The problem of self under materialism

[bahman]

That is the problem of materialism. The sense of self is generated by brain processes. You don't really have any self.

Why isn't a sense of self generated by brain processes what the self is?

I don't understand your question. Did you mean that "why is a sense of self generated by brain processes?"

Self: A person's essential being that distinguishes them from others, especially considered as the object of introspection or reflexive action.

[Immanuel Can]

Mannie,

Like I told bahman: you're wrong.

Not seein' how materialism (as I understand it) denies mind since I am mind/self/I and I'm real, material, organic, chemical, electrical...I certainly don't deny 'me'.

No, I understand. But when you make a difference between "me" and "meat," that is, between Henry and hamburger, or between mind and brain, you're no longer a Materialist.

For a materialist, mind IS brain, end of story; because "mind" cannot really exist. It just has to be some kind of illusion thrown up by the "meat," but no kind of thing-in-itself.

[Terrapin Station]

bahman, you'd say that the "sense of self" that is identical to a particular set of brain states isn't actually one's self, right?

The question, however, is why wouldn't that be what the self is?

[Terrapin Station]

Mannie,

Like I told bahman: you're wrong.

Not seein' how materialism (as I understand it) denies mind since I am mind/self/I and I'm real, material, organic, chemical, electrical...I certainly don't deny 'me'.

No, I understand. But when you make a difference between "me" and "meat," that is, between Henry and hamburger, or between mind and brain, you're no longer a Materialist.

For a materialist, mind IS brain, end of story; because "mind" cannot really exist. It just has to be some kind of illusion thrown up by the "meat," but no kind of thing-in-itself.

It's not an illusion (at least not to materialists who are not eliminative materialists). It's simply what the "meat" is when one is the "meat." In other words, it's those particular materials/structures/set-of-processes from the perspective of being those materials/structures/set-of-processes. There's nothing illusory about that.

[henry quirk]

What particular strain of materialism are you guys lambasting? Insofar as I'm aware, there's nuthin' about the simple notion "nothing exists except matter and its movements and modifications" that obligates me to deny my own I-ness (to accept that 'I', the man typing these words one-fingered on an Ipad, am an illusion, a spook, a figment of my own illusory imagination). So there must be some particular version you two find stinky and ugly like an old cat turd found under the sofa.

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"eliminative materialists"

I had to look it up (and thanks to Terrapin for the unintended heads up).

Is this eliminative or reductive materialism the cause of all this hub-bub?

[bahman]

bahman, you'd say that the "sense of self" that is identical to a particular set of brain states isn't actually one's self, right?

Yes.

The question, however, is why wouldn't that be what the self is?

Because it would be redundant for brain to create a self and then create a sense of self, what we experience, from what self is. We without doubt can experience stuff around us. This means that brain is in charge of creating the experience. What we need to act in different occasion is a sense of self.

[Terrapin Station]

Because it would be redundant for brain to create a self and then create a sense of self,

What in the world are you talking about? The only thing redundant there is that you're writing the same thing twice. Just like someone could write, "Because it's rundundant to build the Empire State Building and then Build the Empire State Building." Sure, but no one is doing that. The only thing reundant is that you're writing "build the Empire State Building" twice.

There is a set of brain states that is a "sense of self."

That's all that one's self (in the relevant connotation) IS.

You're saying that the self is something other than that. Why are you insisting that it's something other than that?

[Immanuel Can]

"eliminative materialists"

I had to look it up (and thanks to Terrapin for the unintended heads up).

Is this eliminative or reductive materialism the cause of all this hub-bub?

My argument would be this: Eliminative Materialism is a faith position, not science, since it tries to tell us what "will be discovered" that, by the Materialists' own admission, has not been discovered. That's speculative at best, and a mere naive wish at worst.

And all Materialism is "reductive."

[Immanuel Can]

There's nothing illusory about that.

here IS no "me"; there is just the meat. And the "me" is waved away as a meat-state. We may perhaps say that's not "illusory," but what else can we call it when the explanation denies the existence of it as anything to-be-explained?

[bahman]

Because it would be redundant for brain to create a self and then create a sense of self,

What in the world are you talking about? The only thing redundant there is that you're writing the same thing twice. Just like someone could write, "Because it's rundundant to build the Empire State Building and then Build the Empire State Building." Sure, but no one is doing that. The only thing reundant is that you're writing "build the Empire State Building" twice.

There is a set of brain states that is a "sense of self."

That's all that one's self (in the relevant connotation) IS.

You're saying that the self is something other than that. Why are you insisting that it's something other than that?

What I am saying is that sense of self is different from self. What is produced in the brain is sense of self and not self. By the way, what is the definition of self in your opinion?

[Terrapin Station]

There's nothing illusory about that.

here IS no "me"; there is just the meat. And the "me" is waved away as a meat-state. We may perhaps say that's not "illusory," but what else can we call it when the explanation denies the existence of it as anything to-be-explained?

One doesn't need to believe that something is a profound mystery to believe that it's not an illusion.

[Terrapin Station]

What I am saying is that sense of self is different from self.

Right. And the question then is, why are you saying that (or insisting it rather)?

If one believes there's no difference, then it's hardly illusory, right?

[bahman]

What I am saying is that sense of self is different from self.

Right. And the question then is, why are you saying that (or insisting it rather)?

The problem is that sense of self (or even self if it is possible) in materialism is only a mental state and it cannot experience another mental state as it is illustrated in OP.

If one believes there's no difference, then it's hardly illusory, right?

The problem is that there is a difference between sense of self and self.

[Terrapin Station]

What seems like a problem is rather the odd conception of needing one mental state to be something that experiences other mental states. Mental states ARE experiences. Why would you think that you need one to be a "thing" that then experiences other mental states? What would be the motivation for positing something like that?

The problem is that there is a difference between sense of self and self.

No. The problem is that you have a false belief about that

[Immanuel Can]

There's nothing illusory about that.

here IS no "me"; there is just the meat. And the "me" is waved away as a meat-state. We may perhaps say that's not "illusory," but what else can we call it when the explanation denies the existence of it as anything to-be-explained?

One doesn't need to believe that something is a profound mystery to believe that it's not an illusion.

Your syntax here is perplexing: you seem to be saying "Mind is neither a mystery nor an illusion." That can't be right. Do you maybe mean, "One does not need to believe it is an illusion, but may rather call it a profound mystery?"

Because otherwise you'd be implying you personally could "demystify" it somehow, presumably by explaining it....