The problem of self under materialism

[sthitapragya]

1) Materialism is a system of belief that claims that everything is made of matter or it is matter's state
2) The self is a brain state in materialism
3) Any subject matter turns into a brain state in order to be experienced
4) This means that the self (brain state) experiences another brain state (subject matter) in materialism which this is absurd
5) This means that the self cannot be a brain state

4) does not make any sense. The self just customizes the subject matter to its own subjective interpretation. The self does not experience 'another' brain state.

(4) does make sense. What is the function of "self"? You are simply experiencing things (brain states) by your "self".

By the way what do you mean with the bold part?

No, it does not. The function of self is to allow one to distinguish itself from another. Otherwise, you would not be able to see that the hungry tiger coming very quickly towards you is not you. Self is a construct of the brain. Brain creates a perspective of what it experiences. The perspective is created from the reference frame of the body the brain is contained it. The brain understands that the body it is contained in is separate from the rest of the world. If it did not, there would be nothing it could protect from harm and nothing it needed to keep alive. Viola. You have the self and others.

[Terrapin Station]

Your syntax here is perplexing: you seem to be saying "Mind is neither a mystery nor an illusion." That can't be right.

Why not? Because it seems to be a big mystery to you?

presumably by explaining it....

Sure, let's give the criteria for what counts as an explanation, and make sure that the criteria work for everything that you'd agree is presently explained. For example, if you believe that things like photosynthesis, crystallization, virus replication, beach erosion, comet tails, etc. etc. are presently explainable, make sure that your stated criteria for what counts as an explanation fit what you count as an explanation for each of those things.

[bahman]

What seems like a problem is rather the odd conception of needing one mental state to be something that experiences other mental states. Mental states ARE experiences. Why would you think that you need one to be a "thing" that then experiences other mental states? What would be the motivation for positing something like that?

That is you who has certain experience. You never say that experience happen instead you say I experience. What is the use of this sense of self?

The problem is that there is a difference between sense of self and self.

No. The problem is that you have a false belief about that

I don't think so.

[Immanuel Can]

...make sure that your stated criteria for what counts as an explanation fit what you count as an explanation for each of those things.

And what exactly are the "criteria" for what "counts as an explanation" of sentience, in your view? List them for us, as you purport to have an insight on that.

[bahman]

4) does not make any sense. The self just customizes the subject matter to its own subjective interpretation. The self does not experience 'another' brain state.

(4) does make sense. What is the function of "self"? You are simply experiencing things (brain states) by your "self".

By the way what do you mean with the bold part?

No, it does not. The function of self is to allow one to distinguish itself from another. Otherwise, you would not be able to see that the hungry tiger coming very quickly towards you is not you. Self is a construct of the brain. Brain creates a perspective of what it experiences. The perspective is created from the reference frame of the body the brain is contained it. The brain understands that the body it is contained in is separate from the rest of the world. If it did not, there would be nothing it could protect from harm and nothing it needed to keep alive. Viola. You have the self and others.

There is not really any use for sense of self/self. You see a tiger then scape. Moreover, in (4) we are discussing the fact that that is the self who experiences certain things and this is problematic since self is a mental state too.

[Terrapin Station]

That is you who has certain experience. You never say that experience happen instead you say I experience. What is the use of this sense of self?

Wait, is that supposed to be an answer for what the motivation would be for positing that there are mental states that are effectively "things'" that then "experience other mental states"?

I'm asking because it doesn't seem to be an answer to that.

The answer should go something like, "The motivation for positing that there are mental states that are effectively 'things' that then 'experience other mental states' is_______________" and then you fill in the blank.

I don't think so.

I do.

[Terrapin Station]

...make sure that your stated criteria for what counts as an explanation fit what you count as an explanation for each of those things.

And what exactly are the "criteria" for what "counts as an explanation" of sentience, in your view? List them for us, as you purport to have an insight on that.

You're the person asking for explanations and claiming that there aren't any for some things, while presumably accepting that there are explanations for a whole bunch of other things.

I don't formulate any argument on the idea of explanations, because I think that what counts as an explanation conventionally is extremely vague and that arguments hinging on whether there are explanations for something or not are typically red herrings. They're convenient red herrings, because what almost no one does is say, "Wait a minute--just what are the criteria for an explanation anyway, so that the things you accept as explained fit the criteria?"

Explanations really seem to be highly subjective. They seem to amount to "What S is comfortable counting as an equivalence description or causal description of some (aspect of a) phenomena," and that seems to be all there is to them on a general level that would be consistent with any given S accepting all of the explanations they do and rejecting everything they say doesn't have an explanation.

One upshot of this is that if some S isn't comfortable accepting anything as an equivalance or causal description of some aspect of a phenomena, then that S can say that the phenomena in question has no explanation, regardless of any putative explanation offered. What it really tells us something about is the person's psychological comfort.

So I don't do any arguments where "explanation" is a hinge of any sort for a position, and even outside of that, I don't really parse anything in terms of explanations. I think the whole idea of them is questionable.

[bahman]

That is you who has certain experience. You never say that experience happen instead you say I experience. What is the use of this sense of self?

Wait, is that supposed to be an answer for what the motivation would be for positing that there are mental states that are effectively "things'" that then "experience other mental states"?

That is the subject of OP. We know that self is mental state and created by brain. That is however self which experience other things which themselves are mental states hence we have a problem.

I'm asking because it doesn't seem to be an answer to that.

The answer should go something like, "The motivation for positing that there are mental states that are effectively 'things' that then 'experience other mental states' is_______________" and then you fill in the blank.

I have no idea what you want me to do. Do you want me to fill the blank part with something?

[henry quirk]

all Materialism is "reductive."

No, Mannie, not 'all' materialism is reductive. Mine, for example, is only a simple observation, that being 'only matter, and the interplay of matter, exists'. I'm not eliminating or reducing, only making a statement based on personal observation and assessment.

As for 'eliminative materialism': it, as position, denies 'belief' so right there I know it's hooey. I believe a great many things, my believing is what I 'do', is real (as I am).

[Terrapin Station]

The answer should go something like, "The motivation for positing that there are mental states that are effectively 'things' that then 'experience other mental states' is_______________" and then you fill in the blank.

I have no idea what you want me to do. Do you want me to fill the blank part with something?

Yes, with your motivation for positing what I described there.

[bahman]

The answer should go something like, "The motivation for positing that there are mental states that are effectively 'things' that then 'experience other mental states' is_______________" and then you fill in the blank.

I have no idea what you want me to do. Do you want me to fill the blank part with something?

Yes, with your motivation for positing what I described there.

I have no idea what should I put there.

[Immanuel Can]

You're the person...

Heeeere we go! Ad hominem.

Let's not.

Explanations really seem to be highly subjective...I think the whole idea of them is questionable.

So, in the interest of understanding you:

Minds are just brains.

But you don't have an explanation for why or how.

And you do believe in "the mind"?

And you don't believe in explanations.

And Materialism is the explanation.

Ummmm...are you going to help me with that at all?

[Terrapin Station]

If you're going to hinge an argument on the idea of explanations, why would you shy away from giving the criteria you require for something to count as an explanation?

Also, just fyi, every time you bring up the "explanation" argument I'm going to bring this up (I do this whenever anyone brings it up), because I think this is an important issue that everyone ignores . . . and unfortunately no one who relies on "explanation" arguments ever wants to examine it.

[Terrapin Station]

I have no idea what you want me to do. Do you want me to fill the blank part with something?

Yes, with your motivation for positing what I described there.

I have no idea what should I put there.

Okay. Well, you have a reason for positing that there's a mental sense of self that effectively becomes a "thing" that can then itself experience other mental states, right? What is that reason?

[Immanuel Can]

No, Mannie, not 'all' materialism is reductive.

But by definition, it is. It universally reduces all explanation to "materials." At the end of the day, whatever "mind" is it's going to turn out to be some kind of "materials," "material processes," or "material dynamics." But it's all reducible to "materials."

Now, how does Materialism "know" it is? It claims to "know" because it's not prepared to accept the existence of anything else but that. Not because it has any facts. Not because we possess the relevant data, if such there is. Not because it has proof of anything, or even a credible theory: just because it does not want there to be anything else.


A priori and completely gratuitously, Materialism is not prepared to believe in anything but itself.

It's stubbornly, unintellectually reductional.

You're not; but it is. So why ride that horse?

Mine, for example, is only a simple observation, that being 'only matter, and the interplay of matter, exists'.

That isn't an "observation" at all. "Observations" are drawn from observables. And what "observable" pertains to the materiality of mind?

How do we know there IS only matter? Most people live as if there is much more. Even Materialists fall in love, make promises, follow morals, claim to honour reason, think they have a self, believe in human rights, and so forth. But this is utterly inconsistent with Materialism. Materialism offers no warrant for honouring, loving or worshipping immaterial phenomena of any kind...it says they do not really exist except as artificially privileged "materials."

Is not the absurdity and self-contradiction of such an assertion a really clear "observable"? I think so.

As for 'eliminative materialism': it, as position, denies 'belief' so right there I know it's hooey. I believe a great many things, my believing is what I 'do', is real (as I am).

But "I" is a metaphysical concept. It's no part of Materialism. "Body" is all Materialism knows, really, the contingent disposition of lumps of meat, spurts of electricity and cascades of coagulant fluid -- now provisionally called "Henry," but soon to be called cosmic dust.

So when you say "I believe," do you mean anything more than "the materials arbitrarily designated as 'Henry' happen to be in this or that position at a given time"?