak of.