The problem of self under materialism

[bahman]

You don't need self to experience fear, love, etc. since all of these emotions are simply mental states that they could be experienced directly. Moreover I think that under materialism what a brain can produce is only sense of self and not a self.

How? What would the self be afraid of if there was nothing to separate it from the rest of the world? What would it love. You don't say "I love me" to a woman you love. You say, "I love you". Without the self there would be no you. Or this. Or that.

The brain does not produce a sense of self. The brain identifies the self. Here. Just read this even though it is a wikipedia page. It does the job. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neural_basis_of_self

Oh well. First thing first: Brain cannot create a self but at most a sense of self if there is any. That is true because self is simply you who could act on a specific occasion or experience something and because self is noting more than a mental state. In simple word, a mental state, self, simply cannot experience another mental state, fear, happiness, etc. How about a sense of self? You experience your emotions directly. There is no need to create any sense of self either.

[Terrapin Station]

I believe that observation itself is not a mental state. You see a tree and recognize it as a tree, relate it to your psyche and then have some feelings regarding the tree. That is the mental state. Of course, this is the definition of mental state I looked up. It could very well be wrong. But if you get the point, initial perception itself is not a mental state. I look up from my lap top and I see a wall and look back down. Now, when I think back, I realize I saw the wall and didn't react to it at all. Our eyes when open see a lot of things which we disregard completely, otherwise I believe we would have an overload. It is only when there is a focus on something that we react to it and that creates the mental state with regard to that thing.

I agree with all of that, but I don't understand how in your view interpretations could be things that are not focused on. For one, interpretations necessarily involve concept application, meaning assignment, etc.

When the eye rests on something, the light that enters the eye is interpreted by the brain and an image is formed. While I am typing, when I focus on my peripheral vision I realize that I can see a part of the room with a lot of stuff in it. It is always there. But when I am focusing on the typing, all I really see the words that I have written. I realize that I can see the blue philosophy now logo all the time but only if I focus on the peripheral vision. Otherwise what I see is the word that I am typing because my focus is there. The brain is interpreting the light and creating the full image but all my emotions and feelings are vested in the words I am typing when I focus on it. I hope this explains what I mean.

It seems like you're using the word "interpretation"/"interpreting" in a way that I wouldn't use it. You're using it to refer to sensory data that you do not focus on. I use "interpretation" for something that necessarily is about meaning, concept-applications, etc.

[sthitapragya]

Oh well. First thing first: Brain cannot create a self but at most a sense of self if there is any. That is true because self is simply you who could act on a specific occasion or experience something and because self is noting more than a mental state. In simple word, a mental state, self, simply cannot experience another mental state, fear, happiness, etc. How about a sense of self? You experience your emotions directly. There is no need to create any sense of self either.

The brain identifies the self. The reality is you are separate from other things. The brain simply identifies that otherwise the body would not be able to survive. The brain creates the mental state of the self, of course. But it is not the mental self which experiences other mental states. It is the brain using the correlation with the mental state of the self that translates the experiences for the body.

You say you experience your emotions directly. How do you identify yourself? Without the sense of self, nothing would be possible to feel. Who would be feeling it?

[sthitapragya]

It seems like you're using the word "interpretation"/"interpreting" in a way that I wouldn't use it. You're using it to refer to sensory data that you do not focus on. I use "interpretation" for something that necessarily is about meaning, concept-applications, etc.

Isn't sensory data the brain's interpretation of external stimuli?

[Terrapin Station]

It seems like you're using the word "interpretation"/"interpreting" in a way that I wouldn't use it. You're using it to refer to sensory data that you do not focus on. I use "interpretation" for something that necessarily is about meaning, concept-applications, etc.

Isn't sensory data the brain's interpretation of external stimuli?

I don't use "interpretation" for that. Also, "sensory data" isn't necessarily referring to brains, in my opinion. It's sensory data prior to making its way to the brain. For example, one's optic nerves send sensory data to the brain. The optic nerves aren't themselves part of the brain. Anyway, I would just call that perceptual data or perceptual information.

[bahman]

The brain identifies the self. The reality is you are separate from other things. The brain simply identifies that otherwise the body would not be able to survive. The brain creates the mental state of the self, of course. But it is not the mental self which experiences other mental states. It is the brain using the correlation with the mental state of the self that translates the experiences for the body.

What is your definition of self?

You say you experience your emotions directly. How do you identify yourself?

How I could possibly identify myself. There is no sensory data which goes to brain in order to allow us to identify our selves. We simply assume that a self exist when we act or experience.

Without the sense of self, nothing would be possible to feel. Who would be feeling it?

That is not correct. Brain can allow us to experience things and act directly. There is no use of self to intervene.

[henry quirk]

"How I could possibly identify myself?"

Look in a mirror.

Pinch yourself.

Think.

Not rocket science.

[bahman]

"How I could possibly identify myself?"

Look in a mirror.

Pinch yourself.

Think.

Not rocket science.

These are simply experiences.

[henry quirk]

It's 'you' experiencing by way of self-direction (you look, you pinch, you think). It's 'you' doing.

[Immanuel Can]

It's 'you' experiencing by way of self-direction (you look, you pinch, you think). It's 'you' doing.

You're onto something here, Henry. Descartes used the same line of thought to prove that the "I" exists: cogito ergo sum, in context, forms the argument like this:


I doubt that I exist.

But if that's so, who is doing the doubting?

Somebody must, or the first statement wouldn't be true; and I know it is, because I'm immediately experiencing the doubt.

So I may not know what exactly "I" am, but I am certain that "I" thing exists.

That's what I know!


Now, unfortunately for Materialism, what Descartes proved with your very common-sensical argument strategy is not the existence of the material realm, but rather the existence of an existential experience, an ideation, an "I."

But subsequent philosophers have pointed out that it is not possible to get from the absolute certainty of an "I" to anything else...certainly not to the material world...without some sort of leap of faith. One simply can't be certain the Material world exists... at least, not absolutely, positively certain the way you can for the "I".

In other words, he proved the existence of a consciousness, not of a body or a material realm outside of it. Descartes skeptical insight leads either to some variety of pure Idealism, or to some sort of Dualism (on the further assumption that the material world does somehow turn out, after all is said and done, actually to exist).

In short, your argument undercuts Materialism.

[henry quirk]

"One simply can't be certain the Material world exists... at least, not absolutely, positively certain the way you can for the "I"."

Hogwash.

Something exists 'outside' of me...this something exists independent of me...how do I know?

Simply: I'm too fuckin' dumb to be imaginin' the world and every-thing and -one in the world.

Now we can dicker about the nature of the something that exists outside of me, that exists independent of me, but to claim I can't know for certain of this outside-of-me, independent-of-me something is lunacy.

And here's the kicker: this something appears to just matter, material, substance, (oh my!) and the interplay thereof.

As far as materialism goes: mine seems to be doin' just fine

[OuterLimits]

[quote="bahman"
So what is it? If we are merely materials, what makes some materials capable of sentience, and other materials not at all?

There must be some additional factor not present in materials qua materials, but what is it?

Good question. Of course, as an individual, I experience consciousness only directly & subjectivity - more intimately than I experience or know about my brain. As far as other brains, I see only matter in them, not subjectivity.

Another related question - you use the word "capable" - this turns out only to make sense in a universe which is not fully deterministic, i.e. which has "agents", sources of causation. In a deterministic world, there are no agents, just regions through which cause-effect chains travel, and thus no capability.

[Immanuel Can]

In a deterministic world, there are no agents, just regions through which cause-effect chains travel, and thus no capability.

Indeed so. That would be the case. But I have never met someone who can actually live (consistently) as a Determinist, so I don't think it's a hypothesis worth entertaining long. After all, if it's true, none of us are really "entertaining" any ideas we were not predetermined to entertain anyway.

[OuterLimits]

In a deterministic world, there are no agents, just regions through which cause-effect chains travel, and thus no capability.

Indeed so. That would be the case. But I have never met someone who can actually live (consistently) as a Determinist, so I don't think it's a hypothesis worth entertaining long. After all, if it's true, none of us are really "entertaining" any ideas we were not predetermined to entertain anyway.

I don't think of it as something you would attempt to "live as" a determinist or a reductionist. It's just a question of what you believe when you're examining something very seriously. One can't "live as" a "very serious" person all the time.

[Immanuel Can]

I don't think of it as something you would attempt to "live as" a determinist or a reductionist. It's just a question of what you believe when you're examining something very seriously. One can't "live as" a "very serious" person all the time.

Who said "serious?" I just said that one can't actually "live" it at all.